Last time we spoke about the fall of Shaggy Ridge, some hardcore patrolling on New Britain and major planning for the invasion of the Marshalls. The Australians seized the Kankeiri saddle, the Prothero’s, Crater Hill and countless other features until finally at last the Japanese had been dislodged from the area. Meanwhile over on New Britain, the Americans were expanding their perimeter and unleashing wave after wave of patrols, trying to figure out where the Japanese were concentrating. It was tireless work, without any good maps in a horribly difficult climate with menacing terrain. The commanders of the central, south and southwest pacific all met to finalize big plans, that would now involved the invasion of the Marshall islands. It seems Dougey boy MacArthur was delivered some setbacks for his grand advance to the Philippines, as the Central Pacific was stealing the drivers seat.  This episode is Operation Flintlock: The Invasion of the Marshalls  Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  In spite of General Douglas MacArthur’s attempted hijacking of the strategic control over the Pacific campaign, by trying to have the US Navy’s Central Pacific campaign pretty much aborted, it did not pan out. MacArthur had made multiple arguments against their Central plans, stating Nimitz choice of route was “time consuming and expensive in our naval power and shipping” which was really a self-serving argument flying in the face of actual evidence. MacArthur pointed out all the problems faced during the invasion of Tarawa, such as the high casualty rates. The Marines had jumped 2500 miles from New Zealand to hit Tarawa at the cost of 4 days of fighting. Yet Australian soldiers and American GI’s would take nearly a year and a half, through nearly continuously fighting to make the 300 mile journey from Port Moresby to Madang. Operation Cartwheel proved to be extremely laborious, time consuming and costly in terms of materials and men. But from MacArthur's point of view the lives lost were largely Australian and perhaps as some Historians might point out “were politically expendable to a person like MacArthur”. Kind of a hit point to make, that one came from Francis Pike’s Hirohito’s War, go after him not me folks. It was also self evident the supply lines of ships from the west coast of the US to Nimitz Pacific fleet and their Marines, some 5000 or so miles from San Diego to Kwajalein atoll, was shorter than the long route going from the US west coast to Australia then to New Guinea, a colossal 9108 mile trip. By mid 1943 the supply line to MacArthur was nearly double that of Nimitz in distance with increased dangers of IJN submarines prowling about, though as I have said numerous times, the IJN only really figured out the capability of merchant hitting in the late years of the war.  Well in spite of all of that MacArthur gave Brigadier-General Frederick Osborn and MacArthurs trusty lackey Sutherland going to Washington to fight on his behalf against the Joint Chiefs of Staff, they elected to commit themselves to the Central Pacific thrust. It had been a strategic decision based on logistical and strategy…well logic? The 1943 Cairo conference ended just as Tarawa was captured, thus driving the nail in the coffin so to say. The next target on the way to the Marianas was thus the Marshall islands, way back in the old days they were property of the German empire, that Japan had stolen with ease. Ever since 1938, the Japanese banned any non Japanese ships from the region, thus US intelligence was pretty lax on them. MAGIC intercepts began to give clues as to how the Japanese deployed their troops on the Marshall islands however. This led the allied war planners to leave some “to wither on the vine” like Wotje. It was decided the main target would be Kwajalein. The 380 mile lagoon made it one of the largest in the world, quite beautiful also. Some like Rear Admiral Turner, questioned the risks of going straight into the heart of the Marshall islands, calling the move “too aggressive and dangerous and reckless!” But Nimitz and Spruance were adamant, well this was before Tarawa. The bitter lessons learnt on Tarawa prompted Spruance to determine that “Kwajalein would be struck with violent, overwhelming force and swiftly applied”. For the invasion of the Marshalls, codenamed Operation Flintlock, the first phase was to be the capture of Kwajalein, earmarked by General Corlett’s 7th division against the southern group of islands in the atoll that included Kawjalein. General Schmidt’s 4th marine division would capture Roi-Namur and the northern islands in the atoll. Furthermore prior to these attacks, Colonel Sheldon’s Sundance Landing Force would hit Majuro Atoll. Because of the experiences gained during the invasion of the Gilberts, a far greater quantity and variety of amphibious equipment had been made available to the Central Pacific forces. Now the attack force commanders would not have to rely on the faulty communications systems of battleships to maintain proper radio liaison between ship and shore and ship and air. Two newly constructed headquarters ships, each equipped with the latest developments in radio and radar gear and unburdened by gunfire support duties, were provided for the operation. Several improvements were also made in the techniques of softening up the enemy defenses before the first troops touched shore. The US Navy changed their bombardment tactics based on the experience at Tarawa and now used armor piercing shells and fired from closer ranges. These all added would increase the quantity and accuracy of firepower to be delivered before the invasion. To provide a last-minute saturation of the beaches, two new, or rather modified, forms of older types of amphibious equipment were also introduced. The first of these was the amphibian tank LVT-A, which was just the standard amphibian tractor equipped with extra armor plating and mounting a 37-mm gun housed in a turret. The second was the LCI gunboat, an LCI converted into a gunboat by the addition of three 40-mm guns and banks of 4.5-inch rocket launchers.  Admiral Turner’s plan called for extensive pre-landing bombardment both from surface ships and from aircraft. Most of the Marshall’s airfields had been successfully neutralized by Admiral Hoover’s aircraft over the prior months. To complete preliminary operations, Admiral Mitschers Fast Carrier force launched a heavy strike on January 29 and 30th. On the 30th, eight of Mitschers battleships, accompanied by about a dozen destroyers, were to deliver a dawn bombardment against Kwajalein Island and Roi-Namur. The object was to destroy aircraft, coast defense guns, and personnel, and to render the airfields temporarily useless. At the same time, two advance units of cruisers and destroyers from Turner's task force were to bombard the airfields at Wotje and Maloelap. These dawn bombardments were to be followed by air strikes against each of the objectives. After the strikes were completed the surface ships would again take up the bombardment and maintain a steady fire until about noon. Then on the 31st, initial landings would begin against Carlson (Enubuj), lying  northwest of Kwajalein Island; Ivan (Mellu) and Jacob (Ennuebing) Islands, lying southwest of Roi-Namur. For southern Kwajalein, three other small islands in addition to Carlson were to be captured during the preparatory phase of the operation. These were Carlos (Ennylabegan), Carter (Gea), and Cecil (Ninni) Islands, all lying north of Carlson. On some of these islands artillery could be emplaced for the main assault. On February 1st, battleships, cruisers and destroyers would conduct a monster bombardment in support of the main landings and air strikes would begin 45 minutes before the men hit the beaches. There would be a cease to the carnage 25 minutes before to allow the smaller islands to deploy their artillery to help support the main assault. With this tremendous bombardment by aircraft, surface ships, and artillery, all to be executed before the first troops hit the shore line, it was hoped that the bitter experience of Tarawa would not be repeated. For the attack on Kwajalein Island, Corlett decided to land on a narrow front on the beaches at the western extremity, as the reef and surf conditions were more favorable there. He had at his disposal 79 amphibian tanks and 95 amphibian tractors that would transport the first 4 waves to hit the southern beaches. The first with great secrecy would be a pre-dawn landing against Carter and Cecil islands, by one platoon of the 7th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop. The reconnaissance troop was embarked on two high-speed transports (APD's), along with two platoons of Company B, 111th Infantry. After this the 17th regiment led by Col. Wayne C. Zimmerman would land on Carlos and Carlson islands. The 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry, would hit Carlos while the 2nd Battalion, 17th Infantry, hit Carlson. The 3rd Battalion, 17th Infantry was to be held in reserve, ready to go to the aid of either landing team. While the capture of Carlson Island was in progress, the division artillery, loaded for the most part on amphibious trucks, was to debark and proceed to a rendezvous area offshore. Upon a signal from the commander of the Carlson landing force, the guns were to be moved ashore and into position. This was all done to secure General Arnold's artillery, whom on the night of the D-day along the 145th field artillery battalions would deliver interdictory fire from Carlson on all the principal fortified areas of Kwajalein Island and place counter-battery fire on any enemy artillery that might be emplaced on Burton. They were also to fire general support missions for the infantry. Finally, the 184th on the left and 32nd Regiment on the right would land abreast and advance up the axis of the island. If things looked like they were going well enough and the reserve 17th regiment would not be necessary, they would instead capture the remaining islands of Beverly (South Gugegwe), Berlin (North Gugegwe), Benson, and Bennett (Bigej) Islands in the eastern chain. There was a hell of a lot of fire power they would face as well. On Kwajalein, 4 12.7-cm, dual-purpose twin-mount guns were divided into batteries of 2, one located at each end of the island. Each battery was protected by 7.7-mm. and 13-mm. machine guns along the nearby beaches. Near each gun were 2 150-cm. searchlights. In addition, the northern end of the island was guarded by a twin-mount dual-purpose 13-mm machine gun on the lagoon shore. Several 7.7-mm. machine guns were in position on the western end and other heavy machine guns were scattered about the center of the island, some mounted on wooden sleds for easy movement to critical points. On the ocean shore were 6 8-cm. dual-purpose guns, divided into 2 batteries of 3 guns each. One battery was east of the tank ditch and the other was opposite the center of the airfield. The first had a 360-degree traverse and could fire either to seaward or landward. The other formed the nucleus of a strongpoint composed of a semicircle of rifle pits facing the beach supported by one heavy and one 13-mm. machine gun, and also included an observation tower, a range finder, and a 110-cm. searchlight. 2 other 8-cm. guns were in position on the lagoon shore, and the blockhouse on the main pier (Nob Pier), which jutted out into the lagoon near the northern tip of the island, had a 13-mm. dual-purpose gun on its roof and firing ports on the ground floor allowing machine guns to fire in all directions. For the attack on Roi-Namur, Schmidt's 1st phase was to capture the 5 islets near Roi-Namur. The Ivan Landing Group was commanded by Brig. General James L. Underhill, consisting of the 25th Marines under Col. Samuel C. Cumming; the 14th Marines Artillery and Company D of the 4th Tank Battalion. They would seize Jacon and Ivan islands to allow the 3rd and 4th Battalions of the 14th Marine Regiment artillery to deploy. Then they would hit Albert, Allen and Abraham islands where the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 14th Marine Regiment artillery would deploy. For the main landings Schmidt chose to perform a orthodox amphibious maneuver, simply landing two regiments abreast on a broad front over the lagoon shore. The 23rd marines would hit Roi’s red beach 2 and 3 and the 24th marines would hit Namur’s Green beaches 1 and 2. The 3rd and final phase would see the capture of the remaining islands in the northern Kwajaleins.  Now that was all for the Americans, but what about the defenders? Admiral Akiyama had recently been reinforced with a number of IJA units such as the 3rd South Sea Garrison from Wake; the 1st South Seas detachment from Mille and Jaluit and the 1st Amphibious mobile brigade from Eniwetok. The reinforcements were deployed mostly on the periphery, as Kwajalien, Jaluit, Maloelap and Wotje had sizable naval garrisons already. The hub of the Japanese military in the Marshalls was at Kwajalein and its main air base at Roi. If you pull out a map, which I do hope many of you do during this entire podcast series haha, especially for Burma it gets really confusing, trust me I know your pain. You can see Kwajalein lies far to the west, with Jaluit, Mille, Maloelap and Wotje kind of acting as buffers. If you were a Japanese commander you would most likely assume any invasion attempt would hit outer islands first and leave Kwajalein as the last one. A quote from one commander, Chikataka Nakajima makes this point "There was divided opinion as to whether you would land at Jaluit or Mille. Some thought you would land on Wotje but there were few who thought you would go right to the heart of the Marshalls and take Kwajalein.” The three most heavily defended islands were Roi-Namur, Kwajalein and Burton in that order of strength. The defenses of Roi-Namur were organized around a series of seven strong points, 4 on Roi and 3 on Namur, all on the ocean side. Starting from the southwest tip of Roi, the first was located along the southern shore of the west coast. The second and third were to the south and north of the northwest taxi circle. The fourth was on both sides of the wire and stone barriers next to the northeast taxi circle. The fifth, sixth, and seventh were on the northwest, north, and east tips of Namur, respectively. From the lagoon side the approaches were covered mostly by nothing heavier than 7.7-mm. machine guns. Wire entanglements were found at two points—on the beach around the northeast taxi circle on Roi, and on the narrow bit of land connecting Roi with Namur. The beach around the northeast taxi circle also boasted a tank obstacle in the form of large rocks jutting out of a rock wall. Anti-tank ditches had been dug throughout the two islands. On Kwajalein, there was a concrete sea wall along most of the ocean shore and around the northern and western ends of the island. The section at the northern end had posts set into it, probably to act as a tank barricade. East of the area cleared for the airfield was a tank ditch extending halfway across the island, and three smaller tank ditches ran between the ocean shore and the road in the vicinity of the airfield. The lagoon shore was protected by a two-strand barbed-wire fence at the water's edge. The large tank ditch was supported by trenches, rifle pits, and machine guns. At this point in the war, the Japanese tactical doctrine still stressed beach-line defense that would hinder a proper defense in depth. The Japanese doctrine to fortify beaches would gradually change as a result of the Gilbert-Marshall campaign. IJA General HQ research groups abandoned beach defenses for internal defenses to thwart naval and aerial bombardments, but also to favor concealed positions to thwart flamethrower and grenade attacks. Actually to side track just a bit, there is a book I rather like “The Battle for Okinawa” by Colonel Hiromichi Yahara. If you are interested in how some of the Japanese commanders decided to change to defense in depth, Colonel Yahara was a good case study and the book is interesting. Akiyama had roughly 5000 men on Kwajalein. 930 of these were IJA units, the 1st Company, 3rd Mobile Battalion, plus 2nd and 4th Companies of the 2nd Mobile Battalion of the 1st Amphibious Mobile Brigade. The IJA forces were led by Colonel Asu Tarokichi, commander of the 2nd Mobile Battalion. There also was 250 SNLF of the Yokosuka 4th; 1150 naval troops from the 61st Guard Unit and Akiyama’s headquarters. The rest were not considered combat effective, mostly comprising laborers and logistical units. Most of these units were at Kwajalein itself, with some 345 troops and over 2000 air personnel of the 24th Air Flotilla at Roi-Namur. Three lookout stations were also established on Bennett, Carter and Carlos Islands while an air unit of the 952nd and 160 men defended Burton. By January 20th, all the preparations were complete in the Hawaiian islands for the grand invasion of the Marshalls. 2 days later, the task forces departed. At dawn on the 29th, the 4 task groups of Task Force 58 and the Neutralization Group arrived to their first assembly positions Aircraft carriers Enterprise, Yorktown, and Belleau Wood successfully neutralized Taroa while while Essex, Intrepid, and Cabot bombed and strafed Roi-Namur. Aircraft from Essex, Intrepid, and Cabot bucked northeasterly winds to bomb and strafe once more the important airfield at that base. Ninety-two enemy planes were based on Roi airfield when the attack developed. Command of the air was seized by American planes at the outset and after 8am, no enemy planes were seen airborne over Roi-Namur. Numerous hits were made on runways, hangars, fuel dumps, and gun positions. Additionally, carriers Saratoga, Princeton, and Langley sent multiple strikes against Wotje, managing to neutralize its airfield. Finally Admiral Sherman’s carriers Cowpens, Monterey, and Bunker Hill launched strikes against Kwajalein. Her airfield and buildings were bombed on the first strike, then she was subjected to strafing and bombing. During the evening Admiral Sherman's group moved northwestward toward Eniwetok to be in position to launch an attack at dawn of D minus 1. It was not just the navy that smashed the Marshalls, the Army also got a taste. At Kwajalein one flight of seven B-24s dropped fifteen tons of bombs on Roi-Namur and three more tons on Kwajalein Island during the morning and early afternoon. As the carrier planes retired at dusk another seven heavy bombers arrived for a night attack, dropping twenty tons of bombs on Kwajalein Island. At Wotje, flying through heavy overcast, one flight of three B-24s dropped seven tons of bombs, causing fires and damaging the runways. A few hours later a flight of nine B-25s dropped three tons of bombs on the island in a low-level attack and strafed and sank a small cargo vessel in the lagoon. During this late attack carrier planes from the task force mistakenly intercepted the B-25s and shot down two before it was realized they were American planes. Maloelap, Jaluit, and Mille also received land-based attacks during the day. At Taroa, two and a half tons of bombs were dropped by B-25s, which then joined carrier planes in strafing the island. At Jaluit, attack bombers and fighters dropped seven tons of bombs and afterwards strafed the island. Mille was covered all day by twenty fighters, flying in flights of four. Planes that had been scheduled to strike these targets but that were unable to get through because of weather or mechanical difficulty flew over Mille on the way back to American bases in the Gilberts and dropped their bomb loads on the islands of that atoll.The Neutralization group shelled Wotje and Maloelap, leaving the last operational airfield on Eniwetok. Sherman’s fighters and bombers hit the atoll during the morning of the 30th, destroying nearly all its buildings and runways, though a few aircraft managed to escape. The rest of the day would see more carrier strikes and surface bombardments against the Marshalls’ atolls while the landing forces made their final approach towards Kwajalein. Meanwhile, Admiral Hill’s attack group detached from the main task force, heading for Majuro Atoll. At 11pm 1st Lt. Harvey C. Weeks led a recon platoon on rubber boats to Calalin island, becoming the first Americans to land on any territory the Japanese had possessed prior to WW2. The rest of the recon company led by Captain James Jones landed on Dalap, Uliga and Darrit Islands. Finally, Majuro Island itself. They would find the Japanese had abandoned the atoll perhaps over a year earlier. At the same time Sheldon’s landing force occupied Darrit and Dalop without any opposition and the 1st defense battalion soon arrived to take up garrison duties. To the northwest, the Destroyer transports Overton carrying Troop A and Manley carrying Troop B raced past Turners task force to hit Carter and Cecil islands. Troop B successfully landed on Carter at 6:20am, rapidly securing the island after killing her 20 defenders. Troop A accidently landed on Chauncey Islet at 5:45am and upon realizing they had landed on the wrong island, they left a detachment of 61 infantrymen and then re-embarked at 9:29am. Finally, Troop A landed on Cecil at 12:35pm, finding zero opposition there. On Chauncey, however, the Americans discovered a force of over 100 Japanese hidden in the islet’s center. Half of the enemy force was killed but the Americans would eventually have to withdraw after losing two men. The desperate Japanese would continue to resist until eventually being annihilated a few days later. With the lagoon’s entrance secured, Colonel Zimmerman transferred his two assault battalions to amphibious tractors and sent them towards Carlos and Carlson Islands.  While Kwajalein, Burton and everly islands were under heavy bombardment, the 1st battalion, 17th regiment landed on Carlos unopposed at 9:10am. From there they quickly attacked the 25 man garrison. To their south, the 2nd battalion landed on the northeastern end of Carlson at 9:12am under some heavy artillery fire coming out of Kwajalein that was quickly suppressed by air and naval bombardment. The men expected fierce resistance, but the Japanese fled, leaving 21 Koreans to be taken prisoner. Honestly pretty good outcome for those poor Koreans. Then General Arnold landed his 5 artillery battalions who got their guns ready by nightfall. Further north, Brigadier Generals James Underhill began operations against Ivan and Jacob islands to secure even more artillery positions. After the preparatory bombardment the marines got aboard their amtracs with a lot of difficulty. Before the operation, landing team commanders had estimated that their debarkation interval would be about sixty minutes, but this did not pan out. Once the troops were loaded in their assigned landing craft they had to make their way through choppy seas to the LST area for transfer to amphibian tractors. At this juncture all semblance of control broke down. Landing craft were about two hours late in reaching the LST area. Choppy seas and a headwind were partly responsible for the delays. Boat control officers left the tractors in frantic search for the landing craft and failed to return in time to lead the LVTs to the line of departure. Tractors were damaged or swamped while milling around their mother LSTs waiting for the troops to show up. Radios in LVTs were drowned out. One LST weighed anchor and shifted position before completing the disembarkation of all its tractors. The elevator on another broke down so that those LVTs loaded on the topside deck could not be disembarked on time. In short, almost every conceivable mishap occurred to delay and foul up what, under even the best of circumstances, was a complicated maneuver. Despite the issues, by 9:17 the amtracs were surging forward while LCI gunboats fired rocket barrages. B Company of the 25th marines hit Jacobs at 9:52, easily overrunning the island within 15 minutes. Ivan island had a much rougher surf alongside bad reef conditions that slowed down the amtracs. Company D, 4th light tank battalion managed to land at 9:55am, with Company C of the 25th marines landing on the opposite side of the shore at 10:15am followed by Company A. They linked up and began advancing inland, rapidly destroying a token defense force and securing the entire island by 11:45. During the early afternoon, the 3rd battalion, 14th marines landed at Jacob Island aboard LVT’s, while the 4th battalion landed on Ivan aboard LCMs. At this point the lagoon entrance was secured, so the 2nd and 3rd battalions, 25th marines re-embarked to land on Albert and Allen. Rough seas delayed them, but the marines were once again on the move. LCI gunboats performed rocket barrages as the 3rd battalion landed on Albert at 3:12, while the 2nd battalion hit Allen 3 minutes later. Both islets were quickly cleared, while G Company landed on the unoccupied Andrew island. The 3rd battalion then assaulted Abraham island at 6:24, securing it by 7:15. With that, the Americans had secured a chain surrounding Roi-Namur and the first phase of the operation was done. Now the Americans would perform the main landings. Late during the night, Arnolds artillery and Turner’s warships bombarded Kwajalein and Burton while 3 destroyers kept up a barrage upon Roi-Namur. Under the cover of darkness, frogmen of Underwater Demolition Team 1 scouted Roi-Namur and UDT 2 scouted Kwajalein’s beaches. These men made sure there were no obstacles or mines in the way of their landing objectives. This was the first use of UDT’s during the Pacific War. Early on February 1st Kwajalein was hit with an unprecedented bombardment. During one period two shells per second were hitting specific targets or areas in the path of the assault troops. The 14-inch naval shells of the battleships were most effective in piercing and destroying reinforced concrete structures. From the cruisers and destroyers, 8-inch and 5-inch shells ploughed into bunkers and tore up the thick growth of pandanus and palm trees. All together that day, nearly 7,000 14-inch, 8-inch, and 5-inch shells were fired by supporting naval vessels at Kwajalein Island alone, and the bulk of these were expended against the main beaches before the landing. The field artillery on Carlson also joined in the preparatory fire. Its total ammunition expenditure against Kwajalein was about 29,000 rounds. The results of all this expenditure of explosives were devastating. The damage was so intensive that it is impossible to determine the relative effectiveness of the three types of bombardment. The area inland of Red Beaches was reduced almost completely to rubble. Concrete emplacements were shattered, coconut trees smashed and flattened, the ground pock-marked with large craters, coral ripped to splinters. From the carriers Enterprise, Yorktown, Belleau Wood, Manila Bay, Corregidor, and Coral Sea eighteen dive bombers and fifteen torpedo bombers struck the western part of Kwajalein Island while as many fighters strafed the area with machine guns and rockets. All together ninety-six sorties were flown from the carriers in support of the troop landing on Kwajalein Island. As one observer reported, "The entire island looked as if it had been picked up to 20,000 feet and then dropped.” After 36000 rounds of naval gunfire and artillery, along with sizable air attacks, pummeled the island, LCI gunboats were on the move, tossing rockets into the mix. At 9am, Turner unleashing his landing force. Colonel Curtis O’Sullivans 184th regiment headed towards Beach Red 1, while Colonel Marc Logie’s 32nd regiment hit Beach Red 2. Each beach was covered by a strongpoint, though these were mostly obliterated, with only a few pillboxes surviving. Both regiments landed at 9:30am, finding weak opposition, allowing their artillery support to start smashing 200 yards ahead of their positions. The americans were met with light mortars and automatic fire from some surviving pillboxes, but many were able to take shelter behind the wrecked ruins of a seawall. Meanwhile as more Amtracs pulled up they were hampered by wreckage and debris, causing a congestion. The reefs also hindered where they could approach, but by 11:22 the first four waves of both battalions were ashore, all with 15 minutes. They then began to advance inland against light resistance. Logie’s 1st battalion managed to reach the western edge of the west area by 11:30. Meanwhile O’Sullivan’s 3rd Battalion came face to face with a network of several pillboxes still containing live Japanese in spite of the heavy preliminary bombardment. These were silenced in short order in a series of almost simultaneous actions in which many varieties of weapons were used. Two infantrymen of Company K, Pvt. Parvee Rasberry and Pfc. Paul Roper had landed near the left of Red Beach 1 and had run about 25 yards inland when they came under fire from one of the pillboxes in the area. Quickly taking shelter in a shell hole, they started lobbing grenades at the enemy position about fifteen yards ahead. The Japanese merely threw the grenades back and the volley kept up until a flame thrower was brought forward. That, too, proved ineffective; the flames only hit the box and bounced back. Finally, Private Rasberry got out of his foxhole, crawled to within about five yards of the pillbox and threw in a white phosphorus smoke grenade. This flushed several Japanese from their cover into open positions where they could be taken under rifle fire. Those who weren't hit ran back to the pillbox. Rasberry threw white phosphorous grenades until he had none left, by which time about eight of the enemy had been killed. At this juncture, T. Sgt. Graydon Kickul of Company L was able to crawl up to the pillbox and on top of it. He emptied his M1 rifle into it, killing the remainder of the Japanese inside. To make doubly certain that the job was done, an amphibian tank was then brought forward to fire both its flame thrower and its 37-mm. gun into the aperture. Meanwhile Logie’s 1st battalion got within 250 yards of Wilma road by 12:20. An hour later they fell upon a network of pillboxes. To the north O’Sullivan’s 3rd battalion ran into tough resistance again, but managed to link up with Logie’s men at Wilma Road by 2:50pm. Behind the battalions were follow up battalions who mopped up the area and the reserves secured the beachheads. Logie and O’Sullivans men then fought their way to Kwajaleins airfield. Lucky for them the Japanese had not established a defensive line across the width of the island, instead the bulk of them retired eastward, for their commander Admiral Akiyama had run into an early tragedy. Akiyama had left his bunker to observe the front line and was killed by an artillery shell. At 3:25, the 1st battalion was relieved by the 2nd battalion who began attack against the strongpoint at Canary Some of these positions, which extended along each side of Wallace Road, were defended by Japanese who ducked and crawled through rubble heaps and bunkers in such a way that Lt. John L. Young, commanding Company E, became convinced that they were using connecting tunnels. For an hour the fighting persisted, but not more than ten enemy dead could be counted above ground. Company E continued through a litter of small works, moving so slowly that it was necessary to commit Company F, which undertook a flanking movement at the left. The maneuver was intended to cut the strong point off, but the company promptly ran into fire that slowed its advance to about fifty yards in thirty minutes. It then became clear that the whole movement had been stopped. The attack was consequently broken off at 1800 and defensive positions were organized for the night. To the north, O’Sullivan’s 3rd Battalion ran into large underground shelters and defenses. Their advance was temporarily blocked by a fuel dump ignited by artillery fire, but they eventually pushed on another 500 yards before halting at 18:00 for the night.  Meanwhile Logie’s 2nd battalion broke off their attack halfway up the length of an unfinished runway and dug in for the night.  By the end of February 1st, approximately 450 of the dead Japanese were counted  in the zone of the 184th, and this regiment also was responsible for the capture of ten of the eleven prisoners taken. A large share of the enemy casualties was attributed to the heavy bombardment from ships and aircraft and from artillery based on Carlson. Estimates made by assault troops and by others, including doctors following the assault, indicated that the preparatory bombardment caused from 50 to 75 percent of all Japanese casualties on Kwajalein Island. It truly was a colossal bombardment. The Americans suffered 21 deaths and 87 wounded. Over on Roi-Namur, Admiral Conolly’s LSTs entered the lagoon at first light to provide the amtracs an easier ride. Naval ships, artillery and aircraft began smashing the island. The marines saw some delays, but Colonel Colonel Louis Jones’ 23rd Marines began their run to Roi at 11:50. Covering them, amphibian tanks sought hull defilade positions and concentrated their 37mm fire on the Wendy Point blockhouse, which could deliver flanking fire on the assault waves. The 1st and 2nd Battalions hit the beaches at 11:57 landed and immediately began to push 300 yards inland. Meanwhile Colonel Franklin Hart’s 24th Marines bound for Namur were assigned the tractors of the 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion that had participated in the preceding day's actions. The troubles that had beset the 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion on D-Day were titanic. They had been launched too far from the line of departure in the first place. They had to buck adverse winds and unexpectedly choppy seas. Radio failures had tremendously complicated the problem of control, causing still further delay and much unnecessary travel through the water. All of this spelled excessive fuel consumption and many of the tractors ran out of gas before the day was over. For an LVT to run out of fuel in a choppy sea was usually disastrous. This model, the LVT-2, shipped water easily and its bilge pumps could not be manually operated. Thus, when the gasoline supply was gone the vehicle could not be pumped out and usually sank. In addition, many of the tractors of the 10th Battalion had not been released from their duties on D-Day until after dark, were unable to get back to their mother LSTs for refueling, and had spent the night on various outlying islands. Thus, as the hour for descending on Namur approached, the 24th Marines could muster only 62 of the 110 tractors that had been assigned to them and a hurried call was sent out for LCVPs to make up the difference. After some scrambling, the 2nd and 3rd battalions were reorganized and on their way to Namur. Hart’s 2nd battalion hit Beach Green 2 at 11:55. They faced anti-tank ditches across the narrow beach, causing a large congestion. Hart’s 3rd battalion made it to Green 1 at 12 and his K and I companies immediately advanced north. Meanwhile Jone’s battalions secured Wendy Point facing no opposition. Encourage by the lack of resistance, the Marines began a rather disordered dash across the island. The stormed across the runway without orders and all guns blazing. Tanks and infantry hastily charged in the disorder, successfully driving the surviving and terrified Japanese north. Jones managed to gain control over his units and brought them back to assembly points to coordinate further attacks. The “re-assault” of Roi kicked off at 3:30 against a dazed enemy still trying to recover from the first attack. The 2nd battalion pushed north towards Estelle point while the 3rd battalion hit Nancy point. Enemy resistance was being rapidly annihilated, Estelle point was secure by 5pm, while Nancy Point would be taken by 6pm. After Nancy point was secured, Jones declared Roi secure. Meanwhile Harts F company unknowingly breached a torpedo warhead bunker and began throwing satchel charges into the hole. The structure was obliterated by a massive explosion that would detonate two other ammunition bunkers nearby. Blocks of concrete, palm trees, wood, torpedo warheads, and other debris rained down over the island, covering most of the island with smoke and dust. 20 Marines were killed and 100 were wounded. The enormous explosion disrupted the 2nd battalions assault, causing a delay. Hart’s 3rd battalion enjoyed more success, but heavier resistance as the Japanese defenders took advantage of all the rubble and dense brush tossed around to hide behind. By 7:30pm, Hart ordered his men to dig in and during the night the Japanese began their classic infiltration tactics. The green troops amongst the men began indiscriminately firing throughout the night. The next morning, light tanks broke a Japanese counter attack, as the Marines advanced 50 yards. Hart then launched his main attack at 9am,with the 3rd Battalion rapidly securing Nora Point by 11:00am. Tank support for the 2nd Battalion arrived an hour late, but they still managed to push towards Natalie Point by 12:15, where the two battalions linked up. Mop up operations continued in the rear, but the island was declared secure at 2:18. For their first operation, Schmidt’s 4th Marine Division suffered 206 killed, 617 wounded and 181 missing. 3472 Japanese would be found dead, with 51 captured and 40 Korean laborers surrendered.  To the south, after aerial, artillery and naval bombardment, Corlett launched a tank supported attack at 7:15am. O’Sullivans 2nd battalion advanced north against weak resistance while Logie’s 2nd Battalion continued to fight through the Canary strongpoint. Advancing through destroyed pillboxes with tanks at the forefront, O’Sullivans men were able to reach Carl Road on the eastern end of the airfield by 10:40am. Meanwhile Logie’s men reduced the Canary and advanced rapidly until they reached the deadly Cat strongpoint. Here they faced tiers of well-concealed defensive works, taking many lives until they also reached Carl Road at 10:40. The Americans were now facing the main defensive system of the island. In front of it lay a deep tank trap, connected to long rifle trenches. Beyond this was anti-tank ditches and an elaborate organized set of defensive positions called Corn strongpoint. They were in for a hell of a time. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Operation Flintlock went off with a terrifying bang seeing the combined firepower of land, air and sea tossed against the Marshall islands. The Americans had made easy and quick work of the smaller islands, but now we're face to face with a truly formidable defensive position that was sure to cause them real headaches. 

Last time we spoke about the operations HA-GO, U-GO and the continued drive against Shaggy ridge. Lt General Mutaguchi Renya sought to invade India and was continuously scheming to drag the rest of the IJA on this rather insane endeavor. Yet the allies also tossed their own operations in the Burma theater greatly disrupting the Japanese planners and achieving numerous objectives. Over in New Guinea, Vasey launched an offensive against the Kankeiri saddle, designated operation cutthroat. Meanwhile General Nakano 's men were in a dire situation with the allied seizure of Sio and Saidor. Multiple Japanese units found themselves all doing the same thing, retreating further north. It seemed no matter what defensive lines they established, the allies kept their advance over land and periodically amphibious assaults their flanks and rear. The formidable defenses region of Shaggy ridge was not going to hold up against the allied advance much longer.  This episode is The Fall of Shaggy Ridge Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  The Australian advance overland and Saidor operation had paid great dividends over and above the establishment of forward military base construction. The allies had formed a giant wedge between a significant residue of the Japanese fleeing the Finschhafen area. General Adachi commanding the 18th area army was facing a nightmare. Prior to the American landing, he had visited the 51st division HQ at Kiari and then traveled overland to the 20th Division over at Sio. He was fully aware of the hardships facing both forces. Meanwhile news of the Saidor landings hit Rabaul creating a massive debate. Senior officers sought to bring over all available troops to try and retake the town. Others sought to save as many troops as possible for a defense of Wewak, considering it the next main allies target. General Imamura favored bypassing Saidor altogether and withdrawing over inland trails. Thus Adachi appointed General Nakano to take charge of the withdrawal to Madang, and ordered 8 other companies to cross the Ramu valley to Bogadjim to harass the Americans at Saidor. These were purely defensive maneuvers. The Japanese also faced the daunting task of how to evacuate large numbers of troops from the 20th and 51st divisions from the impending allied trap. Nakano took the lead getting the 20th to retreat up the coast while the 51st worked their war over the inland trails. Nakano would soon be forced to abandon the plans and ordered both to pull into the interior to retreat towards Madang, nearly 200 miles away. This would mean the exhausted, starving and sick Japanese had to battle through the jungles, ridges, rivers and other horrors of the Finisterre range.  Meanwhile Saidor was easily secured by the 32nd division, the Australian 7th division advanced through the Ramu Valley and came face to face with Shaggy Ridge. Shaggy ridge had been transformed into a heavy fortified position with numerous nasty features such as the Kankeiri saddle, Pimple, Intermediate snipers pimple, Green snipers pimple, Prothero 1 and 2 and so forth. During the first weeks of January the Australians made very little headway against the honeycombed Japanese defenses. Their air forces were called in numerous times to plaster the ridgelines in a 3 day assault designated Operation Cutthroat. On the 18th of January, B-25s from Nadzab and Port Moresby would drop 500 lb bombs all over the defenses. On the 21st P-40s strafed and bombed the area and this was met with some reorganizing of the ground forces. The 15th and 18th brigades relieved the exhausted 21st and 25th. Brigadier F. O Chilton began the new job by opening heavy artillery up on Prothero I. Captain T. L James with the 2/2 pioneer battalion described the attack on January 20th “At 1000 hours we met 2/12 Infantry Battalion at the appointed rendezvous, where I met their CO., Lt.-CoI. C. F. Bourne. We did not stay long at the rendezvous but formed up and commenced the long approach march. It was a gruelling day. The long single file moved silently up the deep ravines, scaling cliff-faces with the aid of ropes and lawyer vines. It took us the entire day to cover the four mile approach. In one spot that was almost impossible to traverse—a steep-sided cliff—they rigged lawyer vines between trees to act as a handrail and allow us to pull ourselves up." Despite the harsh conditions and fierce resistance, the Australians got atop Canning saddle and then forded the Mene river and drew near the village. Colonel Matsumoto’s men were now trapped between the 2/9th battalion advancing from the Pimple and the 2/12th battalion from Prothero 1. To the east there was the 2/10th battalion about a mile away from the main Japanese defensive position along the Kankeiri saddle. On the 22nd, the 2/12th dispatched D company who advanced between Prothero1 and Prothero 2. At 10:40am they began to fire their artillery upon Prothero 2 and at 11:15am a platoon tried to progress but was held down by Japanese snipers and machine gun fire. A company came through D company to advance along Shaggy ridge until 3:30 pm once they took were held down by Japanese fire. Then a single australian section rushed forward led by Bren gunner Private Bugg. His team hit a Japanese machine gun crew from just 30 yards away. He seized a toehold quickly upon Prothero 2. After some bitter fighting Prothero 2 had fallen into allied hands. Meanwhile to the south the 2/9th sent a patrol out on the 22nd who found pill-boxes at McCaughey’s knoll occupied with Japanese gunners. At 10:45am as allied artillery hit Prothero 2, Captain Taylor led a company of the 2/9th and assaulted McCaughers knoll. They were quickly pinned down, but by 1:15pm word reached them that Prothero 2 was captured and that the entire battalion was to push along Shaggy ridge. During that afternoon Taylor took his company to the western side of Shaggy ridge, getting ready for a new flanking maneuver against McCaughey’s knoll. The men fought their way up the knoll cleaning up pillbox one after another, capturing McCaugheys knoll by nightfall. It would cost them 8 men wounded. More than 100 dead Japanese were found over the Prothero-Shaggry ridge area when mop up crews did their work. Meanwhile 2/10th kept up the pressure in the east. On the 22nd A Company led by Lt Gunn seized a foothold on Faria Ridge and, prompting the enemy by late in the afternoon, to abandon Cam's Hill, which was occupied by the 2/10th by 5.20 p.m. During the night and early morning of january 23rd, two counter attacks were launched by the Japanese.  At 2.40 the forward troops of A Company on the ridge were attacked from the south but the attack was repulsed with no casualties. After this the Australians moved down the track towards Kankeiri. Captain Haupt’s B Company of the 2/12th advanced down the track from Prothero 2. By 6pm they were atop the saddle around Crater Hill when they came across a Japanese gun position containing 150 rounds of 75mm ammunition. Half an hour later they ran into some resistance from slopes atop Crater Hill. They would pull back to the Kankeiri saddle to dig in for the night.  The 2/10th then dispatch D company led by Captain Kumnick to advance along the Faria Ridge. They made it 1500 yards before running into a well entrenched position that held them down with machine gun fire. During the night however the Japanese abandoned their entrenchments for Cam Hill allowing the 2/10th to establish itself in a position roughy 1200 yards southeast of Crater Hill the next day. On the 24th, the 2/9th took over the responsibility for Shaggy Ridge up to Prothero 2 allowing the 2/12 to advance up Kankeiri.  Small patrols from company B of the 2/12th reached the top of Crater Hill that day finding an enemy position on the southern slopes. On the 25th, the 2/12th and 2/10th probed enemy defenses on all sides of Crater Hill looking for decent approaches to attack. This led to several skirmishes, seeing both sides suffer casualties. One patrol led by Lt Coles of the 2/2nd pioneers, surveyed the Paipa mule track along the valley of the Mindjim, firing upon small bands of retreating Japanese. The Australians gradually converged to attack Crater Hill, but Matsumoto’s defenders put up a valiant effort to repel the assaults. On the 26, Brigadier Chilton ordered Companies C and D of the 2/9th and Companies C and B of the 2/12th to assault Crater Hill. This saw companies C and D of the 2/9th perform a outflanking maneuver to the north tip of the Mindjim valley to hit the enemy's right flank, while Companies C and B of the 2/12th held the enemy down. Captain A. Marshall's C company led off at 10.35 a.m, passing from Shaggy Ridge through Kankirei Saddle and then to the north, with Captain Taylor's D company following to provide flank protection. By midday Marshall reported that he had advanced some 600 yards and passed through several old and abandoned positions finding no enemy. Cautiously he pushed on, at 5 p.m. he reached the summit of 4100. The main enemy position was to the south between Marshall and the 2/10th and 2/12th Battalions. Leaving Taylor to occupy the summit of 4100 Marshall advanced south towards Crater Hill in an attempt to surprise the enemy from the rear . He met them about 300 yards south-east from the summit just at dusk. The leading platoon attacked along the usual razor-back but withdrew because of heavy machine-gun fire. At 7 p.m. Marshall sent Lieutenant White's platoon round the right flank but approach from this flank was also very difficult and White was killed. By the nighttime, they had successfully surrounded Matsumoto’s weakened defenders. Matsumoto’s defenders had established extremely formidable positions and had a large number of automatic weapons at their disposal. Matsumoto was ready alongside his men to make a final stand. Basically a siege of Crater Hill began and would only end after 5 brutal days. The first two days saw Chilton order the 2/9th take responsibility for the southern slopes of 4100 and Kankeiri saddle, while the 2/12th held Protheros and Shaggy ridge, and the 2/10th maintained pressure on the south-eastern slopes of Crater Hill. Skirmishes borke out everywhere, as the artillery smashed Crater Hill. Captain Whyte of the 2/4th field regiment fired 2000 shells, shattering trees, which unfortunately created more timber obstacles for the advancing Australians. At 9.30 a.m. on the 29th, 19 Kittyhawks dive-bombed Crater Hill, followed by ten minutes of artillery fire. At 1.30 p.m. the artillery laid down a barrage and machine-gun fire covered an assault on Crater Hill from the west by Captain Daunt's company of the 2/9th . The leading platoon attempted to rush the enemy position up a very steep and open slope but the Japanese, entrenched on a razor-back, were too strong and drove them back. The Australians also had the bad luck to be shelled by their own artillery. Each time they performed an assault, the stubborn Japanese held firm. Finally on the 30th with the help of some heavy rain Matsumoto decided to evacuate during the night. Matsumoto and the remnants of his force withdrew towards Yokopi and Kubenau valley. After dawn on the 31st, Australian patrols found Crater Hill abandoned and it was a horror show. They found a ghastly mess. At least 14 dead were found and evidence of burials alongside them. The 2/9th and 2/10th advanced occupying the hill on February 1st. With that, Shaggy Ridge and the Kankeiri saddle had finally fallen. Chilton sent out patrols to pursue the retreating Japanese and perform mop up operations. By February 6th his forces managed to seize Paipa and Amuson. The Australians had suffered 46 deaths, 147 wounded while the Japanese figures were estimated at around 500 casualties. Meanwhile, Brigadier Hammer had also carried out two operations during this time period. The first was a diversionary attack against the Spendlove Spur held by elements of the 5th company, 80th regiment. This was carried out by Captain Kennedy company of the 24th battalion, whom managed to surprise the Japanese and quickly seized Cameron’s Knoll. On January 30th, the 57/60th battalion led by Lt Colonel Robert Marston departed Ketoba and along another company led by Captain McIntosh assaulted Orgoruna, Kesa and Koba. The Australians would find Orgoruna and Kesa undefended.. Lt Marston ordered Major Barker 's 8 company to patrol Koba, and they would enter Koba on  February 1st finding nothing, so they  pushed on towards Mataloi 2 . There were signs of very recent occupation and, 200 yards along the track , they were ambushed. Barker brought heavy fire down upon the Japanese ambush position and managed to capture Koba that night. On the morning of the 3rd, about 400 yards east of Koba, Barker again struck a Japanese ambush position. They quickly outflanked the enemy who withdrew through Mataloi 2 towards Mataloi 1 . By the time Mataloi 2 was occupied at 6.30 p.m., there was not enough time to hit Mataloi 1 nor to allow adequate consolidation of Mataloi 2 before dark. At 9.30 p.m. the Japanese counter-attacked from the direction of Matalo 1, commencing the assault with a heavy mortar bombardment. As Mataloi 2 could be defended from three sides, Barker decided that he could hold the area best from high ground to the south which would also be out of range of the enemy mortars. Accordingly he ordered a withdrawal and departed with his headquarters and one platoon. Apparently the orders did not reach the other platoons who were encircled while the remainder of the company was withdrawing to Koba. Long-range enemy machine-gun fire was directed at Kesa at the same time as the counterattack developed at Mataloi 2. The 57th/60th pulled out concluding their little raid. Now Brigadier Hammer’s 15th were getting ready to pursue Matsumoto’s detachment who were fleeing to Kwato. But that is all we have for New Guinea, as were are moving back over to New Britain. Last time we were over in New Britain, the Americans had captured Hill 660, and were unleashing patrols to try and figure out where the Japanese were concentrating. Now they sought to secure the Borgan Bay-Itni river line. Meanwhile on the other side, General Matsuda’s battered men had begun a retreat heading east via the Aisalmipua-Kakumo trail towards Kopopo. They also received reinforcements in the form of the fresh 51st reconnaissance regiment who took up the job of rearguard. The Japanese knew the terrain better than their American counterparts, thus held distinct advantages. They knew good grounds to put up defenses and how long they could hold out in such places until they should retreat. The Americans did not enjoy good maps, they had to painstakingly explore where they went. They relied on native reports on where to go, but in the end they were like explorers jumping into jungles, atop mountains and a hell of a lot of swampy terrain. The rainforests could be so dense, patrols could be moving yards from another and not know it, imagine trying to find hypothetical objectives in such places?   Thus an enormous amount of vital patrolling was performed, beginning on January 19th with Captain Ronald Slay’s men of L Company 1st marines. They advanced past Mt. Gulu, Langla volcano and Munlulu before heading down the saddle of Mt. Tangi. They managed to ambush a group of 20 Japanese being led by 8 armed natives, who fled east after 6 Japanese were killed. Slay took his men across the east-west government trail, only finding some Japanese telephone wire, which was severed. On the 22nd two patrols each consisting of a reinforced company departed the airdrome perimeter to converge from two directions along the trail junction Captain Slay’s men discovered. The first was elements of the 1st battalion, 1st marines led by Captain Nikolai Stevenson, the other was led by Captain Preston Parish with elements of the 7th marines who took landing crafts to Sag Sag, the terminus of the east-west Government trail. Parishes men would bivouac around 1.5 miles inland near Aipati on the 24th while Stevensons men headed south of Mt Gulu. Both patrols found no Japanese, but Parish gained some valuable intelligence from a native village, who indicated there had been several Japanese parties around. On the 23rd, Stevenson and his men ran into a concealed machine gun crew 30 yards near Mt Langla. The Americans scrambled to fight back at an enemy they could not see. They did not lose any men, but had no idea if they hit any Japanese either. They continued their advance afterwards and would be ambushed again, this time 1500 yards south of Mt Munlulu. This time they seemed to be facing a force of platoon strength. By the 25th Stevenson and his men were pulling back to Mt Gulu and were relieved by another incoming patrol led by Captain George Hunts K Company, 1st marines. Meanwhile Parish’s patrol continued east as the natives had indicated to them where the Japanese might be retreating through. On January 27th Hunts company ran into Parish’s and both shared information and went in opposite directions hoping to hunt down nearby Japanese units. Hunt set off to the location where Parish’s men had run into a Japanese ambush previously, expecting to find at least 50 Japanese. At 7am on the 28th, Hunt’s men came across an outpost line and engaged it for hours, seeing 15 casualties. Hunt pulled his men back out of mortar range and the Japanese swarmed upon them forcing the Americans to perform some heated rearguard actions. Overall these patrols amongst others allowed the Americans to get a better picture of the terrain and concentration of the enemy. For two weeks the American patrols searched for the enemy headquarters running into countless skirmishes, mostly against the forces of Colonel Sato Jiro. By the 27th, Matsuda had reached Kokopo and received new orders from General Sakai that he was to take the men further on towards Iboki. Colonel Sato was to again provide the rearguard. This allowed the Americans to seize Nakarop, a placed their translators had mistranslated from Japanese documents as “Egaroppu”. It had been the nerve center of General Matsuda’s operations. They found countless abandoned tents in bivouac areas, the village contained native and Japanese built structures. There was a huge sign saying "Matsuda Butai Army Command Principal Place." There were traces of elaborate radio installations recently removed containing an American-made telephone switchboard labeled "Glory Division." It would turn out Matsuda's personal quarters, however, were actually located off the main trail roughly midway between Magairapua and Nakarop, its approaches so skillfully concealed that patrols did not find it until several days later. Well camouflaged bivouac areas also infested this entire region. With the capture of Matsuda’s former headquarters, all patrols were combined into the Gilnit Group led by the legendary Colonel Chesty Puller. Puller pointed his force in the direction of the Borgen Bay-Itni River to clear it out. They departed Agulupulla on January the 30th as the 5th Marines relieved the 2nd battalion, 1st marines to attack the Iboki area. Attempts were made at leapfrogging, using landing craft to hit places hoping to trap Japanese during the advance. The landing craft were operated by the Boat Battalion, 533d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, of the Army's 2d Engineer Special Brigade. They were made available to carry out the amphibious phase, and the division's little Cub artillery spotter planes for observation and liaison. Rough seas frustrated the first landing attempt at Namuramunga on February 4th, forcing two patrols from the 2nd battalion to proceed overland from Old Natamo via a coastal track. They got as far as Mambak killing a few stragglers and taking 3 prisoners. The next day another patrol landed at Aliado and advanced down the coastal track to the mouth of the Gurissa river through Kokopo and Gorissi. By the 10th of february they managed to kill 16 stragglers and grabbed 6 prisoners who they brought back to the Borgen Bay perimeter. Meanwhile the 3rd battalion advanced into Gorissi by boat on the 12th and setup a radar station. They then dispatched a patrol to the EI river on the 16, finding it impassable. Another patrol was sent to leapfrog around the Arimega Plantation on the 19th. It was seized quickly and now the Americans were very close to Iboki.   Meanwhile Sato reached Kokopo, but did not linger long and continued on to Karai-ai by February 12th. That day the 3rd battalion, 5th marines, aware of the Japanese course, set up an advance base at Gorissi. Now 20 miles separated the Japanese rearguards from their pursuers. Sato and his men would reach Iboki by February 16th, while the Marines were fording the El river, 30 miles behind. It would take them 5 additional days to reach Karai-ai. To the south Puller’s group had reached Gilnit and Nigol on the 10th, finding no enemy. These actions saw the Americans secure the western half of New Britain. 2 days later, Company B of the 1st Marines landed on Rooke Island where they set up a radar installation. They also had to patrol the islands to see if any Japanese remained upon it. They fanned out, running into native villages who offered them fresh fruit. They would come across machine gun emplacements, abandoned bivouac areas and some medical stations, but no Japanese. The enemy had clearly evacuated the island   All the way back over at the Arawe area, Major Komori had received new radios on February 5th enabling him to resume communications with the 17th divisional HQ. He received a gloomy report  “At present, the airfield is covered with grass 4 to 5 [feet] high. The airfield, 200 m [sic] in width 800 m in length, will be serviceable only for small airplanes. However, it will take quite some time to develop it. Consequently, I believe that it will not be of great value.” Knowing about Matsuda’s withdrawal, he began casting envious eyes in the same direction. On February 8, he hinted more broadly to that effect: “As has been reported, the value of Merkus airfield is so insignificant that it seems the enemy has no intention of using it… Due to damage sustained by enemy bombardments and to the increased number of patients, it becomes more and more difficult to carry out the present mission… It is my opinion that as the days pass, replenishment of supplies will become more and more difficult and fighting strength will be further diminished; our new line will be cut off and consequently leave us with no alternative but self-destruction.” Divisional HQhowever was not pleased with this and sent a telegraphic response the following day ordering him curtly to continue his mission. Komori would write in his diary that day "Wondered what to do about the order all night long. Could not sleep last night… I felt dizzy all day today." Fortunately for Komori, on February 17th Sato was ordered to occupy key positions at the Aria river’s mouth to help supply him by land. This allowed Komori to begin his retreat north on the 24th while Sato evacuated the Iboki stores to Upmadung. Komori’s departure would be just in the nick of time as the Americans dispatched two tank platoons to clear out the airfield area on the 27th. They would find zero enemy resistance and this would put an end to the Arawe operation. And that will be all for today for New Britain as we are going to be covering some big allied planning.    Over in the southwest and south Pacific Areas, General Douglas MacArthur continued his plan to drive back towards the Philippines. This would be done via amphibious operations along the north coast of New Guinea. His next main target was the Vogelkop Peninsula, then the Palau Islands, then the invasion of Mindanao. This would also see the Japanese lines of communications to the Dutch East Indies cut off. Yet before all of this he needed to capture the Hansa Bay area of northeastern New Guinea and then Hollandia in the Dutch part of New Guinea. This action would allow his forces to bypass the Japanese stronghold at Wewak. Meanwhile there were the ongoing efforts to reduce Rabaul, and to continue that he still had to capture the Admiralty Island and Kavieng, which would completely cut off Rabaul. The planners for the south, southwest and central Pacific Areas met at Pearl Harbor on January 28th. However the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to delay MacArthur’s invasion of the Admiralties and Kavieng pushed it to April 1st. They had determined it was better to prioritize the invasion of the Marshall islands in the central pacific. This delay would further delay most of the southwest pacific operations along the New Guinea coast. Meanwhile Admiral Kusaka and General Imamura had sent the bulk of the 230th regiment and the recently arrived 1st independent mixed regiment to New Ireland. The 2nd battalion, 1st independent mixed regiment was sent to the Admiralties on January 25th, joining up with Colonel Ezaki Yoshio’s 51st transport regiment. Then the 1st battalion, 229th regiment was sent to the Admiralties on february 2nd. These were last ditch efforts by the Japanese to secure a very desperate lifeline for Rabaul. No offensive could be mounted for at least 3 months, thus the Japanese were given ample time to reinforce and strengthen their defenses. Admiral Halsey also had plans to invade the St Matthias Islands as a preliminary for the attack upon Kavieng, and this like MacArthur's plans were thrown into disarray. In view of all of this MacArthur suggested to Halsey a new plan, codenamed Operation Squarepeg, to seize the Green Islands and establish a new PT boat and or air base there. With that in hand they could project air and naval power further against Rabaul and perhaps even as far as Truk. However many of the officers did not believe any of this would significantly isolate Kavieng and Rabaul. Furthermore, they believed it doubtful that fighters stationed at a base in the Green Islands would even be able to cover Kavieng. Admiral Wilkinson, with the backing of Admiral Fitch and General Geiger, suggested that the proposal be abandoned, and that plans be laid for a landing either at Borpop or Boang Island. On 28 December, however, after analyzing the situation, Colonel William E. Riley, Admiral Halsey's War Plans officer, made the following observation: “There is no doubt but that the occupation of this area [Borpop] and the utilization of air facilities thereat would assist materially in the neutralization of both Rabaul and Kavieng. However, the grave possibility that such an operation would result in the employment of approximately two divisions and additional naval support, not now available and will--in all probability--not be made available in time for this type intermediate operation, makes it necessary to eliminate Borpop as a possible intermediate operation… Though Green Island is not as far advanced as Boang Island, yet it is quite possible to provide fighter cover for strikes on Kavieng. In addition, dive bombers, based on Green Island, can operate most effectively against shipping at Kavieng.”Thus Halsey elected to go ahead with Operation Squarepeg anyway because a fighter umbrella could be tossed over the Green Islands during an amphibious invasion, something that would not be possible for Boang or Borbop. Halsey’s staff went to work planning the amphibious landing. It would be carried out by elements of General Barrowclough’s 3rd New Zealand Division. PT 176 and PT 178 of Lieutenant-Commander LeRoy Taylor’s Torokina Squadron conducted hydrographic reconnaissance of the islands on January 10th and discovered the southern channels near Barahun island were the most suitable. 300 men of the 30th New Zealand battalion led by Lt Colonel Frederick Cornwall got aboard the APDs Talbot, Waters and Dickerson, covered by the destroyers Fullam, Bennet, Guest and Hudson led by Captain Ralph Earle. They landed on Nissan Island and performed a survey finding a promising airfield site. They also discovered there were no more than 100 Japanese at a relay station alongside 1200 native Melanesians. Pretty sure I said this before in the series, but I will repeat it. Melanesians are one of the predominant indigenous inhabitants of the Melanesian islands that are found in the area spanning New Guinea to the Fiji Islands. Something pretty neat about them, along with some indigenous Australians, they are the few groups of non-Europeans to have blond hair. The Melanesians were so friendly to the New Zealanders and so hostile to the Japanese that it was decided to omit the usual preliminary naval and aerial bombardment for the landings.  Now over in the Central Pacific plans to invade the Marshall were underway, even before the successful liberation of the Gilberts. The operation was codenamed Operation Flintlock, and Admiral Nimitz assigned the 4th Marine division, reinforced with the 22nd marine regiment and Army’s 7th division to train intensively for amphibious warfare. They were deemed Tactical Group 1, led by Brigadier General Thomas Watson. They would be backed up by a whopping 23 aircraft carriers, 15 battleships, 18 cruisers and 109 destroyers. Yet things had certainly changed since 1942, the American Navy was packing overwhelming heat. Admiral Spruance, now commander of the 5th fleet, would hold the highest operational command for Operation Flintlock. Admiral Turner would be commanding task force 51 and the Joint Expeditionary Fleet and General Holland Smith would be commanding all the expeditionary troops. General Smith's position in the chain of command in relation to Admiral Turner was made much clearer than it had been during the Gilberts operation. Simply put he was put in direct command of all landing forces and garrison forces once they were ashore. The troop commanders of each of the landing forces, the 7th and 4th Marine Divisions, were expressly placed under Smith until such time as Admiral Spruance should determine that the capture and occupation phase of the operation had been completed. However, Smith's authority as commander of expeditionary troops had one limitation. It was recognized that "the employment of troops, including the reserve troops engaged in the seizure of objectives, is subject to the capabilities of the surface units to land and support them," thus any directives issued by Smith as to major landings or as to major changes in tactical plans had to have the approval of Turner before they could be issued. To this extent, the expeditionary troops commander was still subordinate to Turner. They would also be supported by Rear Admiral Marc Mitscher’s fast carrier force, task force 58 and Admiral Hoovers land based air forces, including the 7th air force and other Navy air forces. So yeah, America was coming in overkill. Nimitz’s original plan was to advance into the Marshalls by simultaneously hitting Kwajalein, Maloelap and Wotje. Together these contained 65% of the aircraft facilities in the island group, leaving the 35% remainder on Jaluit and Mille. Jaluit and Mille could be neutralized and bypassed. Yet after facing the difficulties during the Gilberts operation, Nimitz decided to also bypass Maloelap and Wotje as well, so he could concentrate all his forces against Kwajalein. General Smith and Admirals Spruance and Turner opposed this, arguing that sailing into Kwajalein would be too exposed if Maloelap and Wotje were left unoccupied.  Nimitz 'new plan would see General Corlett’s 7th division hit the southern group of islands in the atoll, including Kwajalein island, while Major General Harry Schmidt’s 4th marines would hit Roi-Namur and the other northern islands of the atoll. Task Force 52, would transport the 7th Division while Rear Admiral Richard Conollys task force 53 transported the 4th marines. After some meetings, Spruance managed to secure the invasion of Majuro, which would be carried out by Lt Colonel Frederick Sheldon’s “Sundance” Landing Force. They consisted of the 5th amphibious corps reconnaissance company, the 2nd battalion, 106th regiment and the 1st defense battalion. Spruance wanted to make the atoll a fleet base, so airfields could be constructed to help cover the line of communications to Kwajalein. To support the main landings, Mitschers fast carrier force was going to smash the enemy aircraft and air facilities at Wotje, Maloelap, Roi-Namur and Kwajalein while his vessels simultaneously coordinated with Turners cruisers and Rear Admiral Ernest Small’s Neutralization group task force 50.15 to naval bombard them as well. The main threat that needed to be neutralized quickly was Eniwetoks airfield. Meanwhile Hoover’s land based aircraft would help neutralize Mille and Jaluit and help smash the other islands and shipping. Throughout November and December, two atolls would receive more attacks than the others. Mille closest to the Gilberts, thus much more accessible, earned the lionshare of attention. Maloelap with its large air facilities had to be kept under constant surveillance and attack, thus she came second. Beginning on December 23rd, aircraft based out of the Gilberts began increasing air strikes against the Marshalls.  On Mille between November 24th to December 18th, 106 heavy bombers dropped 122 tons of bombs over the runways and facilities. The next week bombers and fighters began attacking Mille’s fuel dumps, leveled all buildings, destroyed 11 grounded aircraft and another 13 in the air. Mille was neutralized and the Japanese would abandon its airfield by January. The damage dished out to Maloelap was extensive, but not as crippling. Her runways were not entirely put out of operation. From January 11th to the 25th, B-25’s destroyed her ground installations, but still her airfield remained operational. On January 26, 9 B-25s, followed by 12 P-40s, flew into Taroa for a low-level attack. The B-25s destroyed 9 interceptors on the ground and 5 more after they were airborne. The control tower and two other buildings on the airfield were set afire and four tons of bombs were dropped in fuel dump and dispersal areas, starting large fires. As the B-25s left the target to return to Makin they were chased by about 15 Japanese fighters. 30 miles south of Maloelap the 12 P-40s met the bomber formation and immediately engaged the enemy fighters, destroying11 of them and severely damaging 2 more. The strike of January 26 was decisive. Practically all of the remaining enemy air strength at Maloelap had been destroyed, and the once formidable base was rendered almost powerless to defend itself against air strikes,  thus neutralized. Jaluit was subjected to 15 attacks reduced to rubble and Wotje was hit 14 times suffering extensive damage. Meanwhile Admiral Pownalls task force 58.1 and 58.3 consisting of 6 fast carriers, 5 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers, 3 of the new class of anti aircraft cruisers, and 12 destroyers hit Kwajalein on December 5th. That day saw her attacked by over 246 aircraft. As a result 19 Japanese interceptors and 4 bombers were destroyed at Roi-Namur, 7 cargo ships were destroyed at Kwajalein and extensive damage was inflicted upon both bases. Simultaneously, 29 aircraft hit Wotje where they destroyed 5 grounded aircraft, set fire to hangers, machine ships and barracks. Japanese interceptors attacked Pownall’s carriers, though they were unable to inflict serious damage. Following these attacks, Hoover’s aircraft continued to smash Kwajalein, tossing 10 attacks, dropping nearly 210 tons of bombs on the atoll. Roi-Namurs airfield still remained operation by January 29th however, though she only had 35 aircraft on Roi-Namur; 10 reconnaissance planes on Kwajalein; 13 aircraft on Maloelap; 12 on Wotje and 15 on Eniwetok. The Japanese did not have any effective air force to defend the Marshalls any more. The feeling of the men on the islands, was doom.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Finally the Australians had taken the formidable position known as Shaggy Ridge. The Japanese continued the harrowing marches going north as their enemy would not let up. In the Marshalls the IJA and IJN personnel were inflicted the full might of American’s wartime productivity, and they all knew Uncle Sam was coming to pay them a visit soon. 

Last time we spoke about the landing at Saidor and continuation of advances upon New Guinea and New Britain. Operation Michaelmas was a huge success, isolating countless Japanese and threatening those trying to retreat further north. Taking advantage of the new front on New Guinea, the Australians began pushing more so upon the features across Shaggy Ridge and towards Sio. General Adachi frantically shifted units around in an effort to plug up the multiple advancing allied units, but in the end there was little to be done as the Japanese were pushed further and further north. Features were taken upon Shaggy Ridge and Sio fell nearly uncontested. Over in New Britain, General Rupertus triumphed over the Airdrome and his Marines were expanding their perimeters. Katayama made a bold attack against an enemy he overestimated at it certainly did not pan out for his men at suicide creek. This episode is The battle for Shaggy Ridge Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    A while back I covered the start of the Chinese-Indian offensive into the Hukawng Valley and Arakan regions. When I did so it was almost entirely from the allied viewpoint, but what of the IJA war planners? The Burma campaign has been arguably a complete disaster for the allies, the Japanese steamrolled all the way through, claiming vast amounts of territory and key cities and ports, so what really did they need to do but garrison it all? After Wingate unleashed operation Longcloth, the relatively idle Japanese raised the idea of potentially attacking India. Lt General Mutaguchi Renya, the victor of the Singapore campaign in 1942 was made a commander in Burma and wargamed the possibility of attacking India to try and earn support from his superiors at Tokyo General HQ. It was his belief, they could brush past the British in Assam and reach the gateway into India, and he expected the Indians to rise up and greet them with open arms. A lot of money and effort had been spent on Subhas Chandra Bose and his Indian National Army. The fall of India would be an absolutely devastating blow to the British Empire in Asia and in 1942 there was even the belief the Japanese could link up with their German allies in the middle east. But that was 1942, before Stalingrad and Kursk, 1944 was a very very different geopolitical situation. This however did not stop Mutaguchi from continuing his plans to invade India. Lt General Hanaya Tadashi, commanding the Arakan front was given the task of convincing the British that the counterattack in Arakan was the appearance of the main army earmarked to conquer India, thus leading General Slim to send up reserves from Imphal. The operation was codenamed HA-GO and it was intended to be a fent to mask the real attack upon Imphal designated Operation U-GO. Now let me dig a bit deeper into how this all came about. Until now, General Stilwell had been able to build much of the Ledo Road practically unmolested. Yet by early August, General Kawabe Mazakazu’s Burma Area Army was preparing for a counter offensive. Kawabe actually did not trust Mutaguchi and suspected the man was harboring megalomaniac designs to invade India, which he was 100% right about. The “counter offensive” was really just the beginnings of Operation U-GO and it had been sold to Tokyo HQ as a pre-emptive strike to disable the 14th Army and make it unable to invade Burma. Thus General Mutaguchi’s 15th Army was given the task of destroying any hostile elements in the Imphal region and to establish a strong defensive line. From December 22nd to the 26th, Mutaguchi held a conference pushing for the possibility of launching Operation U-GO and developed detailed missions for each division which would participate by means of a war game. At the same time Kawabe sold the operation HA-GO the diversionary attack in Arakan, with Lt General Hanaya Tadashi’s 55th Division earmarked to pin down as many of the enemy’s units as possible and to draw the British reserves away from the main offensive.  When General Christisons offensive kicked off, this forced Kawabe to reinforce Hanaya with the 54th division, and this in turn established the 29th Army under the command of General Sakurai on January 6th. The 29th Army was under the overall command of the Burma Area Army, and its HQ was initially situated in Moulmein. It was assigned to defend the coastal region of Arakan and the lower Irrawaddy valley and consisted at first of the 55th Division in Arakan, the 54th Division in reserve in Prome, and various garrison units including the 24th Independent Mixed Brigade in Moulmein. It also controlled the 11th Shipping Detachment of Major-General Suzuki Gisaburo, consisting of the 11th Shipping Engineer Regiment and the 3rd Sea Transport Battalion. It had roughly 1,105 men, 85 large landing barges, 54 small landing barges, 47 motored sampans, two armored boats, 10 fishing boats, one messenger boat and one speed boat. The 11th Shipping Detachment was stationed at Taungup and its main supply depot was at Prome. Meanwhile after the capture of Maungdaw, the 5th Indian division of Major General Harold Briggs was ordered to attack the main Japanese defenses at Razabil. Razabil’s defenses were quite formidable, it dominating the crossroads and road linking Maungdaw with the Tunnels and Buthidaung located 3 miles eastwards, forming the 15th Indian Corps immediate objective following Maungdaw's capture. It was dubbed by its Japanese commander “The Golden Fortress of the Mayu Range”. It was centered on the railway tunnels running through the Mayu Range and at Point 551 to the east with a further forward position at Point 1301. These powerful defenses, built carefully exploiting the rugged mountainous terrain, were tunneled deep into the hills and consisted of bunkers, trenches and other fire positions located amidst dense jungle and camouflaged with customary Japanese skill. The main outworks at Letwedet to the east and at Razabil to the west of the Mayu Range were major fortresses in their own right, requiring careful reduction before the main position could be tackled. With both bastions in direct line of sight from the Tunnels, accurate supporting artillery could be called down with ease, moreover, adding to the problems already facing troops assaulting trenches and bunkers dug into the hillsides invulnerable to all but direct hits by medium artillery. The offensive against Razabil was codenamed Operation Jonathan, but it would be delayed until the corps artillery became available. At the same time the 7th Indian division seized the initiative on January 18th and launched an attack against the 55th division’s position between Letwedet and Htindaw. The 9th company, 143rd infantry regiment was defending a hill east of Htindaw and stood their ground against repeated attacks until January 24th. The Japanese strongpoints were well dug in on the tops of narrow ridges. On January 26th, Major General Briggs ordered the 161st brigade, with support in the form of Lee-Grant tanks, artillery and aerial bombardment to attack the Tortoise defended by 1st battalion, 143rd regiment in the Razabil area. The Tortoise was a horseshoe defensive position that dominated the highway. It was an elaborate system of bunkers, trenches and all the typical Japanese goodies. For the boys in Burma it would be the first time for most to face such a thing, as Slim wrote in his memories “This was the first time we had assaulted an elaborate, carefully prepared position that the Japanese meant to hold to the last."   The attack opened up with 12 Vultee Vengeance dive bombers of the 3rd Tactical air force, 12 Mitchell medium bombers and 16 Liberator heavy bombers of the Strategic air force followed up by even more dive bombers. It was a visually spectacular event and to those observing from the ground looked devastating. However little to no damage was inflicted on the strongly constructed Japanese defenses burrowed so deeply into the hillsides. Similarly the mountain artillery regiment and batter from a field regiment did little damage with their bombardment as well. The Japanese had simply pulled back 1000 yards during the bombardments and by the time the allies surged forward came back to man their positions. When the Indians began their assault, the fire coming down the steep and jungle clad hillsides was absolutely devastating. The Lee-Grant tanks fired from the valley floor and managed to destroy all the identified bunkers, but the exposed Indian troops suffered massive casualties. It was virtually impossible to keep the defenders heads down long enough to advance even 50 yards towards the summit. Things got even worse when the men reached the defensive lines for the Lee-Grant tanks had to lift their fire lest they hit their own men. By the end of the day, only a toehold had been secured over the lower slopes of Razabil ridge.  The assault carried on for 3 more days, with intense tank and artillery fire from different directions supporting the infantry as closely as possible. The only immediate effect of the bombardment and indirect fire by 25 pounders and 3.7 howitzers was to destroy the vegetation over the hillsides, thus exposing more and more of the Japanese defensive works. During the intense battle, the Lee-Grant medium tank proved itself a real solution in providing effective covering fire for infantry and soon new techniques were evolving. The Japanese defenses were mainly built over the summit of steep, thick, jungle covered hills and the Lee-Grants provided fire support from positions in the paddy fields below them. Their 75mm guns effectively destroyed or at the least neutralized bunker positions. A procedure was quickly developed for providing cover during the last stages of infantry assaults. Tanks would use high explosive shells to clear the vegetation, than delayed action high explosive shells to break up the front of visible bunkers, then armor piercing shells to enable the infantry to advance close behind the creeping barrage as shrapnel was not flying everywhere. All combined this showed the potential of armor vehicles in jungle warfare, when most claimed they had little practical use in such climats. Despite such developments, the casualties were mounting, little progress was being made. On January 28th, the 123rd brigade attacked Japanese positions on the secondary hill of Wrencat and its smaller neighbor hill Wrenkitten, probably the best hill names I have read on this podcast as of yet haha. These were located on the lower western foothills of the Mayu range. They were extremely steep, cone shaped features with fortified circular trenches around their heads, bunkers, and bamboo jungle. Firing from positions on the valley floor the Lee-Grants and 5.5 inch artillery were able to destroy the bunkers and switch to armor piercing rounds to perform creeping barrages for the infantry. Despite the tank and artillery support, the Japanese were throwing a ton of mortar, grenade and machine gun fire. An officer of the 123rd brigade involved in the fight had this to say 'It appears from our experience that consolidation on the objective which normally consists of a series of deeply constructed bunkers connected one with the other is extremely difficult in the very limited time that the enemy allow.' The failures against the Tortoise and Wrencat, prompted General Christison to call off the attack against Razabil by January30th. Christison regrouped his corps artillery and tanks to instead support the 7th divisions assault against Buthidaung and Letwedet.   Meanwhile further to the north, General Tanaka had brought 6300 men of the 55th and 56th regiments to the Hukawng valley by early January. He wanted to counterattack in strength, but General Mutaguchi believed he could not spare additional motor transport units to give the necessary logistical support to the 18th division since preparations were already going on for operation U-GO. Thus, Tanaka ordered his men to perform a delaying action down the Hukawng valley with the primary objective of holding Kamaing, the ridge line separating Hukawng valley from Mogaung valley. Tanaka weighed his orders and the looming monsoon season that hit the area in May or June. Against Tanaka, Stilwell sought to continue his offensive after successfully taking Yupbang Ga. Stilwell now looked towards Taihpa Ga and convinced both General Wingate and Admiral Mountbatten to unleash the Galahad long penetration unit into the Hukawng valley.   On January 4, 1944, Frank Merrill abruptly relieved a disappointed Brink. Despite having a background with cavalry, like Brink, Merrill understood the Japanese strength, but unlike Brink he respected the chain of command. General Sun met with Stilwell and and it was agreed the bulk of the 114th regiment should swing widely around Tanaka’s left flank while the 113th regiment wheeled to the south to hit Tanaka’s front along the Tanai Hka. Further north the 2nd battalion ,112th regiment would also advance east across the Tarung Hka to secure Warang Ga; the 65th regiment would continue their advance towards Taro, fording the Tanai river by January 9th; south of Kantau, the 3rd battalion, 114th regiment ran into two Japanese companies. The jungle made it difficult for the Chinese forces to organize themselves. The battalion split into 4 fragments and no two of them were in contact. The supporting 6th battery could not fire until fields of fire were cut and while that was being carried out, the Japanese companies performed infiltration maneuvers and quickly surrounded the battery. Fighting for their guns and lives between the 9th and 11th of January the Chinese cannoneers managed to save both. The battalion was nearly wiped out from these Japanese tactics, but thankfully on January 12th, the regimental HQ arrived and reformed the battalion to launch a concerted attack that managed to gradually push back the Japanese. 3 days later the 2nd battalion arrived allowing the 114th regiment to force a crossing of the Sanip Hka by January 16th.   Meanwhile the 1st battalion, 113th regiment forded the Tarung river near Yupbang Ga and sent patrols north to occupy Tabawng GA on January 13th. From there they advanced southeast to Kaduja Ga then to Brangbram Hka where they formed a line extending to the junction with the Tanai bank by mid january. On January 21st, the Chinese broke through the Japanese lines north of Brangbram Hka and made it to Ningru Ha less than one mile downstream from Taihpa Ga. Simultaneously, the battered 112th regiment swung wide going north east to Warang Ga. By the end of January the 113th continued their advance upon Taihpa Ga where they would meet stronger Japanese resistance. They began fighting within 1,500 yards of Taihpa Ga. Artillery support, the 4th and 5th Batteries, was then brought up. The next 1,000 yards between the 113th regiment and Taihpa Ga took two days to cross; then they spent a week in what was called "preparations for attack." General Sun's men were now approaching the Japanese strongpoint in the area, and Japanese resistance was more freely offered, with heavy shelling by 75- and 150-mm. pieces. At Taihpa Ga, the Kamaing Road crossed the Tanai on a long gravel bar which bullock carts could use quite well. At this point was the village itself, a humble collection of bashas, long since burnt out. About 800 yards upstream was a ferry across a stretch of fairly deep water. The Japanese used this ferry to bring supplies across the Tanai, rather than the vulnerable and easily spotted gravel bar. Here they had their strongpoint, well prepared and stubbornly defended.   Further to the west, the 65th regiment advance was much slower than expected for Stilwell.  Upon reaching the Hukawng Valley, the 65th's commander, despite means more than ample for his mission, contracted the same lethargy that had hastened the demise of the 112th Regiment. Stilwell was greatly frustrated by the delay a few more weeks with Colonel Fu, so he ordered Colonel Liao to relieve him. Stilwell wrote in his diary "Told Liao this included division commanders unless they watched their step. Also that Fu really should be shot. Liao took it OK though it shook him up." On January 22, General Sun was told about this affair, but the news softened somewhat by the presentation of a silk banner for the victory at Yupbang Ga, a dramatic contrast of the respective awards for lethargy and vigor. Having made his point, and hoping that he had given the Chinese a healthy shock, Stilwell restored Fu to his command by January 26. Fu's later performance in combat was rated as excellent.   The Chinese managed to encircle the passive 3rd battalion, 55th regiment on January 23rd, and by the 25th the last Japanese pockets were wiped out. On the 26th the Chinese reached Ahawk Hka and on the 28th crossed the Taro river and occupied Taro on the 30th. This effectively cut behind Tanaka’s flank. The bulk of the 112th now was close enough to the 113th to aid them so Sun began an attack against Taihpa Ga on the 30th. The Japanese held on stubbornly for days and would quietly withdrew on the night of February 4th. Tanaka concluded the loss of the Taro plain meant "the failure of the whole division in its operations along the Tanai". Thus Tanaka decided there was no point in continuing the fighting there. Over at Sanip, Sun ordered the 3rd battalion, 114th regiment to rest. However Stilwell thought this was close to disobedience of his orders,  because he wanted Sun to move quickly and cut behind the 18th Division. On January 13, he had spoken very bluntly to Sun, asking him what orders he gave the 114th Regiment and if there had been any word from Chongqing to slow the operation. Stilwell told Sun that if he could not exercise the commands that Peanut had given him, he would resign and report the whole affair to the US Government. "Regardless of what anyone else may say, I assure you that my report will be fully believed in Washington." General Sun was confronted with the prospect that Chinese lethargy in north Burma might mean withdrawal of all US help from China. Stilwell, Sun was told, had been alone in his fight to convince the United States that the Chinese Army was worth helping. "If I am double-crossed by the people I am trying to help I am through for good and I will recommend very radical measures." Stilwell closed by saying that he had done his part; would Sun reciprocate? But despite Stilwell's arguments and threats, General Sun did not meet Stilwell's ideas of how a dynamic field commander should conduct himself. Thus the 114th gradually began to dislodge the Japanese from their positions along the river bank, taking care to annihilate all pockets behind. Stilwell was satisfied with the progress of his offensive and established the northern combat area command on February 1st. This organization would be led by Brigadier General Haydon Boatner and would include American, British and Indian units entering North Burma. But that is all for the wild Burma front as we now need to travel over to New Guinea.   Last time we were in New Guinea, Brigadier Chilton’s 18th brigade had just completed their advance upon Shaggy Ridge and Brigadier Hammer’s 15th brigade had just relieved the 25th brigade on January 7th. Thus two brigades were flown in and two were flown out, showcasing how far the allied New Guinea air forces had increased their efficiency during the war. The New Guinea force was now under the command of General Milford, though Vasey still retained his task of  "contain hostile forces in the Bogadjim-Ramu area by vigorous action of fighting patrols against enemy posts”. The division's role was still to prevent enemy penetration into the Ramu-Markham valley from Madang and protect the Gusap airfield and the various radar installations the instruction added that the division would "create the impression of offensive operations against Bogadjim Road by vigorous local minor offensive action". This was to be done by holding in strength with two brigades a "line of localities" from Toms' Post on the right to the Mene River on the left, the boundary between the 18th on the right and the 15th on the left being a line from Bebei through Herald Hill to Kankirei Saddle. In addition the 18th Brigade would "by raids and harassing tactics ensure that no major Jap withdrawal takes place undetected and occupy the Mindjim-Faria divide and the high ground to the north and south of it as the administrative position permits". The 15th Brigade would hold the Yogia-Mene River area, delay any enemy advance up the Ramu from the Evapia River, patrol to the Solu River, and deny the 5800 and 5500 Features to the enemy.    Despite this, Vasey was preparing to assault the Kankirei saddle with the fresh 18th brigade. Designated Operation Cutthroat, the seizure of the Kankieri saddle and ultimately that of Shaggy Ridge, Vasey planned to launch an attack against Mount Prothero which was being defended by the 6th company, 78th regiment. He would attack it from the south, preceded by a diversionary attack against Cam’s saddle. Brigadier Chilton realized however, that frontal attacks along Shaggy Ridge would not be able to achieve surprise, so he instead wanted to attempt a wide encircling maneuver on the left flank via Canning’s saddle to attack Prothero directly. The 18th brigade spent the early part of January patrolling to see if it was possible to advance through Canning’s saddle to Prothero 1 while simultaneously and stealthily building a road to Canning’s in preparation for the coming offensive.   The possibility of occupying Prothero from Canning's Saddle had been suggested to Chilton by Lt-Colonel Lang of the 2/2nd Pioneers, after a patrol performed by Captain McInnes. Captain McInnes had found an approach along a steep, razor backed spur within a short distance of Prothero’s summit where they could hear Japanese. Meanwhile the 2/9th battalion had sent a patrol that found a possible track from McGullough’s ridge vie Geyton’s Hill to the Mene River. Going up the river bed led one to Canning’s saddle. Two companies of the 2/12th spent a few days constructing a track going to the Mene River and they took special precautions to prevent the enemy from finding out. Reconnaissance patrols in general were careful to avoid contact with the enemy and so was the case around Prothero. The jeep track was hurriedly pushed to Guy's Post, existing tracks were improved and shorter and better tracks constructed to improve the supply routes to Shaggy Ridge and Mainstream; reserves of supplies in forward areas were built up, thus enabling a concentration of as many natives as possible to carry for the attacking battalion on the left, and arrangements were made for a limited air dropping at Canning's Saddle at an appropriate time.   To support the upcoming attack, 9 long and two short 25 pounders of the 2/4th field regiment were brought up along with 7000 shells. The guns had to be dragged forward to the Lakes-Guy’s Post area. Lt Colonel Charles Bourne’s 2/12th battalion was to head the attack. Chilton also planned to have Lt Colonel Charles Geard’s 2/10th battalion perform a diversionary attack through Cam’s saddle. After Protharo 1 was captured, the 2/10th were to exploit north to Kankieri and south to the Mainstream area; while Lt Colonel Clement Cummins 2/9th battalion attacked northwest along Shaggy Ridge to join up with the 2/12th. By January 18th, the 4000 yard track to Geyton’s Hill was complete, allowing the 18th brigade to advance. On that same day, B-25 Mitchell bombers unleashed their cannons and bombed the enemy positions at the junction of Mainstream, the Faria and Shaggy ridge. They dropped 60 delayed action bombs over the Faria river valley and some modified Mitchells sporting 75mm cannons mounted on their chins fired upon the crest of ridges. This cannon, the same used by Sherman tanks, was quite a formidable weapon in the air. To enable its fire, the nose of the B-25G model had to be shortened and the cannon breech positioned behind the pilot from where it could be loaded by the navigator for firing. To fire it the pilot would press a button on his control wheel. The weapon would prove inefficient against shipping, but it would be a lot more successful at hitting ground targets. Over three successive days from 18 to 20 January the Mitchells flew 180 sorties against Shaggy Ridge, firing 135 rounds of 75 mm at the ridge as well as dropping around 200 tons of bombs. The aircraft also fired about 90,000 rounds of .50 caliber. The machine-gun salvos were particularly devastating. From his accompanying Boomerang, Alex Miller-Randle recalled ‘Mitchells strip the trees of Shaggy Ridge clean and shatter the limbs and trunks to matchsticks’.   D-day was the 20th, seeing the 2/10th on the right and 2/12th on the left. Captain Kumnicks company of the 2/10th advanced to Grassy Patch and over on the left a party of the 2/12th led by Major Fraser took vanguard. All of the preliminary actions were completed back on the 19th when Captain Gunn’s A company of the 2/10th advanced from Tom’s Post for Sprogg’s ridge via a Japanese mule track. Later Captain Humnicks D company would use the same track. On the left the 2/12th battalion and B and D company of the 2/2nd Pioneers advanced along the new line of communication to Geyton’s. At 8:45am Captain Gunn’s company advanced from Sprogg’s ridge to attack Cam’s Saddle, followed 30 minutes later by Captain Kumnick’s company. Operation Cutthroat opened up with artillery and B-25 mitchell bombardments against the Protheros and Kankirei Saddle. By 11 a .m. Captain Gunn was 300 yards from an enemy position on Cam's Saddle while artillery shelled the position until 12.30 pm when the Australians found that the enemy had withdrawn.   Farther on, Captain Gunn’s men would be pinned down by Japanese defending the western end of the saddle as Japanese patrols ambushed a signal line party 500 yards behind. Gunn initially tried to outflank the enemy, but then withdrew 200 yards and dug in for the night astride the mule track. At the same time, the 2/12th battalion reached Canning’s Saddle by 3:30pm. The next morning, the 2/12th began to silently creep along the razor back ridge towards Prothero 1 with Cameron’s C Company taking the lead. At this point Fraser had Captain Cameron’s C Company, Captain Geason’s A Company  and Captain Thomas’s D company enveloping the ridge. They nearly achieved surprise, but the Japanese discovered their advance and rapidly turned their mountain gun upon them causing many casualties. Despite the mountain guns fire, Lt Braithwaites 8th Platoon charged the Japanese and captured the mountain gun upon Prothero 1. The action cost 11 Australian lives with another 44 wounded. The 2/12th had thus captured the key point in the Japanese defenses upon Shaggy Ridge. After the loss of the mountain gun position, Colonel Matsumoto ordered his men to pull back closer to Kankirei. In the process the 2/10th were able to capture Cam’s Saddle. On that same day the 2/9th began their attack, sending A Company to envelope the Green Sniper’s Pimple defended by a platoon of the 78th regiment. A Company managed to seize the position using stealth and would be met by failed counterattacks. By the end of the day the Japanese defenders were now sandwiched between the 2/9th to the south and the 2/12th to the north, while the 2/10th were advancing from the east.   Way further to the east, General Nakano’s men were in an even more dire situation. After the evacuation of Sio, the Japanese were forced to retreat day and night under heavy rainfall, hindered by rough terrain and allied aerial attacks. Lieutenant General Yoshihara Kane, Chief of Staff of the 18th Army, recalled this of the march: “The most wearing part was that with these ranges, when they climbed to the craggy summit they had to descend and then climb again, and the mountains seemed to continue indefinitely, until they were at the extreme of exhaustion. Especially when they trod the frost of Nokobo Peak they were overwhelmed by cold and hunger. At times they had to make ropes out of vines and rattan and adopt "rock-climbing" methods; or they crawled and slipped on the steep slopes; or on the waterless mountain roads they cut moss in their potatoes and steamed them. In this manner, for three months, looking down at the enemy beneath their feet, they continued their move. Another thing which made the journey difficult was the valley streams, which were not usually very dangerous. At times, however, there was a violent squall, for which the Finisterres are famous during the rainy season; then these valley streams for the time being flowed swiftly and became cataracts. Then there were many people drowned... General Shoge was swept away by one of these streams on one occasion but fortunately managed to grasp the branch of a tree which was near the bank and was able to save one of his nine lives.”   The men were malnourished, fatigued, but kept going day by day anticipating an abundant food supply at Gali. When they reached Gali in late January they would find nothing there. This anguish was just the beginning. The base had been shelled by allied warships and bombed by allied aircraft. General Muroya was injured on January 17th during the bombardment. Luckily for the Japanese there was no offensive towards Gali. Since the Saidor landing, General Martin’s men were busy expanding the perimeter with outposts extending towards Sel and Bilau. Martin was reinforced with the 1st and 3rd battalions of the 128th regiment on January 16th. Although Martin believed launching an eastern attack upon the withdrawing enemy would provide an excellent opportunity to destroy some of their divisions, General Kreuger refused to permit such a thing. This was because the 32nd division was required for an upcoming offensive in the Hansa Bay area.   Meanwhile General Nakai had brought the bulk of his detachment over to the Mot River area and established a strong outpost on Gabumi. Nakai also sent the 3rd battalion 239th regiment to Bilau to try and contest the control of its outpost. On January 12, the Japanese attacked Biliau, forcing the Americans to retreat behind the river. 30 Americans then tried to retake the outpost the following day but were repelled by the Japanese. On January 15th, the Japanese withdrew, allowing the 1st Battalion, 128th Regiment to occupy it on January 20. Another Japanese attack on January 26 would force them to retreat; and two days later, the Americans were successfully ambushed when they tried to reoccupy the outpost. Nakano’s men had thus successfully carried out a fighting withdrawal from Lae. They had suffered horribly for it, crossing unbelievable difficult terrain, with basically no supplies, apart from what meager amounts could be airdropped or brought over via submarine. Yet now they needed to break through towards Madang, and there were 3 possible options of doing so. Number 1, they could advance along the coast, but this one was disregarded immediately because they would have to break directly through the new American defenses. Number 2, codenamed A would be an advance inland through Cabutamon, Monara, Sibog and Bilau towards Mindiri. Option 3 codenamed B was an advance even further inland crossing over the foothills of the Finisterre, through Nokopo, Kwembum, Yugayuga, Gabumi and Singor towards Mindiri. Nakano elected to send the 20th division over plan A while his division would advance in 3 echelons over plan B.   On January 23rd, the 51st division departed Gali along the B route while the 1st battalion, 115th regiment and General Katagiri’s 20th division would advance along the A route. Katagiri’s 80th regiment and 20th engineer regiment tried the best they could, but the march was only advancing a single kilometer per day. Katagiri’s troops had to cut through dense jungle and were facing strong enemy patrols along their route. Facing greater difficulties than expected, Katagiri decided to follow Nakano’s 51st division along the A route in the end. Yet unbeknownst to him, the 3rd battalion, 126th regiment had just established new outposts at Sibog and Paramusi on January 22nd. From there they were sending out patrols to Langani and Sindaman. The Americans still could not break through Nakai’s defenses at Gabumi giving the Japanese some relief. The bulk of Nakano’s forces were withdrawing smoothly, seeing just sporadic harassment from American patrols. On the 1st of February, the 1st battalion, 115th regiment finally made contact with Nakai’s forces at Gabumi while the bulk of the 51st division advanced through Yugayuga. A week later, Nakano himself reached Gabumi and began advancing towards Madang. By the 16th of February, the 1st battalion, 115th regiment reached Madang and the 20th division had successfully pulled out of Gabumi.   Late February would see 1667 men in total arrive at Madang, 5469 would reach Singor and 1235 would reach Gabumi. Thus 80% of Nakano’s strength had effectively withdrawn. Nakai also managed to collect 500 patients that had been abandoned at Yugayuga and brought them over to Madang by March 1st. It seemed once again, Nakano’s men had escaped doom. On the other side, Brigadier Cameron had begun his advance towards Saidor on January 25th. His 4th battalion led by Lt Colonel Percy Crosky, with a Papuan company reached Kiari on January 28th. Without taking a break they continued towards Singor the next day, then Malasanga and Crossingtown by the 31st.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Japanese were slowly but surely losing their hold over Shaggy Ridge. With the loss of the vital artillery position it was just a matter of time before the Australians took over the area, meanwhile Nakano’s great retreat was a success, but one does not win a war moving backwards. 

Last time we spoke about the landing at Saidor and the drive against Sio. The Australians were still advancing across Shaggy Ridge when General MacArthur unleashed an amphibious assault against Saidor to cut off the Japanese escape and isolate Sio. Numerous features were seized up the large ridge and the Americans successfully amphibiously assaulted Saidor and seized their airfield. General Adachi placed the 51st and 20th divisions under the command of General Nakano, who was tasked with advancing to Gali to try and secure a new supply point. Meanwhile efforts were made to try and contain the new threat in Saidor while simultaneously holding back the Australians in the south. Over on new britain the airdrome was seized as Colonel Katayama launched a failed counter attack against the Marines. The Marines tossed back the attack and began their own advance further inland. This episode is Ledo Road Offensive Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  The Americans had landed at Cape Gloucester, Saidor and were carrying out massive attacks against Rabaul. As we had seen previously, on November 5th, aided by bad weather, a surprise air raid was made by the USS Saratoga and Princeton, led by Rear-Admiral Frederick Sherman that inflicted heavy damage to 4 cruisers within the harbor; Maya’s engine room was smashed by a bomb killing over 70 men; a 500 lb bomb hit Mogami; Takao took 2 500 lb bomb hits while 3 500 lb bombs narrowly missed Atago killing 23 seamen and caused severe damage to the ship’s plating. 2 other cruisers and 3 destroyers also suffered light damage. Captain George Chandler flying a P-38 fighter pilot described how “There were B-24 bombers up high and B-25 bombers attacking right down on the deck dropping ‘frag’ bombs on the airplanes along the runways … we did our best work at high altitude, but we also took part in combat a thousand feet off the ground.” The devastation caused Admiral Miniechi Koga to withdraw his forces to Truk, thus ending the IJN threat to Bougainville. A Japanese naval officer would later admit that they had given up on Bougainville mainly because of “the serious damage received by several Second Fleet cruisers at Rabaul by carrier attack …” The successful  raid against Rabaul left Halsey ecstatic. “It is real music to me and opens the stops for a funeral dirge for Tojo’s Rabaul.” On November 8th, reinforcements led by Rear-admiral Alfred Montgomery task force 38, with the new fleet carriers USS Bunker Hill, Essex and Independence. With the added carrier strength on November 11th, a follow up air raid was made seeing the IJN cruiser Agano torpedoed and badly damaged, while 35 Japanese aircraft out of 120 launched in a counter attack against the carrier force were shot down. Montgomery would not lose a single ship. Admiral Koga’s decision to send carrier pilots to bolster Rabaul had quite literally blown up in his face. Koga’s air fleet had lost 43 of its 82 Zeros, 38 of its 34 Vals, 34 of its 40 Kates and 6 Judy spotter planes. Over 86 of his 192 experienced pilots and crew had perished, and he had only inflicted minimal damage to Nimitz fleet, it was a disaster. Yet the fantastical reports from Japanese pilots kept pouring in, claiming the air battles over Bougainville were infact won by the IJN air forces. Newspapers in Japan reported victories that added up to the destruction of 5 American battleships, 10 carriers, 19 cruisers and 7 destroyers. The reality was the destruction of 2 cruisers, the USS Birmingham and Denver. By mid november Vice Admiral Kusaka was finding it difficult to sustain attacks against allied convoys feeding supplies to Empress Augusta Bay. On November 12th, Rabaul only had 113 Zero’s of which only 59 were operational. Crews were suffering from malaria and other diseases, no one was granted rest as they were limited in personnel and under constant attack. The quality of ground crews and pilots was deteriorating every week.  From November 12 through December 16, the daytime skies over the Gazelle Peninsula remained relatively quiet, as the US carrier forces had departed to support operations in the Central Pacific. AirSols received a new commander on the November 20th, Major General Ralph Mitchell who continued to support operations in Bougainville and General Kenney’s Fifth Air Force was supporting preparations for the landings in western New Britain. The lull gave Admiral Kusaka a brief opportunity to recuperate as replacements began to arrive from the Marshalls and Truk. The Imperial Japanese Navy would take six months to replenish its carrier pilots with less well-trained and inexperienced replacements. In the meantime the carrier fleet itself, Japan’s most expensive and precious strategic asset, was forced to remain idle in Truk as Nimitz began his island hop through the Central Pacific Meanwhile the Torokina airfield had become crude but operational. The Seabees had created a single 4750 foot by 200 foot strip. It lacked taxiways, hardstands and buildings, but by December 10th it could launch aircraft. Soon the Seabees would carve 2 additional landing trips in the jungle 3 miles further inland. The first would be a mile long, the second 8000 feet or so for bombers. Unlike the Japanese airfields on the Gazelle Peninsula which would take more than a year to complete, both of these American airfields took a month. You often hear, especially from marine veterans of the pacific, praise for the Seabees, such a colossal advantage in logistics paved the way to victory. A massive fighter sweep was launched on December 17 consisting of 32 Corsairs, 24 F6Fs, and 24 RNZAF Kittyhawks from airfields at New Georgia and Vella Lavella who rendezvoused at Torokina, topped off their fuel tanks, and hit  Rabaul. The strike was led by Major Greg “Pappy” Boyington, the commanding officer of Marine Fighter Squadron 214, better known by its nickname, the "Black Sheep Squadron". The three types of aircraft had different flying characteristics and different cruising speeds. The Kittyhawks, slowest of the bunch, took off first. The plan was for them to come in at 15,000ft, and lure out the Japanese. Next came the Hellcats, flying above the Kittyhawks. And the last were the Corsairs, who flew top cover. It was a long flight over open water, calculated to make the pilot of a single-engine aircraft nervous. If the engine failed it was a long swim home. They were intercepted by 35 Zeros, with the Kittyhawks getting the first jump on them. After the Kittyhawks made their first pass, shooting down a Japanese fighter, the advantage switched over to the more agile  Zeros. The Kittyhawk squadron leader’s plane was fatally damaged and a second Kittyhawk went down after colliding with a Zero. Remarkably, both pilots survived. Meanwhile the Hellcats and Corsairs, at high altitudes, were coming up empty. The Corsairs circled Lakunai field finding no targets. Pilot Boyington exchanged insults with an English-speaking Japanese officer over the radio, but despite his challenges found no targets in the air. When all aircraft returned to base, the score was even. Two Kittyhawks and two Zeros were lost; one each due to the collision and one shot down by both sides. It was a rather disappointing fighter sweep, but would become just one of many against Rabual over the course of the next 3 weeks. The next raid came two days later seeing 48 B-24s launched, but 32 were forced turned back. The remaining 16 bombers escorted by 51 were intercepted by 94 Japanese fighters, yet they also suffered from the bad weather. Less than half made contact with the enemy. In the resulting fight, 5 Zeros were shot down and 10 allied aircraft were lost, but only two were shot down. The other eight were due to a mid-air collision and landing mishaps, all near home. The weather persisted to be so bad, it was only on the 23rd another sortie could be launched. B-24s escorted by Corsairs and Hellcats bombed Lakunai. Radar gave the Japanese some early warning and nearly 100 Zeros were scrambled. 60 made contact with the bombers after they hit Lakunai. No bombers were lost, but 2 Corsairs were shot down in the ensuing dogfights. Yet the Americans had a twist, they followed up the raid with a fighter sweep of 48 Corsairs. They arrived 15 minutes after the bombers left, surprising the airborne Japanese fighters, most of whom lacked radios. 6 Zeros were shot down, several others damaged and only 2 Corsairs lost.  2 days later, another fighter sweep preceded by bombers was launched claiming 18 aircraft kills, but it was probably closer to 5. In comparison the Japanese pilots would claim 55 kills, a number greater than the american force sent. On the 27 another sweep was launched against Cape Gloucester downing 7 Japanese aircraft for one American. 28 Corsairs returned the next day but this time the Japanese held the advantage, sandwiching the Marines between 2 large groups of Zeros. 3 Corsairs were shot down, but so were 3 Zeros, with 2 others badly damaged. On 30th 36 Liberators escorted by 20 Hellcats and 20 Corsairs, bombed Rabaul. 1 B-24 was lost on the raid, hit by antiaircraft fire. No air combat occurred. On New Years day 15 B-24s and 68 escorting fighters met heavy fighter opposition. 40 Zeros had been sent to Rabaul from Truk, manned by veteran pilots. 1 B-24 was shot down, and two others badly damaged. On January 2 48 US fighters raided and on the 3rd another 44. The two sweeps took out a handful of fighters. The last sweep was on the 5th seeing another 2 zeros downed. Meanwhile back on December 24th, Admiral Sherman’s task force 37 raided Kavieng. The operation had two purposes, 1) was to distract attention from the landings at Cape Gloucester and 2) to interdict sea traffic between Truk and Rabaul. The 5000-ton naval transport Tenyru Maru was sunk and several other ships were damaged. After this task force 37 made several raids against Kavieng through January 4th. They managed to shoot down 10 Japanese fighters, damaged IJN cruiser Noshiro and destroyers Fumizuki and Satsuki. On Janaury 6th, the bomber strip at Piva became operational, thus Rabaul was now within range of allied light and medium bombers, basically it was pounding time.   On January 7th, 16 Avengers and 24 Dauntless raided Tobera airfield. From medium altitudes the Avengers dropped 2000lb pounds smashing the paved runways. The Japanese managed to shoot down 3 fighters and one dauntless, but Tobera was temporarily not operational. It was the first time any Rabaul airbase was neutralized from bomb damage. This would be followed up on the 11th by a low level attack against Vunakanau by B-25’s, damaging 8 parked aircraft. Then on the 14th, Simpson Harbor was attacked by 16 Avengers , 36 Dauntless and fighter escorts. The Japanese tossed 84 fighters but the allies held such a tight formation it was difficult to get at the bombers. 2 bombers were lost before reaching Lakunai; 1 to a mid-air collision and 1 to antiaircraft fire. When the Allied aircraft finally arrived, clouds shielded Lakunai so the bombers switched to targeting the ships in Simpson Harbor. The Avengers carried 2,000lb bombs, limiting their effectiveness. Regardless, they landed hits on the 15,400-ton-displacement oiler Naruto, and thus ended its goal of becoming the Hokage. . . sorry folks could not resist that one. The destroyer Matsukaze was also damaged alongside 5 other vessels.    AirSols came back to hit simpson harbor and blanche bay 3 days later sinking  the Komaki Maru, Kosei Maru, Yamayuri Maru, Hakkai Maru and Iwate Maru. To take down the combined 30,000 tons of shipping AirSols lost 8 P-38s, 1 Hellcat, 1 F4U, 1 Avenger, and 1 Dauntless. The rest of January saw so many raids, sometimes 2-3 on the same day, thus I can’t spend the entire podcast listing their actions, but the losses were brutal. For the Americans they would lose 23 aircraft between January 23rd-30th, for the Japanese it was around 37. By the end of the month, Rabaul was being bled dry of planes, thus the rest was withdrawn to Truk with around 40 pilots. To make up for the withdrawal, Admiral Koga brought over the air groups of carriers Junyo, Hiyo and Ryuho on the 25th adding 62 zeros, 18 vals and 18 kates to Admiral Kusakas dwindling forces. Does that not sound like performing the exact same action that saw such devastating losses in late december to early january? Yes, yes it does.    Moving over to New Britain, General Shepherd had just smashed the Japanese positions along Suicide Creek. While seizing Suicide Creek some Americans captured a Japanese dispatch saying “It is essential that we conceal the intention that we are maintaining positions on Aogiri Ridge. Concerning the occupation of this position, it is necessary that Aogiri Yama is maintained.” While making arrangements for the Japanese assault against Target Hill one, Lieutenant Abe had occasion sent field dispatches to Warrant Officer Kiyoshi Yamaguchi, one of his platoon leaders. The dispatch mentioned command post locations, hour of attack, and other orders. Yamaguchi, with that seemingly incredible indifference to basic security which the Japanese so often demonstrated, simply stuck the dispatch in his pocket and carried it with him to the assault. Marines found it on his body the following morning, thereby gaining their first inkling of the existence of a terrain feature which appeared as such on none of their maps but upon which the Japanese appeared to place great importance, for reasons not yet clear. Aoigiri Ridge was not in the American maps and it was currently held by the 2nd battalion, 53rd regiment and 2nd battalion, 141st regiment. Behind the ridge was a wide trail leading to Magairapua, connecting Matsuda’s HQ with Borgen Bay. The trail was heavily used and concealed extremely well from American aircraft. Back over at the American lines, by January 5th, the 3rd battalion, 7th marines had pulled back into the reserve, allowing the weapons company, 7th marines to occupy the extreme left along the shore to prepare for Shepherds offensive against Hill 150. The new formation launched their attack at 11am on the 6th. Tanks surged forward to smash a roadblock held by the 2nd battalion, 141st regiment on the left trail. Artillery was deployed on a nearby hill hitting the Japanese lines as A company tried to break through but was quickly pinned down by the roadblock. The tanks eventually burst through the roadblock sending the Japanese packing.   The americans advanced through the increasingly swampy terrain, facing weaker resistance. B company crossed a small stream and stormed Hill 150 during the afternoon, securing it. Further right, C company and the 3rd battalion, 5th marines were surprised to be held up by extremely heavy fire from the until then unknown feature, Aogiri ridge. The men had no other choice than to pull back to a safe distance to dig in as they reported back the presence of the heavily fortified position. The Japanese would unleash carnage upon the men for 2 days whenever they tried to press forward. On the 7th the commanding officer of the 3rd battalion, 5th Marines, was wounded and replaced by Lt Colonel Lewis Walt. The next day, Walk’s men were cautiously inching forward under heavy enemy fire through dense jungle, when they first encountered the ground rising in steepness. At this point Walt realized the feature had to be Aogiri Ridge.    On the 9th, the assault battalions resumed their attacks, this time with heavy artillery support against Aogiri ridge. Walt was reinforced with Companies K and L from the 7th marines, but the advance was extremely slow and painful. Two Japanese bunkers were knocked out with white phosphorus grenades, but that ended the limited gains. Walt personally began pushing a 37mm gun excruciating foot by foot up Aogiri ridge, firing a volley of canisters every few feet. Somehow he managed to get the gun up the steep slope into a decent position to sweep the ridge, allowing the gain of a foothold on the crest of Aogiri. The loss of the ridge was a huge threat to Matsuda and Katayama’s positions, so the latter decided to throw his reserves in a desperate but ferocious counterattack.   At 1:15am on the 10th, Katayama sent his recently arrived 3rd battalion to attack the reverse slope. However the Marines held firm and would end up repelling 5 consecutive banzai charges with a fury and persistence unparalleled in the campaign. On the 4th try a Japanese major and two company officers succeeded in knifing through the Marine cordon almost to Colonel Walt's fox hole, 50 yards behind the front line. At that instant one of two short rounds in a 60-round artillery barrage burst in a tall tree almost directly overhead, and the major died there, sword in one hand and a pistol in the other. The 5th charge was blunted by artillery and the Japanese finally cut their losses and pulled back. The Japanese had suffered immense casualties, seeing all 3 of their battalions depleted, forcing Katayama to pull off Aogiri ridge that very night. The morning of the 10th saw Walk’s men securing the feature and then discovering the vital Magairapua trail. The marines went to work mopping up the area until January 12th, whereupon Shepherd planned to seize Hill 660. The feature was guarded by the 6th company, 141st regiment supported by a number of guns of the 30th machine cannon company. The fresh 3rd battalion, 7th marines, led by lt colonel Henry Buse Jr were to perform the main assault, with the 1st battalion extending the perimeter behind them. To help the effort, the weapons company,7th marines of Captain Buckley would begin constructing a roadblock between the eastern base of Hill 660 to the shore of Borgen Bay, hoping to cut off the defenders escape route.   At 08:00am on the 13th, after artillery, mortars and the 5th Air Force performed a bombardment of the area, the last Marine offensive commenced. A intricate system of small arms and automatic weapon positions going up the summit unleashed fire upon the marines, quickly pinning down I company. L Company attempted swinging to the right, but were also pinned down. Engineers worked a light tank forward far enough to place fire across a gorge demolishing the more troublesome enemy weapons. By late afternoon, together with artillery supporting fire, the pinned-down companies were rescued and withdrawn for the night. Meanwhile the Weapons company worked with their bulldozer, by 1030 they had skirted the eastern base of the hill and set up an all-around perimeter. There they dug in clearing fields of fire for about 60 yards to both north and south, placing their half-tracks and tanks in supporting positions. The only opposition they encountered during the advance was by two Japanese machine guns and emplaced near the summit of the hill. With all said and done they successfully cut off the Japanese line of retreat.  On the morning of the 14th, the 3rd battalion resumed their assault, with their leading companies advancing to the right working their way up. One unit nearly got atop the crest before coming under fire from heavy machine guns. They got to a position where they could bring 60mm mortars to bear, and went to work neutralizing the machine gun positions before a final surge carried them across the summit. The Japanese fled down the crest heading east, coming straight into the line of fire of the Weapons company below. The result was a terrible rout, seeing many escape to the safety of the swamps to the hills southeast. By the end of the 14th, the marines had seized Hill 660 and were performing mop up operations through the following day. At 5:30am on the 16th, Katayama ordered the 6th and 11th companies, 141st regiment to counter attack Hill 660. Soon the marines were face to face with a large banzai charge, seeing the fighting getting up close and personal. But small arms, rifles, 60mm mortars and 81mm artillery broke the Japanese. Over 110 Japanese bodies would be found after the fight. This ended Shepherds offensive, as the remnants of Colonel Sumiya’s forces began to arrive to the Borgen Bay area. Over the next few days, the exhausted 7th marines were relieved by the 5th marines and 2nd battalion, 1st marines who had recently been recalled after completing their mission at Green Beach.  After suffering the defeated in Borgen Bay, General Sakai decided to order the 1st battalion, 54th regiment to reinforce Talasea and for Matsuda to launch a last ditch effort, a suicidal one at that, to obliterate the enemy. But the men were in no condition for such an offensive, thus Katayama elected to postpone it for now. Since every man was needed for the defense of Borgen Bay, Colonel Sato took the remainder of his commander and departed Rooke Island to join the main body. Now that Hill 660 was secured, the Americans began a new method of patrolling; this time their patrols would specifically seek out and destroy what was presumed to be exhausted Japanese units, before the division would attack the defensive line at Borgen Bay-Itni river. Yet that is it for new Britian, as we are going to be traveling over to the CBI theater. Between November 22 to December the 1st, two conference were held between the Allied leaders. The first was the Cairo or “sextant” conference on November 22-26th, between President FDR, Sir Winston Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek. The second was held in Tehran on November 28-December 1st between FDR, Churchill and Joseph Stalin. You might be asking, why did they all not meet up together. The crux of it was the Soviet-Japanese neutrality Pact and to a lesser extent, though probably not in Chiang Kai-Shek's mind, Stalin was aiding the CCP. Because the Soviets had not declared war on the Japanese, it would not look to good if they met with the leader of China, likewise Chiang Kai-shek was not too forthcoming to meet with Stalin. The easy fix was to just have two different conferences. Overall the conferences did not really touch too much upon the Pacific war. But Stalin did promise to declare war on Japan within ninety days after the end of the European War. In return he demanded military and logistical concessions in Manchuria, maintenance of Outer Mongolia under Soviet control as well as sovereignty over the Kuril Islands that stretched from north of Japan to Russia’s Kamchatka Peninsula. When Chiang Kai-shek heard about this he had suspicious and noted “The influence of this conference on China will be great. I hope Roosevelt isn’t plotting with Churchill and Stalin against me.” Soon his suspicion would turn to anger when he discovered there were secret protocols relating to Manchuria.  Stalin had made some assurances to Mao Zedong that once the Soviets were in the war against Japan, they would have forces to bear down into China to help tip the scale for the CCP against the NRA. Yet after the war, it would seem promises made by Joseph Stalin were not always kept.  Another important aspect of the conferences was the British decision to cancel Operation Buccaneer, the invasion of the Andaman Islands, because Admiral Mountbatten’s landing crafts were required for landings in southern france. The Joint chiefs of staff were livid at this, because it came at the same time the Japanese were reinforcing Burma. FDR overruled them and agreed to the British decision and this in turn greatly pissed off Chiang Kai-Shek. Yet at the same time, the Cairo declaration had lifted up the morale for the Chinese army and people to continue their war against the Japanese. The declarations made by the Tehran conference implied publicly that the CBI theater was all but abandoned to the mercy of Japan’s air and land forces. Thus it would be no coincidence the Japanese thought it ripe to launch an all-out offensive against China.  In the meantime, the rather aggressive Admiral Mountbatten was trying to salvage what he could of the situation. To try and please Chiang Kai-Shek, he proposed Operation Pigstick. The operation was something Mountbatten had wargamed a bit, it was to be a landing on the southern Mayu peninsula aimed at hitting Akyab. He began assigning landing craft for the amphibious operation, only to be immediately slapped down by Alanbrooke and told to return 3 fast tank landing crafts that were direly needed for operations against Italy. Mountbatten hoped to retain 2 slower tank landing craft, but Cunningham requested them. Pigstick was to be 2 divisions plus 2 brigades who would be used in a southward advance down the peninsula and 1 division in an amphibious assault aimed at surrounding and destroying not less than 20,000 Japanese. An additional landing similar to PIGSTICK, could perhaps be launched in the Ramree-Cheduba area, could take staging areas that would put 15 Corps within reach of Rangoon. Speaking of Ramree, if any of you have heard this kind of myth about over 1000 Japanese being eaten by crocodiles on that island, over on my personal channel the pacific war channel I did a full investigation into the so called “ramree island massacre” story. A little sad about its performance not going to lie. Dramatically improved my lackluster animation skills for it, came out really well and I did a silly impersonation at the beginning, anyways check it out its a fun one! Alongside Pigstick, Mountbatten changed the Tarzan operation into Operation Gripfast, calling for an offensive on north and central Burma with an airborne landing at Indaw to sever the Japanese line of communications to Myitkyina. But now Chiang Kai-Shek was very wary of anything British, so he rejected the plans on December 19th. Alongside pissing off Chiang Kai-Shek, his estranged wife, Joseph Stilwell was also again angry with the British, particularly Mountbatten. At one point Mountbatten proposed moving certain American units into the Hukawng valley to help the offensive there and Stillwell burst out ‘I should like it placed on record that I am responsible for the training of all American forces in this theatre and I am the person to decide when they are adequately trained and can move forward.’ Mountbatten replied: ‘I accept that in principle, but would remind you that these troops are being trained under British officers. I am responsible for operations and will decide when units move into the fighting lines. In other words, general, I should like to place on record that I am Supreme Commander out here and what I say goes.’ Stilwell took it good-humouredly and laughed. ‘We none of us dispute that,’”. That day Stilwell wrote a letter to his wife, referring scathingly to Mountbatten as ‘the glamour boy. He doesn’t wear well and I begin to wonder if he knows his stuff. Enormous staff, endless walla-walla but damn little fighting . . . And of course the Peanut is unchanged. The jungle is a refuge from them both.’ The men would all share some screaming matches against another, until Stilwell would shock everyone by exclaiming “I am prepared to come under General Slim’s operational control until I get to Kamaing.” It was a truly bizarre idea, Mountbatten asked how such a thing would work, and both Slim and Stilwell asked to discuss the matter amongst themselves. The two men would agree on tactical essentials such as getting more Chinese divisions for the Ledo force and to use the Chindits to assist in hitting Myitkyina. Slim and Stilwell shook hands and Stilwell said to him ‘I would fight under a corporal as long as he would let me fight.’ Slim would later reflecte ‘In practice this illogical command set-up worked surprisingly well. My method with Stilwell was based on what I had learnt of him in the Retreat – to send him the minimum of written instructions, but, whenever I wanted anything, to fly over and discuss it with him, alone. Stilwell, talking things over quietly with no one else present, was a much easier and more likeable person than Vinegar Joe with an audience. Alone, I never found him unreasonable or obstructive. I think I told him to do something he did not approve of on only two or three occasions, and on each he conformed, I will not say willingly, but with good grace.’ In the end Operation Pigstick never became a reality, because the landing crafts were needed for the Italian campaign and thus the hope of meeting Chiang Kai-sheks continued demand for an amphibious operation was gone. It was almost like the British never intended to go through with such a thing in the first place, woops that is just my opinion. Meanwhile the British-Indian command elected to start a new operation in Arakan. The brutal hard-won lessons of 1st Arakan battle had been absorbed in India Command, with senior British officers determined to avoid similar mistakes. The new operation was the subject of meticulous reconnaissance, planning, and rehearsals. A series of lectures, war games, models of the grounds and syndicate discussions were held for commanders, staff and regimental officers whom carefully considered countering Japanese offensive tactics and assaulting prepared defensive positions like those witnessed at Donbaik. A carefully planned programme of continuous, progressive and intensive training was put in hand for all corps and divisional fighting, support and administrative troops to practice necessary skills, including using brigade boxes, aerial resupply and the infiltration and envelop- ment of enemy positions. This comprehensive training programme culminated in intensive rehearsals and combined arms training with artillery, tanks and close support aircraft carried out near Lohardaga, over ground resembling Arakan, simulating attacks on mock Japanese defensive positions on jungle-clad hills. General Auchinleck assigned the 15th corps, reconstituted at Ranchi with the 3 best trained divisions available: Major-General Harold Briggs’ 5th Indian Division; Major-General Frank Messervy’s 7th Indian Division and Major-General Christopher Woolner’s 81st West African Division.The 26th Indian Division formed the corps reserve. Command of the 15th corps would be given to Lt General Philip Christison. The plan called for the 5th and 7th Indian divisions to advance along the summit of the Mayu range towards Maungdaw and Buthidaung while the 5th and 6th west african brigades would provide flanking protection. On November 1st, the 2 Indian divisions began their advance and by mid november would make contact with a Japanese outpost.As the 7th Indian division advanced astride the Kalapanzin River they ran into stiff resistance. Efforts to dislodge Japanese defenders near Awlanbyin and Letwedet, showcased the formidable difficulties that attacking Japanese defensive bunker positions presented. Most were built on razor-back ridges, through which were burrowed fire positions, affording a limited approach, while the reverse slopes protected troops from view and bombardment. With the precipitous Goppe Pass initially only suitable for porters, pack transport and pack artillery, 7th Indian Division quickly devised other methods to overcome enemy defenses, since normal stereotyped, set-piece attacks stood little chance of success without supporting field artillery. Aircraft proved an ineffective substitute, moreover, with dive-bombing having only a transitory effect since the broken terrain and dense jungle absorbed blast leaving defenses and morale largely intact unless a lucky direct hit was made. The Indian forces began to infiltrate and bypass the well-entrenched Japanese defenses, giving the impression they would soon unleash a frontal attack upon them at any moment. General Messervy’s would say of the action  “'We will undoubtedly have a Neapolitan sandwich of British - Japs - British, but it will be one made by ourselves, and with the initiative in our hands it will soon be transformed to British - British - Jap.” They were gaining ground and with it valuable combat experience. On the night of November 30th, the 15th Indian Corps commenced large-scale operations to drive in the Japanese outpost line astride the Mayu Range. A series of brisk skirmishes were fought by 33rd Indian Infantry Brigade on the jungle-cloaked ridges south of Awlanbyin quickly evicting small determined parties of Japanese infantry from carefully prepared platoon and company defensive localities. This was by no means an easy task since most heavily camouflaged positions were built atop steep hillsides overlooking paddy fields that provided an open field of five and difficult going for advancing troops. Earlier directions about infiltration paid off in practice. An attack on Awlanbyin west redoubt from the rear through thick jungle achieved complete surprise. Although a neighboring Japanese position initially held out, its garrison withdrew on 2nd December after being cut off. The 33rd Brigade columns  crossed the Ngakyedauk Chaung and occupied the area from Ngakyedauk village to the ridge about 1.5 miles north-west of Sinohbyin village. By December3rd, they extended the area of operation to the hills overlooking Maungyithaung and Sinohbyin. The 89th Brigade, meanwhile, pushed forward down Tatmin Chaung and established forward positions on the hills south of the chaung, one mile west of Tatmingyaungywa. By mid-month, 7th Indian Division had reached the main enemy positions covering the Tunnels and Buthidaung, and the opening of the Ngakyedauk Pass to wheeled traffic in late December considerably eased resupply and allowed the divisional artillery to join the formation. However, both the Indian divisions were under orders not to get engaged in serious fighting with the Japanese, so the advance stopped there. It is also important to note, in November 1943,  Spitfires were deployed in Bengal for the first time. The 615th and 617th squadrons were based in Chittagong to protect the vital port and also to cover the Arakan. Within one month, the Spitfires destroyed four Japanese photographic reconnaissance aircraft. Previously, the Dinah’s range, speed and height had enabled them to fly with impunity over the Allied forward bases and the Hurricanes were unable to catch them. The Japanese reacted by sending out fighter sweeps in order to test the Spitfires and whittle down Spitfire strength. However, by the end of December, the Japanese lost 22 aircraft, another 33 were damaged, and the Allied loss was only 13 aircraft. The greatest air battle occurred on the last day of 1943. On that day, No. 136 Squadron destroyed 12 and damaged 11 when a mixed force of Japanese fighters and bombers attempted to attack the light naval force along the Arakan Coast. The Japanese carried out one strategic attack when on 5 December 1943, 60 bombers and fighters, including some naval aircraft, in two waves bombed Calcutta. The Japanese lost two aircraft and another five were damaged. The three and a half squadrons of Hurricane fighters, including half a squadron of night fighters which were defending the area lost five aircraft and another six were damaged.  To the west the 5th Indian Division had also encountered stiffening resistance from Japanese outposts as it advanced southwards along the coastal plain towards Maungdaw, through the foothills further north and along the spine of the jungle-clad Mayu Mountains. They soon discovered that overcoming Japanese bunker defenses presented particular difficulties. As the division would report "The great difficulty in attacking Jap "hill top" positions lies in the concealment of the actual bunker or weapon pit' one brigade commander later wrote, and in the practical impossibility of deploying attacking troops in thick jungle, particularly where the approach runs along the top of a razor backed ridge.' In each case, patrols infiltrated between these localities isolated them from supplies and reinforcements with the result that Japanese normally gave up ground without a contest. A newsletter prepared by the HQ of 5th Indian Division reported: 'The only way to deal with the Jap def positions is by INFILTRATION. Recent experience has shown that the Jap has produced nothing new in def tactics... It is almost physically impossible in hilly and thick country to have every post covered by another, the posts can be eliminated piece- meal by infiltration tactics.' After the outline of the main Japanese defenses became apparent this approach was also increasingly applied at brigade level. At the end of December 1943, the 5th Indian Division held the area from the sea to the crest of the Mayu Peninsula and the 7th Indian Division moved into the Kalapanzin Valley. By the end of the month they reached Maungdaw. The advancing 5th Indian Division discovered that frontal assaults could not be completely avoided, however, when Japanese troops were determined to stay put. During this advance, the 161st Brigade moved to the high ground to the northeast of Bakkagona about five miles to the north of Razabil. On 30th December, 161st Indian Infantry Brigade assaulted Point 124, but the 4/7th Rajputs were held up by dense jungle and heavy mortar and machine fire and suffered heavy casualties. For six days assaults continued with the forward infantry regularly reaching the Japanese defenses before being driven off by showers of hand grenades and supporting machine-gun from every other enemy defensive position within range. Only after a 'policy of strangulation, starvation, and attrition was adopted', did its defenders withdraw. The 5th Indian Division immediately began probing the main Razabil defenses, while its 123rd Indian Infantry Brigade patrolled the western foothills of the Mayu Range and northern side of Razabil, particularly two hill positions dubbed Wrencat and Wrenkitten. To do so an indirect approach was again advocated by Major-General Harold Briggs in note on tactical policy issued on 4th January, stressing the importance of patrolling to identify positions held by the Japanese and infiltration to seize vital ground in their flanks or rear that would either provoke Japanese counterattacks or force a withdrawal. Meanwhile Stilwell arrived to Shingbwiyang on December 21st and assumed command of the Chinese forces in India. To relive the trapped battalion of the 112th regiment at Yupbang Ga, Stilwell and General Sun planned to send the entire 114th regiment to break the Japanese center at Yupang Ga to rescue the 112th, then hook north to envelope the northern fragment of the Japanese defensive line. On December 24th, they unleashed artillery and launched the infantry into the Japanese lines. The 114th regiment managed to envelop the Japanese right flank by the afternoon and soon a breakthrough emerged allowing for them to make contact with the 112th. Sun’s men then surrounded the Japanese pocket during the night and would wipe them out the next morning. And thus the Chinese had gained their first victory at Yupbang Ha, though the Japanese still held the river crossing, so Stilwell began plans for another assault set after Christmas. On December 28th, Sun ordered 3 battalions to attack the north, while the 1st battalion, 112th regiment would sweep to the right, getting behind the 3 Japanese outer strongpoints. The chinese forces rapidly broke the Japanese outer defenses creating a breach while the 1st battalion, 114th regiment broke through the river defensive line. The Japanese tossed a large counterattack, but it would be repelled by the night time. Now Yupbang Ga was in allied hands as the surviving Japanese companies split into smaller groups trying to hold out for many days. With the fall of Yupbang Ga, the Japanese were forced to withdraw from Sharaw Ga as well, so elements of the 2rd battalion, 113th Regiment were be able to seize it by December 30. In the meantime, as the 22nd Division’s 65th Regiment had been sent towards the Taro Plain to try and secure the southern flank, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 114th Regiment had been sent south to cross the Tanai Hka at the Kantau ford in an effort to cut off the enemy withdrawal line. By the end of 1943, with the loss of 315 killed and 429 wounded, Sun’s 38th Division had gained complete control of the Tarung Hka.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Things were deteriorating for the Japanese on New Britain as American Marines were seizing features and gradually pushing them into Borgan Bay. Within the CBI theater a ton of drama amongst the high commanders was surprisingly not resulting in disaster, as operations in Burma were kicking off with great results. Perhaps Burma could be saved.

Last time we spoke about Operation Backhander, the landings at Cape Gloucester. General Douglas MacArthur unleashed another cog in the machine that was his drive back to the Philippines. The 1st Marines under General Rupertus were back in the action, spearheading the landings at Cape Gloucester. The landings were successful and multiple allied units began advancing towards the airdrome.  Colonel Sumiya realized the futility of attempting a defense upon the open ground against American armor, so he pulled his units away towards Razorback Hill from which they could launch harassment maneuvers against the new American perimeter. Over on New Guinea the Australians continued their drive towards Sio, pushing the Japanese even further north in the process. The Japanese were being attacked in multiple places without the ability to contest them everywhere. What would the Japanese commanders do to establish a proper defense? This episode is Landing at Saidor Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Last week we left off with General Nakai unleashing a counteroffensive against Kesawai. The counteroffensive was successful at pushing the Australian commando’s out of the area to prevent them from encroaching upon Madang. These actions worried General Vasey who thought the Japanese might follow them up with an offensive against Dumpu. Vasey elected to carry out a punitive attack along Shaggy Ridge. Perhaps a refresher as I think I did once describe it, but Shaggy Ridge is located six miles north of Dumpu. The razorback ridge has one elevation of more than 5,000 feet, running roughly southeast to northwest. The highest point on the ridge is known as the Kankirei Saddle. There are also three high elevations along the ridge that the Australians named the Pimple, the Intermediate Snipers' Pimple, and the Green Sniper's Pimple. The Japanese had constructed four miles of defenses along the northern part of the ridge. These positions dominated the trail along which the Australians would eventually have to cross. The trail was narrow, only two to three feet wide, and there were drops on either side of 300 to 500 feet. The Japanese had also constructed a rough road on the coast side to a point between the Mindjim and Faria Rivers, making supply to the defenders much easier. The Pimples were the strong points, and the Japanese had built fortified posts with machine guns and deep trenches on each. Vasey’s punitive force consisted of the 2/16th battalion under the temporary command of Major Garth Symington. Patrols had been sent to figure out decent approaches for an attack against the Pimple, but everything indicated there was only a narrow path to perform a frontal assault from. Thus Symington planned to assault the Pimple and exploit for about 400 yards along the ridge with Captain Christian’s B Company while Captain Anderson’s D Company maneuvered behind to consolidate the ground gained. Fortunately Symington would be receiving aerial support from the American 41st Squadron and Australian No. 4 Squadron, artillery support from the 8th battery and 54th battery and back up from the 2/27th battalion who would launch a diversionary attack against the Japanese along the Faria River and Mainstream area. During the morning of December 27th, the assault began with 16 Kittyhawks and two Boomerangs bombing the Pimple followed by artillery. Dive bombing, strafing and artillery fire was intense causing reverberation and roars that could be heard up and down the Ramu Valley. An hour later, B Company’s leading platoon departed their startline under the foliage of the rainforest to scale the rock face leading to the pimple. Although the bombardment was stunning, the dazed Japanese defenders quickly responded to the invaders by tossing grenades from the well sited pillboxes atop the pimple. The Australians dashed forward and wiped out the forward pillbox, securing their toehold on the ridge. With the artillery firing further forward the Australians were soon able to capture the second pimple feature just 100 yards ahead, successfully clearing the Japanese from their entrenchments. However at this point, B company came across a strong rock bunker. They first allowed the artillery to smash it, then they tossed grenades while trying to outflank the defenders. A Japanese defender refusing to surrender, covered the entrance to his pillbox with a groundsheet and for about two hours flicked away the grenades thrown at him before they could explode. Eventually he was blasted out when a grenade was tied to the end of a bamboo pole which was poked into the pit, the pin being pulled out by a length of string. More than 100 grenades were thrown during the day at the rock bunker in front of the second pimple. As hard as they tried it was impossible to outflank as the sides of the razorback guarding the bunker were almost perpendicular. Christian was forced to pull B company back and dig in on the second pimple. Meanwhile, D company came up to relieve the exhausted men of B company. To deal with the bunker menace, Australian Pioneers chiseled a track along the cliff face towards it and designed a special bomb consisting of a grenade placed in a chemical and sealed in a field ration tin. During the morning of the 28th, D company advanced over their newly cut track and hurled the new bombs successfully blowing up the enemy bunker. While this was occurring, Lt Scott’s 18th Platoon was advancing down the eastern slope of Shaggy Ridge attempting a encircling maneuver against the third pimple. At 10.50 a.m Scott reported being at the base of the third pimple and a quarter of an hour later the artillery and mortars began firing smoke to cover his Platoon’s advance. At the foot of the objective Scott ordered his platoon sergeant, Longman, to take a small party of Owen gunners up the third pimple. Under heavy enemy machine-gun fire Longman and three men charged an enemy machine-gun post near the top. Two of his men were wounded but Longman and the other man continued to advance upon the enemy post and eventually silenced it with Owen-gun fire. To reach the enemy post they had to pull themselves up a steep slope with one hand and fire their Owens with the other. Still under heavy fire from other enemy posts the two men covered the evacuation of the two wounded and neutralized the fire of another enemy post 40 yards away which was opposing the advance of the rest of the platoon, led by the wounded Scott, up the cliff face. Nine minutes after Longman led the first assault, Scott was in possession of the third pimple and was covering the advance of Lieutenant McCaughey's 16 Platoon to the fourth and highest pimple, later named McCaughey's Knoll, farther along the ridge. The two platoons then dug in on the newly-won ground. During the afternoon, the battered Japanese attempted a counterattack but were easily repelled, suffering a total of 28 dead during the battle against Symington’s three killed and eight wounded.   After the pimples were captured, the fighting fell into a series of artillery duels and patrol skirmishes. With the Pimples in hand the Australians could observe Madang. Vasey at this time acquired further support from General MacArthur who relieved his exhausted brigades with the 18th and 15th brigades. Meanwhile General Adachi sensed key points in the Madang area were not defended well enough, so he ordered the bulk of the 41st division to advance from Wewak to Madang. In early december, the 2nd battalion, 237th regiment and 2nd mountain artillery battalion of the 41st group were deployed at Karkar island. However the movement of the rest of the division was sent to the Gogol area and was heavily delayed by storms that caused numerous rivers to overflow. But now we are shifting gears and heading over to the Huon Peninsula where a new allied landing was about to occur.    In early December, General MacArthur finally decided to act upon a suggestion put forward by his assistant chief of staff Lt General Stephen Chamberlain. Chamberlain argued Saidor on the south side of the Huon Peninsula should be occupied in order to construct an advanced air and naval base. MacArthur waited until two days before the Arawe expedition, before giving orders to Krueger to prepare plans for a landing against Saidor. Because of limited landing craft the landings would need to be pushed until January 2nd. The operation was code named Michelmas and initially it was thought the 503rd parachute infantry could be airdropped over Saidor, but a limited number of aircraft killed this one in the crib. Thus the 32nd division who had been earmarked for the canceled Gasmata landings were chosen for the task. The general outline for the operation was discussed at a conference held on Goodenough island on December 20th attended to be Barbey, Major General William Gill, Whitehead commanding the 32nd division, Colonel Clarence Martin commanding the 126th regiment and other staff officers. Allied intelligence reports indicated the Japanese had few forces in the Saidor region. Nevertheless, the plans called for landings in force on three beaches codenamed Red, White and Blue on the west shore of Dekay’s bay.   If the Americans could successfully seize Saidor, this would cut the Japanese retreat from Finschhafen and therefore would trap another Japanese division at Sio. Krueger selected the 126th Regiment for the task after they were rebuilt following the Battle of Buna-Gona and retrained in amphibious warfare. Brigadier-General Clarence Martin would act as the commander of the new Michaelmas task force. MacArthur did not have much time to carry out ground reconnaissance, thus the 3 beaches selected were chosen primarily from aerial photograph data. They would prove to be quite narrow, rocky and exposed to heavy seas. Because the allied intelligence indicated few Japanese forces in the area, MacArthur elected not to perform a preliminary aerial bombardment.  Admiral Barbey’s amphibious force were now well experienced veterans with amphibious landings, so the last minute notice did not hinder them too much. On January the 1st, Martin’s men were tossed onto 9 APD’s, 17 LCI’s and two LST’s supported by 9 of Barbey’s Destroyers and Admiral Crutchley’s Cruiser force, hoping to intercept some IJN forces. Yet Crutchley would be disappointed as Admiral Koga had his hands full with something cooking up at Rabaul and Kavieng and could not afford to dispense units to Saidor. What could hinder the landings was air forces from the IJA at Wewak, though they were considerably weakened with just 39 fighters, 17 light bombers and 7 heavy bombers available after so many allied air strikes.   The landings went off smoothly. The beaches were hit by more than 2000 shells within 20 minutes prior to the first LCV landings at around 7am. Two battalions of the 126th landed abreast without opposition and quickly established a perimeter. Soon a 3rd battalion passed through and extended the perimeter further left upon high ground, just southwest of an unserviceable airfield. Captain Meredith Muggins, who played a key role in the capture of Sanananda, recalled his impressions of this seemingly uneventful landing:    “When we landed at Saidor it was an amazing sight. There were dozens of warships bombarding the coast. The sound was like a rolling thunder and the smoke hung along the ground. As we approached the beach, air attacks began. Heavy bombers dropped their load of high explosive from a few thousand feet. Then came in the B-25 strafers shooting everything in sight, clobbering positions. Behind them came fighters to give the Japs a final working over. There was very little opposition when we landed. We found a few wandering around in shell shock. What a contrast from the days at Buna and Sanananda, only a year before, when we were fighting with rifles, grenades, and rocks!”   Thus 8000 troops were landed ashore by the end of the day. The only real resistance came in the form of some air raids from Wewak beginning at 4pm. 9 Japanese Nakajima Ki-49 (Helen) aircraft, escorted by up to 20 Zeros and Kawasaki Ki-61 (Tony) fighters bombed the beach area at 4:30pm. There were three more air raids during the night, and 49 over the course of the month, but most were quite small. Thus on Januaruy the 3rd MacArthur triumphantly stated  “We have seized Saidor on the north coast of New Guinea. In a combined operation of ground, sea and air forces, elements of the Sixth Army landed at three beaches under cover of heavy air and naval bombardment. The enemy was surprised both strategically and tactically and the landings were accomplished without loss. The harbour and airfields are in our firm grasp. Enemy forces on the north coast between Sixth Army and the advancing Australians are trapped with no source of supply and face disintegration and destruction.” The Saidor area and her landing strip were in allied hands and further men and supplies would be brought over without enemy interference.   Over on the Japanese side, General Adachi had the understrength and exhausted 51st division garrisoning Sio while the 20th division was retreating from the Finschhafen area. On December 30th, Adachi arrived to Kiari where he ordered the 51st to advance to Bogia, once the 20th had arrived at Sio. Since mid December, some units, such as the bulk of the 66th regiment had already made it to Bogia, where they could be rehabilitated, leaving just the 3rd composite battalion of the 66th regiment, the 3rd battalion HQ, the 10th company and one machine gun company to garrison Gali under the leadership of General Muroya. Just as Adachi was preparing to depart on January 2nd, he received word of the allied landing at Saidor which effectively opened up a new and important threat against his isolated forces. Adachi believed it was now useless to hold on to Sio and the Vitiaz Strait, since enemy troops were also landed on New Britain. Furthermore his main base at Madang was now vulnerable. Thus Adachi placed General Nakano in command of both divisions now designated the Nakano force and ordered him to advance the forces to Gali by submarine to try and secure the new key supply point while the Shoge detachment would delay the Australian advance to Sio. Nakano would therefore have to break through or bypass Saidor overland to arrive safely at Madang. Additionally the 41st division was ordered to depart Wewak immediately and advance overland towards Madang. General Nakai was given orders to advance his detachment towards Saidor to try and contain the American advance as long as possible and this would only leave the 2nd battalion, 78th regiment under Colonel Matsumoto Matsujiro on the Kankirei Saddle-Shaggy Ridge area.  On January 3rd, Lt General Goro Mano was flown directly to Alexishafen to assume command of all units in the Madang region, including the Matsumoto detachment. Back over in Saidor, the Americans began to send patrols and an outpost was setup at Sel on January the 5th while the 3rd battalion, 126th regiment skirmished with other American patrols at Teterei and Biliau. General Muroya managed to secure Gali without much difficulty. Meanwhile, upon receiving the news of the Saidor landing, Brigadier Windeyer’s 20th Brigade continued their advance, expecting the march to be a lot easier. After fording the Sanga River on January 3rd, the 2/17th battalion advanced to the Sazomu river while fighting off elements of Colonel Miyake’s rearguard. At this point General Katagiri’s forces were in a full retreat towards Kiari, only performing some rearguard against around Kelanoa. Thus the 2/17th advance went pretty much undisturbed as they reached the Dallman River on January 6th. Kelanoa offered more defensible positions, so Windeyer cautiously sent some patrols to scout the area out, trying to avoid unnecessary casualties.  At 8 a.m. on the 8th the 2/17th resumed their advance and half an hour later their leading company was met with some fire from a track junction. There seemed to be about 40 determined Japanese with four machine-guns holding the area. The Australians killed 8 Japanese and lost 2 in the process with another 2 wounded. As the company could make no headway without further casualties they withdrew to a kunai patch south-east of the track junction so that artillery mortars and machine-guns could hit the Japanese. The position was hit with mortar heavily causing the Japanese to withdraw during the night. The next day at 9:30am the Australian battalion advanced through the position finding abandoned pill boxes, foxholes and several dead Japanese. Later during the day, a group of 30 heavily armed Japanese fire upon the battalion 1500 yards from the Buri River. The Australians unleashed artillery, mortars and machine guns upon them until 4pm when some tanks arrived forcing the Japanese to flee.   Meanwhile the Japanese were able to repair 12 barges which were quickly used to evacuate wounded towards Gali. Unfortunately, allied PT boats were lurking in the area like sharks. The PT boats unsuccessfully attacked Adachi’s submarine that was bringing him back over to Madang but managed to destroy one barge carrying 100 wounded near Herwath Point and damaged others. Most of the wounded would reach Gali by the 10th and 20th division advanced past Kiari on the 9th and were drawing closer to Gali. The 2/17th crossed the Buri River on the 10th and reached the Kapugara river the next day without opposition. General Nakano departed Kiari with his division heading for Gali. It was now only the Shoge detachment that stood in the path of the Australians. The Shoge detachment received orders on January 13th to withdraw towards Sio using an exhausting inland route going from Nambariwa to Nokopo. The Australians would soon enter the ruins of Nambariwa finding the Japanese had destroyed numerous large dumps. Nambariwa had been the principal Japanese supply base for the Finschhafen area, both banks of its river had been barge loading points. There were numerous facilities such as barge workshops, engineer store dumps, hospital areas and bivouac areas. By January 15th the Australian forces would occupy Sio uncontested.   General Wootten’s 9th division had completed its mission and it would be their last action in New Guinea. Wootten had received word in early January that the 8th Brigade led by Brigadier Claude Cameron was being brought over to Finschhafen to relieve the 24th Brigade. Now with the fall of Sio, General Berryman ordered the 5th division now under the command of Major General Alan Ramsay to take over the forward area. Mop up operations would continue for a week, until the 4th battalion, 8th brigade and 5th division officially took over Sio. The advance from Fortification Point to Sio saw the 20th Brigade suffer 3 deaths, 13 wounded and 958 sick from malaria, mosquitoes remaining a larger foe than the Japanese as usual. The 20th brigade had marched 50 miles in 24 days and counted a total of 303 dead Japanese and captured 22. Within the 4 months campaign going back to September 22nd, Wootten’s 9th division had suffered 283 deaths and 744 wounded, but estimated they killed 3099 Japanese, captured 39 and inflicted around 4644 wounded. Now we are heading back to the boys on New Britain. With the airdrome secured and a strong defensive perimeter surrounding it, General Rupertus radioed the commander of the 6th Army “First Marine Division presents to you as an early New Year gift the complete airdome of Cape Gloucester. Situation well in hand due to fighting spirit of troops, the usual Marine luck and the help of God…” General Krueger expressed himself as "delighted." At his advance headquarters at Port Moresby General Douglas MacArthur, presented the airdrome to the people of the United States with his compliments and sent Rupertus the following dispatch: “I extend my heartiest congratulations to your officers and men. I am filled with pride and gratitude by their resourceful determination in capturing Cape Gloucester. Your gallant Division has maintained the immortal record of the Marine Corps and covered itself with glory.” General Rupertus raised the US flag on an improvised staff above the main strip with simple ceremonies on December 31. Soon American engineers were being brought over to repair the airfield as the Japanese sent nightly air raids to hamper these efforts. The Japanese still held several operational airfields within range, but their efforts to bomb the Americans positions were hampered by terrible weather. They also never massed air forces to attack in great strength, thus the damage was always minor and easily repairable. To the east, assistant commander of the 1st Marines, Brigadier General Lemuel Shepherd assumed command of the forces within the Yellow Beach perimeter. Due to the lack of Japanese resistance around the airdrome, the Marine commanders were convinced General Matsuda was retaining the bulk of his strength in the Borgen Bay area, thus leaving Colonel Sumiya out to dry. Shepherd elected to take his force and use them to clear up the Borgen Bay area. On January 1st he proposed to hold fast on the left and center of the Yellow Beach perimeter, while his right line consisting of the 3rd battalions of the 7th and 5th Marines would advance southeast. On the other side, Colonel Katayama had just arrived at Magairapua with his 2nd battalion on January 1st. It seems at this point Matsuda made an error. Perhaps its because he was essentially a transportation expert rather than a combat leader, perhaps it was due to his failed initial attacks, but he decided to place Katayama in command of all the forces in the Brogen Bay area. Now designated the Katayama detachment, these forces were the 2nd battalion, 53rd regiment and 2nd and 3rd battalions 141st regiment.There would also soon be Major Tatsumi Asaschichi’s 3rd Battalion who were still en route from Nigol and Cape Bushing. Katayama first tackled his command by underestimating his enemy’s strength. Katayama ordered an offensive in force against Target Hill to be led by Captain Mukai Toyoji’s 2nd battalion, 141st regiment. Major Takabe Shinichi’s 2nd Battalion, 53rd Regiment, would attack the center of the marine perimeter to confuse the Americans and prevent them from reinforcing the hill. At this time Target Hill was being defended by the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, more particularly their A Company . This unit was deployed with its 1st Platoon defending the area on the left between the beach and swamp, the 2nd Platoon holding a series of strong points on such dry ground as could be found in the swamp itself, and only the 3rd Platoon on the hill proper. Unbeknownst to Katayama, Shepherd had begun his offensive at 10:00am on the 2nd. The 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines, under the temporary command of Lieutenant-Colonel Lewis B. Puller and 3rd Battalion, 5th Marinesunder the command of Lieutenant-Colonel David S. MacDougal were advancing abreast southeast towards Suicide Creek. The terrain they were traversing was particularly brutal. The 3rd battalion had to hack their way through the jungle going some 300 yards where they would come across well prepared Japanese positions. The 5th battalion had a longer distance to travel, but would encounter less resistance at the early phase. The 5th battalion attempted an encircling movement from the west, the assault troops soon encountered the face of the same Japanese pocket that was holding up the 3rd battalion and were halted in turn. As a result, the attacking lines on the night of 2 January, and throughout 3 January, resembled a huge letter "U", with the enemy strong point contained on three sides. Recognizing Suicide Creek was a major obstacle, the Japanese had sited their positions skillfully to cover it. Time after time Marines attempted crossings, only to be fired upon from invisible positions. The Japanese had become experts at field fortifications.  The jungle curtailed both their attackers' freedom of movement and enhanced their own concealment: Marines would need get within just a few feet of the emplacements in order to locate them, by which time few were left alive to spot them for others. Even their lack of fortification materials--cement and steel reinforcing--reacted in favor of the Japanese, for the earth-and-log bunkers which they improvised were too soft-surfaced to detonate bazooka rockets, the heaviest weapons the infantry was capable of bringing to the point of contact. To support these bunkers, they had dug deep foxholes between and under the flaring buttress roots of the giant trees characteristic of the region, camouflaging them with foliage and cutting cunningly interlocking fire lanes. Artillery and mortar shells and air bombs were all but useless in reaching these positions, owing to the fantastically high forest cover that usually caused tree bursts, to which the deeply dug-in enemy was virtually invulnerable. The marines gradually surrounded the well prepared positions of the 2nd battalion, 53rd regiment during the night, but they could do little else as each attack brought failure.    Under the cover of darkness and Marine mortar fire, Katayama’s assault troops and engineers hacked their way to the lower slopes of Target Hill. They did their best not to make any noise as they attempted scaling it, but the Marine defenders heard them. On January 3rd  they launched their attack, unleashing artillery, mortar and 20mm machine cannon fire from below the hill. However most of the artillery missed the hill altogether, and the 20mm cannon fire was not causing much damage. Company D's mortars replied from their positions behind the hill, but the high angle of fire precluded effective damage to the advance enemy elements which had actually worked their way to positions about 20 feet from the Marines' front emplacements by then. Katayama’s 5th company leading the assault fought bravely and with great determination, but against the steep terrain and inadequate support, against a very alert enemy proved too much for them. By dawn the attack had died down and the 5th company was virtually annihilated. Further to the west, the 53rd regiments secondary attack had achieved little more and suffered heavily for it. The Japanese were now trying to resist Shepherds attacks along the Suicide Creek while engineers of the 17th Marines were building a corduroy causeway across the coastal swamp to enable tanks to come into the action. By the morning of the 4th, following a 15 minute artillery bombardment, the first Sherman wallowed through the shallow water and mounted itself on the opposite bank. Soon the other Shermans followed and their 75mm guns began to absolutely devastate the Japanese emplacements from point blank range. Shepherd’s assault battalions surged forward across their whole front, encountering no further opposition. Encouraged by the victory and the apparent death or withdrawal of all Japanese in contact to the immediate front, General Shepherd ordered the advance to continue, changing direction to south-southeast. Meanwhile, the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, pinched out by the successful sweep of its former front and the tying-in of 3rd battalion and  1st battalion on their left, executed a wide swing inland, made contact with the right of 3rd battalion, 5th marines extending the line westward. By the nightfall, Shepherd held a 4 battalion strong front against Katayama’s positions at Aogiri Ridge and Hill 150.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Operation Michaelmas, the landings at Saidor were a great success, forcing General Adachi to shift numerous units around, scrambling to remedy the situation. Yet with so many Japanese units trapped, isolated and continuing to retreat north, would they ever be able to halt the allied advance? 

Last time we spoke about the aftermath of the Arawe landing and the drive towards Sio. The Komori detachment did everything they could to bottle up the new American beachhead at Arawe. Meanwhile after the fall of Wareo, the Australians decided it was time to drive towards Sio. General Katagiri had just got his men to Sio, but would have little time to prepare defenses as the Australians were quick on their heels. Likewise the Australians were also expanding past Dumpu, seeing multiple patrols fan out, probing for where the Japanese were massing their forces. In Tokyo, Hideki Tojo invited Japan’s allies for the east asian conference, reiterating Pan-Asia unity against the west. Yet for all the talk, in reality Japan sought to dominate its Asian allies, really as a means to an end. In Cairo the allies held a conference of their own, trying to keep Chiang Kai-Shek in the fold. This episode is Landings at Cape Gloucester  Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  General Douglas MacArthur faced daunting challenges during the Pacific War. One of these challenges was in the shape of Rabaul, one of Japan’s strong points from which she exerted force in the region. To neutralize Rabaul, MacArthur sought to seize some airfields in Western New Britain, but to do this would also require securing control over the Vitiaz strait between New Britain and New Guinea. General HQ sought to use airfields at Cape Gloucester and on the south coast to help neutralize Rabaul. Thus Operation Dexterity was born. It was to be twin landings against originally Gasmata, but then for necessity changed to Arawe and Cape Gloucester. This was but a cog in the major plan within MacArthur’s mind to return to the Philippines, one could argue within a greater plan for the white house. The landings at Arawe were largely successful and with that in hand General Krueger felt his Alamo Force could now launch operation backhander. The battle-hardened 1st Marine division was earmarked for the landings against Cape Gloucester. It was to be their first action after a prolonged period of rest and recuperation in South Australia following their heroic campaign on Guadalcanal. The 1st marines were now under the command of Major-General Rupertus. You probably could not ask for better men for the job, they were well refreshed physically, mentally and militarily. They had acquired an enormous amount of experience on Guadalcanal and with it a high degree of morale. The marines began training with the new types of landing crafts available to them, things they did not have during the Gaudalcanal days. Meanwhile Krueger carried out a programme of reconnaissance based on aerial photography, mosaics, older maps and some amphibious patrolling. There were 3 Australian officers who played key roles aiding in the effort. The first was Major John V. Mather, AIF, a former labor contractor in the Solomons who had been attached to the 1st Division for the Guadalcanal operation. He remained an integral component of the D-2 Section, where his proficiency with Pidgin English and grasp of native psychology proved most useful. The second was Sub-Lieutenant Andrew Kirkwall-Smith, RANVR, one of the versatile islanders who could turn his hand to nearly anything, and who had been a coastwatcher in the Cape Gloucester region at the time the Japanese first moved in. The third man and the one most more familiar with the ground and inhabitants was the Reverend William G. Wiedeman, who had operated the Anglican Mission at Sag Sag for several years prior to the war and, like Kirkwall-Smith, he was a commissioned Navy lieutenant to give military status to his present activities. A number of amphibious patrols was performed by the Alamo scouts. The first patrol was led by 1st Lieutenant John D. Bradbeer, who set out for New Britain's western coast by PT boat on September 24th. Around midnight, he cut the motors off on his PT boat around a mile off Grass Point, and his scouts paddled in from there in an inflated rubber boat, landing on a beach at the mouth of the second stream to the south at 0100 on the 25th. After hiding their craft with great care, they proceeded inland through dense secondary jungle growth up the western slopes of Mt. Tangi. There they found enemy defenses in the vicinity of Aisega. After this they turned northward heading through heavy foliage to the upper Gima River and there interrogated the inhabitants. The natives had been excluded from the airdrome area and the coast since the previous July, but they had some information to impart. There was a motor road connected Ongaia and the airdrome, and 12 to 14 Anti aircraft guns were emplaced between these two points; radio stations were located at Aisega, the airdrome, Sakar Island and Rooke Island; barge traffic was heavy on the Itni River and along the coast. Relations between the native population and the Japanese had deteriorated to a low level, although a few quislings still operated in the area. The natives related that the enemy expected an invasion of the Cape Gloucester region. Finally, they retraced their steps; and in the early morning hours of 6 October the Alamo Scouts climbed on board the waiting torpedo boat and returned to Goodenough Island to make their report. The next significant patrol was carried out on the night of 14 October by Captain W. A. Money, AIF, two other Australians, a Marine sergeant and six natives went ashore about one mile south of Higgins Point on Rooke and remained there until the early hours of 26 October. Captain Money reported there were few Japanese on the island, which doubtlessly influenced the later decision to defer a landing there. Shortly before midnight on November 20th two PT boats throttled down to a halt just south of Dorf Point on New Britain's west coast. Eleven men aboard had the general mission of reconnoitering the beach for an offensive landing, but more specifically they were to study beach approaches, beach conditions and inland terrain between Potni and Sumeru. They were commanded by Major Mather. With plans carefully laid the men stealthily made their way ashore, but luck under such conditions could not always hold up, and the Japanese became aware of the patrol's presence almost as soon as it reached the beach. Thirty minutes after leaving the PT boats, they were back on board, but in that time they had obtained enough information to declare the beach unfavorable for a landing operation. The significant patrol occurred on the night of 21 December, and was done to study two beaches at Tauali. Once again Major Mather acted as overall commander. Splitting the patrol into two seven-man groups, Bradbeer took the first on a reconnaissance of "South Beach" while First Lieutenant Joseph A. Fournier of the 1st Marines took the other for a look at "North Beach." The patrol recommended the latter as the more favorable of the two for a landing. It was duly labeled Green Beach, and 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, made its D-Day amphibious operation there. Such amphibious patrolling helped Krueger figure out where not to land. Meanwhile the 7th fleet had just come under the command of Admiral Kinkaid and was assigned the naval responsibility for the Gloucester landing. Admiral Barbey would have at his disposal 12 destroyers, taking the USS Conyngham as his flagship, 3 minesweepers, 10 APDs, 16 LCIs and 24 LSTs for the main landings; with another two destroyers 14 LCMs, 12 LCTs and two rocket DUKWs for the secondary landing on Beach Green at Tauali. Covering them would by Admiral Crutchley’s task force 74 consisting of 4 cruisers, 8 destroyers and two rocket LCI’s. The 1st echelon carried by the APDs Stringham, Crosby, Kilty, Dent and Ward was the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines; and APDs Brooks, Gilmer, Sands, Humphreys and Noa would carry the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines. The 2nd Echelon of six LCIs would carry the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines; and four LCIs for the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines. The 3rd Echelon was seven LSTs, each carrying 500 troops of 1st Marines and 150 tons of supply, escorted by destroyers Drayton, Lamson, Mugford and Bagley. The 4th Echelon was seven LSTs, each carrying 480 troops of 1st and 7th Marines and 150 tons of supply The 5th Echelon was five LSTs, each carrying 240 troops of 12th Defense Battalion and 250 tons of supply. And the 6th Echelon was five LSTs, each carrying 250 Marine engineers and 250 tons of supply.   For air support, General Kenney assigned Brigadier-General Frederic Smith’s 1st Air Task Force (FATF). The FATF contained about ⅓ of all the squadrons in the allied air force. It had flown fighter and bomber missions for all ground operations excluding those in the Ramu valley. To support the coming offensive, between November 19th to December 13th, 1241 tons of bombs were dropped over Brogen Bay. For the next 11 days, daylight bombings were intensified with over 1207 bomber sorties being performed, dropping more than 2684 tons of bombs.Their favored point of attack was Target Hill because it was so easily discerned. Gun positions at the airstrip were also given attention, with eighty 2,000-lb. bombs being dropped on 17 December. A few direct hits were claimed on gun positions. Bunkers and supply dumps, protected from view by the lush jungle growth, were fairly safe from air attacks, but the lines of supply suffered heavily. Daylight runs were not all that was performed, simultaneously the allies introduced harassing night tactics as well, to keep the enemy under additional mental strain. You see the Japanese anti-aircraft teams and pilots tried to sleep at night, but the B-24’s would continuously drop bombs, grenades and even beer bottles over bivouac areas simply to keep them dazed.   On December 21st, a final rehearsal was carried out at Cape Sudest and 3 days later, Colonel Julian Frisbie’s 7th marines boarded Barbey’s vessels at Buna Harbor. On Christmas day at 6am the convoy was moving. At 4pm the convoy rendezvous with Colonel William Whaling’s 1st marines at Cape Cretin while the 2nd battalion reinforced with H battery of the 11th marines proceeded to Beach Green in their own smaller convoy.    However, as they made their way towards their objective, the main convoy was spotted by a Japanese reconnaissance plane. The convoy would arrive at its destination unmolested. Commander of the southeast area fleet, Admiral Jinichi Kusaka had incorrectly assessed the convoy was bound for Arawe bearing reinforcements and as a result ordered a heavy air strike against the Arawe area instead of Cape Gloucester. At 6am on the 26th Crutchley’s cruisers and destroyers began a naval bombardment followed up an hour later with Smith’s B-24’s, B-25’s and A-20’s. The 5th air force had tossed B-24’s from Dobadura who dropped their payloads all the way from Target Hill to Cape Gloucester. The B-25 medium bombers followed this dropping their heavier loads and the A-20’s focused on the landing areas making sure to strafe the beaches until the first wave would be just 500 yards away.   For the next hour and a half the landing craft launched towards the beaches. Two LCI’s outfitted with multiple rocket launchers led the first wave. A considerable amount of smoke screen was set over the area, hindering some of the landing craft from finding their marks. One group carrying elements of the 3rd battalion, 7th marines missed their beach altogether and hit the shore some 300 yards further west. The 3rd battalion led by Lt Colonel William Williams landed at Yellow at 7:46, with Lt Colonel John Weber’s 1st battalion doing the same at Yellow 2. The men charged down the lowered ramps of their LCVP’s seeing marines find unmanned trenches, abandoned guns and a handful of scared shipping engineers cowering in dugouts, too stunned by the naval and aerial bombardments to fight or flee.    The allies had achieved tactical surprise as Matsuda was not expecting an invasion to come to these beaches. Major-General Iwao Matsuda’s had deployed his 53rd regiment around the Tsurubu airdrome and Natamo Point. Storming forward, the 3rd battalion reached a region known as the “damp plat” which according to one Marine “was 'damp' up to your neck”. To the Japanese this was known as “swamp forest” and it held some of the most treacherous terrain, thus the Japanese did not expect the enemy to come by it. The forward momentum was beginning to peter out as men were wading through thick mud, with vines tearing at their bodies. A heavy congestion hit the beaches, greatly hamping the unloading process. As the men advanced, trees literally fell around them, rotten to the core from the bombing. The first marine casualty would actually be a result of a falling tree.   Meanwhile the 1st battalion advanced towards Target Hill and Silimati Point. Company B seized their key elevation points by noon. Behind these men came the first echelon of LSTs bearing the 2nd battalion led by Lt Colonel Odell Conoley. They beached their LCI’s and drove straight inland some 900 yards through mud and water all the way up to the center of the new beachhead perimeter on a patch of dry ground. At 2:30 after the LST’s were pulling out a force of 25 Vals and 63 Zeros emerged at low altitude who made a very fast bombing and strafe run against the beaches and shipping. The back and forth firing from the Japanese aircraft and allied forces was intense.  A formation of FATF B-25s, coming in at treetop level, suddenly found themselves snarled up with the Japanese flight almost directly over the beach. In the excitement, two were shot down by friendly fire and two seriously damaged before the gunners aboard the LSTs could cool their trigger fingers. Possibly because they wanted to jettison their explosives, or possibly because they mistook their target, the B-25s then proceeded to bomb and strafe the Silimati point position occupied by 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, killing one officer and wounding 14 enlisted Marines. One correspondent had this to say "the most inexcusable small scale blunder of the war." The Japanese attacked Barbey’s vessels covering the retreat of the first echelon of LSTs tangling with allied CAP. The destroyer Brownson was sunk, destroyers Lamson, Shaw and Mugford were damaged and two LSTs were driven off. 13 vals and 4 zeros were destroyed, for the allies it was 4 fighters and 3 B-25’s. Meanwhile the 3rd battalion was still securing its right flank as Whaling’s 1st Marines supported by Sherman tanks were coming up behind on LCI’s. Their commander landed at 10:15 with the division command post in operation ashore within the hour as the 1st marines drove towards the airdrome. Lt Colonel Joseph Hankins 3rd battalion ran into one of Colonel Sumiya’s roadblocks. It consisted of 4 fortified bunkers with machine guns and a system of rifle trenches manned by  1st, 2nd and 1st Machine-Gun Companies of the 53rd Regiment. The assault was quickly shattered. K company lost its commander and executive officer in a matter of minutes. Everything seemed to go wrong. Bazooka rockets did not explode in the soft earth covering the bunkers; flamethrowers malfunctioned and an LVT carrying ammunition got wedged between two trees. The Japanese defenders were so amped up seeing the chaos, they rushed out of their bunkers trying to swarm the trapped LVT. They managed to kill two men manning its machine guns, but the driver refused to lose his head and skillfully drove the vehicle right over the nearest bunker providing infantry to storm behind him with grenades. The daring LVT maneuver allowed the men to take the bunkers, stealing victory out of the chaos. Behind them was Whaling’s 1st battalion led by Lt Colonel Walker Reaves who were bogged down in the damp flat. Whaling quickly changed his plan of advance as a result. He ordered his 3rd battalion to advance in a column along the narrow shelf of firm ground while the 1st battalion covered their left rear, speeding up the progress. Yet as the 3rd battalion moved out to expand their perimeter westwards, Sumiya’s men began infiltrating unoccupied gaps, forcing Colonel Julian Frisbie to recall his Marines and wait for reserves to pull up. By nightfall Frisbies Marines had secured the beachhead. The landing was so well scheduled that the big LSTs began dropping their ramps on the beaches 40 minutes after the first assault waves had landed. By 1pm, they had unloaded and cleared the area to make way for the second echelon. However, close encroachment of the "damp flat" greatly curtailed the area available for dump dispersal and necessitated some hurried improvising by the Shore Party. According to an officer of the 1st Motor Transport Battalion: “The true cause of the traffic congestion can be attributed directly to Army personnel who manned 150 odd 6x6 trucks with preloaded cargo. These drivers had been scraped up from an artillery regiment in New Guinea and supplied with salvaged trucks into which had been loaded practically all the supplies. The trucks theoretically were to discharge their cargo at the dumps, return to the LSTs they had debarked from and return to New Guinea for the second load. The plan failed in one respect, as there were no immediate dump areas to unload the trucks in due to the "Damp Flat." It was decided to leave the cargo in the trucks until dump areas were established. This caused consternation in the ranks of the Army drivers, who consequently abandoned their trucks in an effort to get back on the LSTs… This naturally left 150 trucks stranded on the beach exits for quite a time. Eventually the trucks were unloaded by Marines and proved to be a big aid to transportation starved organizations.” Meanwhile Whalings battalions set up their own perimeter for the night with both flanks on the beach, a technique they repeated each evening until the airdrome was captured. Further to the west Lt Colonel James Masters 2nd battalion, 1st marines with H battery of the 11th marines codenamed STONEFACE group landed at Beach Green at 8:35. By 10am they had established a perimeter; E company held the left, G company the center and F company the right. The H battery unit was unable to emplace its 75mm pack howitzer satisfactorily on the rugged jungle terrain so they reorganized themselves into 3 platoons of infantry and took up a mobile reserve at the front line. Stoneface’s task was to cut off the coastal road. When Masters men looked around they found the beach completely unoccupied, numerous positions had been abandoned with their weapons. Masters figured the defenders must have fled to the hills during the bombardment, so he ordered patrols to fan out. The only contact made that day was a small group roughly 1000 yards north of the beachhead near the village of Sumeru seeing a small firefight. Yet unbeknownst to Masters, Sumiya had sent a provisional unit consisting of elements of the 3rd and 4th companies, 53rd regiment with the 3rd battalion ,23rd field artillery regiment to drive out the marines via a secondary road east of Mount Talawe. The force was led by 1st Lt Takeda, and was thus called the Takeda Provisional battalion For Barbey the first day saw 13,000 troops and 7600 tons of materials landed on either side of the cape. However many men had landed in swamps so dense and deep that maneuvering out of such areas was quite difficult. General Matsuda was well aware of this and seized the opportunity. Matsuda ordered Colonel Katayama to leave token garrisons at Aisega, Nigol and Cape Bushing while he brought the bulk of his 141st regiment to Magairapua, this would take until December 30th to occur. Yet Matsuda had made one mistake, he thought he was facing just 2500 men. How the 65th brigade staff came to this conclusion is unknown. Perhaps it was became the smoke screen during the landings had made visual observation limited; perhaps the loss of Target Hill so fast also limited further observation of the enemy. The Marines had achieve tactical surprise by landing on undefended beaches, but other than that, they did not do all that much on the first day, perhaps the lack of activity also factored in Matsuda’s head. The only real fight of the day had been a brief affair at the roadblock where the invaders, instead of throwing infantry frontally against powerful bunkers in the glorious banzai manner, had awaited supporting weapons to knock out the position. Perhaps to Matsuda this spelled weakness or timidity, or both. Regardless, like most Japanese commanders Matsuda was obsessed by the then-current Japanese doctrine of "annihilate-at-the-water's-edge," so he ordered his own major assault unit hurled in an all-out attack against the center of the invaders' perimeter. Thus instead of reinforcing Sumiyas forces at the airdrome, or withdrawing forces to more defensible areas like Borgen Bay, or even waiting for Katayam’s troops to arrive, Matsuda decided to make a daring attack directly at the center of the marine perimeter with only his 2nd battalion, 52rd regiment.   At 3am on December 27, the Japanese attacked the sector held by the 2nd battalion, 7th marines, during one of the worst monsoon storms the Americans had ever seen. Because of the storm, many of the Japanese failed to find gaps existing on each side of the battalions flanks. Thus instead the Japanese hurled themselves frontally against very well dug in positions. By 7am, the surviving Japanese finally began to pull out, Matsuda’s men suffered 200 deaths with over 100 wounded. The Marines suffered 8 deaths and 45 wounded, added together for the day the total loss for the Americans was 28 deaths and 68 wounded. After Matsuda’s terrible defeat, Whaling’s battalions resumed their drive towards the airdrome. While they advanced in columns along the road, patrols were sent into the jungle to hunt down the enemy, but they encountered no resistance. The 1st marines were able to dig in for the night after advancing 5000 yards.   To the east, Frisbie’s 2nd battalion had expanded their perimeter towards the bank of Suicide Creek where they would continue to face short and sharp attacks by Matsuda’s 2nd battalion. Despite the heavy punishment he was served, Matsuda continued to believe in the destroyer-at-the-water’s edge tactics. His men began constructing defensive positions, bunkers, trenches, rifle pits and so forth, so close to the American lines the Americans could hear them doing it. Meanwhile the engineers of the 17th marines performed their own work, widening the Japanese coastal road to allow the movement of supplies. Despite their valiant work, the volume of traffic was immense, coupled with the storm made the narrow coastal road a logistical nightmare.    The next morning the Marines expected to encounter some heavy resistance. The marine artillery crews increased their rate of fire and General Kenney’s aircraft bombed Colonel Sumiya’s strongpoints. With tank support, Whaling resumed his advance at 11am, with Company I finally hitting the first enemy positions about 12:15. They ran into a Japanese strong point consisting of a system of mutually supporting bunkers and rifle trenches, well armed with anti-tank guns and 75mm guns. The way forward was littered with land mines and barbed wire. The defenders enjoyed an added advantage in the heavy jungle lying a short distance inland which limited the tanks' field of maneuver to the comparatively narrow area directly to their front, facing the flank of the Japanese position which thus became, in effect, a defense in depth for the entire extent of its east-west length: approximately 300 yards.   At 12:00, I Company was fired upon with small arms from the front, followed by 75mm shells along the road area. 15 minutes later the leading elements led by Captain Carl Conron began attacking the fortifications alongside the tanks. They were facing the  2nd Company, 53rd Regiment and the 1st Machine Gun Company, 53rd Regiment and the strong point was quickly nicknamed Hell’s Point. Later it would be renamed Terzi Point in honor of Company K’s commanding officer who died on the landing day. Within the heavy rain, the tanks surged forward and smashed Sumiya’s bunkers, while A company dashed to the left, emerging from kunai grass just 500 yards from the bunkers. Enjoying excellent cover, the defenders’ fire successfully stopped the American advance, although the Marines themselves also easily broke up two Japanese frontal assaults and one attempt to turn their flank.    Ammunition began to run low, forcing A company to withdraw at around 3:45. Yet K Company closer to the beach held enormous firepower in the form of Sherman tanks that obliterated 12 bunkers rather quickly.  In the words of Company K’s commander: “I was given three tanks (the other two were out of action, one with engine trouble and one with a jammed breech of its 75) to accomplish this mission. I put one squad of the Second Platoon behind each tank and deployed the Third Platoon to set up a skirmish line behind the tanks. We encountered twelve huge bunkers with a minimum of twenty Japs in each. The tanks would fire point blank into the bunkers, if the Japs stayed in the bunkers they were annihilated, if they escaped out the back entrance (actually the front as they were built to defend the beach) the infantry would swarm over the bunker and kill them with rifle fire and grenades. By the time we had knocked out twelve bunkers the Second Platoon . . . were out of ammunition and had been replaced by the Third Platoon and they too were out or down to a clip of ammunition per man. I called a halt and sent for the First Platoon. By the time the First Platoon arrived and ammunition was resupplied forty-five minutes had elapsed. We continued the attack and found two more bunkers but the enemy had in the meantime escaped.” The immense power of the tanks forced the defenders to retreat.    During this action the 1st marines suffered 17 deaths and 52 wounded and claimed to have counted 300 Japanese corpses. The capture of Hell’s Point enabled the Americans to establish a position at Blue Beach to reduce the distance for supplies. General Rupertus command post was also moved there by Deemer 28th. The next day the American advance was delayed until the arrival of Colonel John Seldens 5th marines. General Rupertus feared he might be outnumbered at the airdrome so he played it safe. During the fighting at Hell's Point, a curious misadventure befell Corporal Shigeto Kashida of the 1st Machine Gun Company. The trench in which he was defending suddenly caved in, burying him helpless up to the neck. An astonished Marine, observing Shigeto's apparently disembodied head blinking at him, paused to debate whether to shoot or shovel, which dilemma was resolved by the arrival of an intelligence officer who ordered the corporal disinterred and made prisoner. Shigeto painted a depressing picture of his battalion's situation, but he mentioned the original plan for the 2nd Battalion was to reinforce the 1st, something that might still be accomplished; he also mentioned the presence somewhere in the vicinity of the 141st and 142d Regiments, possibly within striking distance. Since Colonel Sumiya had conducted withdrawals following every action to date, it could be presumed that a good part of his force remained intact. Thus Rupertus was right in his belief the Japanese may have large numbers at the airdrome.   The 1st Battalion under Major William H. Barba and the 2nd Battalion under Lieutenant-Colonel Lewis W. Walt got aboard 9 APD’s at Cape Sudest and arrived off Cape Gloucester during the morning. However during the transit, there was a large storm that caused some confusion, leading some elements to land at Yellow 2 and others at Beach Blue. General Rupertus planned for the 1st Marines to continue their advance along the coastal road while the 5th Marines would perform a wide sweep on the left flank to attack airstrip No.2. At 3pm following the artillery and aerial bombardment, the Marines launched a fierce offensive. The 2nd battalion, 5th marines attacked simultaneously with the 1st Marines along the coast road and both ground immediately inland. Major William H. Barba's 1st Battalion was just struggling out of the swamp and jungle near the line of departure. The unexpected terrain difficulties, however, kept the plan from being carried out. Both battalions sent out patrols in an effort to establish contact, but a combination of darkness and unfamiliar territory prevented positive results.  Supported by tanks, artillery, mortars and rocket launchers, Whaling’s 1st Battalion successfully reached the eastern end of Strip No. 2 at 5:55 and immediately commenced setting up a defensive perimeter. The 3rd battalion followed behind and extended the perimeter to the left, with Selden’s 2nd battalion arriving at 7:25pm extending the perimeter around airstrip No 1 towards the beach. It seemed Colonel Sumiya realized the futility of attempting a defense upon the open ground against American armor, so he pulled his units away towards Razorback Hill from which they could launch harassment maneuvers against the new American perimeter. The Japanese had begun firing artillery and mortars into the airdrome. The Marines, somewhat astonished by such goings-on, called for mortar and artillery support of their own. They reported that, according to their best estimates, the enemy had reoccupied the defenses in at least full company strength.  The marines were formulating a plan to deal with the menace and the Japanese took advantage of the lull time to launch a banzai charge that failed to gain any ground. The Japanese continued their harassment, until the Marines received some tank support to launch an offensive. Platoons from different units got together to perform a sweeping maneuver, advancing 300 yards from the defensive line. They ran into bunkers, foxholes and trenches manned by Japanese. The marines mopped them up with grenades and automatic weapons, then at 11:30 suddenly all the fighting ceased. No more enemy seemed to remain near the front. The marines had suffered 13 deaths and 19 wounded, but counted 150 dead Japanese. With more tanks on hand, the Marines gradually pushed the Japanese to flee back towards Razorback Hill. Meanwhile, because of the repeated attacks, Colonel Masters men had been patrolling, trying to pinpoint where the Japanese were concentrated. At 1:55am on December 30th, the 3rd and 4th companies of the 54th regiment had discovered an excellent approach towards the Marine perimeter. As was always the favored Japanese strategy, to concentrate force against a narrow sector, they chose to attack at this place called Coffin Corner, a natural causeway connected to ridges. The two companies attacked under the cover of a storm. The Japanese unleashed mortars and machine gun fire and quickly overran a machine gun position, but G company launched a counter attack pushing them back. The battle raged for nearly 5 hours, but by 7am it ceased. The marines had 6 deaths, 17 wounded and would count 89 Japanese dead with another 5 captured. Yet that concludes the action in Cape Gloucester for today, for now we need to jump back to New Guinea. Back on December 8th, General Nakai commenced an offensive against Kesawai, dispatching the Saito Volunteer unit for the task. The unit had the aid of native guides who gave them detailed information on the terrain, allowing the Japanese to infiltrate behind a forward Papuan platoon led by Lt C.E Bishop. They explode all of their booby-traps, allowing the 1st battalion, 78th regiment to advance behind them into Kesawai 2 without much difficult, annihilating the Papuan platoon and securing the eastern portion of the highland. Meanwhile the 3rd battalion crossed the Boku River and captured Koropa, cutting off the commandos at Isaria; the 2nd battalion, 239th regiment crossed the Boku river and assaulted the commando position at Ketoba, but the Australians resisted until nightfall before withdrawing towards Isariba. Nakai’s enveloping maneuver was a success, forcing the commandos and Papuans to withdraw towards the Evapia River. On December 9th, Brigadier Eather ordered A and C companies of the 2/25th battalion to advance forward as the commands pulled back towards the Mene River. Meanwhile at 7:15am at Isariba, the Japanese had begun a series of attacks. The attacks were repelled with vicker guns, grenades and a quick air strike from 20 Kittyhawks and Boomerangs that bombed and strafed the attackers. The 2/25th companies arrived at Evapia and one of their patrols managed to ambush several Japanese parties over the next few days. On December 12th, Nakai arrived at Kesawai where he ordered his 1st and 3rd battalions, 78th regiment to attack the 2/25th positions by nightfall. C Company's machine gun fire managed to halt the enemy assault from the north, but another came from the south. A Company found itself surrounded as the Japanese managed to get between the two Australian companies, firing their Woodpeckers from multiple directions. It was a 5 hour battle until the Australians repelled the enemy who gradually pulled back west. At 5am on the 13th, the Australians were running low on ammunition and were forced to withdraw. The 2/25th advanced through think jungle and deep swamps, by 8am they had managed to get to safety after suffering 5 deaths and 14 wounded but killing an estimated 67 Japanese. The companies withdrew east of the Evapia River, rejoining the rest of their battalion. Nakai expected his enemy was attempting an offensive against Madang and ordered his men to return to their former defensive positions, leaving token garrisons at Koropa and Kesawai. Because of the heated attacked, General Vasey worried it was preliminary to something much bigger, so he ordered the 2/16th battalion to perform punitive attack along Shaggy Ridge and Eather’s 2/33rd battalion would retake Kesawai. The 2/33rd Battalion advanced under the cover of darkness to the 5800 Feature to attack any Japanese there, and to move the Papuans across the Evapia to establish a patrol base for the Koben-Koropa-Solu River area . With three of his companies Colonel Cotton of the 2/33rd moved off an hour and a half after midnight on the 18th-19th December towards the summit of the 5800 Feature arriving just before dawn . At 2.10 p.m. a section made contact with the enemy about 700 yards south of the highest pinnacle on 5800. The patrol withdrew while the artillery fired 120 rounds. By 5 p.m. the enemy had had enough and withdrew enabling one company to occupy the pinnacle . Next day the battalion patrolled the whole area and found evidence of Japanese occupation and a hasty withdrawal.    I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The allies finally unleashed operation backhander, the amphibious assault of Cape Gloucester. The 1st Marines had a long rest after Guadalcanal and would now be the spearhead to reconquer New Britain. However the Japanese were not going to just roll over easily.  

Last time we spoke about landings against Arawe, the continuation of the Bougainville campaign and some new action in the CBI theater. Despite a rubber boat disaster, the operation against Arawe went off successfully seeing another allied landing taking the Japanese by surprise. Now the Japanese would be forced yet again to launch a counter attack hoping to dislodge the allied forces from a new beachhead. Over on Bougainville the Marines performed some assaults against hills such as Hellzapoppin ridge to expand the perimeter enough so the Army boys would have an easier time of taking over. Over in the CBI theater, the onion man Wingate was given the task of expanding his chindits and the Americans wanted their very own chindit force. Stilwell decided the time was ripe to unleash a minor offensive in Burma and soon saw what looked like a weakened Japanese perimeter was in fact very strong. This episode is Drive on Sio Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Last time we saw General Cunningham’s men successfully landing at Arawe where they hoped to build a new PT boat base. Troop A was supposed to land an hour before the main landing to cut the coastal road near Umtingalu village and Troop B would land at Pilelo island to cover the main passage to the harbor. Troop A was a disaster. Their 15 rubber boats were met with 25 mm dual purpose guns that sank 12 boats, killed 12 men and wounded another 70. Troop B was more successful landing on Pilelo and capturing the radio station before engaging in a fire fight. For the main landing at House FIreman Beach, there was little resistance. Sporadic machine gun fire was silenced by rockets as the men landed. The Japanese tossed some air strikes to hit further landings and convoys, but allied CAP managed to limit the damage.  A few days after the landing, the Komori Detachment reached the village of Didmop along the Pulie River where they paused to reorganize and rally the incoming survivors fleeing the landing area. The difficult terrain and river crossings prevented Komori and his men from assembling into offensive positions until December 25th. Meanwhile back on the 18th, the 1st battalion, 141st regiment began an advance from the Itni region aboard 7 barges. Unfortunately for them, two LCVP’s bearing 19 men on patrol had been sent by Cunningham to Cape Peiho. The two forces ran into another and after an exchange of gunfire the US soldiers abandoned their LCVP’s and retreated back along the Arawe coast. Another patrol traveling by LCVP was also fired upon by Japanese barges near Umtingalu that same day, but was able to return to Cape Merkus. On Christmas night, 100 men of the Komori detachment assaulted the main line of defense across the neck of the peninsula. The inexperienced American cavalrymen of the 112th managed to repel, albeit with some difficulty. The attack prompted General Cunningham to believe Komori was in charge of the lead element of a much larger force, most likely enroute from Gasmata. He therefore requested reinforcements and General Krueger responded by dispatching a company of the 158th infantry by PT Boats. Meanwhile the lack of results from the attack prompted Komori to defer further attacks until the arrival of Major Tobuse’s battalion. On the 27th, allied intelligence indicated the Japanese had retaken Meselia and Umtingalu, prompting Cunningham to withdraw all outposts and patrols within the main line of defense. The 2nd battalion, 158th regiment were sent to reinforce the beachhead while Komori and Tobuse finally made contact with another. The first order of business to contain the growing American perimeter. Both commanders believed the Americans sought to repair the unserviceable Lupin Aerodrome. 700 yards from the US line the Japanese established a series of alternate positions taking advantage of the terrain and concealment making it difficult to spot. Cunningham would remark "This is not an organized position in the accepted sense of the word, it consists apparently of shallow trenches and deep fox holes… The ground is covered with a thick green mat about 12 to 18 inches in depth which makes observation absolutely impossible… Officers and men… report that they have not seen a single Japanese and that they are unable to locate machine guns firing on them from a distance of 10 to 20 yards.” From these positions the Japanese harassed the Americans using mortar and automatic weapons fire. Whenever the Americans tried to pinpoint where the fire was coming from the Japanese would simply switch positions to another. Within these parameters only limited skirmishing was carried out for the next few days.  On January 4th, Komori reported repulsing a strong American and two days later received his first citation from Emperor Hirohito for his heroic achievement. Meanwhile a much frustrated Cunningham began sending reports to Krueger he could not spot the enemy and was convinced continued attacks would simply result in further casualties. By January the 9th he reported 75 dead, 57 wounded and 14 missing. He requested Kreuger send him some tanks and on the 9th he received the 1st marine division's 1st tank battalion from Finschhafen. The 1st Tank Battalion had been left behind at Finschhafen because of transportation shortage and limited range for tank operations in the inhospitable terrain of the Cape Gloucester region. Eventually Rupertus would also release the rest of the tank company then in reserve at Cape Gloucester to help out. The Marine tanks and Army infantry quickly worked out the details of how they would go about combined operations. The morning of January 16th kicked off with a squadron of B-24’s followed by another of B-25s bombing the Japanese positions. This was followed up by artillery and mortars and then two 5 tank platoons began their assault against a 500 yard front. Behind the tanks were infantry of the 158th and despite the swampy terrain and thick vegetation, the tank-infantry stormed forward. The Japanese resisted ferociously, grounding two tanks that had to be destroyed lest the Japanese seize them later. The Americans destroyed the enemy’s positions, crushing numerous automatic weapons and a 75mm mountain gun. But the Americans had no orders to hold any positions, so they destroyed and pulled back to their perimeter for the night. The following morning the Americans resumed the attacks with flamethrowers eliminating small pockets of resistance still remaining. Komori still obsessed with defending Lupin aerodrome to the last man ordered a withdrawal, but not before radioing to the brigade HQ "fight till the glorious end to defend the airfield" which earned him a second Imperial citation on February 7. During these actions the Americans suffered 20 dead, 40 wounded and two tanks. For Komori’s men they had 116 dead and 117 wounded. For the next 3 weeks the fighting would deteriorate into a matter of patrol skirmishes, with Komori triumphantly reported back to HQ how the airfield was still in Japanese hands. The reality however was the Japanese were heavily outnumbered and lost control of the air and sea. How many men Komori commanded remains difficult to figure out as no documents were captured after the operation. It appears unlikely there were more than 1000 under his command. Early in the operation the Japanese were supplied by airdrop, often during daylight in view of the Americans. Yet as the Americans tightened their grip over the sea and air more, Komori became increasingly dependent on the trickle of supplies coming over the tortuous trail from Iboki. Carrying and distributing these supplies imposed still more of a drain on his manpower, and he withdrew his headquarters to Didmop to give more attention to this phase, leaving direct defense of the airfield to Major Tobuse. Yet that is all for Arawe for today, because we need to travel back over to New Guinea. Wareo had fallen and now the Australians were advancing upon Fortification Point as General Katagiri’s 20th division were retreating towards the northern coast. The 20th division would arrive at Zagaheme and Orarako on the 22nd and 25th respectively. With these movements occurring the Australians now felt the time was ripe to launch an offensive against Sio. On December 20th, General Wootten ordered the 20th brigade to advance through the 4th brigade's positions and begin a rapid pursuit towards Sio. The next day, Brigadier Windeyer had his men advance towards Wandokai while Wootten was reorganizing his forces to allow the coastal advance to continue. Meanwhile the 24th brigade took over the Gusika-Wario-Sattelberg area; the 4th brigade took over the Fortification Point-Masaweng River area; the 26th brigade advance down the coast and would be ferried to the mouth of the Masaweng to support Windeyer’s advance. The Australians enjoyed the advantage of aerial support in the form of Bostons, Mitchells, Marauders, Airacobras and Thunderbolts who continuously hammered the Japanese with bombs and strafing runs. Alongside this allied PT boats harassed the Japanese barge fleet, between the 9th and 13th they would sink 23 barges along the coast, mostly south of Sio. Despite the air and sea support the overland advances were particularly rough on the men. From fortification point to Kapugara gorge the coastal track ran along a flat kunai ledge some hundred yards wide, between the sea on each side with sharp coral terraces. They had little cover along the line of the advance. There were also few natives inhabiting the area. The men of the 20th brigade were not in great condition when they began the pursuit. They were stricken with malaria and Colonel Simpson anticipated the enemy might hit their left flank so he dispatched two companies to travel parallel with the main coastal advance and those guys had some even rougher terrain to travel. There was little water to be had along the coast and the long kunai fields increased the heat exponentially. The men occupied Hubika on the 22nd without opposition. The allied engineers would find the gorge beyond Hubika would prevent any progress by the tanks, so the troops would have to proceed without their support. By nightfall the 2/13th battalion would advance another 3000 yards facing no opposition. They got around 1500 yards past Wandokai when suddenly mortar and artillery fire rained down upon them. This was Captain Yoshikawa’s 1st battalion, 80th regiment who unleashed a bombardment for 2 hours upon the advancing Australians. Though it appeared like there was a major fight on their hands, it was only rearguard actions. Yoshikawa and his men were retreating towards Ago that night.  Christmas would see Windeyer receive the gift of further artillery reinforcements for his advance. The 62nd battery and 2/12th field regiment came over and on Boxing day Colonel Miyake would decide to abandon Ago and continue the retreat towards Kanomi. On the night of the 26th a company from a boat battalion of the 592nd EBSR, alongside an Australian radar detachment landed on Long Island. This was Operation Sanatogen, the mission was to set up a radar station and observation post on Long Island to help with the landing at Saidor and thwart Japanese barge movements. The Japanese had never placed a garrison on Long Island, but it was used as a staging point for barges moving between Rabaul and Wewak.  At 9am on the 27th, 18 Mitchells and 12 Bostons bombed and strafed the Walingai and Kanomi areas before Windeyers resumed his advance. The 2/13th advanced through Ago and occupied Walingai unopposed by the end of the day. The next day saw Australian patrols running into Japanese positions around Kanomi. At 11:15am a patrol of the 2/13th was fording a creek when they were fired upon. The patrol saw at least 14 Japanese retreating north around Blucher Point as they fired vicker guns and mortars upon them. During the afternoon the allied began a heavy artillery bombardment. The speed at which the Australians were advancing was providing results as the Japanese were forced to further withdraw towards Kalasa. Yet the Australians were stretching their logistical lines forcing Wootten to halt the forward units for 2 days. The two day delay allowed General Katagiri to get his men past Kalasa and reach Sio without any hindrance. On new years eve the 2/15th resumed their advance finding slight resistance around Nanda. At 5:30pm the 2/15th were fired upon by a few bands of Japanese and responded with artillery fire forcing them away. To avoid unnecessary casualties the Australians halted at the last creek before Nanda and resumed the march on new years day. The 2/15th then passed through Kwamkwam and captured Sialum Island during the afternoon of the 2nd. Sialum lies around half way between Fortification Point and Sio and it afforded the Australians a decent area to build a large supply dump on its sheltered. Yet the advance to Sio was not the only one going on, on New Guinea.   Since the battle of John’s Koll and Trevor’s Ridge, General Nakai’s detachment were forced to withdraw farther back into the hills. The Nakai detachment were now clinging to Shaggy Ridge the Kankirei Saddle and the area between the Faria River, Madang and Bogadjim. At Kankirei, Nakai dispatched Captain Ohata Masahiko’s 3rd Company of the 1st Battalion, 26th Field Artillery Regiment. General Nakai told Ohata that ‘the enemy is extremely sensitive to the use of artillery fire arms so that the artillerymen are expected to cooperate closely with the infantry men until the very end”.Ohata recalled “I realized what was expected from our commander, and he also said please take good care of your life. It took more than twenty years to train one artillery officer, but a gun is only material. We can replace the gun, but not an artilleryman.’ There is a very reasonable explanation for Nakai’s order. The IJA artillery field manual indicated their field guns were more valuable than artillerymen. In article 10 it said ‘The gun is the life of the Artillery. Therefore, the Artilleryman must live and die with the gun, and share the honor and shame together with the guns. One must continue to fight until the end’. Nakai at this time prohibited suicide and it seems was trying to save the lives of his artillerymen, lest they die for the sake of their guns. The main Japanese position was at Shaggy Ridge, a 4 mile long spur dotted by several rocky outcrops where the Japanese troops established numerous strong points. From the Pimple, a large rocky peak rising around half way along the crest of Shaggy ridge, the Japanese found it extremely sturdy to defend. The feature often saw a mist envelope it adding to its defensive capabilities.  As the Japanese clung to their heights, the Australians were busy developing their new main base at Dumpu. Airstrips, roads, bridge, culverts and numerous buildings were being worked on and with the recent acquisition of the Ramu valley they were also building a forward air base at Gusap. The only major offensive against Shaggy Ridge came in late October.  In accordance with Vasey's advice, Brigadier Dougherty prepared to attack the southernmost peak of Shaggy Ridge on the 20th. For three days from the 17th Dougherty’s patrols crept as near as they could, and early on the 20th, Captain Whyte the F.O.O. of the 54th Battery, directed the fire of his guns on to the Japanese position.  At midday forward units reported that they were within five yards of a four-strand barbed-wire fence; the Japanese position on a kunai covered Pinnacle was about 30 yards away. Between the enemy position and his men, there was a steep gully about 100 feet deep with precipitous slopes on both flanks . The Japanese hand cut fire lanes through the kunai and were dug in and heavily bunkered from the cliff face. Through the clever use of artillery fire, the Australians tricked the Japanese into retiring temporarily to gain shelter. The artillerymen varied the rate of fire so it was never the same, while platoons stormed specific ridges, gaining ground without casualties.To defend his western flank, General Vasey dispatched  the 2/7th to Kesawai 1 and the 2/6th to Kesawai 2. Yet the role of the 7th division for the time being was really limited to patrol activities. On 23rd October a section of the 2/2nd Commando Squadron led by Lieutenant Doig crossed the Ramu and moved up the Urigina Track next day, seeking a way east to the Mataloi-Orgoruna area. Lt Doig entered this new territory on the 25th and by 9 a.m. trees across the track near Orgoruna suggested that the Japanese might be in possession. Between 25th and 31st October Captain Haydon's company of the 2/25th Battalion tried to reach the Japanese track between Paipa and Kankirei. After moving up the Evapia River and then through rugged unmapped country for 4 days the patrol leader was forced to return as he realized that it would be impossible for him to reach his objective without further rations. On the 29th the 2/7th Commando Squadron, an engineer, Captain Gossip of the 2/6th Field Company, and two others left to patrol a road from the Ramu Valley across the Finisterre Ranges towards the Japanese road. This patrol returned on 1st November reporting that there was no possibility of making a road from the Kesawai area towards the Japanese roadhead.  Lieutenant Maxwell of the 2/6th Commando Squadron, performed a three-day reconnaissance towards Yokopi , walked right into an enemy defensive position on the first day out, saw five Japanese looking at him from about 20 yards away, and retired before they could fire at him.  Sergeant Berrell of the Papuan Battalion led his section, three men from the 21st Brigade, and 50 native carriers on a 13 days' patrol into the ranges to patrol enemy movement in the Kankirei area. He returned on 11th November without having found a worthwhile observation post near Kankirei. On the 20th October MacAdie sent a patrol from the 2/2nd Squadron to Josephstaal to find out whether the Japanese were there, and whether a strip could be constructed. Accompanied by Sergeant-Major England of Angau, Lieutenant Green's small patrol of five troopers, 32 native carriers and five police boys left for Sepu where it remained until setting out on the main journey on 3rd November. The route chosen by Green and England did not follow the known native tracks as the Australians wished to avoid any contact with Japanese patrols. The journey would take nine days. Over at Atemble, where the Japanese were known to be in some strength, was bypassed and, although there were tracks of Japanese horsemen at Sambanga and reports from natives that the Japanese did occasionally patrol the area between Atemble and Josephstaal and Madang, there were no encounters. On 13th November Green arrived at Josephstaal, which was not occupied and which had only been visited occasionally by small enemy patrols in recent months. The patrol returned to base on 26th November.    On December 2nd a patrol of 42 men from the 2/33rd Battalion led by Lieutenant Scotts set out, urged on by Eather's hope that it would be able to blaze a track into the heart of the Japanese defenses at Kankirei from the west and get a prisoner. Moving up the Mene River Valley and across the 5500 Feature, Scott established a base on a steep ridge. The next day he moved down a spur to some native huts where the dense jungle was replaced by kunai and then crossed into another spur, where they established an observation post. Meanwhile a patrol from the 2/2nd Pioneer Battalion was attempting to observe the Kankirei Saddle area from the east. On the 7th Lieutenant White led out eight Pioneers, two Angau warrant-officers and 20 natives from Bob's Post following the Japanese Mule Track north to Toms' Post. Next day the patrol moved on along a well-surveyed track, and, about 1,500 yards beyond Toms' Post, saw a strong enemy position ahead on a high feature astride the track. On the 9th and the morning of the 10th White tried to work round to the north of the enemy position to carry out his original task, but dwindling rations, heavy rain, and rugged country forced his return to the track. Accompanied by two men White then advanced along the track but after 20 minutes he came under heavy fire. The three men ran back down the hill which they had been climbing but White was hit by machine-gun fire and fell. All of these patrol actions helped prevent the Japanese from penetrating south and figured out generally where the Japanese were in numbers. On November 9th Vasey relieved the 21st brigade at the front with the 25th brigade. Along with this the 2/6th commando squadron and a Papuan company were sent to reinforce the front while the 2/7th command squadron was withdrawn. And with that, after nearly 10 months since Lt Rooke and his platoon of the 2/7th battalion had arrived on the airstrip at Bena, the Bena Force ceased to exist. They had 12 deaths, 16 wounded and 5 men missing but claimed to have killed over 230 Japanese. They helped build the Garoka airfield; over 78 miles of motor transport road between Bena and Garoka, Sigoiya, Asaloka and Kainantu and produced maps of completely unknown areas In his final report MacAdie wrote: “The force fulfilled its task. Every enemy patrol which crossed the Ramu River was driven back with casualties, and very determined enemy attacks were repulsed with heavy casualties. In addition the enemy lost many men in ambushes on tracks north of the Ramu River... There is no doubt that the enemy regarded this force as a menace to his flank, and little doubt that the size of the force was grossly overestimated.” Now the 2/2nd Commando Squadron would assume the responsibility for the defense of the Bena-Garoka area. November would see the start of an intense hide and seek artillery duel. The Australian artillery was attempting to neutralize the Japanese 75mm guns. Captain Ohata’s had placed two gun emplacements on the outskirts of Shaggy ridge in a position that protected the ridgeline in the front. The first emplacement were not entirely concealed and thus quickly became a target. Fortunately the guns survived as the Australian fire hit their shields mostly. Captain Ohata thought he could conceal their muzzle flashes by firing lower. The second gun emplacement was completely covered by shelter yet Ohata would remark ‘However the footsteps of the soldiers who were coming in from the behind the position were spotted by the search airplane. We were indeed astonished by their way of finding the gun position.’ By the end of November General Nakai was preparing to hit Kesawai and counterattack towards Dumpu. In early December patrols from the 2/16th were probing Shaggy Ridge. Vasey intended to perform a diversion to attract the Japanese attention away from other pending operations in New Guinea and New Britain. An idea was floated around to have Brigadier Dougherty raid Kankirei, but that's it for New Guinea as major events were unfolding for the CBI theater. Over in Tokyo, on November 5th and 6th the Greater East Asia Conference was being held. Attendees included Hideki Tojo for Japan, Zhang Jinghui for Manchukuo, Wang Jingwei for the Republic of China based in Nanjing, Ba Maw for Burma, Subhas Chandra Bose for Free India, Jose P Laurel for the Philippines and Wan Waithayakon for Thailand. Notable exclusions would be that of Korea and Taiwan, whom the Japanese had annexed and did not want to give any political autonomy to. There was also Vietnam and Cambodia who were not invited so as to not offend the Vichy French government who was still claiming French Indochina to be under their rule. There was also Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, but Japan figured they would be simply annexing these regions as their natural resources were now the lifeblood of the empire. Of the attendee’s, Suhas Chandra Bose was only present as an observer as India was still a British colony and the representative of Thailand under strict orders from Plaek Phibunsongkhram was to emphasize on every possible occasion that Thailand was not under Japanese domination, but in fact an allied nation. You might be asking why did Plaek Phibunsongkhram not attend such a grand event himself, well he actually feared if he were to leave Bangkok he would be ousted.  Hideki Tojo made a grand speech, greeting each of the participants and praising the spiritual essence of Asia in opposition to the materialistic civilization of the west. To give you a taste of this meeting here are some of the dialogue amongst participants. Tōjō Hideki stated in his speech: "It is an incontrovertible fact that the nations of Greater East Asia are bound in every respect by ties of an inseparable relationship". Ba Maw of Burma stated: "My Asian blood has always called out to other Asians… This is not the time to think with other minds, this is the time to think with our blood, and this thinking has brought me from Burma to Japan." Jose Laurel of the Philippines in his speech claimed that "the time has come for the Filipinos to disregard Anglo-Saxon civilization and its enervating influence… and to recapture their charm and original virtues as an Oriental people." Subhas Chandra Bose of India declared: "If our Allies were to go down, there will be no hope for India to be free for at least 100 years".   Overall the meeting was characterized by praise of solidarity and condemnation of western imperialism, but in terms of how Asia was going to come together and economic development and such, there really was no meat to any of it. Tojo simply kept reiterating how great Pan-Asianism was against the evils of the white devils. Yet for all the talk of asian unity, the Japanese governments actions were anything but that. The Japanese viewed themselves as racially superior to that of the other asian nations. They saw themselves as the Great Yamato Race and that they were destined to rule over the other asian peoples, similar to a father and son relationship. To actually go off the script so to say, I happen to have covered this topic extremely thoroughly in a 4 part series I did on my patreon about General Ishiwara Kanji. You see, Hideki Tojo’s main military/political rival was Ishiwara Kanji, and all of the greater east asian stuff was literally stolen from Ishiwara.   Ishiwara, for those unfamiliar, is someone I believe had an unprecedented impact on global history. Ishiwara pretty much single handedly began WW2 I would argue. He was a very bizarre figure who came to the realization after WW1 that the entire world would be engulfed in what he called “the final war”. To prepare Japan against this apocalypse he believed Japan had to seize Manchuria for her resources, to empower the empire so it could face the United States. He also believed it was absolutely necessary to ally with China and that everything needed to be done to create a harmony between the two peoples. Ironically after Ishiwara caused the invasion of Manchuria, it all in his view got out of hand and he was tossed aside by people like Tojo. He spent the entire war openly criticizing Tojo and the policies of Japan while trying to create this Pan-Asian league, and Tojo simply copied what he was doing, gave it a different name and made sure to eliminate the elements about allying with China and stopping the war with her. Ishiwara is a fascinating figure and to be honest I was so happy with the 4 part series I told on my patreon I might be releasing it on my Youtube channel and on my personal podcast server soon.   Now back to the conference, in the words of Indian Historian Panjaj Mishara  “the Japanese had revealed how deep the roots of anti-Westernism went and how quickly Asians could seize power from their European tormentors”. Tokyo hoped that a major demonstration of Pan-Asianism would lead China to broker peace with Japan and thus join them in a war against the west. A major theme of the conference was that Chiang Kai-Shek was not a proper asian and that no Asian would ally themselves to the white devils. As you can imagine the speeches made by Tojo emphasized how evil Britain and the United states were, yet at the same time praised Nazi Germany. Here are parts of Tojo’s speech.   “The need of upholding international justice and of guaranteeing world peace is habitually stressed by America and Britain. They mean thereby no more and no less than the preservation of a world order of their own, based upon division and conflict in Europe and upon the perpetuation of their colonial exploitation of Asia. They sought to realize their inordinate ambition in Asia through political aggression and economic exploitation; they brought on conflict among the various peoples; they tried to destroy their racial integrity under the fair name of education and culture. Thus, they have to this day threatened constantly the existence of the nations and people of Asia, disturbed their stability, and suppressed their natural and proper development. It is because of their notion to regard East Asia as a colony that they harp upon the principles of the open door and equal opportunity simply as a convenient means of pursuing their sinister designs of aggression. While constantly keeping their own territories closed to us, the peoples of Asia, thus denying us the equality of opportunities and impeding our trade, they sought solely their own prosperity. The Anglo-American ambition of world hegemony is indeed a scourge of mankind and the root of the world’s evils.”   “As regards the situation in Europe, we are very glad that our ally, Germany, has still further solidified her national unity and, with conviction in modern times. As regards the situation in Europe, we are very glad that our ally, Germany, has still further solidified her national unity and, with conviction in sure victory, is advancing to crush the United States and Britain and to construct a new Europe. The War of Greater East Asia is truly a war to destroy evil and to make justice manifest. Ours is a righteous cause. Justice knows no enemy and we are fully convinced greater of our ultimate victory.”   Meanwhile the allies held the Sextant Conference in Cairo between November 22-26th. This conference established China’s status as one of the four world powers, kind of a cheeky jab at Japan and a means to sway Chiang Kai-Shek from surrendering. At the conference plans were made for an offensive in Burma codenamed Operation Champion with sub operations Tarzan and Buccaneer. Lord Mountbatten presented  three plans of action. First Operation Tarzan called for 4 Indian divisions of the British 14th army group's 15th army  to concentrate their forces in Chittagong and cross the Maungdaw-Buthidaung line in mid-January. The next year they would capture the Burmese coast in order to defend Chittagong and occupy Sittwe on the Burmese coast. Then three divisions of the 4th Army, would assemble at Imphal and move east with the objective of destroying Japanese lines of communication and advancing to Arak and various parts of Sidon in northern Burma. In March, the Chindits long-range infiltration force would be parachuted into Burma, behind the Japanese lines while the Chinese Expeditionary Force (CEF) in India would cross the Ho Kang Valley and advance eastward into Myitkyina. The Chindit special forces would then support the Chinese forces and occupy Bhamo in April, while the Yunnan Army would begin operations on March 15 and advance to Lashio in April to join the British forces at Lashio and Bhamo. In the Bay of Bengal, a massive amphibious offensive would also be launched, with 3,000 British and American long-range infiltration troops participating.   Operation Musket would see the capture of Cape Sumatra and Operation Buccaneer was to be an amphibious operation to seize the Andaman Islands in order to cut off the Japanese supply lines. Chiang kai-shek expressed support for Tarzan, but once again insisted for it to be coupled with a massive naval operation in the Bay of Bengal. Though the British were reluctant to do this, US pressure eventually convinced them to land on the Andamans. The Chiefs of Staff then agreed to drive Japan out of Burma and reopen land links with China, with Stilwell conducting the ground attack in the north and Mountbatten commanding the amphibious landings in the south.    The American delegation told Chiang kai-shek that for the following six months, only 8900 tons of supplies could be flown to China via the Hump route each month, even though Chiang continuously pushed for 10000 tons. In the end, President Roosevelt promised to increase the airlift supply to China to 12000 tons, and also promised that B-29 Superfortress bombers would bomb Japan from Chinese bases. By the way if you are interested in the beginnings of the bombing campaigns against the Japanese home islands, please check out the podcast I did with Dave from the cold war channel over on my youtube channel. It is actually B-29’s operating in India and China that kicked it all off, and its not often talked about.    Many of the resolutions and promises, would not be really implemented. Politically, many arrangements were also made for the postwar international situation. Roosevelt and Churchill supported the territorial claims of the Republic of China, such as returning Taiwan and Manchuria to the Republic of China and deciding to allow Korea to become independent "in due course". The Cairo Declaration, however, made no specific mention of the future of the Ryukyu Islands. China of course wanted them, but the US believed that the Ryukyu Islands could be left to Japan after the war if they were completely demilitarized. It was also agreed between China and the US that Lushun would be used as a public military port for the Americans after the war, and that Dalian would become a free port. Roosevelt also consulted Chiang kai-shek on the possibility of the abolition of the Japanese imperial system along with the emperor, Hirohito, but Chiang kai-shek mentioned that the cause of the war was the Japanese warlords, and that the issue could be left to the Japanese people to decide for themselves after the war. The Americans did not want France to return to Indochina and offered Chiang kai-shek control of French Indochina; but he publicly declined, as Chiang kai-shek strongly advocated the independence of Korea and wanted to assist in the independence of Vietnam. Roosevelt firmly supported Chiang kai-sheks efforts to end imperialism in East Asia. To end the conference off, on December 1, the Allies issued the Cairo Declaration, demanding Japan's unconditional surrender and the return of all occupied lands.    I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. And so the drive to Sio was raging on, the Japanese were not being given a moment to breathe as they continued their withdrawal further north. Back over in Japan, Tojo was trying to win over China, but the allies were making sure to keep Chiang Kai-shek firmly in the fold in a 4d game of global chess.

Last time we spoke about the two pronged offensive against Wareo and the ongoing operation on Bougainville. Katagiri’s men had lost the battle for sattelberg and were performing their long retreat to Madang, but the Australians were not going to let up. Wootten immediately ordered the capture of Wareo and soon the allies were right back on the Japanese heels. General Katagiri lacked manpower, supplies and even physical strength to fight the advancing Australians off. The Australian took Bonga, Horace, the Kalueng lakes, Nongora, the Christmas hills and Kuanko during the drive to Wareo. Katagiri could do little more than order his men to continue fleeing north. 455 Japanese were killed, while the Australians suffered 47 deaths and 332 wounded. On Bougainville, General Geiger expanded his perimeter and launched a bold and dangerous amphibious raid against Koiari. Luckily for the raiders, the Japanese were taken by surprise and the Americans were able to pull out before they were annihilated.  This episode is The Landing at Arawe Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  The allies were edging ever closer to Rabaul as the Japanese were facing a long string of defeats in New Guinea and the Solomons. General Douglas MacArthur had elected to carry out two amphibious landings on western New Britain, in an effort to gain dominance over the Dampier strait. Codenamed Operation Dexterity, MacArthur was going to perform amphibious landings at Arawe and Cape Gloucester. Initially Operation Lazaretto called for an amphibious landing on southern New Britain 5km away from Gasmata in mid November. This would have been done to neutralize the Japanese base as Gasmata and protect the eastern flank for future operations, however the Japanese anticipated the attack and rapidly built up their  forces there. The 7th fleet was not capable of hitting both Gasmata and Cape Gloucester simultaneously, so instead Admirals Carpender and Barbey formulated the plan to invade Arawa that was thought to not be as heavily defended. With Arawe in hand the allies could establish a PT boat base with the objective to “establishment light naval forces and to protect the southeastern flank of our forces in the impending seizure of the Gloucester Peninsula”. But Morton C. Mumma, who commanded the motor torpedo boats in the Southwest Pacific Area, would have none of Arawe. He already had all the bases he could use, and the Japanese barges used mostly the north coast of New Britain. Apparently Morton spent days “camping on 7th Fleet’s doorstep to protest against setting up a PT base at Arawe”. Morton only left after he was assured by the Admirals that he need not have one if he did not want it.  By November 22nd, MacArthur ditched Operation Lazaretto and created Operation Director. Operation Director was to land at Arawe was slated for December 15th, 11 days prior to the landings at Cape Gloucester. Operation Director would also act as a diversion for operation backhander. The operation would be performed by two squadrons of the 112th cavalry regiment combat team. This regiment had spent its time as a National Guard patrolling the Mexican border before they were shipped off to New Caledonia in July of 1942. They were assigned to General Patch’s Americal division and were deployed as a horse mounted security force on New Caledonia. General Patch initially thought horse mounted cavalry could be used in jungle warfare, but the torrential and muddy pacific weather, quickly changed his mind. The regiment was sent to Goodenough island for training and was tossed into Operation Director quite at the last minute. The regiment had not yet seen combat and was converted to an infantry units in late may of 1943.  The regiment consisted of two squadrons: the 1st Squadron of A, B and C Troops and 2nd Squadron of D, E and F Troops. For combat support there was the M2A1 howitzer-equipped 148th Field Artillery Battalion and the 59th Engineer Company. The other combat units of the Director Task Force were two batteries of the 470th Anti-aircraft Artillery Battalion, most of the 236th Anti-aircraft Artillery Battalion, A Company of the United States Marine Corps 1st Amphibious Tractor Battalion and a detachment from the 26th Quartermaster War Dog Platoon. The 2nd Battalion of the 158th Infantry Regiment was held in reserve to reinforce the Director Task Force if required. Not only was the 112th regiment's attachment to the operation rushed, its planning was as well. The allies lacked good aerial photographs and the troops would only have 10 days to practice amphibious warfare at Goodenough Island. After this the regiment would be embarking aboard the LSD Crater Hall, the LSI HMAS Westralia and the two APD’s Humphrey’s and Sands departing on December 13th. A and B of the 1st squadron would also have additional missions, A would land at Umtingalu and B would land on Pilelo island. They were going to hit the beaches in rubber boats from the APD’s while the main force would be hitting their beaches in LVT 10 Buffaloes and 29 Alligators. For those of you wondering, the Buffalo LVT were more heavily armed with 37mm, turrets from Stuart tanks and Howitzer Motor Carriages. The Alligator LVT were designed to operate in swampy areas and less armed. The LVT’s would be hitting the western shore at a place called Cape Merkus.  The original plan was devised by General Krueger’s Alamo Force and called for the 7th marines to land east of the Tsurubu airdrome, the 2nd battalions, 1st marines west of it and the 503rd parachute battalion to land in a large patch of kunai grass southeast of it. The three units would work to converge on the airdrome. The plan was heavily criticized by General Kenney and Major General Rupertus. When they looked over the operational maps it seemed to them the planners had completely overlooked the mountains, swamps and jungle terrain. The marines were expected to drive though the jungle to link up with the paratroopers and that did not sit at all well with the air commanders. The Marines hated the plan because the converging of the 3 forces over the rough terrain, against a more than likely larger enemy would also see problems telling friend from foe. In early December General Kenney added his voice to their criticism on behalf of the air forces. Kenney argued the plan intended to use piecemeal paratroops instead of performing a mass drop, the piecemeal drops would require innumerable flights of troop carriers and these flights would require approaching enemy air reaction dangerously close. In conclusion he said "Commander, Allied Air Forces, does not desire to participate in the planned employment of paratroops for DEXTERITY." On December 14th, Colonel Edwin Pollock bluntly voiced his opposition of the plan to MacArthur who apparently walked out of the meeting quite pissed off.  It is difficult to know why an invasion of the southern area was believed to be necessary. It is most likely because the Navy wanted a PT boat base at Gasmata to better operate against IJN barge traffic. However Captain Morton Mumma’s declaration of not needing a base as long as Cape Gloucester was secured made the decision to hit Arawe final. Kenney also found the Lindenhafen plantation at Gasmata unsuitable for an airfield. To twist MacArthur’s arm somewhat, an intelligence report indicated Arawa was only defended by 500 men of the 115th infantry of the IJA 51st division. MacArthur was much more worried over Operation Backhander so he agreed. The use of paratroopers for operation Backhander was eliminated and instead they would concentrate strength for a potentially decisive stroke rather than a dispersal of forces. The 1st marines wold land immediately behind the 7th marines to hit the airdrome. Furthermore the 2nd battalion, 1st marines would make a secondary landing on the western shore of New Britain in order to block the Japanese from reinforcing the airdrome and to cut off the retreat of its garrison. After all was said and done the planning had finalized just 11 days prior to the landing date, it was quite a last minute ordeal. Given Backhander was a success, MacArthur also sought to hit Saidor on the northeastern coast of New Guinea, hopefully by the start of the new year. This would cut off General Adachi’s 18th army from retreating. Thus on December 10th, MacArthur ordered General Krueger to begin preparations for Operation Michaelmas with the 32nd division earmarked for this task. Over on the other side, General Imamura deployed General Sakai’s 17th division in western New Britain with their command center being at Gavuvu. Units already in the region consisted of the Matsuda Detachment and the 2nd battalion, 228th regiment, both of whom would now be under Sakai’s command. The original mission of General Matsuda’s 65th mixed brigade had been maintaining the supply line to New Guinea. Thus his unit was quite topheavy with transportation personnel alongside an assortment of orphan units that had become separated from their parent units on New Guinea. Matsuda’s HQ was near Kalingi, his 4th shipping detachment were located between Tsurubu and Natamo and his 65th engineer regiment was at Tsurubu. Matsuda concentrated the majority of his strength along the south and west coasts at placed like Cape Bushing, Aisega, Nigol, Arawe and Cape Merkus.  At Tuluvu, the name the Japanese used for Cape Gloucester, the detachment had been relieved by Colonel Sumiya Koki’s 53rd regiment in early november, successfully establishing defensive positions between Mount Talawe and Borgen Bay. Colonel Sumiya had prepared several small roadblocks to cover his eastward approaches while placing the bulk of his troops and weapons in and around two main strong points. The first point was the crescent shaped Borgen Bay around 1000 yards east of the airdrome. Over there he had an elaborate system of mutually supporting bunkers with mounting weapons up to 75mm guns, connected by a network of rifle trenches. The second point was in the broken foothills of Mount Talawe, dominating the flat grounds for several hundreds of yards to the south. Further south, Colonel Katayama Kenshiro’s 141st regiment were defending Cape Bushing; Colonel Jiro Sato’s the 51st reconnaissance regiment were defending Rooke Island; an understrength provisional company was defending Cape Merkus; and the 3rd battalion of the 141st were defending Nigol alongside a few orphan units of the 51st division. General Sakai dispatched Colonel Hirashima Shuhei’s 54th regiment were sent to reinforce Gasmata and their 7th company was detached to garrison Talasea. In early  December Major Komori Shinjiro’s  understrength 1st battalion, 81st regiment landed at Iboki. Sakai was concerned with the safety of the Cape Merkus Garrison, so he sent Komori’s detachment to proceed to Arawe urgently. Komori’s men would have to traverse an extremely difficult trail that saw them going through jungles, swamps, mountains and rivers over the entire width of the island. Back over with the allies, General Cunningham’s convoy rendezvoused with Admiral Barbey’s escorting force at Buna on December 14th. From there they would head for Arawe after dusk, also accompanied by Admiral Crutchley’s supporting force. On that same day, Kenney’s 5th air force performed bombing campaigns, dropping some 433 tons of bombs against Arawe. At 3:30am on the 15th Barbey’s convoy reached the transport area and prepared their assault. To get the vulnerable rubber boats ashore, General Cunningham had to rely on the element of surprise rather than strength. So he chose to land under the cover of darkness with no forewarning. According to Barbey "Although it was considered that the moonlight might prevent surprise, the Landing Force Commander desired to attempt it without any preliminary bombardment." Unfortunately an American party of amphibious scouts had landed on that beach back on the 10th, causing the Japanese to suspect another landing would soon take place. There would be machine guns ready to hit the boys. At 5:05 Humphrey’s launched 15 rubber boats for Pilelo island while Sands launched 15 others for Umtingalu. The landing at Pilelo went off without a hitch. Troop B landed and immediately attacked a Japanese radio station near the village of Paligmete. Troop A came under attack from a small group of Japanese hiding in some nearby caves. One american and 7 Japanese would die in the fighting. The landing at Umtingalu was another story entirely. The Japanese defenders unleashed heavy enfilading machine gun fire upon incoming rubber boats. 12 out of the 15 were punctured and sank quickly. Most of the men swam for their lives seaward and were rescued by small boats later on near House Fireman Beach. Around 12 men would die, 4 went missing and 17 were wounded. The submarine chaser SC-699 would manage to rescue 71 from the water while under fire. Between 6:10-6:25 allied destroyers bombarded the beach with 1800 5 inch shells and B-25 mitchells made a bombing pass around House Fireman Beach. The main landing force approached the area on amphibious tractors, facing slight opposition that they easily silenced using the rockets. The first wave consisted of 10 LVT-2 Buffalos that hit the beach in a chaotic fashion at 7:28am. The other waves of LVT-1 Alligators kept stalling and this caused the landing force to be strung out in columns for a couple of miles. Once ashore the cavalrymen stormed the Arawe peninsula's base. The two understrength Japanese companies there had little hope against them and withdrew northeast towards Didmop along the Pulie river.  At 8:00am more troops aboard General Heavy’s  LCVP’s and LCM’s came over with the first echelon of supplies. This time however, Japanese aircraft had spotted the convoys coming to Arawe at around 4am. Admiral Kusaka dispatched a strike force of 8 Vals and 56 Zeros to try and break the landings. 16 P-38’s intercepted the strike force, but many got through. Barbey’s flagship Conyngham and the supplies ships managed to evade the bombs. By the end of the day, 1904 troops had been landed and a new base was being constructed. Over the next following days, naval convoys would bring over reinforcements to the Arawe area. The Japanese launched multiple attacks upon them resulting in the sinking of APc-21, and APc-12, Subchaser SC-743, minesweeper YMS-50 and 4 LVT’s being damaged. Despite that minor damage, 6287 tons of supplies and 451 guns and vehicles were landed at Arawe within 3 weeks. A defensive perimeter was established behind the main line of resistance as General Cunninghumas men began sending patrols towards the Pulie and Itni Rivers to establish outposts. General Matsuda now realized he was facing a full blown invasion. He dispatched Major Tobuse Asayaki’s 1st battalion, 141st regiment while awaiting further reinforcements from the Komori detachment. There were no trails connecting the Itni and Arawe regions, thus the men were forced to travel by landing craft from Cape Bushing over to Omoi point a few miles west of the Arawe landings. From there they would travel overland to join up with Major Komori. Yet that is it for the Arawe operation as we now need to travel over to Bougainville.  The last time we were speaking about Bougainville the raid against Koiari had been quite a blunder. Meanwhile the amtracs were busy cutting trails through the jungles and swamps to help the general advance. A small unit from the 21st marines occupied Hill 600 back on November 27th. Then on December 3rd an intense artillery duel began as the Japanese unleashed 150mm guns upon the forward slopes of Hill 600, forcing the Americans to pull back. On December 5th the general advance kicked off. Colonel Robert Williams paratroopers occupied a line stretching from the crest of Hill 1000 going across a series of ridges and ravines towards the junction of the East-West trail and the Torokina river. Now this line would begin to expand 3000 yards over a ridge named Hellzapoppin Ridge. The marines named it after the musical, because of its extremely difficult terrain. The 3rd marines captured Hill 500 with zero opposition. The American supplies lines had been extended as well, now there was a growing supply dump called Evansville established in the rear of Hill 600 to provide supply to the final defensive line. December the 6th saw a severe earthquake hindering any advance. Commander of the 9th marines, Frazer West recalled “Being raised in Nevada I'd been through a lot of earthquakes so they were nothing new to me. We had one really severe earthquake on Bougainville. The big trees were just swaying around and we had built this fortification on this ridge, pillboxes, and such out of coconut logs and the roofs fell in on the pillboxes and some of the trenches caved in. The men got down and hugged to ground. It was impossible to stand up while it was going on. They were scared to death when these huge trees were breaking down around them. This went on it seemed for several minutes. The ground really rumbled and shook. It was the worst earthquake I'd ever been in.” On December 7th Williams led a patrol east towards a 300 yard long spur being defended by the 23rd regiment in well dug positions. William twice attempted seizing the spur and was wounded alongside 7 of his men who had to retire back to the marine lines. On the 9th, three other patrols hit the spur again, but were likewise driven off. During the late afternoon of the 9th the Japanese launched a counterattack against the marine position on Hill 1000. The paratroopers with the support of some 105mm and 75mm howitzers managed to repel the attack which cost them 12 deaths and 26 wounded. The next day, General Geiger decided to relieve Williams with the 1st battalion, 21st marines and the 1st battalion, 9th marines. At first the Marines tried to neutralize the Japanese with artillery fire, but the reverse slopes on places like Hill 1000 made it difficult for the guns to hit their positions. On the 13th Geiger requested aerial bombardments and received 3 dive bombers and 3 torpedo bombers who hit the targets causing, but also on a marine position killing 2 men and wounded 5. The next day 17 torpedo bombers hit the ridge and the following day another 18 torpedo bombers landed some direct hits on the Japanese positions.  On the 18th, 11 torpedo bombers loaded with 100 lb bombs with delay fuses managed to pin the enemy down while 155mm howitzers cleared much of the dense vegetation covering the crest of their ridge. Immediately after the air strike, the Marines stormed the ridge from Hill 1000 in a double envelopment, finding little resistance by the dazed survivors. The artillery and aerial bombing had been so heavy, most of the Japanese company were forced to retreat, leaving 50 corpses over Hellzapoppin ridge. Hellzapoppin ridge cost the marines 12 dead and 23 wounded. Meanwhile on the 21st a patrol of the 21st marines encountered a few Japanese upon Hill 600A. One platoon ran into some heavy fire from the Japanese requiring Company I to perform a double envelopment, but they were likewise pinned down. On the 23rd, Company K, reinforced with a heavy machine gun platoon attempted a direct assault against Hill600A, but they were driven back. The marines poured more artillery fire upon Hill600A and tossed more attacks, but still they were driven off and with heavy casualties. Then on the morning of the 24th, scouts discovered the Japanese were inexplicably abandoning the position and had begun slipping away during the night. Hill600A was to be the last offensive by the Marines on Bougainville, the army boys were soon to take over. Geiger relinquished command to General Griswolds 14th corps on the 15 and now the Americal Division would be advancing up to relieve the 3rd marine division. The Army boys would be taking control of an inland perimeter extending 23,000 yards. Over 50,000 troops would be working to expand that perimeter. Yet that is all for Bougainville as we will now be covering some events in India and Burma. As a result of the August Quebec Conference codenamed Quadrant, the allies created the combined South East Asian Command. This new command would have Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten as Supreme allied commander and General Joseph Stilwell as deputy supreme commander. They would hold overall strategic command of all air, sea and land operations for all the national contingents in the theater. Our old onion eating maniac friend Wingate had also returned from the Quebec Conference with the mission of expanding the strength of the Chindits. However Wingate refused to use Indian Army formations in his force, because he maintained that their training in long-range penetration would take longer and their maintenance by air would be difficult due to the varied dietary requirements of different Gurkha and Indian castes and religions. He couldn't get his way and was forced to accept the 111th brigade and two Gurkha battalions in the 77th brigade. Again this seems to be another point of evidence Wingate really did not like the Gurkha units.  So Wingate now had the 77th Indian brigade, led by Brigadier Mike Calvert and the 111th Indian brigade led by Brigadier Joe Lentaigne. To increase the number of Chindits the 14th, 16th and 23rd British brigades were added, breaking up the experienced 70th british division much to the misery of General Slim. The 3rd west africa brigade was also snatched up from the 81st west africa division. Through the Quebec conference, Wingate also managed to obtain a “private” air force for the Chindits, designated 1st air commando group, consisting mostly of American aircraft. The new Chindit force became officially known as the 3rd Indian division, though it would be referred to as a special force or Chindit or Long Range Penetration group. The new recruits were tossed into the rigorous training of crossing rivers, demolitions and some bivouacking at Gwalior. Calvert and Fergusson had both been promoted to brigadier and took command of two brigades. Both men were responsible for a lot of the training program and the development of tactical planning while Wingate was promoted to Major-General.  Inspired by Wingates onion force, the allied leaders during the Quebec conference decided to create an American deep penetration unit that would also harass the Japanese in Burma. On September 18th of 1943 a new American long range penetration force was announced to be created and it would be an all-volunteer unit. It received 960 jungle trained officers and men from the Caribbean defense command, 970 from the Army Ground Forces and 674 “battle tested” jungle troops from the South Pacific Command, those boys being veterans of Guadalcanal and the Solomons. General MacArthur handed over 274 Army combat experience volunteers from the Southwest Pacific command, veterans of New Guinea and Bougainville. These 3000 men were now the 5307th Composite Unit formed under the code named Galahad Project. The unit arrived to Bombay on October 31st where they were equipped and began training under the direction of Wingate at Deolali. Colonels Francis Brink and Charles Hunter trained the men from November to January of 1944. Then the 5307th moved to Deogarh where they received additional training in scouting, patrolling, stream crossing, weaponry, navigation, demolition, camouflaged, guerilla style warfare and the novel technique of airdrop supplying.  In the meantime, Stillwell was in China, so the command of the operation fell to Brigadier General Haydon Boatner who was the commanding General of the Ledo Sector and the Chief of staff for the Chinese Army in India. Stilwell had been planning an offensive codenamed Albacore while the Ledo Road was being constructed. To exercise his command, Stilwell had his small staff of American officer advisers each grab a Chinese division. They kept in touch via radio teams who spoke both American and Mandarin. However these American officers did not have real authority of command, they were merely acting through the use of persuasion. Operation Albacore was an offensive aimed at protecting the Ledo Base and securing the Shingbwiyang area. General Sun Li-Jen’s 38th division was given the task of capturing the line of Tarung Hka, then later to join with Lt General Liao Yaoxiangs 22nd division to hit the Jambu Bum ridge line. Afterwards they would proceed towards Myitkyina in December. Stilwell assumed the Japanese were not particularly strong north of Kamaing and would not be able to reinforce the Myitkyina-Paoshan area, but in fact the Japanese Burma Area Army had received a large amount of reinforcement in the area. Anxious to prevent any interference with their ongoing offensive, the Japanese Burma HQ had dispatched reinforcements all around the Burma permeer. In OCtober of 1943, the 56th division had eliminated a Chinese bridgehead over the Salween north of Teng-chung; in late September the 18th division set up positions in the Hukawng Valley; and some elements of the 56th division had taken up a position at Maingkwan. On October 24th, General Sun Li-Jen had the 112th regiment advance forward to shield the Ledo road builders, while the 2nd battalion advanced to Sharaw Ga and Ningbyen. Defending Sharaw Ga was the 5th company, 56th regiment with one platoon securing Ningbyen. The 1st battalion attacked Shingbwiyang before advancing upon Yupbang Ga. The 2nd battalion, 56th regiment stationed at Maingkwan upon receiving word of the allied offensive began moving towards Yupbang Ga. The 3rd battalion advanced from Hkalak Ha towards Ngajatzup in the northern edge of the Taro Plain. Due to supply difficulties, the 3rd battalion were making little progress. These Chinese forces were marching over portions of the trail that the defeated army and refugees had used in 1942 to flee Burma from the Japanese. The paths were a horrifying sight. Skeletons were found around every water hole. Groups of bones were found en masse. Dr. Gordon Seagrave, a Surgeon moving with troops, recalled seeing  “hundreds and hundreds of skeletons”. The Chinese would encounter unexpected well-led and well entrenched resistance at all of their objectives. Defending Sharaw Ga was the 5th company, 56th regiment with one platoon securing Ningbyen. Two miles north of Sharaw Ga the Chinese ran into an outpost which they quickly dislodged. However when they attacked the village which lay between two hills, the Japanese fired down upon them from said hill causing 116 casualties. From november 1-3rd the Japanese inflicted 50 deaths upon the Chinese attackers receiving no casualties upon themselves. The 1st battalion had a similar experience at Yupang Ga. There they ran into a well entrenched and well led force who created roadblocks between Sharaw Ga and Ningbyen isolating them. Major Chen’s 3rd battalion while trying to clear the Taro Plain was so hampered by logistics, by November 1st he had only arrived toNgajatzup on the extreme north edge of the plain. When notified Stilwell commented “Sorry performance. Arrived about November 1. Sent one company forward. Pulled it back again. Thereafter did nothing. Maj. Ch'en cowered in dug-out. Terrific waste of ammunition. Told Sun to have him move or I would shoot or court-martial Maj. Ch'en. Sun sent [name illegible] to investigate. Ch'en killed by British grenade in his dug-out on December 27. (Report was during Japanese attack. There was none).”  The Japanese resistance ground the offensive to a halt as the Chinese forces were forced to dig in. At Yupbang Ga in particular the Japanese had cut off the Chinese from the river crossing and began encirclement maneuvers. The CHinese relying on air supply were powerless to cut their way out. In response to the Chinese offensive, Lieutenant-General Tanaka Shinichi shifted the main strength of his 18th division to the Shingbwiyang area hoping to assemble there by the 15th of December. As the Japanese presence grew in the areas so did the casualties upon the Chinese forces. The 112th regiment had one of its companies annihilated on the 2nd of november. Their regimental command post was overrun on the 3rd as their guards were digging in for the night. The regimental commander, Colonel Chen, and junior US liaison officer Major General Laughlin managed to escape, but chief liaison officer Lt Colonel Douglas Gilbert was captured by the enemy. A company of the 114th rushed to aid the situation, but were halted by the Japanese just before reaching Yupbang Ga. In late November the situation for the 112th began to improve when the 114th regiment reinforced them. However when they began attacking Yupbang Ga their artillery batteries were driven away by four Japanese machine gun positions. More attempts were made in december, but the Japanese were simply outperforming them. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The landings at Arawe was yet again another successful allied amphibious operation, but most assuredly it would soon be met with the typical Japanese counter attack. The Bougainville operation was now under new management, and the situation in Burma was starting to heat up again.  

Last time we spoke about the learning process after the success, a very bloody one at that, of Operation galvanic, the continued operations in New Guinea, Bougainville and the naval battle of Cape St George. Galvanic was an extremely bloody experiment, one that would teach the allies bitter lessons of what to expect from the new phenomenon of “island hoping warfare” against the Japanese. On Bougainville, Japanese roadblocks were crushed and the Americans were extending their perimeters and advancing further inland. The IJN sought to help the IJA bolster Buka and this led to an absolutely disastrous engagement against Captain Burkes destroyer squadron. Burke won a near flawless victory. Then over on New Guinea, after the seizure of Sattelberg, the Australians were now beginning a new offensive heading north along the eastern coast. The Australians were in hot pursuit of the fleeing Japanese.  This episode is Fall of Wareo  Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    After their latest defeat at the battle of Sattelberg, Lt General Shigeru Katagiri had his men begin the long retreat towards Madang. In response General Wootten launched a two pronged offensive aimed at Wareo and Gusika. By the end of November they captured Gusika with ease effectively cutting off the Japanese supply route to Wareo. “All that remained of the 20th Division in this area consisted of abandoned foxholes, entrenchments, ammunition and ration dumps, equipment, weapons, camps, medical aid posts and graves.” The advance continued, on December 1st, the 2/43rd’s tanks were blasting through Horace’s Ears. The tanks blasted out the light opposition and soon the 2/43rd were occupying Horace’s Jaws, Nose and Western Ear. Meanwhile the 2/15th attacked Nongora, but were unable to defeat its defenders and had to pull back. A company of the 2/23rd smashed the last line of opposition south of Kunako village allowing for its seizure. Over at the Kalueng river, after a artillery bombardment, the 2/28th sent Lt Rooke’s with a patrol to check out the Lagoon who advanced without any opposition. Later in the afternoon the Australian scouts pushed south around 600 yards and began to hear the sounds of digging and chopping. They killed a Japanese and wounded another advancing further southwest to avoid what was assumed to be an enemy position. Towards dusk a strong Japanese patrol ran into them causing a small firefight. Rooke had his men dig in for the night while he climbed up a tree to observe the Japanese northeast of them. Rook then sent two volunteers, Privates Hutton and Wadel to try and slip back to the battalion HQ to get help, both men were killed trying. At 8pm Rooke’s patrol snuck out under the cover of rain and darkness to dig in closer to Kalueng. On December 2nd, while the 2/43rd consolidated all of Horace, they also began advancing towards the Lakes against slight opposition. Then some of the tanks were attacked by Japanese 75mm guns from atop some high ground to the north of a lake at around 200 yards. The 2/15th would find Nongora abandoned on the 2nd and seized what was once the 79th’s regimental HQ. At Kuanko, patrols of the 2/23rd would find the Japanese held a formidable position along a ridge near Peak Hill. At 8:30am the Japanese began firing machines guns upon the Kuanko area, only to be replied with Australian mortar and artillery. At dusk the Japanese suddenly charged using bombs made of gelignite that caused large blasts, but did little damage. The Japanese charge had surprised the forward Australian units who pulled back, thus the Japanese were able to seize ground north of Kuanko. It was a serious situation, so the Australians decided to launch a night attack. The leading platoons lost several men while charging the Japanese throwing grenades and explosives. The men of the 80th regiment however held their ground and repealed the Australian assault inflicting heavy casualties upon them. For the past two days, Brigadier Edgars three battalions had been receiving training from AIF battalions about jungle fighting. Wootten then decided to attach AIF experienced jungle fighting units to Edgar’s battalions in an advisory role. Now the 20th, 24th and 26th brigades would each supply the 29th/46th, 37th/52nd and 22nd battalions with teams consisting of 3 officers, 9 NCO’s, 9 Privates all capable of leading sections. These men would be advancing up the coast towards Fortification Point, with the 20th brigade held back in reserve. To support this advance a new beachhead was required at the mouth of the Kalueng to supply them by sea. Men went to work removing all the underwater and hardwood obstacles, so a bridge could be built over the Kalueng to allow the tanks and jeeps to cross. Edgar sent the 22nd battalion on the 3rd to capture some high ground north and west of Gusika to secure the new beachhead. At 10:15am, Captain McFadden, Guild and Martin led companies across the Kalueng to assault some features held by Japanese. They were held back by heavy machine gun fire and quickly called in artillery support that blasted the Japanese positions until 12:45pm. After that the companies continued their attack, but without success. Then Guild’s company seized a knoll around a mile northwest of Gusika while Martins company pushed frontally and McFadden’s formed a circle around the Japanese. By 5pm the companies and artillery managed to dislodge the Japanese allowing the 22nd battalion to establish their bridgehead. However the following day for the 22nd battalion would not be an idle one. A mixed force consisting of the 238th battalion, 33rd independent engineer regiment and 2nd battalion, 26th field artillery led by Major Tashiro had orders stating "the force, while avoiding any decisive engagement, will carry out successive resistance to try to delay enemy advance". The 22nd battalion had fought hard to clear the enemy positions south of the Lagoon, but their successes were few. Patrols discovered the enemy had dug in near a creek half way from Kalueng to the Lagoon. At 12pm, one of McFaddens platoons found a mine field along a track before being attacked. McFadden requested artillery support, but it failed to hit the mark. Lt Holdworths leading platoon 5 found themselves fighting hand to hand combat with some Japanese near the same track. Soon multiple platoons converged into the area forming an incoherent skirmish, while the Japanese enjoyed well established dug-in positions to face off against the multiple Australian groups. Because of the disorganizations, none of the Australian units managed to penetrate the Japanese positions.   Over along the track to Wareo, Brigadier Porter worried his 2/43rd battalion was too worn and torn, so he ordered two companies of the 2/32nd led by Colonel Scott to head up to bolster their strength. By the 3rd of december, Colonel Scott’s men began arriving to cover the 2/43rd, who were engaged in battle with multiple disabled tanks. By midday the Japanese could no longer withstand the Australian attacks and were forced to pull back 100 yards. Now Colonel Scott took command over the Lakes area, deploying his men and those of the 2/43rd up the main track half way between the Lakes and Christmas Hills. Back at Kuanko, the 2/23rd battalion were clinging on to their unfavourable position, being  battered by the Japanese all the while. They were suffering from a lack of supplies, which were painstakingly being brought to them all the way from Palanko by men of the 2/24th battalion. Kuanko was seeing a firing duel involving numerous Japanese snipers, prompting Brigadier Whitehead to reinforce the position with Captain Denny’s company of the 2/24th.    On the 4th, Colonel Scott resumed the attack against the Lakes area with both his 2/32nd and 2/43rd companies becoming “exhausted and culled of semi-sick personnel”. Beginning at 7am the 4th and 24th batteries bombarded the Japanese positions along the track, an hour later this was followed up by 3 inch mortars. The Australian companies advanced parallel to the track over rough terrain, some managed to get 800 yards behind the Japanese where they began digging in. Despite being cut off the Japanese continued to resist until the cover of night allowed them to withdraw. To the west the 2/15th advanced north against Christmas Hills, but the terrain was so bad they eventually had to pull back to Nongora. At Kuanko, the 2/23rd discovered that elements of the 80th regiment had hooked around their rear during the night and were most likely trying to cut off their communications. Whitehead ordered the 2/24th company to clear the track. The 2/24th company advanced cautiously, going 75 yards south of the 2/23rds position near the main track. They began to dig in as patrols fanned out who quickly found the enemy occupying a track between Kuanko and the 2/23rd. They left the enemy unmolested for the moment as other patrols were sent to cut the Wareo-Kuanko track around Peak Hill linking up with the 2/23rd.   The next day with enough supplies carried forward, Whitehead sent the rest of the 2/24th to reinforce the flanking maneuver going west of the track between Kuanko and Peak Hill. Colonel Scott had his 2/43rd and 2/32nd advance towards Christmas Hills who only found dead men of the 79th and 80th regiment as they had pulled out during the night. There was a ton of abandoned equipment, rifles, anti-tank ditch and dumps of 81mm mortars. The men quickly dug in as some men were sent forward to try and outflank the Japanese who were just 50 yards or so beyond their new positions. The Australians found the Japanese had dug in on another ridge close to the track. On that same day, the bridge over the Kalueng was finally finished allowing the 4th brigade to advance to Fortification point, with Lt Colonel Kenneth Cusworths 29th/46th taking the vanguard. With three matildas in the front the vanguard advanced at a good pace through sporadic Japanese fire. At 10am the leading tank was disabled by a landmine south of the creek with its tracks blown off. The other two tanks were unable to cross the creek without engineering aid leaving the vanguard force to advance unsupported. Several abandoned positions were passed before they ran into significant enemy fire. Cusworth’s men were held up at the line of the first creek where the terrain turned into a large kunai field then jungle. By the afternoon the tanks were repaired and helped cross the creek, successfully brushing aside the enemy resistance allowing the Australians to advance halfway to the Lagoon. But the 238th regiment’s companies regrouped and began attacking the advancing columns using sniper fire. This eventually caused Cusworth to order his men to pull back 60 yards to dig in near the creek.    Though the tanks were essential at pushing away the enemy, they also were causing significant delayed as they continued to run into tank ditches and mines. On December 6th, Cusworth resumed his advance along two tracks leading to the inland side of the Lagoon. Woodpecker and light machine guns pelted the Australian columns inflicting heavy casualties. On the left track the Australians fought a Japanese position upon Bald Hill near the northern end of the Lagoon. The leading platoons had to charge through artillery and machine gun posts, but they managed to dislodge the Japanese who were hastily fleeing. The Japanese fought like lions, but there was little they could do against superior artillery and tank supported infantry. The best the Japanese could hope for was to continuously fight delaying actions while trying to avoid decisive engagements.   General Katagiri lacked manpower, supplies even physical strength to fight the advancing Australians off. His units in the mountain and coastal areas were essentially cut off from the frontlines. The were relying heavily on Submarines and barges to move the meagre supplies that came from sea, and these were at the mercy of PT boat patrols. Overland the Japanese were failing to recruit native carriers because the Allies were extremely successful at bringing them to their side. Katagiri had no choice he ordered a gradual withdrawal from Wareo, lest it become a massacre. The 79th regiment began pulling back towards Lakona to reinforce the coastal area.   Colonel Scott ordered an artillery bombardment to kick off December 6th before sending his men to assault Christmas Hills. His men were able to easily seize the eastern slope near the top, but now faced Japanese defensive lines on the western slopes less than 100 yards away. Colonel Hayashia received orders to abandon the positions during the night and as was becoming a routine, Scotts men found them abandoned the next morning. Meanwhile the 2/23rd discovered the enemy in front of them had likewise pulled out during the night. The 2/24th began cutting the track between Kaunko-Kwatingkoo and Kuanko-Wareo. During the afternoon the 2/23rd and 2/24th coordinated an assault to take Peak Hill. The 2/23rd performed a diversionary attack at 5pm using 25 pounders as the 2/24th stormed Peak Hills western slopes. By 6:45 the 2/24th were digging in on the western slopes and when darkness fell the 80th regiment began withdrawing from Peak Hill, allowing the Australians to seize the feature entirely by the morning. At this point the 2/23rd passed through the 2/24th position to hit the last Japanese defensive positions located 600 yards away from Wareo. Along the way the 2/24th discovered that Kwatingkoo was still held strongly by the enemy. The village still had at least 4 machine gun posts and mortars. The Japanese were only performing delaying actions as by December 8th the mountain area was finally abandoned altogether. The 2/24th occupied Kwatingkoo and the 2/23rd Wareo, quickly hoisted the Australian flag on the high ridge in the area. The fighting had cost the Japanese 451 dead, with 1 captured. For the Australians, they suffered 47 dead and 322 wounded. Knowing the Japanese were just going to take up more defensive positions, the 2/24th were ordered to pursue them as quickly as possible towards Bazuluo and east of the Christmas Hills area. The acting Japanese rearguard, units of the 2nd battalion, 79th regiment took up a position at a 2200 feature ambushing the Australians at every point possible. The Japanese rearguard would perform a delaying action against the 2/24th and 2/32nd battalions until December 12th, gradually pushed northwards. Their efforts earned them severe losses, but also valuable time for Katagiri to pull the forces back and assemble new positions. On December 7th, Cusworths men were held up by heavy fire coming out of an enemy position halfway between the lagoon and Tunom River. Cusworth men had advanced far past their tank support who were continuously being bogged down by mines and tank ditches. Regardless, the Australians still enjoyed superior artillery support and continued their pursuit of the Japanese until they reached the Tunom by nightfall and dug in. The next morning, Cusworth ordered the forces to cross the river, but the 238th regiment had companies take up positions to hit them as they did. Well concealed Woodpecker guns unleashed havoc from the jungles upon the advancing Australians causing heavy casualties. The Japanese were desperate to delay the advance as much as they could to give their men a fighting chance to withdraw. Sniper fire and Woodpeckers were all they could toss back, but the Australian artillery was able to pinpoint and annihilate their positions systematically.  Along the Australian left flank, the 37th/52nd were fighting their way towards Tunom, with one company managing to get across the river against fierce resistance. During the night the Tunom defenders pull out allowing Cusworth to advance towards the mouth of Tunom by November 9th. The next day saw the 37/52nd in a very dangerous position. They were under heavy fire including artillery and it was likely the Japanese would perform a hook to cut them off. Brigadier Edgar decided to toss his 22nd battalion into the center line. The 22nd battalions advanced to a creek junction and unleashed a large mortar bombardment and upon advancing further only found dead Japanese. Along the rest of the advancing line the men were facing less and less resistance, as most of the 79th regiment were nearing Lakona. Cusworths men accompanied by the 29th/46th and some tanks advanced further and reached the Sowi river by 1:40pm. With heavy artillery and tank support they continued on until 3pm when they found Kilingia recently abandoned. The Engineer special brigade amphibious scouts rolled up to the Kiligia area and went to work forming a new beach head. This led to a new group constituting of AASC, medical and ESB detachments being brought up by landing crafts who constructed jeep tracks to help the infantry come over and to alleviate native carriers. The Australians did not rest however, the next day saw them continue the advance, with one company of the 22nd crossing the Sowi before digging in for the night. On December 12th, the rest of the 22nd crossed the Sowi with their tank support dispersing meager Japanese resistance. The 22nd advanced over numerous creeks where Japanese took up positions. By the 14th, the 22nd managed to force the Japanese back away from the 5th creek they came across. At this point the remnants of the 238th regiment withdrew to Lakona joining a garrison forming there and sent 50 infantry towards the Masaweng River to help Hayashidas rearguard. The 37th/52nd advancing on the left flank were meeting stiff resistance, but the Japanese rearguard could do nothing against their artillery and mortars. Now the 22nd were approaching a creek near lakona and began clashing with the growing garrison in the area. The Japanese had dug in forming a strong position, but a company of the 22nd led by Howieson hooked around a cliff trying to block the Japanese escape route. While this was going on the 37th/52nd were pushing back the rearguard forces towards the fringes of Cape Sibida. The 50 Japanese there found themselves surrounded because of Howieson’s men and had no choice but to fight to the last man. Howiesons men from the cliff position tossed grenades down upon them to horrifying effect. At 5:30 on december 16th, 5 matildas rolled in towards the Cape Sibida pocket finding the doomed Japanese with their backs to the sea. At a range of 150 yards they began to fire upon the Japanese and with 8 minutes reached the cliff where they mopped them up to the last man.  After further investigation it would turn out many Japanese had leapt off the cliffs around Cape Sibidia rather than die to the enemy. For the next day several stragglers were shot, including a few men who tried to swim out to sea heading for Sanga. 47 dead Japanese would be counted by the end of the 17th, though it was likely there were 70 or more. On the 17th, 14 more Japanese would be killed sheltering in some caves below Cape Sibida, it is theorised this was the area men had lept to the deaths. It was a decisive day, the Japanese had fought fanatically, but had lost Lakona, the pivot to their escape route. The next day the 29th/46th advanced along the coast and crossed the Sanga under a heavy artillery bombardment. The resistance from here on seemed only half hearted all the way until the Masaweng river. Once at the Masaweng, remnants of the 238th regiment launched a counterattack forcing the Australians to dig in for the day. It seems it was the last ditch effort to delay the advance of the 4th brigade as both the 29th/46th and 37th/52nd battalions were able to reach the Masaweng unopposed on the 18th. On the 18th, Katagiri received orders from Generals Imamura and Adachi to officially cancel further operations to take back Finschhafen and to withdraw towards Sio, the very last key position on the west coast of the Vitiaz strait. For the new task at hand, Katagiri sent the 80th regiment to occupy the Ago-Kanomi area and guard the coastal area to allow the rest of the division to withdraw towards Kalasa and Sio. The rearguard would be provided by Colonel Hayashida’s 79th regiment.  The 19th brought an intense artillery barrage as Cusworth’s men were hitting Hayashida’s main line. The Australians were met with a strong rain of fire and were unable to break through. Only the matildas were able to make some progress, but they were quickly held back by a steep ravine. On the left flank the 37th/52nd crossed the Masaweng unopposed during the day and marched to the southern slopes of FOrtification Hill by nightfall. This action forced Hayashia to withdraw during the night, the unpleasant routine his men had endured for days at this point. Facing no further resistance the 29th/46th and 37/52nd battalions occupied Fortification Hill. The 4th brigade had suffered 65 deaths and 146 wounded during their pursuit. For the Japanese it was a staggering 420 deaths, 6 prisoners and another 136 bodies would be found later having died of disease, malnutrition and suicide. However now we need to take a little detour over to the boys on Bougainville. Last time we were talking about Bougainville, General Geiger had expanded his perimeter. The army troops on the left flank had reached their final inland line back on November 25th. The line was adjusted at this point. In the front were the 21st marines taking up various positions on high grounds, though a lot of the terrain was swampy. Artillery units were moved forward into better positions to support the frontline positions better. Every avenue of approach to the defensive perimeter was covered in length. Meanwhile daily patrols from platoon to company strength, fanned out of the perimeter scouring the area for Japanese outposts to the east and north. They would find countless abandoned outposts. An order was issued on November 28th that no further movements were to be carried out until December. The line was now anchored in the north by Hill 1000 and extended southward paralleling the Torokina River to Hills 600 and 500. This denied the Japanese access to any high ground that would allow them to use artillery against the airfields and beachhead. To protect their general advance from any Japanese surprise attacks against their right flank, Geiger planned to launch a raid against the village of Koiari to the south. Geiger selected the 1st parachute battalion of Major Richard Fagan, reinforced with M Company of the 3rd Raiders. Their task was to launch a surprise attack against a Japanese position near Koiari, blow up any supply dumps they found, disrupt communications and harass the enemy as far into the interior as the East-West trail. A landing reconnaissance was carried out on November 27th, reporting no enemy anywhere near the target area, however these reports were unfortunately wrong. The paratroopers got aboard some LCM’s and LCVP’s at 4am on the 29th and would find themselves tossed nearly in the center of a Japanese supply dump. Major Fagan had estimated they would be opposed by at least 1200 Japanese, most likely the Japanese 6th transport regiment and elements of the 23rd infantry regiment. Luckily for Fagans men, the Japanese were just as surprised as them. Fagans men quickly overran the dump and established a perimeter extending 200 yards inland. The Japanese then responded by tossing mortar, machine gun and rifle fire at the marine beachhead. Artillery from Torokina began to help the marines as they were met with a series of enemy charges through the night. The second landing party landed further south to meet up with the main party, but in the process would suffer 13 casualties. Fagan sent word to HQ that things were getting very hot and they needed to pull out quickly. He estimated 1200 Japanese would be storming his beachhead. Geiger fearing his mens annihilation quickly formed a rescue operation, though communications broke with Fagan. The Japanese continued to toss attacks at the beachhead, but were kept at bay by gunfire from 155mm guns of the 3rd defense battalion. Meanwhile the craft used to get the paratroopers over were sent to rescue them, but they were hindered by Japanese artillery. This prompted Geiger to send an LCI gunboat and the destroyers Fullam, Lradner and Landsdowne which had just come back from convoy duties. During the night the Japanese began surrounding the beachhead firing into their perimeter. The 155mm “long toms” continued to offer a shield for the marines, barely managing to keep the Japanese pinned down. The paratroopers were running out of ammunition when just in the nick of time the boats arrived to the scene and all the boys were picked up by 8:40pm.  In the end the raid was a complete failure, the Americans suffered 15 deaths, 99 wounded and 7 were missing out of a force of 614 that went over. They estimated they had caused 291 casualties upon the enemies, but there was no way to really gauge this. Nearly all the damage dealt to the enemy was done via artillery and naval bombardment, pretty much making the raid a complete waste of time. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Over on Green Hell, the Japanese yet again found themselves on the run with the Australians biting at their heels. Wareo had fallen, now all that remained was Sio, but the Japanese would be no means make it a walk in the park for the allies. Over on Bougainville, the Americans proved once in awhile they could mess up to. 

Last time we spoke about operation Galvanic, the invasion of the Gilbert islands. The Americans finally assaulted Tarawa, Makin, Betio and the smaller islands of the Gilberts. Tarawa saw an estimated 4690 Japanese and Koreans killed, with 17 Japanese and 129 Koreans POWs captured. The Marines suffered 1009 deaths, 2101 wounded and 191 missing in action. Vandegrift would tell the New York Times on December 27th "Tarawa was an assault from beginning to end. We must steel ourselves now to pay that price". The heavy casualties would be met by an outraged american public who could not believe such losses were necessary to take such small and seemingly unimportant islands. Little did the American public know, the lessons of places like Tarawa, were just one of many more to come. Admiral Nimitz would spend considerable time reading furious letters from the letters of the dead boys on these islands. This episode is battle of Cape St George Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  The Gilberts, specifically Tarawa, provided the first “wake up call” to American about the ferocity of the war ahead of them. Correspondents were not present at Henderson Field during the Marine battle for Gaudalcanal where the Americans found themselves defenders and the Japanese attackers. 6 months of grueling battle would see casualties approximating those incurred after three days on Tarawa. Correspondent Richard Johnston was one of the first to write of the action for Time magazine “It has been a privilege to see the Marines from privates to colonels, every man a hero, go up against Japanese fire with complete disregard for their lives.“Last week some two to three thousand US Marines, most of them dead and wounded, gave the nation a name to stand beside those of Concord Bridge, the Bonhomme Richard, the Alamo, Little Big Horn and Belleau Wood. The name was Tarawa.”” Johnston was one of 25 war correspondents, 5 photographers and two artists embedded with the marines in the Gilberts. Never in history had a battle been so fully covered by the press. The amphibious landings drew immense casualty rates and during the active fighting, the mortality rate per 1000 soldiers per day was 1.78 compared to 0.36 in europe, thats nearly 5 times more. Overall casualty rates, including the wounded were 5.5 per thousand per day compared to 1.74 for europe. The war correspondents learnt a lot about the fighting qualities of their marines, but they also learnt a great deal about the enemy. The battles frequently saw hand-to-hand combat. The Americans were shocked to find the enemy were not in fact short, bucktoothed, bespectacled “Japs” as the propaganda cartoons had portrayed them. Private 1st class Robert Muhlbach recalled many of the enemy were over 6 feet tall and “They were good at defending themselves, and so we had to parry and thrust, and they were good! Those guys were so much bigger than the average Jap. They were naval landing forces [Rikusentai], like Japanese Marines, and they were larger. They were very accurate with their weapons, and good with their bayonets … They were good and we were pretty good, too. So it was two of probably the best military outfits in the war.” One Lt Thomas encountered some hand to hand fighting and said “ I had the field telephone in my hand when I was rushed by the biggest Jap I’ve ever seen. We grappled for a few seconds, and I managed to kick him off me and throw him to the ground. Then I picked up a 0.45 and finished him off.” General Holland Smith who commanded the marines had this to say about Tarawa “I don’t see how they ever took Tarawa. It’s the most completely defended island I ever saw … I passed boys who had lived yesterday a thousand times and looked older than their fathers. Dirty, unshaven, with gaunt sightless eyes, they had survived the ordeal, but it had chilled their souls. They found it hard to believe they were actually alive …” He was not to be the only high ranking commander stunned by what occurred on such a small island. Admiral Nimitz wrote to his wife  “I have never seen such a desolate spot as Tarawa. General Richardson, who saw battlefields in France last year, says it reminded him of the Ypres field, over which the battle raged back and forth for weeks. Not a coconut tree of thousands was left whole …” Nimitz would read countless letters beginning with “you killed my son on Tarawa”. The mothers of 1009 marines and 687 naval personnel would never see their sons again. The invasion of the gilberts had ushered in what is commonly known as the “island hoping campaign” vs what was called Leapfrogging in the south pacific. As told to us by General Douglas MacArthur “Although we’ve already seen many instances of American forces launching amphibious invasions against Japanese-held islands, particularly at the Solomons, there is one difference to be made. The strategy employed in the South Pacific is often referred to as leapfrogging, and the explanation comes from General MacArthur himself, who claimed to have invented this strategy despite it predating WW2 by many decades.    My strategic conception for the Pacific Theater, which I outlined after the Papuan Campaign and have since consistently advocated, contemplates massive strokes against only main strategic objectives, utilizing surprise and air-ground striking power supported and assisted by the fleet. This is the very opposite of what is termed island hopping which is the gradual pushing back of the enemy by direct frontal pressure with the consequent heavy casualties which will certainly be involved. Key points must of course be taken but a wise choice of such will obviate the need for storming the mass of islands now in enemy possession. Island hopping with extravagant losses and slow progress ... is not my idea of how to end the war as soon and as cheaply as possible. New conditions require for solution and new weapons require for maximum application of new and imaginative methods. Wars are never won in the past.””   With the capture of the Gilberts, now the allies had an assortment of new air bases for land based aircraft to be used against the Marshalls. The seabees and 7th air force engineers rapidly went to work on airfield construction at Tarawa and Makin. Yet there were many who questioned if it really was all worth it, amongst them was General Holland Smith "Was Tarawa worth it? My answer is unqualified: No." He questioned whether 1772 lives and an escort carrier was worth the additional air fields. The invasion taught a lot of bitter lessons, such as how to improve the preliminary naval bombardments and air strikes so they would be more successful; to improve the capability of naval fleets to move into a area and obtain control over it; for naval and aerial assets to remain in the area for the throughout the entire assault; the vital importance of maintaining good communications between land and sea and between the tanks and infantry which proved rather lackluster at Tarawa; the value of amphibian tractors when you had to face fortified beaches and most importantly Operation Galvanic proved to be a significant testing ground of established amphibious doctrine. The Americans had no illusions that the techniques, tactics and procedures set for in the basic US manuals for landing operations were workable under such difficult conditions. On the other side, the Japanese had prepared the Ko Brigade at Ponape consisting of the 3rd battalion, 107th regiment, 3rd battalion, 16th mountain artillery regiment, 2nd company, 52nd engineers and other units of the 1st south seas detachment to launch a counterlanding against the Gilberts, but this plan was quickly dropped. Instead the Japanese would focus their efforts on reinforcing other central pacific islands such as the Marshalls. Over on Bougainville, the Americans were enjoying a rather quiet week after the battle of the Coconut Grove and they used this time to expand their perimeter. However there was a hiccup on November 17th when convoy 31.6 bearing the 3rd battalion, 21st marines were set upon by Betty bombers. 185 marines were aboard the destroyer transport McKean and as she approached Empress Augusta Bay a Betty hit her with a torpedo off her starboard quarter. This exploded her after magazine and depth charge spaces. Flaming oil engulfed her, she lost power and communications. Her commanding officer Lt Ralph Ramey ordered abandon ship at 3:55am as she began to sink stern first by 4am. 64 crew and 52 troops died as a result of the attack. Meanwhile Colonel Hamanoue’s men had been busy constructing defenses around the forks of the Piva River. By the 18th, American patrols discovered two new Japanese roadblocks on the Numa Numa and East-West trails. This led the 3rd battalion ,3rd marines to be tasked with knocking out the Numa Numa roadblock. The marines opened the following day up with an artillery barrage before rolling in with some light tanks flanking and rousing the defenders of the roadblock. 16 Japanese would be killed. With the Numa Numa position secured, the men advanced over to hit the East-West roadblock. That same morning the 2nd battalion, 3rd marines crossed the Piva and captured the roadblock at the forks area. During the afternoon, a reinforced platoon seized some high ground to the left of the East-West Trail. The platoon led by Lt Steve Cibek dug in on top of the feature that would provide excellent observation over the area. The Japanese would toss attacks at their hill for 3 days prompting reinforcements to be brought up to help Cibeks men. On the 21st, General Geiger decided to expand the perimeter again, this time to Inland Defense line “easy”. The 21st marines would now take up a position between the other two regiments. They would however run into some strong resistance from the bulk of Colonel Hamanoue’s focus with their 3rd battalion getting pinned down after crossing the Piva by heavy mortar fire. Their 2nd battalion in the center ran head on into a Japanese defensive line astride the East-West trail. There were around 20 pillboxes and the 2nd battalion were forced to pull back. Unexpectedly the Japanese pursued them, trying to envelop the line held by the 1st battalion, but they failed and were cut down by machine gun fire. This allowed the 1st battalion to extend their lines north towards what was now being called Cibek’s ridge. Geiger then halted the advances on November 22nd and shifted his units the following day to plug up some gaps in the line. He further planned to launch a new assault on the 24th. The 24th began with a heavy artillery bombardment as the 2nd and 3rd battalions, 3rd marine began advancing under the supporting first of the 1st battalion. At H-hour, 9:00am, a Japanese battery located on the forward slope of a coconut grove began to accurately smash the 1st battalions assembly locations. As one observer noted  “Shells poured into the first lines, into the attacking battalions' areas, the forward Regimental C.P. area, the rear C.P., the trail. The noise was much greater now-not only the deafening roar, but, added to it, the sharp terrifying sound of a shell exploding close by ... the agonizing moans of men shouting for corpsmen, for help, for relief from burning torture ... the maniacal screams and sobs of a man whose blood vessels in his head have burst from the blast concussions of high explosives devised by the clever brain of civilized man. The Third Battalion took it. The C.P. area took it to the tune of fourteen men killed and scores wounded in a period of five minutes." The 1st battalion quickly became pinned down. Fortunately Cibeks men were able to locate the battery and used 155mm howitzers to destroy it. At first the advance saw little resistance, as described by one historian of the 3rd marines "For the first hundred yards both battalions advanced abreast through a weird, stinking, plowed-up jungle of shattered trees and butchered Japs. Some hung out of trees, some lay crumpled and twisted beside their shattered weapons, some were covered by chunks of jagged logs and jungle earth, a blasted bunker, their self-made tomb. The Marines pressed forward on their destructive mission toward their clearly defined day's objective." Yet Japanese reserves were rushed to the scene and began engaging the 3rd marines. The 3rd marines were facing extremely accurate enemy artillery and mortar fire taking heavy casualties. The advancing americans would have to destroy a series of bunkers one by one while at the same time repelling the enemy's counterattacks. After already suffering 70 casualties going a quarter mile the Americans fired upon log bunker after log bunker one by one. The Japanese targeted American flamethrower units killing a number of them. Around every defense point Japanese snipers in trees and on elevated platforms fired upon them. Nambu machine guns were firing at all times. The terrain eventually dictated hand to hand and tree to tree combat. Though grueling, the Americans reached their first objective. The men reorganized their positions and unleashed a new artillery barrage with the two battalion advancing yet again against fierce resistance. It was not just the enemy they faced, the terrain in this area was dominated by swamps. General Geiger then postponed the attack to secure the terrain above the proposed airfield site so he could provide his men with a Thanksgiving meal. For thanksgiving the turkey meals were sent forward to the front with parties organized, braving Japanese sniper fire. One observer recalled “Some of the meat got there, some didn't. But it was a good stunt and a necessity; no one would have been forgiven if it had been left to rot down at the Division Commissary just because we had a battle! The men sat on logs eating their turkey. Nearby a Jap lay rotting in the swamp. Heads and arms of dead Japs floated in the near-by jungle streams. Not a very enjoyable setting, but these were tired, ravenously hungry men who had been fighting all day. And it was Thanksgiving. Those who were able to get it enjoyed their turkey.” By nightfall the resistance was crumbling and the Americans were grabbing a mile beyond the objective line before digging in. Mop up operations would be around the clock, but the battle of Piva forks had effectively come to an end, thus securing the site for a projected bomber field. The battle cost the Japanese dearly. Hamanoue’s 23rd regiment ceased to exist as a well organized fighting unit. The marines counted 1107 dead Japanese, though it is likely the number was much higher. The 3rd marines suffered 115 casualties, thus earning some relief from the 9th marines for many days. On November 25th, the 1st battalion, 9th marines advanced past Cibeks ridge and unexpectedly ran into heavy machine gun fire from a small feature directly in front. They charged at the feature and tossed grenades, but the Japanese were able to repel their attack, thus the feature was named Grenade Hill.  Meanwhile General Hyakutake feared that the invasion of Cape Torokina was only a stepping stone for a large invasion against Buka. He persuaded Admiral Kusaka to further reinforce Buka. Previously Major General Kijima Kesao’s 17t infantry group had been dispatched on 5 destroyers to protect Bougainvilles northern sector. No Captain Kagawa Kiyoto would perform a run to Buka on the 24th. Luckily for him his run went uncontested and he was able to unload 900 men of the 1st mobile raiding unit and a detachment of the 17th engineer regiment. At the same time he evacuated over 700 aviation personnel no longer required on Buka as her airfield was destroyed. Kiyoto’s movement however was soon discovered by the Americans. Admiral Halsey, never one to let up a fight, immediately dispatched 5 destroyers, the Ausburne, Claxton, Dyson, Converse and Spence under Captain Burke to intercept them. Kiyoto had departed Buka shortly after midnight, while Burke lurked near them. American radar gave Burke an enormous advantage in first detection and he knew how to use it. At 1:41am after the initial radar contact was gained at 22,000 yards, Burke turned east to close in more. The Japanese were oblivious as Burkes force closed in at just 5500 yards when at 1:55am he ordered all his destroyers to fire 5 torpedoes each before the force made a hard turn to the south to avoid retaliation. Lookouts on the Japanese flagship Onami only spotted the American destroyers when it was too late. Kiyoto’s force were absolutely shredded by the torpedo volley. Onami took several hits and sunk without a single survivor; Makinami took a single torpedo hit and managed to stay afloat, but greatly crippled. Burkes force pushed it to the limit going 33 knots to overtake the IJN vessels as they tried to flee while firing upon them using 5 inch guns. Yugiri turned to fire 3 torpedoes, but Burke foresaw the maneuver and executed a well timed evasion. The torpedoes exploded in the wake of Burkes flagship. It devolved into a running gun battle until 2:25 when the Japanese dispersed. 60 miles off Cape St George, Burke’s three destroyers concentrated their 5 inch guns on Yugiri which received a critical hit at 3:05am crippling her speed. Yugiri was outgunned and outmaneuvered, so her captain turned her around to fire their remaining torpedoes and engage in a suicidal gun battle. At 3:15 Yugiri received another hit causing a tremendous explosion and would sink by 3:28. Meanwhile the crippled Makinami was finished off with torpedoes and gunfire. The two other Japanese destroyers managed to flee westwards, but Burke could not pursue as it was too close to Rabaul. The Japanese suffered terrible losses, aboard Onami all but 228 men died; aboard Makinami all but 28 out of 200 perished, from Yugiri there were 278 survivors out of 497 crew and troops. For the Americans, it was a brilliant victory and it demonstrated how far the IJN’s super human night fighting ability had fallen to allied radar innovation. Burkes victory was described “as an almost perfect action” and he was awarded a Navy Cross. But now we have to head over to Green Hell where the battle for Sattelberg was raging. General Katagiri’s counteroffensive that was launched back on November 22nd did not produce the results he was expecting. General Wootten predicted the 238th regiment would attack from the north while the bulk of the 79th regiment would hit from the northwest. Both of these forces had to cross the Song River to hit their main target, Brigadier Porters position at Scarlet Beach. The 2/43rd battalion took the lionshare of the assault with their B company under Captain Gorden successfully repelling the attempts by the 238th regiment to infiltrate. At around 8am, 15 Japanese tried to get between his right flank and the sea. By 9am some telephone lines to the HQ were cut, gradually the Japanese infiltrators were hunted and killed. Meanwhile the Fujii detachment had been created to take back Pabu hill. Unable to get past the Australian machine gun positions, Japanese mortars and 75 mm guns from Pino Hill began to bombard them. The Australians took heavy casualties but would not budge. Lt Colonel Thomas Scott sent small parties to harass the Japanese rear when they attempted an offensive. Fearing the 2/32nd battalion would soon be trapped, Porter sent his reserve D company over to reinforce them. However as D company crossed the Song river, Colonel Hayashida began to attack the Australian perimeter, applying considerable pressure on the positions held by the 2/43rd. Around noon, D company intercepted a Japanese thrust across the Surpine Valley. At 1pm D company saw the enemy force near some huts and began calling artillery strikes down upon them. As they attacked the Japanese it forces them into a more confined area near a creek. The Australians surrounded them, but the Japanese used captured anti-tank mines as booby traps. The Australians backed off somewhat trying to contain the Japanese into a pocket as they hit them with mortars. By 5:40 the Australians dug in and during the night the Japanese would withdraw after losing 43 men.  November 22nd saw the Japanese suffer 89 deaths while the Australians only had 1. With this Wooten felt the Japanese counteroffensive was most likely defeated and prepared to respond against what seemed to be Katagiri's last attempt to turn the tide of battle. For the Japanese, the attack of D company had completely disorganized their counteroffensive. They had estimated the Australians had sent 3 to 4 battalions instead of a single company to reinforce Pabu Hill and this action had the dual effect of cutting off the road between Wareo and Bonga. Colonel Hayashida had no choice but to redirect units of his regiment to defend the northern bank of the song and try to prevent the reinforcement of Pabu. Despite the actions of the Fujii detachment, the Australians stubbornly continued to resist and this led the Japanese to believe they were increasing in strength at Pabu Hill and enjoyed resupply via aircraft drops. Meanwhile the Japanese fighting power was decreasing due to their overfiring of guns and mortars from Pino Hill. Their rations were at a ⅓ standard amount, local supplies like potatoes were nearly all gone and casualties were high. The fighting around Scarlet Beach would continue until November 28th, when the Japanese withdrew towards Wareo. Katagiri’s counteroffensive was unable to affect the 26th brigades advance upon Sattelberg and fell apart. Over at the Sattelberg front, Brigadier Whitehead resumed his advance on the 22nd, with the 2/48th, supported by Matilda tanks advancing up the Sattelberg road, while the 2/23rd advanced west to the Turn Off Corner position. The 2/23rd were attempting to go across a 3200 foot Feature to gain high ground over Sattelberg. The 2/48th reached a creek southwest of Sattelberg when suddenly they were halted by a landslide and four mines laid out by the Japanese. The 2/23rd after passing the corner, hit the enemy defending the 3200 feature by encircling and gradually annihilating them. Whitehead believed they held favorable terrain to dig in for the night, but would be met with strong artillery bombardment causing heavy casualties upon the 2/32nd and 2/48th. Further north the 2/24th were trying to break through towards Palanko but the 2nd battalion, 80th regiment managed to thwart their every effort at outflanking them. Both sides suffered heavy casualties of the course of a few days of battle.On the 23rd, the 2/48th spent the day trying to find a way through the rugged jungle grounds leading to Sattelberg, finally discovering an uncontested hairpin bend to the right that led to the Red Roof Hut Spur. By this point Katagiri was aware his forces on Sattelberg were not being supplied well and could not hope to resist for much longer. He began preparing to withdraw the 80th regiment over to Wareo as a result. On the 24th Whitehead sent two companies to creep up the approach of Sattelberg from the south while the Japanese continued hammering them using artillery and bombers. Meanwhile the 2/23rd launched a diversionary attack. The attack would employ what was colloquially called a “chinese attack”, ie; to make as much noise as possible. However the action quickly turned into a real firefight over the 3200 Feature. The Japanese made a surprising counter attack from the feature which inadvertently led to the Australians seizing the feature to their surprise. During the afternoon, the 2/48th reached Red Roof Hut where they found 20 Japanese deeply entrenched in two man pits with log covers. The Japanese opened fire upon them quickly pinning them down. The Japanese rolled grenades and fired machine guns at short range , as the Australians gradually surrounded them. Try as the might the Australians were unable to kill or dislodge the Japanese prompting White to signal at 5:50pm "Plan for tomorrow. 2/48 with tanks to go through Lyne 's company. 2/23 to hold firm." Just as the 2/48th were about to withdraw, Sergeant Tom Derrick made a daring attack against the right flank, rapidly advancing through Kunai grass before his men tossed their grenades into the Japanese entrenchments. By nightfall, Red Roof Hut was seized and the Australians dug in about 150 yards from Sattelberg itself. At the same time the 2/24th found the Japanese defenders who had halted them had abandoned their position. When they checked the area they found evidence the Japanese were eating ferns and the core of bamboo. The state of their corpses and the many documents and diaries they found indicated the Japanese supply situation was extremely dire. The men defending Sattelberg were being supplied from bases at Nambariwa which relied on fishing boats, submarines and airdrops, because their barges were too vulnerable to air and naval attacks. The supplies Australians saw airdropped to the Japanese were hardly enough. It was here the Australians found a diary entry from the 79th regiment I’ve read a few times  "Every day just living on potatoes. Divided the section into two groups, one group for fighting and the other to obtain potatoes. Unfortunately none were available. On the way back sighted a horse, killed it and roasted a portion of it… At present, our only wish is just to be able to see even a grain of rice." Another diarist of the 80th Regiment jubilantly wrote in mid-November: "Received rice ration for three days… It was like a gift from Heaven and everybody rejoiced. At night heard loud voices of the enemy. They are probably drinking whisky because they are a rich country and their trucks are able to bring up such desirable things—I certainly envy them." On the morning of the 25th, the 2/48th discovered the enemy positions in front of them also abandoned. Soon the Australians were entering the abandoned shell of Sattelberg. Meanwhile with the aid of tanks, the 2/24th were rapidly advancing towards Palanko, capturing it by nightfall. Further to the left, elements of the 2/23rd and 2/4th commando squadron found Mararuo abandoned. The 80th regiment was fleeing towards Wario as a broken force. With this the battle of Sattelberg had come to an end.  The battle for sattelberg cost the Japanese roughly 2000 casualties. Once the Australians entered Sattelberg a signal was sent to the 2/32nd on Pabu that “Torpy sits on Sat”. Torpy was a nickname for Brigadier Whitehead, based on the Whitehead Torpedo. Whitehead had also been one of the commanding officers of the 2/32nd battalion. Such nicknames were used in signals to disguise messages in case the enemy intercepted them. The capture of sattelberg was another turning point in the New Guinea campaign. General Adachi would note “Local resistance in small pockets continued in order to keep the Australian troops in action and prevent the 9th Division from being free to make an attack on Cape Gloucester and Marcus Point (east of Gasmata) should resistance cease altogether. While delaying action was being fought at Finschhafen the 17th Division was being moved by land and sea from Rabaul to Cape Gloucester to resist the anticipated attack in that area… The most advantageous position (Pabu) for the launching of a successful counter-attack was given up; also Pabu provided excellent observation for artillery fire, and after its capture the position of the Japanese forces was precarious. Even after the failure of the attack on Scarlet Beach we still retained some hopes of recapturing Finschhafen, but at this point the idea was abandoned.” The Japanese now believed that Finschhafen was completely lost and there was not much hope of halting the Australian advance. General Berryman now urged Wootten to begin a drive north along the coast to try and cut off the Japanese lines of retreat and secure the eastern coast before the expected American led invasion of New Britain. Thus Woottne next decided to clear the Wareo-Gusika ridge first, predicting the Japanese might launch a counterattack against his rear. On the 26th Wootten ordered the 24th brigade to seize the area from Gusika towards the Kalueng Lakes; for the 2-th brigade to seize Nongora and Christmas Hills; the 26th brigade to advance north from Sattelberg towards Wareo; and for the 4th brigade to guard the approach to Scarlet Beach and the Heldsbach area. Yet before the Australians could start their new offensive they had to first clear out Pino Hill and secure the road towards Pabu. Two companies of the 2/32nd with four matilda tanks led by Colonel Scott were given the job.  Meanwhile Colonel Hayashida launched a last ditch effort to take back Pabu. Reserve company 8 of the 2nd battalion, 78th regiment with the support of two 75 mm guns and mortars were given the task. As the bombardment raged over Pabu, the 30 Japanese attempted to infiltrate from the northwest and southwest. The Japanese ran into well dug positions, and the Australians caused them 20 casualties for their efforts. The Australian defenders had called in artillery support which bombarded the ring area around Pabu successfully foiling the attack. Meanwhile Pino Hill was hit with 2360 artillery shells, then by fire from four matilda tanks, before the Australian infantry stormed the feature to find it abandoned. On the 27th Wootten altered his offensive plan. Now he sought a three pronged assault against the Gusika-Wareo ridge. Berryman, Whitehead and Wootten were visiting Sattelberg on the 27th when they looked at the rugged country towards Wareo. They all knew it would be another logistical nightmare. Berryman stated it would be unwise to commit the 20th brigade through the center and that instead they should launch a two pronged attack using the 26th and 24th brigades against Wareo proper and the Gusika-Wareo ridge. Thus now the 26th and 24th brigades would hit the Gusika Wareo area and the 20th brigade would support the coastal thrust. On that same day, the 2/28th battalion advanced along the coast to take up a flanking position near the Gusika-Wareo ridge. The 2/28th made it just 500 yards south of Bonga when they were halted by strong Japanese resistance. It would take Matilda tank support to cross over a creek and begin reducing the Japanese positions. The Australians stormed over and a platoon seized a feature called “the exchange position” left undefended. The next day saw the relief of the 2/32nd battalion who advanced north while the 2/43rd took over their position on Pabu. The Pabu defenders had suffered 25 deaths and 51 wounded, but would count over 195 dead Japanese. On the 29th, the 2/43rd fanned out finding Japanese resistance west of Pabu. The Australians attempted to encircle and annihilate the Japanese positions, but were unable and gradually had to pull back to Pabu. To the east the 2/28th seized Bonga and sent patrols towards Gusika who found it abandoned so the entire battalion moved forward and took up a position at a former Japanese supply base along the coast. Meanwhile the 26th brigade were advancing north of the Song River and managed to seize Masangkoo and Fior. On the 30th, Wootten commenced the main offensive; the 2/28th crossed the Kaleung river and advanced to the Lagoon area; the 2/43rd seized the Horace and Horse mountain area; the 2/15th crossing the Song River and advanced towards Nongora and th 2/23rd crossing the Song River to cut off the main Kuanko track. Only the 2/28th would be met with strong resistance from the Japanese who were now panicking as the fall of Gusika had completely cut off their supply route towards Wareo. It was a very dire situation for the Japanese as they retreated. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The battle of Cape St George earned Captain Burke a incredible victory and yet again proved the IJN’s night fighting abilities were no longer up to par. The battle for Sattelberg was finally over and with it any hope for the Japanese to take back the Finschhafen area, yet agian they fled north in New Guinea.  

Last time we spoke about the planning for operation Galvanic and the battle of Sattelberg. The Americans were finally going to make their thrust into the central pacific with operation Galvanic. Admiral Raymond Spruance was given command of the Central Pacific Force and began building his war machine. The Americans would be employing a arsenal of new toys to hit the Gilbert Islands. Meanwhile the Japanese did everything they could to fortify the Gilberts, Marshalls and Carolines for the incoming American offensives, they would make them pay with blood for every island. Over in Green Hell the Australians were advancing up the Sattelberg road seizing Green Ridge, Coconut Ridge and other features. General Katagiri was once again on the defensive and it was only a matter of time before Sattelberg was under siege. Today we are going to cover all of this and more! This episode is The Bloody Invasion of the Gilberts Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Last week we went through in depth the planning behind Operation Galvanic. The time had finally come to invade the Gilberts islands. To soften up the islands, carrier-borne airstrikes were made against the Gilberts and Marshalls. One of the major impacts of the raids in September and October was the evacuation of aircraft from Tarawa. Just before the raids there had been three air installations in the 3rd Special Base Force area; two airfields at Nauru and one at Tara, with a seaplane base at Makin. One of the duties assigned to these installations was to maintain patrols in the southeast corner of the Central Pacific. Patrols from Nauru covered the area south of the island, patrols from Kain covered the east and patrols from Tarawa the southeast between the other two. Yet after the removal of so many aircraft from Tarawa, now Makin had to assume full responsibility for patrolling the Gilberts area. By November there were only four amphibious reconnaissance planes left at Makin and even worse they had the dual mission of reconnaissance and anti-submarine patrol. Thus in other words there were not enough eyes on lookout. On November 10th, Admiral Spruance led out his Central Pacific force from Hawaii enroute for Tarawa aboard his flagship the heavy cruises Indianapolis. The Northern attack force, northern carrier group and interceptor carrier group all departed from the Hawaiian islands simultaneously, but they would not be traveling together. The two carrier groups moved in a parallel course followed by the Northern attack force at around 300 miles to their northwest. The two routes of approach would change around 800 miles east of the Gilberts with the Northern attack force turning to meet them. As the force made its way, Spruance warned “If … a major portion of the Japanese fleet were to attempt to interfere with Galvanic, it is obvious that the defeat of the enemy fleet would at once become paramount … the destruction of a considerable portion of the Japanese naval strength would … go far towards winning the war …” Even within the Navy there were critics of Operation Galvanic. While Spruance was taking the 5th fleet along with 30,000 marines, Vice Admiral John Towers grumbled “Spruance wants a sledgehammer to drive a tack.” The battle for Tarawa would be one of the most controversial engagements of the Pacific war.  Over at Efate, Admiral Hill’s Southern force departed on November 13th to rendezvous with Turner by the 18th. On November 15th, the Relief carrier force consisting of two carriers, 3 cruisers and 4 destroyers departed Espirtu Santo and the New Hebrides. They were a last minute add-on, heading towards Nauru. Thus the southern carrier group and southern attack force moved parallel to another to rendezvous with the rest by the 18th. During the two days before the landings, both the navy and army aircraft delivered last minute airstrikes. At 3am on the 18th, Admiral Pownalls task force launched 18 fighters, followed 3 hour later by 20 more fighters then at intervals of 2-3 hours, dive bombers, torpedo bombers and more fighters. All day long these aircraft strafed and bombed Nauru. By the end of the day, 90 tons of bombs had been dropped. The pilots claimed the installations on the island were in ruins, a Japanese ship was a burning wreck and 3-4 medium bombers were destroyed on the ground. The next day saw the same carrier attack with the help of land based planes from the 7th air force bombers. The airfields on Nauru were hit, shipping as well and Nauru was thought to be neutralized. On the 19th, the interceptor carrier group of Admiral Pownalls task force launched a series of air strikes against Jaluit and Mille. Over 130 tons of bombs were dropped on them. Power stations at both atolls were destroyed, hangers burned down, buildings in ruins. The runways looked unserviceable at Mille and 3 vessels in her lagoon were heavily damaged, alongside 7 grounded aircraft destroyed. On that same day, 19 b-24’s from Nukufetau and Funafuti dropped 10 tons of bombs on Tarawa causing fires and damaging her airfields. 12 more B-24s from Nanomea dropped 23 tons of bombs on Makin. Aircraft from the Northern and southern carrier groups added 95 tons of bombs on Makin and 69 tons on Betio island. One enemy plane was shot down and 3 were hit on the ground near Tarawa. Before noon on the 19th, Southern Carrier groups cruisers destroyers moved in closer to Tarawa to bombard the ground forces between the air strikes. One of the most important effects of the heavy air raids was getting the Japanese to waste a considerable amount of their ammunition against the aircraft. At Tarawa the Japanese expended an estimated 1437 rounds of 127mm AA, 1312 75mm, 51160 13mm, 46 8 inch and 104 14cm ammunition. At Makin it was perhaps nearly 10,000 rounds of 13mm. The loss of the 13mm machine gun ammunition would hurt the Japanese particularly hard since it was the base weapon for the ground defenses. Shortly before 11:30pm on the 19th the convoy entered the 17 mile wide channel between Maiana and Tarawa Atolls. The ships assumed positions west of Betio. Transports took up their debarkation positions and fire support ships moved into shore for another massive bombardment.  At dawn on 20 November, the USS Maryland and Colorado, sister dreadnoughts from  World War I of the Colorado Class, laid down a barrage of fire upon the defenders of Betio. It provided a measure of revenge for the USS Maryland, which had been damaged during the attack on Pearl Harbor. Their combined fire power of sixteen 16-inch guns was able to quickly knock out three of the four 8-inch guns defending Betio both from the lagoon-side to the north and the open sea to the south and west. A fortunate hit on one of the Japanese guns’ ordnance stores sent up a massive fireball. Rear Admiral Howard Kingman, responsible for planning the bombardment of Tarawa, would tell the press aboard his ship, “Gentlemen, it is not our intention to wreck the island. We do not intend to destroy it. Gentlemen … we will obliterate it.” The air and naval barrage of the island would last 3 hours. Aboard the USS Ashland an officer boasted “They’ll [the Marines] go in standing up. There aren’t fifty Japs left alive on the island.” Lt Colonel Herbert Amey leading the 2nd battalion, 2nd marines boasted to his staff “As we hit the beach the planes will be strafing very close in front of you to keep the Nips down until you get in there and knock off what’s left of them. I think we ought to have every Jap off the island—the live ones —by the night of D-Day.” Despite the incredible firepower, Colonel David Shoup leading the assault troops shared some concerns with Robert Sherrod working for the Time and Life magazine “What worries me more than anything is that our boats may not be able to get over that coral shelf that sticks out about 500 yards. We may have to wade in.” Colonel ‘Red Mike’ Edsons went on to say of the upcoming battle “The enemy must endeavor to hold it and make sure its capture is as costly to us as possible. This will be the first attempt to defend an atoll … as it is our endeavor at seizing one.”  Before dawn the Marines woke up to a last meal of steak and eggs with fried potatoes and coffee. They all gave a final check of their combat kits, their M-1 Garand’s, bayonets, 3 days of rations, water, the bedding, grenades, 125 bullets, gas masks, toiletry items, 3 pairs of socks and underwear, their entrenching tool, first aid kits and the most important item, their cigarettes. As the marines moved to their debarkation stations, military chaplains passed through the troops offering last minute homilies. “God Bless you—and go out there and bring glory to our Corps,” . Father Francis Kelley from Philadelphia and veteran of Guadalcanal ended his service with, “God Bless you and God have mercy on the Japanese.” At 6:03am the transports began lowering their boats. At 6:15am the carrier borne Hellcat fighters, Avenger and Dauntless from the USS Essex and Bunker Hill began to strafed and bomb the western beaches. At 6:40 the aircraft began departing as the battleships, cruisers and destroyers opened fire. The damage from the aerial and naval bombardments was considerable. In the immediate region of the main beaches and eastward side, little real damage was inflicted. Coconut trees, native hurts and dummy gun positions took a lot of the hits. In the area of the west tank barrier, neither the ditches nor log barricades took much damage. Just east of the main tank trap was a trench system running to the beach, this area was smashed up pretty good. One trench received a direct hit from a 2000-pound bomb which, in the words of Admiral Turner, "considerably scrambled the trench, Japs and trees for some distance." 62 enemy dead were later counted in this one area, most of whom were the victims of a combination of concussion and air bursts. In the area south of Yellow Beach and east to the East Tank Barrier all buildings were reported destroyed. Three 80-mm. antiaircraft positions at the base of King's Wharf and two light tanks revetted to act as pillboxes were severely damaged. 41 enemy dead were counted, of whom 25 were apparently killed by concussion from heavy bombs. At 8:25 the naval bombardment ended and more aircraft came in strafing. While the aircraft strafed, the 165th regiment began loading onto LCVPS and amphibian tractors carried men of the 105th regiment. At 8:15 the tractors started to head for the beach while firing rockets and machine guns against what they assumed were enemy positions. At 8:31 the tractors hit the beach and the men began to scramble ashore. Beach red 1 and 2 were quickly occupied forming the first beachhead. Following the tractors were the first three waves of landing craft at about 5 minute intervals. They were met with unfriendly studded reefs and coral boulders about 40 yards offshore. Some of the landing craft were unable to slip past the larger boulders, some were broached, stranded or forced to pull back out to sea. The failures of these landings would lead Rear Admiral Richmond Turner to create the Underwater Demolition Teams (UDT) a precursor to the US Navy Seals. The tanks were waterproofed for the landings, and managed to roll off the ramps into water.  The men struggled in swells sometimes over their heads and sought cover at the edge of the beach. At best, only three boats could be landed at one time, and the fifth wave was not able to get ashore until 10:00, over an hour behind schedule. Facing the marines was 798 men led by Lt Seizo Ishikawa, the commander of the 3rd Special Base force Makin detachment. 284 of his men were from his detachment, alongside them were 100 air personnel, 138 men from the 11th construction unit and 276 men of the 4th fleet construction department detachment made up mostly of Korean laborers. They had established 3 defensive areas. The aviation personnel took up the east, the 3rd special base men the middle and the Korean laborers the west. Thus only 284 combat troops with the rest being support staff would face the onslaught. Ishikawa had established a perimeter defense around the seaplane base on the lagoon shore. They had three dual purpose 8cm guns at King’s wharf with a few machine guns. Running from the lagoon to the beach were two anti tank barriers. They were wide ditches with coconut log barriers going around 13 feet wide and 5 feet deep. Numerous anti tank guns were around them, behind were concrete pillboxes, machine gun positions, rifle pits and trenches. There were also trip wires with booby traps laid everywhere someone might creep up. Luckily for General Smith, Ishikawa’s defensive positions were between the two tank barriers as the Japanese had predicted the invasion of the island would be made there. Over on Betio island were 4836 men led by Admiral Keiji Shibazaki. 1122 men were from the 3rd special base force, 1247 from the 111th construction unit, 970 of the 4th fleet construction department detachment and 1497 Sasebo 7th SNLF. The Sasebo 7th were known as the Rikusentai, elite marine paratroopers modeled on the German Luftwaffe paratroop brigades. During the Pacific war, 50,0000 Rikusentai troops were deployed. They work dark green uniforms modeled on the German paratrooper counterpart, dark-brown belts and harnesses with white anchor patches. Recruits were forced to learn by heart Emperor Meiji’s 1882 Imperial rescript to soldiers. The war song Umi Yukaba was also their prophetic line “Across the sea, corpses in the water … I shall die for the Emperor.” As Marine historian, Colonel Joseph Alexander concluded in his work, Utmost Savagery, three days of Tarawa in 1995 “American expeditionary forces would not encounter a more sophisticated series of defensive positions on any subsequent island until they reached Iwo Jima in 1945. Yard for yard, Betio was the toughest fortified position the Marines would ever face.” The Americans were about to see Japan's “water edge” strategy. The directive was simply “concentrate all fires on the enemy’s landing point and destroy him at the water’s edge.” Rear Admiral Keiji Shibazai was an aggressive young officer who demanded his troops build defenses to “withstand assault by a million men for a hundred years.” Yet it was his predecessor Rear Admiral Sichero who had 50 pillboxes and bunkers constructed across an island that was just 800 yards at its widest points and two miles in length. Shibazaki added kettle mines to impede landing boats or direct them to his kill zones. Double barbed wire fences were dug into coral shallows encircling the island 50 to 100 yards from the shore. Yet as noted by Warrant Officer Kiyosha Ota the only Japanese officer to survive the battle for Tarawa, rear admiral Shibazaki could not get a cargo ship to bring over cement and steel to reinforce to build his planned 4500 tetrahedrons to surrounded the island nor reinforce countless pillboxes. Nonetheless Betio was bristling with a armada of guns. Betio held 4 8 inch guns, 4 14cm, 4 12.7cm, 6 8cm, 10 75mm mountain guns, 6 70mm howitzers, 8 7cm dual purpose guns, 9 37mm field guns, 27 12mm guns, 4 13 mm guns and 7 tanks with 37mm guns. Betio was a fortress full of steel, concrete and coconut log emplacements, the entire island was organized for battle. Within their defensive positions the Japanese had bombproof ammunition and personnel shelters in depth. The allies would be facing beach guns, anti-tank ditches, beach barrices, numerous obstacles and booby traps. Tarawa would be the most heavily defended atoll ever invaded by allied forces in the Pacific.  H hour, the landing of the first wave had been scheduled for 8am on November 20th, but Admiral Hill’s transports had run into some problems. They arrived to the scene around 5:50am and began lowering their boats, but it turned out they were too far south and in range of the enemy’s coastal guns. The Japanese opened fire on them forcing them back to the designated positions at the lagoon entrance. American warships meanwhile began bombarding the Japanese coastal guns and positions. The airstrikes arrived a bit late to the scene to add their payloads to the mix. Meanwhile two minesweepers the Pursuit and Requisite and two destroyers, Ringgold and Dashiell fought their way into the Tarawa lagoon to sweep for mines. The Japanese coastal guns fired upon them, seeing Ringgold suffering moderate damage from 5 inch gunfire. The choppy seas delayed the arrival of the amphibian tractors, thus H hour was moved to 9am. In the meantime at least one 8 inch coastal gun and two 120mm anti-aircraft batteries had been neutralized by the naval gunfire, and just about everything above ground or in open pits, like personnel, bombs, trucks and munitions were mostly likely destroyed. The camouflage screens over dugouts were wiped away and Shibasaki’s network of telephone wire, most laid above ground was obliterated, thus his system of communication was paralyzed. Despite all of this the damage was not nearly enough. Along the beaches were rows of pillboxes, some concrete, steel and coconut made. At Red beaches 2 and 3 there were at least 5 machine guns pointing towards where the troops would land over a reef towards the shore. As Admiral Hill put it, "that was five too many."  By 8:55am the tractors were still late, but Hill ceased all naval gunfire anyway allowing them to begin their approach. The volume of intensity of fire grew as the boats motored in towards the landing beaches. Shibasaki’s 75mm field guns and 37mm anti-tank guns were positioned perfectly to hit the incoming boats. Neither the amtracs nor the Higgin boats had enough armor to stop the shells. William Rogal’s boat took a 37mm shell to her bow and Rogal recalled “the force of the explosion threw his body to the rear of the amtrac, showering everyone on the port side with blood and brains.” As Lt Lillibridges boat came under similar fire, the shells pierced their starboard and port sides simultaneously forcing the men to toss themselves on the flat bottom. Light mortars showered them all sending shrapnel into several marines. Most of the first wave boats headed towards Red beach 1, in a cove tucked between the pier and northwestern point of the island. The approached to red beach 1 held a significant amount of crossfire by weapons of various calibers. The men began to hit the beach at 9:10am. Landing ashore was the 3rd battalion, 2nd marines who were met with tremendous fire. The marines quickly ran into a log barricade. Some of their tractors were smashed up and burning dead in the water. If those inside them were still alive they climbed over the sides to try and wade ashore. The vehicles that made it onto land soon were halted by the log barricade seen marines jump over under machine gun fire. K Company took so many casualties they were unable to move past the log barricade and now had to lie in an exposed area under constant fire. By 11am K company would push a few men over the coconut barrier, but by this point the two leading companies had suffered 50% casualty rates. Reserve company L led by Major Michael P Ryan were just landing to the east and would lose 35% of their strength before even touching the each. A platoon of M4 Shermans attached to the 3rd battalion were tossed into the water but 4 of them got stuck in potholes in the coral reef and drowned out, only 2 tanks actually made it to the beach. Meanwhile at 9:22 the 2nd battalion, 2nd marines also landed in chaos and confusion at Red Beach 2. Company F was to hit the left while company E took the right and company G would act in support. Similar to Red Beach 1, a 4 foot high log barricade had been constructed to form a sea wall. Most of the barricade lay 20 yards from the waters edge, leaving a narrow open strip of deep coral sand for the marines to traverse. Numerous pillboxes and shelters lay around the barricade in intervals. Rogal’s amtrac headed to Red beach 2 through mortar bursts that showered his men with shrapnel. When the boat grounded on the sand Rogal shouted “Lets go!” and the men went over the side through machine gun fire. Rogal rushed forward and could see above the seawall to the left a machine gun emplacement, it was one of the major strong points and it would kill roughly 300 marines that day. The amtracs drove onto the beaches and lowered their ramps with most of the first wave units making it to the seawall providing some shield from enemy fire. However going any further was near suicide, a few brave souls climbed over and were shot or wounded. Men sat crouched around the wall with their heads down waiting for tanks and air support. The volume of Japanese mortar, artillery and automatic fire was tremendous. F company was decimated, but managed to grab the left half of the beach near the pier, digging in on the coral sand. E Company suffered heavy casualties and the reserve G company landed in the center and immediately pinned down. As the men were huddled along the coconut barrier they began systematically eliminating enemy positions that jutted out onto the beach. Further to the east, at 9;17am the 2nd battalion, 8th marines of Major Henry Crowe began landing at red beach 3. They were backed up by 4 medium tanks of the 2nd tank battalion, 3 of the tanks would be put out of action within 2 hours. The marines at red beach 3 enjoyed more success than the other thanks to additional naval bombardment support that had lasted just until 7 minutes of their landing. They suffered just 25 casualties as the rapidly burst through the coconut barricade by driving LVTs through it. Company E led the way continuing as far inland as the triangle formed by the main airstrip and taxiways.    Colonel David Shoups 2nd marines were in dire trouble at Red Beach 2 and had to commit the reserve 1st battalion who landed there and were ordered to work their way west towards red beach 1in the hopes of aiding the 3rd battalion. By 11am, two companies in amphibious tractors came over and suffered the same fire that had decimated the other waves, but managed to get their men ashore. When General Smith heard about Shoups call for reinforcements he also sent the reserve 3rd battalion, 8th marines to relief their right flank. Boated over in LCVPs, the battalion were halted by the reef line and forced to wade ashore under heavy fire during the afternoon. Supply barges were unable to reach the beaches, forcing the reserve troops to carry the most vital supplies. Colonel Shoup had radioed the transported intermittently throughout the day asking for more ammunition ,water and medical supplies, but these calls just caused more confusion amongst the shipping. The transport commanders had been tossing boat after boat carrying supplies, but they had no real picture of the situation between their boats and the beach. Captain Henry Knowles would end up sending Major Ben Weatherwax ashore just to determine what the supply situation was. It would literally take until dawn to get a complete picture, that picture being that Shoup had received virtually none of the supplies supposed to be dispatched to him. Additionally two M4 shermans were brought up to help the battered 3rd battalion, 2nd marines who were driving across the island towards the south shore. The marines hit shelter to shelter making steady progress. The tanks got within 300 yards of the south shore when 40mm gunfire knocked them both out. The progress allowed Major Michael Ryan to discover that part of Green Beach, on the western coast of Betio was available for landing reserves. Unable to relay this to Shoup, he ultimately had to pull out and dig in to form a defensive position. While the Americans were suffering communication problems, the Japanese had a much worse one. The naval bombardment had destroyed their communications lines to the Japanese HQ, preventing Rear Admiral Shibazaki to lead, but that problem was soon solved. It was solved when a 5 inch air burst shell fired from either RInggold or Dashiell hit his HQ killing him and all the senior officers. The last message Shibazaki received before his death was from Emperor Hirohito “you have all fought gallantly. May you continue to fight to the death. Banzai”. Shibazaki had planned to launch a counterattack, but now his forces were for the first critical two days of the battle leaderless, demoralized and uncoordinated.  Concurrently the 8th marines were fighting to hold the triangle position they acquired under heavy attacks from the Japanese. F Company was in a brutal fight around the Burns-Philp Wharf facing a Japanese counterattack supported by tanks. The buildings were all ablaze as tanks and flamethrowers were firing upon everything they could. By nightfall the Japanese counterattack failed. To their right Shoups 2nd marines were unable to organize a proper attack because their forces were all over the place. They held a pinned down toehold around the beach, but many units had penetrated some 125 yards inland and no pockets were fighting all over. Throughout the night, men were frantically carrying supplies ashore, but few supplies were actually reaching the beaches. There was an enormous failure in communications. Aboard the USS Maryland, the only information General Julian Smith was receiving came from reports of observers in planes, intercepted radio messages and a few direct reports from Colonel Shoup. By 1:43pm Smith ordered General Hermle to go to the end of the pier and get an estimation of the situation ashore. At 3:10 Hermle tried the best he could to relay the information but couldn't get through. Hermle recommended the 1st battalion, 8th marines be committed to Red Beach 2, but this message never made it to Smith. Meanwhile Smith ordered Hermle to take command of the troops ashore, but this message never reached him. At 4:25 Smith ordered Colonel Hall, command of the 8th marines to land on the eastern beaches, but he also never received the message so most of his men spent the night floating. Luckily by 8:19pm Colonel Hall received a message and landed at Red Beach 2, whereupon he didn't receive any further orders. Over at Makin, Admiral Turner landed the 1st and 3rd battalions, 165th regiment. General Ralph Smiths plan called for the rapid capture of Flink point and Ukiangong Point, along with the occupation of the area east of Red Beaches to the first beachhead line around 1300 yards inland. The 1st battalion would hit Flink Point and the left half of the beachhead line. The 3rd battalion would hit Ukiangong village and Point and was responsible for the right half of the beachhead line. The 1st battalion advanced, overcoming some barbed wire, log barricades and an undefended observation tower. The3rd battalion made equal progress finding little resistance. By 10:30am the beachhead line was secured, Company A and Detachment Y had been dispatched northward to occupy Flink Point, L company with Detachment X were turning south to take Ukiengong Village and to clear the point beyond it. General SMith expected some resistance at Ukiangong, but it with the point were taken unopposed. Therefor Smith elected to establish artillery positions there. Flink Point was taken by 12:40, marking the operation quite an easy success. After receiving word at 8am that the Kotabu detachment had taken the island without opposition, Turner decided to go ahead with the landings on Yellow Beach. At 10:05am the landing forces advances towards Yellow Beach. The destroyers MacDonough and Phelps began a bombardment using their 5 inch guns. The first wave of 16 amphibian tractors began approaching as they fired rockets against the beach. Following up would in a minute was the second wave of 8 LCMS carrying medium tanks, followed two minutes later by the third wave, 7 LCMs carrying medium tanks, then another 2 minutes after was the fourth wave carrying two LCVPS with troops and 4 LCMS with light tanks. The next four waves would consist of LCVPS carrying the bulk of the assault troops and a bulldozer. At 10:25 the tractors were around 600 yards off the beach when the two destroyers ceased their firing to allow a last minute strafing run by carrier planes. As the approached, the men in the tractors crouched low to avoid the rain of bullets that began at around 500 yards. At 10:41 they hit the beaches and one amphtrack ran up the seaplane ramp on Kings Wharf. Enemy shellfire struck two amphtracks killing 5 men and wounding 12. One lone tractor lost control and drove straight across the island toward the ocean shore, directly through the main Japanese defenses. It ended up in a shell crater with two of its crew killed by enemy machine gun fire, but the others managed to jump into the brush. Upon jumping out of their tractors the Americans made their way inland by crawling along the western slope of the causeway. The pier was captured quickly, Detachment Z then divided into two groups, one to take King’s Wharf, the other On Chong’s Wharf. Kings Wharf was taken unopposed, but On Chong’s Wharf would offer some tough resistance. The 105th regiment fought their way through dugouts and bomb proof shelters to get to the Wharf by dusk. They then began mass throwing grenades into the Wharf emplacements killing many Japanese. 35 Prisoners would soon be captured and by noon On Chong’s Wharf was secured. Back over at the beach, 15 medium tanks landed on the beach with two becoming stuck in shell holes in the reef. The other tanks split up advancing east and west against the two tank barriers. Unfortunately they were not very well coordinated and began operating independently. Behind the tanks was the 2nd battalion, 165th regiment whose LCVPS grounded themselves on the reef. The landing troops had little to no opportunity to locate the incessant fire being poured upon them from the right flank. At the offset they believed the fire was coming from two battered and scuttled hulks resting near On Chong’s Wharf. Their first effort to knock these out was made by a LCVP commanded by Joseph Kasper. The boat mounted three of its guns on the starboard side and ran for the hulks while firing all at once. Kasper was fatally wounded during the run and one of the guns jammed. The incessant fire was halting the men so at 11:25 and 12:50 carrier planes bombed and strafed the hulks. Alongside this the destroyer Dewey bombarded them scoring numerous hits, but by 12:07 was ordered to cease fire because a few hits hit friendlys. Finally at 12:57 Major Dennis Claire ordered a stop to the bombardments so he could lead E company to hit the eastern tank barrier. They met light resistance until they came to the area of Kings Wharf. There they ran into concealed pillboxes that would halt their advance for over 4 hours. The men tried rifle grenades, bazookas, artillery barrages, but the pillboxes kept returning fire. Then they tried a daring encirclement maneuver under artillery support. The men crawled and crept in a wide circle reaching the pill boxes 40 yards or so away. They attempted to use flamethrowers, but the defenders still fired back. Then some engineers brought over TNT which was tossed into the pillboxes and exploded just before some light tanks rolled up to fire using 37mm rounds. By 4pm the pill boxes finally ceased firing, 8 Americans had been killed taking them. E company advanced a bit before digging in for the night. F Company advanced across the atoll west to attack the west tank barrier. They did not encounter resistance, excluding the incredibly difficult jungle. By noon the reached the ocean shore where they reorganized their lines and made their way south alongside 5 Sherman tanks to assault the west tank barrier. F Company and the tanks ran into a tanktrap with underground shelters full of Japanese defenders. Some labor troops were also there armed with knives and a few rifles. F Company proceeded to use TNT pole charges to blow up the shelters and flame throwers which quickly became the preferred weapon to face Japanese underground defenses. During the fight F Company had 8 deaths and 6 wounded. By 1:30pm they reached the barrier. The 3rd Platoon of F Company were attacking a section due south of On Chong’s Wharf where an enemy air raid shelter was. The shelter was around 30 feet long with blast proof entrances on either side. When they tossed hand grenades into the shelter the grenades were tossed right back at them. A sherman tank came up and started firing 75mm shells, but had no success. Then a flamethrower unit crept up and tried to fire, but the equipment was soaked from the landing and was not functioning. Thus they resorted to a TNT pole charge. The explosion did not collapse the shelter, but it killed all 12 Japanese inside it. Meanwhile countless units were dealing with machine gun positions aided by 3 shermans. The tanks gradually pierced the barrier and proceeded.  Meanwhile the 1st battalion was advancing from the west passing Joan Lake by 2pm. From there they ran into some strong machine gun posts 150 yards west of the barrier. B Company of the 1st battalion rushed over to help F company from the east side of the west tank barrier. At this point the regimental commander, Colonel Conroy had taken a shot to the head and was dead leaving Lt Colonel Gerard Kelley, the commander of the 1st battalion in charge. Kelley’s first orders were for C company to bypass the pocket in the front, while A company would reinforce B company. The Japanese defenders were now trapped in the center being gradually eliminated by the 4 shermans. By 5:55pm F Company finally destroyed the last of the enemy in the center of the line and contact was made between the two battalions.  After suffering 25 deaths and 62 wounded, the 27th division had gained a good foothold on Butaritari; the West Tank Barrier had been reduced; but the enemy forces in the east still needed to be cleared. The night was a very uncomfortable one. Japanese snipers harassed the Americans the entire time; Japanese infiltrators were up to their old tricks calling out in english, throwing firecrackers and trying to jump into foxholes with knives in hand. Trigger happy Americans fired away indiscriminately, causing chaos. A man of the 152nd engineered ran along the lagoon shore at daybreak from the direction of On Chong’s Wharf toward the 2nd battalions command post screaming “theres a hundred and fifty Japs in the trees!”. This caused a wave of hysteria. That morning Kelley ordered his 1st battalion to clear the remaining enemy pockets west of the barrier while the rear of the west tank barrier area was finally mopped up. To the east an air bombardment smashed the area before the eastward advance commenced. Supported by 10 shermans the Americans advanced slowly against stiff resistance, successfully overran every enemy position. Between 12-2pm they were fighting through one of the most heavily defended areas on the island. Machine gun emplacements supported by rifle pits with double apron barbed wire running back and forth were everywhere they looked. By 5pm they advanced 1000 yards at the cost of 18 deaths and 15 wounded. The next day starting at 6am the 3rd battalion advanced along the island highway towards Yellow Beach. As they reached Yellow Beach 13 medium and light tanks with some engineers fell in line with them and together they advanced towards Ukiangong Point. At 7am artillery bombarded Ukiangong Point, first targeting the east tank barrier. Until 8:20 the artillery fired nearly 900 rounds then the 3rd battalion began their assault upon forward defenses that had been abandoned during the night. By 9;15 the men seized the first 250 yards meeting only light resistance, after that it became fierce fighting. Meanwhile two detachments of the 105th regiment led by Major Herzog were dispatched to cut off the Japanese line of retreat. They performed an amphibious encirclement maneuver going through the lagoon. The men embarked on 6 LVTS and made a 3 mile dash across the lagoon to the northeastern point where they met up with friendly natives who notified them the Japanese were fleeing eastward across the reef to Kuma. They quickly seized Kuma and now the enemy on Butaritari was entirely cut off from their retreat. With artillery and tank support the 3rd battalion managed attacked the Stone Pier area. The tank commanders had learnt many lessons over the past two days and began using their big guns to reduce buildings ahead of them to infantry could toss grenades into the smaller shelters. Tank-infantry tactics were literally being developed ad hoc as the men learnt first hand lessons of war. Tanks opened up with 75mm shells knocking shelters and infantry stormed them with grenades. Soon the Stone Pier area was clear and now they began striking the east tank barrier. The east tank barrier was more heavily fortified than its western counterpart, yet the Japanese abandoned the barrier during the night. Only a few dead Japanese would be found, killed by earlier bombardments. The 3rd battalion continued past the barrier linking up with A company by 1:30pm finding no sign of the enemy. Together they advanced 2100 yards beyond the narrow neck of the island and dug in for the night. Each company created a separate defensive perimeter stretching across the width of the island in a line of about 300 yards in length. It was not long during the night when the Japanese got up to their old tricks. Following behind a group of friendly native guides, a group of Japanese infiltrators approached limiting the cries of babies. The ruse was recognized by a member of the engineer detachment who opened fire immediately killing 10 Japanese. For the rest of the night there was intermittent fire fights as infiltrators continuously attacked. The Japanese began to yell and sing songs, many sounding quite drunk.  It was not just there the Japanese attacked, over on Kuma Island at around midnight 10 Japanese attacked the defense line set up by Major Bradt’s men. Although certainly shaken by the night terror, over 60 Japanese would be killed by the morning of the 23rd. This nearly wiped out the remaining survivors allowing the Americans to have firm control over Makin.  The Americans suffered 58 deaths, 152 wounded on Makin while the Japanese lost perhaps 800 men and the Americans captured 105 POW’s. The Americans had held an unbelievable superiority during this battle. The ratio of American combat casualties to those of the Japanese though was remarkably high. With the battle concluded, most of the 27th division departed Makin on the 24th leaving Colonel CLesen Tenney to lead garrison forces. Tragedy hit that morning when the escort carrier Liscome Bay was sunk by the I-175 who had been hunting around Makin since the arrival of the Americans. This left the death toll at Makin 644, including Rear Admiral Henry Mullinnix. Back on Tarawa the marines were surprised the Japanese did not launch a major counterattack during the first night which was their typical strategy. General Smith landed his reserve 1st battalion, 8th marines on Red Beach 2, but they took some heavy casualties for this. Many of the men wading ashore were fired upon creating a scene of carnage. In central Betio Colonel Shoups marines unleashed a devastating artillery bombardment using delay fuzes in order to penetrate coral and log shelters to hit enemy positions around the triangle. A line just short of the taxiway on the airfield had formed, as the 1st battalion began to drive towards the south shore of Betio. The 1st battalion, 8th marines launched an attack against a strong defensive position at a juncture on the two right hand beaches to try and reestablish contact with the 3rd battalion 2nd marines. Other units of drove all the way across the island to secure Green Beach. The 8th marines were unable to make any progress against the strong Japanese positions. The major success of the day would be landing the reserve 1st and 2nd battalions, 6th marines at Green Beach and Bairiki island by the afternoon facing no opposition.  At this point Colonel Edson landed at Red Beach 2 and took command of the marine forces until General Smith landed. Colonel Edson spent his first night consulting with Shoup and Hall before ordering a coordinated attack the following morning. Edson noted, until then air and naval gunfire had been ineffective because they did not have acute knowledge of american and enemy positions. So Edson ordered spotters to get a better picture of the area and for the 2nd battalion, 10th marines artillery to come over. The next morning the 10th marines began an artillery bombardment to aid the attack. At 8am the 1st battalion, 6th marines advance eastwards down a narrow hundred yard strip of heavily fortified ground between the airfield and south shore. They rapidly progressed and by 11:00a would reach an area held by the 1st battalion, 2nd marines. It was estimated they killed 250 Japanese during this action. After completing this action new orders were issued to continue the advance east to the end of the airfield. They began advancing at 1pm and hit strong resistance. It would take until the late afternoon to clear the way over. During the afternoon the 3rd battalion, 6th marines landed at Green Beach and began advancing up the rear to aid in the assault. Elsewhere on Betio the 8th marines were making progress reducing the strong Burns-Philp Wharf position. The 18th marine engineers helped explode portions of steel pillboxes to let their colleagues storm them. One of the positions was a large blockhouse and when captured suddenly a large Japanese counterattack emerged to retake it. The 1st battalion, 8th marines on the western beaches proceeded slowly with fighting going on well into the night. Colonel Maurice Holmes 6th marines then relieved the 8th marines on the frontlines. By nightfall on the third day of the battle, the Americans now possessed all of the western end of Betio, going as far east as the eastern end of the airfield, except for some pockets between Red Beach 1 and 2. General Julian Smith finally came ashore on Green Beach just before noon assuming command. Despite the substantial gains, it was estimated that at least 5 more days of heavy fighting remaining before Betio was subdued. Smith gave Holmes the command for the final drive to the eastern tip of Betio. With the new daunting task at hand, Colonel Holmes prepared his forces for the brutal final drive, when all of a sudden 50 Japanese launched a counterattack. By the night of the 22nd, most of the remaining Japanese, roughly 1000 men were squeezed on the eastern narrow tail of the island. At 7:30 a group of 50 Japanese began attacking American positions recently just established. The 1st battalion, 6th marines had just assumed responsibility for the whole cross island line and the Japanese managed to find a small gap in the line. The Japanese used grenades and bayonets trying to break through, but the Americans were able to quickly encircle and annihilate them. Thus the Japanese were forced to launch a second probing attack later that night bringing their artillery 75 yards near the Marine front lines in an effort to screen their charges. The second attack was a two pronged movement hitting B company on the right and A company on the left. Both Japanese groups were obliterated in what became a wild frenzy of hand to hand fighting. Then after this the heaviest counterattack was launched at around 3am. The Japanese made a frontal assault for over an hour. 300 Japanese troops hit both A and B companies and like their other comrades were obliterated come the morning. These three attacks were in effect banzai charges, last ditch efforts to break the Americans, it cost the entire Japanese garrison. Holmes plans would be unnecessary to reach the eastern tip of Betio island as little opposition was found. By 10am the 1st battalion, 8th marines and 3rd battalion 2nd marines joined together to form a semicircular attack upon the last enemy pocket. They were supported by 75mm guns that unleashed carnage upon the pillboxes before marines grabbed prisoners through burst open holes from their shelters. Tarawa saw an estimated 4690 Japanese and Korean killed, with 17 Japanese and 129 Koreans POWs captured. The Marines suffered 1009 deaths, 2101 wounded and 191 missing in action. Vandegrift would tell the New York Times on December 27th "Tarawa was an assault from beginning to end. We must steel ourselves now to pay that price". November 24th would see the rest of the Tarawa atoll get mopped up and by the 29th, Abaiang, Marakei and the Maiana atolls were occupied. On the 21st the 5th amphibious corp reconnaissance company landed on Apamama under naval gunfire support from their submarine and escorting destroyer. They would encounter resistance from 23 Japanese whom they neutralized by the next day. With this Operation Galvanic has successfully been accomplished. The operation as we will see in the future weeks provided dire lessons to the allies about what the rest of the war would look like. As Vandegrift would later remark “Tarawa was the first example in history of a sea-borne assault against a heavily defended coral atoll … In the final analysis … success at Tarawa depended upon the discipline, courage, and fighting ability of the individual Marine. Seldom has anyone been called upon to fight a battle under more difficult circumstances.” It was under these circumstances, where the de facto practice of taking no prisoners would easily become the norm. The Japanese soldiers were faking deaths, hiding grenades to take allied men down with them. Suicide attacks were increasing exponentially. Thus the age of phrase would be adopted by the marines “shoot first and ask questions later”. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Operation Galvanic had finally been accomplished. It cost countless lives and would be one of the major bitter lessons learnt by the Americans during the Pacific War. The enemy was going to defend every single inch of their territory until the last man. Would America have the stomach to drive it home? 

Last time we spoke about the Japanese counteroffensive against the Marine beachhead on Bougainville. Things were looking bad for the Japanese before they got even worse. The Japanese had underestimated the amount of Marines on Bougainville and sent Major Mitsuhiro with his special units to try and hit the marine left flank, later to join up with the Iwasa detachment. Mitsuhiro’s men were in for a hell of a surprise when they attacked a larger force than expected. They took heavy losses before pulling back into the interior of the island to search for Iwasa. Meanwhile Iwasa also bit off more than he could chew with a counteroffensive targeting the Piva trail. In the end the marines not only repelled the attacks, but also greatly expanded their perimeter. We also spoke about the battle of Changde seeing the forces of Yokoyama crush multiple Chinese armies and unleash chemical and biological warfare in the area. This episode is the Battle of Sattelberg Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Vice Admiral John Henry Towers the commander of pacific air force circled a plan to recapture Wake island and use it as a springboard to latte assault the Marshalls that were around 500 miles south. Admiral Spruance favored opening a new campaign much father southeast, where the fleet could count on more land base air support in the south pacific. Spruance wanted to launch an offensive into the Gilbert Islands, some 600 miles southeast of the Marshalls. Admiral Nimitz was swapped by this and in turn twisted King’s arm. And thus was born Operation Galvanic, the simultaneous capture of the Ellice islands, the Gilbert Islands and Nauru set for November 15th. Since his victorious return from the battle of Midway a year earlier, Admiral Raymond Spruance had privately longed for a major command at sea. But it was an admirals way to lobby for a job and he would not be surprised when Nimitz told him one morning in May of 1943  “There are going to be some changes in the high command of the fleet. I would like to let you go, but unfortunately for you I need you here” Spruance replied “Well, the war is an important thing. I personally would like to have another crack at the Japs, but if you need me here, this is where I should be.” The next day the two met again and Nimitz said “I have been thinking this over during the night. Spruance, you are lucky. I’ve decided that I am going to let you go, after all.” Nimitz reported to King the new assignment during their meeting in San Francisco a month later. On May 30th, Spruance received the rank of vice admiral and shortly after was detached from the CINCPAC staff and placed in command of the Central Pacific Force, later to be designated the 5th Fleet. It would be the largest seagoing command in the history of the US Navy.  Spruance would have little more than four months to plan the largest and most complex amphibious operation yet attempted. Naval forces and landing troops would be taken from far flung parts of the south pacific and USA mainland. His key commanders had not yet been identified. Spruance immediately recruited a chief of staff with a lot of experience and initiative, his old friend and shipmate, Captain Charles “Carl” Moore. Moore had been serving in Washington as a member of Admiral King's war planning staff. Spruance asked Moore to select other key staff officers, poaching many from naval HQ. Moore would arrive to Pearl Harbor on August 5th and took up a spare bedroom in Nimitz and Spruance house atop Makalapa Hill. Now Spruance was the type of manager that delegated everything possible, he once said “Looking at myself objectively, I think I am a good judge of men; and I know that I tend to be lazy about many things, so I do not try to do anything that I can pass down the line to someone more competent than I am to do it.” Moore was perfectly fine with this philosophy. Some would say Spruance was a bit lazy, the man did seem to bore rather easily and was a compulsive walker, often spent days just walking, grabbing staff with him. Moore wrote about such an instance once that occurred a few days after he arrived to Hawaii  “Raymond is up to his tricks already, and yesterday took me on an eight mile hike in the foothills. It was hot and a hard pull at times, and particularly so as we carried on a lively conversation all the way which kept me completely winded.” On this occasion Moore tried to talk to Spruance about operation Galvanic, but Spruance kept changing subjects. A few days later Moore would write to his wife “Yesterday Raymond stepped up the pace and the distance and we covered over 10 miles in three hours. My right leg caught up with my left and both were wrecked by the time I got back. . . . If he can get me burned to a crisp or crippled from walking he will be completely happy.” Spruance wanted Kelly Turner to command his amphibious fleet. Turner at that point held a year of hard experience in the South Pacific. He was the navy's preeminent amphibious specialist. Spruance knew the man well both at sea and at the Naval War College. Spruance told Nimitz in Juen“I would like to get Admiral Kelly Turner from Admiral Halsey, if I can steal him,” However with the northern Solomons campaign in high gear, Halsey was not too keen to release Turner. Nimitz sent a personal note to Hasley explaining that he had been ordered to wage a new offensive in the central Pacific: “This means I must have Turner report to me as soon as possible.” Unfortunately for Hasley, Turner also took some of their best staff officers with him. Major General Holland Smith would command the invasion troops, designated the 5th amphibious corps or ‘VAC”. Smith was one of the pioneers of amphibious warfare. He had persuaded the navy to adopt Andrew Higgen’s shallow draft boats as landing craft and successfully trained several divisions in amphibious operations over at Camps Elliot and Pendleton in California. He fought hard to get combat command in the Pacific and was backed up by Secretary Knox and Admiral King. Nimitz did not know the man well, but Spruance had worked with him in the 1930’s when they were both stationed in the Caribbean. Turner and Smith would make quite the combustible pair. Both men were aggressive, ambitious and quite overbearing. They were both used to running things without competition. Both were prone to fits of rage and this earned them the nicknames “terrible turner and Howlin’mad’smith”. At Guadalcanal Turner once offended General Vandegrift by infringing upon his command, this led Spruance to wonder “whether we could get the operation planned out before there was an explosion between them.” Smith had met Kelly Turner once in Washington and he found the admiral to be precise and courteous, describing him as “an exacting schoolmaster, affable in an academic manner. He could be plain ornery. He wasn’t called ‘Terrible Turner’ without reason.” For Operation Galvanic, Turner expected to be above Smith in the chain of command. This was consistent with how Operation Watchtower went about. But Smith wanted direct command of all amphibious troops throughout the operation, prior, during and after the landings, and he wanted to directly report to Spruance. Spruance wanted nothing to do with such arguments and because of his laissez-faire style this meant Moore would be acting as referee between Turner and Smith. Here is what Moore had to say of it “Holland Smith particularly complained about Kelly Turner. He was a whining, complaining type. He loved to complain. He loved to talk and loved to complain, and he would come and sit on my desk and growl about Turner. ‘All I want to do is kill some Japs. Just give me a rifle. I don’t want to be a commanding general. Just give me a rifle, I’ll go out there and shoot some Japs. . . . I’m not worried about anything else around here.’ See, that kind of a line. I was trying to soothe him down, and Turner would come and complain about that blankety-blank Smith, couldn’t get any cooperation out of him, and so forth.”Through these referee’d battles a compromise was met. Turner would be in command of the landing forces until the shore commander went ashore and assumed command of the troops. When turner was informed, all the troops ashore would fall under the command of the 5th amphibious corps and thus report to Smith. This model was accepted by both men and would remain in force throughout the Pacific War.  So at this point its important to note the US Navy had still not fully recovered from the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, and was still in the process of building the largest fleets the world had ever seen. You have probably heard this phrase many times: “World War Two would be won through British brains, American brawn, and Russian blood.” As said at the Tehran conference of December 1943 by Joseph Stalin. That brawn was simply incredible. From the start of the war until the end of 1943, the US would commission 7 aircraft carriers, the Essex, Lexington, Yorktown, Bunker Hill, Intrepid, Wasp and Hornet. Of the new Essex-class, 9 light carriers would be commissioned the Independence, Princeton, Belleau Wood, Cowpens, Monterey, Cabot, Langley, Bataan and San Jacinto. Of the new Independence class there would be 35 escort carriers, no worries not going to list them all haha. There would also be 6 new battleships the South Dakota, Indiana, Massachusetts, Alabama, Iowa and New Jersey; 4 new heavy cruisers, the  Baltimore, Boston, Canberra and Quincy; 16 light cruisers, 212 destroyers, 234 destroyer escorts and 92 submarines. To match this in the same period, Japanese commissioned two aircraft carriers the Junyo and Hiyo; one light aircraft carrier the Ryuho; 4 escort carriers the  Unyo, Chuyo, Kaiyo and Shinyo; 2 superbattleships the Yamato and Musashi; 4 light cruisers the Agano, Oyodo, Noshiro and Yahagi; 22 destroyers, 15 destroyer escorts and 61 submarines. Thus it was absolutely clear, the Americans had a significant advantage in naval production.  On September 4th, the 5th amphibious corps of Smith were officially established. Smith proceeded to train and control the units assigned to operation Galvanic which included Major General Julian Smith’s 2nd Marine division and Major General Ralph Smith’s 27th division, that's a lot of Smiths. As the 5th amphibious force and corps were still undergoing organization during the planning phase of the Gilberts operations, much of the burden for tacticaling planning fell initially onto the staffs of the two divisions involved. Julian Smith was informed in august his job was to capture the Tarawa and Apamama atolls. Ralph Smith was told he was to invade Nauru, but Holland Smith believed Nauru offered too many problems. Nauru was 390 miles west of the Gilberts and would place strain on available shipping. Simultaneous landings in the two places would further widen the dispersal of supporting fleet element, a dangerous division of forces in view of the presumed possibility of a Japanese naval counterattack. Finally, the terrain on Nauru would make an amphibious assault and the land fighting extremely costly to be warranted by the strategic advantages to be gained. Makin Atoll was considered no less suitable than Nauru as an air base for operations against the Marshalls and was thought to be considerably less well defended. Makin was also only about 105 miles north of Tarawa making it possible to concentrate the supporting fleet in one area and thus avoid the danger of excessive dispersion. So in early October, Spruance and Nimitz made the decision to invade Makin Atoll instead. Unfortunately the Americans did not have great intelligence on the Gilberts, so they had to do some photographic coverage of Tarawa and Makin between July and October 1943. The USS Nautilus contributed a lot to the intelligence effort by obtaining hydrographic and each conditions for both atolls, such as their surfs, reefs, beaches, lagoon entrance, current data, tidal data and so forth. The unsexy logistical stuff no one talks about. If you want to invade a beach, you have to know about said beach. During September and October a total of 16 former residents and travelers of the islands were attached to Turners staff to help out. Many of these were Australian, New Zealanders, Fijian naval reserve officers, officials of the Western pacific high commission, Australian army reserve officers and enlisted men and a few civilians. Another source of information was given by Lt Colonel James Roosevelt who had taken part in the raid upon Makin. For the landings at Makin, Turner’s task for 54 and 53. He would have at his disposal 4 destroyer transports, one Cargoship, one LSD and 9 LSTS to transport the reinforced 165th regiment of Colonel Gardiner Conroy. He would be supported by the 7th army defense battalion, detachments of the 105th infantry regiment, 27th division, units of the 193rd tank battalion, 152nd engineer battalion, coastal artillery and anti-aircraft batteries of the 98th and 93rd Coastal artillery battalions, a platoon from the 5th Amphibious corps reconnaissance company, sundry medical, signal, ordnance, quartermaster and bomb disposal detachments. Their screening force would be 4 older battleships, 4 heavy cruisers, 13 destroyers and 3 escort carriers. The Tarawa force would be given one destroyer transport, 1 attack transport, 12 Destroyer transports, 3 AKA’s, one LSD and 12 LST’s under Rear Admiral Harry Hill, screened by 3 battleships, 3 heavy cruisers, 3 light cruisers, 21 destroyers and 5 escort carriers. Turner would also make a legendary decision. He appointed Colonel Eareckson, the veteran of the Aleutian Islands campaign to be commander of the support Aircraft, thus establishing a centralized system of ground control for support aircraft in amphibious operations. Eareckson became famous for his innovative tactics such as using radar equipped B-17’s to guide P-38’s to attack Kawanishi flying boats during the Aleutian islands campaign. He also pioneered low level bombing raids through the brutal aleutian weather. Aerial support, both at the tactical and strategic level would be provided by Rear admiral Charles Pownalls carrier task force 50 formed around 6 lage and 5 small carriers and by Rear admiral John Hoovers shore based aircraft; consisting of task groups 57.2/3/4. Both forces had to destroyer aircraft and air/harbor facilities at Tarawa, Mille, Jaluit, Makin and Nauru while simultaneously providing air support. Hoover also was responsible for conducting photographic reconnaissance over the Marshalls. After the air strikes and naval bombardment obliterated the Japanese defenses and installations, Turner planned to assault the beaches with the troops ferried using amphibian tractors, followed up by LCVPS and medium tanks in LCMS. For Tarawa, Ralph Smith’s plan was a bit more elaborate and extreme, he was going to attempt something never done before. The amphibious assault of Tarawa had unique problems. There was no immediate means of achieving depth of deployment. The landing forces would initially be pinned down on a long narrow beach. The island offered basically no room for flank maneuvers and the aerial and naval bombardments would do little. Ralph assigned a major role to troops of a different regiment than the one that made up the main landing force. Detachments X and Y, of the 3rd Battalion, 105th Infantry and 193rd Tank Battalion,  led by Maj. Edward T. Bradt would be the first to land on the west coast of Butaritari, designated Red Beaches. This would be followed up quickly by the 1st and 3rd Battalions. On the right, the 3rd Battalion Landing Team would land on Red Beach 2 and seize the right half of the division beachhead to about 1,600 yards inland. Then they would move right to clear the area around Ukiangong Village and Ukiangong Point. Over on the left, the 1st Battalion Landing Team would land on Red Beach 1, seize the division beachhead in its zone of action and move left to capture the area from the north end of Red Beach to Flink Point. Meanwhile the reinforced 2nd Platoon of Company G, 165th Regiment, and 19 marines of the 4th Platoon of the 5th Amphibious Corps Reconnaissance Company were going to land on Kotabu island, lying just north of Flink point. This would secure the seward approaches into the lagoon. After two hours while the troops consolidated their beachhead the Z detachment of the 105th regiment led by Captain William Ferns would land on Yellow beach 2 on the north side of the island between On Chong’s and King’s Wharfs. The detachment would split into two groups, one heading east to clear Kings wharf the other west to clear On Chong’s wharf. After this a wave of the 165th battalion would advance west. Comparing the two, Julian’s plan was a lot more simple, it called for the landing at Betio of 3 battalions; the 2nd battalion, 8th marines, 2nd battalion and the  2nd and 3rd battalions 2nd marines. Colonel David Shoup and Colonel Elmer Hall would lead the 3 battalions.The 1st battalion, 2nd marines would be held in reserve. The corps reserve for Tarawa, Makin or Apamama would be Colonel Maurice Holmes 6th marines. Once the beachhead was secured, troops would advance across the island to the south, seizing the airfield and mopping up enemy positions along the major beaches To further prepare for Operation Galvanic, Admiral Pownall led three carriers, the Lexington, Princeton and Belleau Wood to strike the Gilberts on September 18th. Supported by 38 Liberators flying out of Canton, Funafuti and Guadalcanal, Pownall made 6 separate and unopposed air strikes against Tarawa. A ton of fuel and ammunition was destroyed, several buildings were wrecked and a small freighter was sunk. Attacks on Makin saw three flying boats lit on fire with some damage done to shore installations. What was more important than these strikes was the photographic coverage that accompanied them. Zero fighter interception was found at either, though two Japanese medium bombers were shot down northwest of Makin. According to the diary of a Japanese laborer, 28 laborers were killed during a strike on Makin, most likely from a direct bomb hit to a shelter. On Beito they hit a runway, though it would be quickly repaired. Pownall tried to keep the strikes going but now saw an interception from 18 zeros which shot down 5 of his aircraft.  To follow up the raid on the Gilberts, Admiral Montgomery hit Wake with one of the largest carrie strike forces to date. The Essex, Lexington, Yorktown, Cowpens, Independence and Belleau Wood with support from land based aircraft hit Wake on October 5th and 6th. Over 67 Japanese planes were reported to be destroyed in the air and on the ground. Shore installations were also battered heavily. Then beginning on november 13th, land-based bombers of Admiral Hoover made nightly raids against Tarawa, Makin, Nauru and some central Marshall islands. Meanwhile between November 13-17th, Major General Willis Hale’s 7th air force's heavy bombers flew 141 bombing sorties against the Gilberts and Marshalls. They dropped over 173 tons of bombs, destroying at least 5 Japanese aircraft and inflicting heavy damage to their facilities and installations. Against the Americans, the Japanese forces in the area initially were that of Rear Admiral Abe Koso’s 6th base force operating on Kwajalein. Koso commanded the 61st guard unit on Kwajalian, 62nd guard unit on Jaluit, 63rd guard unit on Taroa, 64th guard unit at Wotje,  65th guard unit at Wake, 43rd guard unit at Nauru, a detachment of the 63rd guard unit at Ocean island and another detachment of the 51st guard unit on Makin. For the Marshalls he had the 22nd air flotilla consisting of 46 Zeros, 40 kates, 3 vals, 5 flying boats and 11 reconnaissance aircraft. The raid of Makin back in 1942 alerted the Japanese to its significance so they sent the 6th Yokosuka SNLF to help occupy the Gilberts. During the spring of 1943, the IJN created the 3rd special base force of Rear-Admiral Shibazaki Keiji who would defend Tarawa, Makin, Apamama, Nauru and Ocean island. The Sasebo 7th SNLF would be sent to Tarawa, the 2nd Yokosuka SNLF to Nauru. The Japanese went to work on Makin and Tarawa constructing concrete and log emplacements for guns of all sizes. They used coconut tree logs to build tank barricade, tank pits, laid underwatch obstacles and dugouts for riflemen and machine gunners. On Makin the airbase was expanded and by july 1943 was able to take land based bombers. The Marshalls, Marianas and Carolines alongside other islands would be reinforced in preparation for expected American offensives. Four new south sea detachments were formed and tow mobile amphibious brigades that would be used for counterlandings. The Japanese were outmanned and outgunned, but they would make the Americans pay in blood for every inch of land, island by island. Now it is time for us to travel back to Green Hell as the allies were preparing to hit Sattelberg. By November 9th, the Australians knew the Japanese had two out posts west of Jivevaneng, at Green and Coconut ridges with another strong patrol base at Steeple Tree Hill. Whitehead decided to deploy the 2/24th battalion on the right to guard the enemy along the Palanko road; the 2/48th would take up the center advancing along the sattelberg road supported by the 1st tank battalion and the 2/23rd would take the left advancing along Sisi. Major General Frank Berryman would be appointed the new commander of the 2nd corps, as General Morshead was appointed commander of the New Guinea Force. The date for the new offensive was set for November 17th. A preliminary advance was made by a company along the sattelberg road to seize the enemy held Green Ridge. Under the support of heavy machine gun and artillery fire.    At 8:20am two batteries and the company of the 2/2nd machine gun battalion fired upon Green Ridge. Captain Isaksson’s company of the 2/48th then moved up, but were unable to properly follow up the bombardment. The men advanced at a slow rate up the ridge because of thick bamboo. Both the nearby near and far features were strongly defended and would only be captured by 10 and 12:4-pm respectfully. The capture of the Far feature took the machine gunners 26,000 rounds to keep the enemy heads down for the infantry to storm their positions. Captain Brocksopp’s company occupied Green Ridge, Isakssons took White Trunk Tree lying on the junction of Sattelberg road and the Sisi track by 1:40pm. 5 men were killed in the process, 18 Japanese died on Green Ridge. At first light on November 17th, four Matilda tanks led by Major Samuel Hordern led the way to the start line converted under the noise of a deadly rocket barrage. Beginning at 6:30am  rocket propelled bombs were fired from jeeps. These 30 pound bombs had a maximum range of 1200 yards. Several of them ended up being duds, but those that did explode had a very lethal effect, killing within a radius of 50 yards. On top of this came artillery and mortar bombardments, until Horderns tanks began smashing Coconut ridge with the infantry close behind them. A company of the 2/23rd would find Sisi unoccupied and continued north to help defend Green Ridge. Around 50 yards up the track the Australians found the first signs of opposition, a heavy machine gun post. The tanks fired blindly at the enemy defenses, mostly pillboxes and foxholes. Despite the terrifying attack, the Japanese held their ground and replied using machine guns, mortars and grenades, until the tanks blew them and their defenses to pieces. Halfway to Coconut ridge, the Matilada’s had to halt to refill their ammunition. Within all of the excitement, the tank crews had run out of ammunition for their Besa guns. The Besa’s had been firing bursts of around 50 rounds when they could have been firing 10s. Three deeps loaded with ammunition at Jivevaneng rushed forward as the tanks backed up some 60 yards to protect their approach. All of this was coordinated using walkie talkies, an absolutely crucial technology of the war. Meanwhile the 2/24th continued north to attack Japanese positions along the Palank road and to the south the 2/23rd met resistance halfway to Steeple Tree. At 10:20am, Horderns tanks were resuming their advance, eliminating pockets of resistance one by one. Upon reaching the Kunai Knoll on the southern Coconuts, two Matilda’s became disabled. Upon seeing the halting tanks, the Japanese unleashed as much firepower as they could pinning down the infantry alongside their tanks. Lt Colonel Robert Ainslie ordered the men to advance on without the tanks. The men stormed the slopes of the Kunai Knoll, forced to crawl forward under heavy fire. It became a fierce battle, the Australians were unable to make much ground and forced to dig in for the night. Two companies dug in on the slopes of the Kunai Knoll while a third dug in near White Trunk Tree. Despite the terrifying tank attack, the Japanese did not flinch and fought throughout the day to halt the Australian advance. However during the night the Australians unleashed an artillery bombardment forcing the Japanese to abandon the ridge. The next morning, the Australians found the ridge abandoned and went to work repairing the two disabled tanks so they could continue the advance. Three more Matildas wielding 2 pounders and 3 inch Howitzers were brought up. The 2/2rd now advanced towards Mararuo, pushing the Japanese up a spur. The tanks advanced again, allowing the Australians to go another 250 yards until they were met again with heavy resistance. The Japanese held very strong positions upon the 2600 foot Steeple Tree Hill. Their system of defense was to have positions at every possible line of approach near bamboo obstacles. The Japanese would wait to fire until the infantry were just a few yards away to cause maximum damage. Armed with 37mm anti-tank guns the Japanese did all they could to neutralize the tank menace. By nightfall the attackers were forced to pull back to Coconut ridge and during the night the Japanese launched counter attacks using grenades and small arms.  The next morning at 8am the Australians resumed their advance. The tanks led the way, but they were met with extremely fast and well coordinated anti-tank measures. At around 100 yards from the start line, the advance was halted by an anti-tank ditch 6 feet wide and 4 feet deep. Major Moodie’s engineers of the 2/13th field company were able to dislodge the tanks and soon the tanks were overrun an 81mm mortar position. The tanks ran havoc upon a Woodpecker and two light machine gun positions, then after another 150 yards ran into another tank ditch around 10am. Lt Farquhars platoon charged past the tanks to give the engineers room to dislodge them only to see the tanks hit another ditch when they came forward again. The men fashioned two fougasses out of 4 gallon drums filled with petrol to hit the defenders of one of the slopes later to be named Fougasse Corner. A fougasse by the way is a projectile weapon, typically using a 40 gallon drum with a flammable substance like petrol. They would be inclined and when triggered using an explosive charge, shot a flame going perhaps 10 feet up, 3 feet wide for about 30 yards. Picture a really big flamethrower burst. This was unleashed on the slope causing roughly 20 casualties. The Japanese would leave 46 of their dead abandoning the slope when the Australians charged into them. The Japanese then launched a counterattack against the Fougasse Corner leading to more casualties, but were repelled. To the north, the 2/24th launched an attack on a knoll near the summit of the 2200 Feature. After an artillery bombardment, Lt Caples platoon took the unoccupied knoll, but soon the Japanese began encircling them. They fought until 2:30pm when the Australians finally established a secure position on the knoll. Meanwhile, General Katagiri was preparing to send the 79th regiment to attack the mouth of the Song River. Katagiri was facing a dire supply situation. Although 2-3 barges came up daily to bring supplies to Kanimi and Lakona, once the supplies landed they had to be carried overland and that was the crux of the problem. The main roads, Kanimi to Ago to Lakona to Wario to Sattelberg and secondary roads leading to Zageheme and Merikeo were all steep and mountainous, taking 5 days to traverse. This led the supply line to the front lines to be inconsistent. From the Diary entry of an unknown Japanese infantry man at Sattelberg October 15th "I eat potatoes and live in a hole and cannot speak in a loud voice. I live the life of a mud rat or similar creature" At the same time the 2/15th battalion had sent a diversionary force led by Major Newcomb with orders to "in conjunction with the opening of the attack towards Sattelberg… you are to command a diversionary force, broaden the apparent front of the attack on Sattelberg by simulating a new threat towards Wareo" The 2/15th set out on November 17th and reached Garabow the next day. They began bombarding it to  cause the distraction. This was done to support Whiteheads offensive while in the east Brigadier Porter was going to cut the enemy’s main supply line by attacking along the coast. Porter sent the 2/32nd battalion to take some high ground at Pabu. On November 19th, the 2/32nd were able to seize Pabu, avoiding any enemy, finding the hill unoccupied. The next morning the 2/32nd began patrolling and found large numbers of Japanese 500 yards to their west, and that said enemy then found them. Katagiri feared a possible attack upon Bonga so he decided to launch a secondary counteroffensive on November 21st. Meanwhile the 2/48th resumed their advance, this time without Horderns tanks who could not traverse past 250 yards because of bamboo obstacles. By 9:30am the tanks were able to bypass the obstacles and caught up to the infantry. At 10am, Whitehead gave the order “Go ahead as fast as possible” and 50 minutes later the skirmishing began upon the first enemy positions. The Australians pushed on slowly in a sluggish battle but were able to capture Steeple Tree by the late afternoon. At the same time the 2/23rd were trying to drive the enemy away from the southern approaches to Steeple Tree, gradually linking up with the 2/48th.  To the north the 2/24th once again found themselves halted. The Japanese had created strong bamboo obstacles along the slopes that were difficult to traverse. In an attempt to force the issue, Wootten committed another troop of tanks to assist the 2/24th, but it would take a lot of time before the Matildas could climb the 2200 Feature. But the Japanese were caught between two enemy forces and were forced to pull back to Sattelberg during the night. The next morning the 2/48th resumed their advance while the 2/23rd patrolled towards Mararuo. Meeting no opposition the troops moved ahead quickly. At 4:35pm the enemy unleashed machine gun fire at point blank range upon them. The 2/48th tossed mortars and their tank support who crushed the enemy defenses, rapidly overwhelming the enemy, sending them scattering. But on November 22nd, Katagiri finally launched his counterattack using the bulk of the 79th regiment against Porters positions along the Song. Katagiri also sent the Fujii detachment led by Lt Colonel Fujii to attack Pabu. It just so happened Davies Company  had left Pabu to search for the main Japanese supply road, and they came across Horace’s Hoof in the afternoon. A company sized force of the Fujii detachment began their attack forcing Davies company back towards Pabu. But that is it for New Guinea as we now need to travel over to Bougainville. Generals Geiger and Turnage ordered a group of naval and marine engineers with construction personnel led by Civil Engineer corps officer Commander William Painter to construct airfields in the interior of the island. They were escorted by units of the 21st marines and used aerial photographs to find an area about 3 miles inland, roughly 1 mile beyond the defensive perimeter where suitable sites were located for two airstrips to be made. Unable to expand the perimeter properly because of the swamps around them, Turnage directed the 21st marines to establish a strong outpost at the junction of the East-West and Numa Numa trails to cover the new airfield sites. On November 13th, the inexperienced 2nd battalion, 21st marines of Lt Colonel Eustace Smoak set out with E company in the lead. Unbeknownst to them, Colonel Hamanoue had just realized the tactical value of said junction and sent a battalion to occupy Coconut Grove the previous day. The men had managed to establish a solid defensive perimeter.  At 11:05 Company E ran right into an ambush. The Japanese unleashed machine gun and mortar fire with sniper support from the treelines. E companies commander sent a report back to Colonel Smoak, one of many panicked and incoherent reports he would receive from said company. This was the first combat experience for the 2nd battalion, 21st marines. Smoak rushed forward and established his command post close to the action. He ordered F company to relieve E company who had suffered heavy casualties. F company however, advanced too far to the right and suffered a lot of casualties in a disorganized manner. Unable to get artillery support, Smoak ordered his units to begin digging in for the night. The next morning, 5 light tanks of the 1st battalion, 21st regiment came up to support Smoak. While Smoak organized his forces, a air strike hit the Coconut grove area at 9:05am consisting of around 20 Avengers carrying 100lb bombs using 1 second delay fuses. The marines then performed an artillery barrage before resuming their advance upon the grove. The Japanese fired upon the tanks, managing to disable two of them. At this point Smoak ordered the disorganized assault to halt and began regrouping his men to attack again. This time they were able to break the Japanese resistance and by late afternoon established a perimeter around the Coconut Grove. The marines found 40 dead Japanese, the baptism under fire for the 2nd battalions, 21st marines cost them 20 dead men and 39 wounded. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Operation Galvanic was being prepared and in the meanwhile, a large number of air raids were hitting numerous places in the central pacific. The advance to sattelberg was getting closer day by day, the boys on Bougainville were finding inhospitable Japanese around every corner. 

Last time we spoke about the naval battle of Empress Augusta Bay. Operation Cherry Blossom kicked off taking the Japanese by complete surprise. All of the diversionary actions had managed to confused the Japanese into thinking the Shortland Islands were the real target. Wilkinsons flotilla managed to land 14,000 men and 6200 tons of supplies at Cape Torokina. When the Japanese finally received news of the landings they tossed massive air attacks and prepared a counter landing force. The air attacks were not nearly enough to put a dent on the unloading process. Vice admiral Omori set out to intercept the Americans, but was caught off guard by Admiral Merrills figure 8 maneuver that saw two Japanese warships sunk, many heavily damaged and hundreds of Japanese killed. The Japanese tried a second time to hit the Americans, but Admiral Halsey unleashed his carriers to quell the action. This episode is the Counterattack on Bougainville  Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Things were looking bad for the Japanese at the start of the Bougainville campaign. Many Japanese lay dead on the island from the futile attempt to counter the landings. In the depths of Empress Augusta bay lay other bodies and warships. Rabaul was being pulverized systematically. The Japanese needed to dislodge the enemy from the island lest it become another Guadalcanal. General Turnage’s marines had successfully made their landings and now they would expand their perimeter. The naval battle of Empress Augusta Bay combined with Admiral Sherman’s carrier raid against Rabaul’s harbor had delivered a crippling blow the IJN’s power in the region. Admiral Kusaka’s air force at Rabaul had been reduced to 270 aircraft including the last minute 100 aircraft he was loaned from the IJN carriers. To make matters worse, on November the 5th, Admiral Halsey received a new task group led by Rear Admiral Alfred Montgomery. Task Group 50.3 consisted of carriers Essex and Bunker Hill; light carrier Independence and destroyers Edwards, Murray, McKee, Kidd, Chauncey and Bullard. On November 8, the destroyers Stack, Sterett and Wilson were also given to this group, though they would be withdrawn by November 14. These new carriers were packing heat. Essex carried 36 Hellcats, 36 SBDs and 19 TBFs; Bunker Hill 24 Hellcats, 33 SB2C Helldivers and 18 TBFs, plus 24 Corsairs ran CAP for her from Ondoanga and Segi Point; Light Carrier Independence carried 24 Hellcats and 9 TBFs, plus  12 Hellcats (CAP from Ondoanga and Segi Point). With all of that Halsey had an additional 45 torpedo bombers, 69 dive bombers and 120 fighters to continue putting the hurt on Rabaul. The only catch for all of this was Halsey lacked an adequate destroyer screen to protect these super weapons, thus he would be unable to fully utilize them until a bit later on.Halsey was also reinforced with Rear-Admiral Laurance DuBose’s Cruiser Division 13 consisting of light cruisers Santa Fe, Birmingham, Mobile and Biloxi; and destroyers Harrison, John Rodgers, McKee and Murray. Admiral Merrill’s exhausted task force was given some much needed R&R beginning on November 7th.  Back over at the beachhead, General Vandegrift was so certain the operation was 100% successful he handed the keys to the car to Turnage and returned with Admiral Wilkinson to Guadalcanal, of course he was about to receive a promotion and would soon be on his way to Washington. Turnage now sought to expand the beachhead further inland to give the marines more defense in depth, as it was expected the Japanese would launch major attacks to dislodge them. He shifted the 3rd Marines, whose units had suffered the most casualties thus far to the left sector of the beachhead. He then moved the more fresh 9th marines to the right where he believed was the most likely area the Japanese would hit the hardest. Still meeting no enemy resistance, these shuffling actions were accomplished by November 4th. Simultaneously many units also extended the perimeter. By the end of November 3rd, the 2nd raider battalion extended their part of the perimeter 1500 yards or so. The only real action anyone saw for awhile was patrol skirmishes and some fighting over roadblocks. The 2nd Raiders were under the temporary command of Major Alan Shapley who took responsibility for a few roadblocks; companies rotated out of their positions every couple of days. The key roadblock positions were found along the Piva and Mission trails. The 3rd raiders were working out ways to lure out a small group of Japanese holding out on Torokina island. On November 3rd, 3rd defense battalion and a 105 mm battery of the 12th marines fired upon the small island for 15 minutes. The 3rd raiders followed this up to storm the suspected Japanese position to find nothing but corpses. An outpost was established by M company of the 9th marines far to the left of the main perimeter which was hoped to guard against surprise attacks coming over the Laruma river. Turnages patrols at this point became a daily chore for all units on Bougainville. These patrols would go on for 20 grueling months. The thick undergrowth and lack of well defined trails made it extremely easy for the Japanese to set up ambushes at their leisure. Thus to combat this, the marines had to turn to some very good boys, K9 companies. The war dogs used their superior senses to hunt and track down the enemy during patrols. During the early stages of the Bougainville campaign the dogs were able to locate a number of small groups of Japanese. The Bougainville campaign despite being a warzone would not see as brutal fighting as say places like Peleliu. On Peleliu many of the war dogs literally were driven mad, but for Bougainville the dogs had a less intensive time. The patrols scouted as far north as Laruma and south to the Torokina River finding no meaningful resistance. By the 5th of November, the perimeter was extended inland a further 3 miles. Now 5 battalions were manning a 10,000 yard front, with the bulk of the raider battalions located on Puruata island and at cape Torokina in the reserves. Wilkinson’s convoy would bring over another 3548 troops of the 21st marines and 5080 tons of supplies on November 6th. Because the beaches were already so cluttered up with supplies everything and they still lacked developed facilities, the incoming LST’s had to land their cargo on Puruata island where there was open beaches. There was still no shore party to organize the unloading and a supply jam would hit the smaller island just like it was on Bougainville. Turnage now had nearly 20,000 men to man a pretty small beachhead. On the other side, the Japanese were under the belief, no more than 5000 Americans hand landed on Bougainville, getting those guadalcanal vibes aren't we? Admiral Kusaka still sought to send over the specially trained amphibious 2nd mobile raiding unit of Major Miwa Mitsuhiro, 1000 men strong. He hoped to perform a counter landing north of the American beachhead. If the special unit could disrupt the marines enough perhaps the Iwasa detachment could march overland to join up and together they would dislodge the Americans. On the 6th the destroyers Amagiri, Uzuki Yunagi and Fumizuki departed Rabual carrying 475 of the special unit with 375 support troops. The small convoy was escorted by Admiral Osugi’s destroyer squadron consisting of Urakaze, Kazagumo, Wakatsuki, Makinami, Naganami, Onami and Hayanami. Fortunately for them, the naval force managed to sneak past a PT Boat guard force of 8 PT boats operating out of Puruata Island. On November 7th and 4am the IJN destroyers doubled back and unloaded the troops onto 21 landing barges to make a run for the beach. The 8 PT boats operating patrols in the area had established a new base on Puruata island, but not a single one of the discovered the Japanese landing force. Sailors aboard one of the PT boats reported seeing a strange craft, which might have been one of the barges and consequently a PT boat did check out the report. Yet before it arrived the Japanese were already landed ashore and about to charge into the left flank of the perimeter. The landing craft was seen by a Marine anti-tank platoon along the beach, but they did not fire upon it, thinking it to be American. Thus in the end the amphibious assault was a complete surprise to the Americans. The small Japanese force had landed on the beaches between the Laruma and Koromokina rivers. Not only were the Americans surprised, the Japanese were also surprised to find out the American perimeter extended further west than expected, as a result they would be unable to assemble into a unitary force before a firefight broke out. The Japanese had landed so close to the marine beachhead, the 5th company, 54th regiment were cut off from the Laruma outpost at 6am and were forced to attack the left flank of the perimeter. The Japanese raiders came ashore scattered along two miles of beach on either side of the Laruma River. Major Miwa Mitsuhiro gathered the men he could and sought to take advantage of the element of surprise they held. At 6:30am a skirmish broke out against Company K’s 3rd platoon. The platoon had been out patrolling inland towards the Laruma river right at the same time as the landing. The platoon ran right into the force killing some japanese before the platoon leader disengaged realizing the size of the enemy. He took his men into the swamps going eastward, it would turn into a 30 hour grueling adventure. Company K of the 9th marines then were attacked by company 5 of the 54th regiment in a 5 hour long firefight. The guns of the 12th marines and the 90 mm anti-aircraft weapons of the 3rd defense battalion managed to fire upon the invaders who were forced to pull back to some captured foxholes. Company K then launched a counterattack. They found the Japanese dug in 150 yards west of the Laruma river. Fierce fighting broke out, but Company K could not dislodge them. At 1:15pm companies B and C of the 1st battalion, 3rd Marines came in to relieve the exhausted defenders and launched an attack through Company K’s position. Major John Brady’s men attacked the Japanese in the entrenchments. Company C hit the right flank as B hit the left. Both ran into heavy machine gun fire. The men requested tank support and soon the tanks 37mm were firing upon the Japanese at point blank range causing tremendous casualties. Meanwhile the 1st battalion of the 21st marine led by Lt Colonel Ernest Fry had just landed on Puruata island and they were given orders to spearhead a new assault upon the Japanese. Two LCPRS were sent to evacuate the Laruma outpost and by the night time the marines and Japanese were having shouting matches as they fired upon another. The Japanese yelled "Moline you die" and the Marines made earthy references to Premier Tojo's diet. Marine Captain Gordon Warner was fluent in Japanese, so he could quickly reply to the Japanese, apparently he even yelled believable orders prompting a bayonet charge. He would receive the Navy Cross for destroying machine gun nests with a helmet full of hand grenades, but lost a leg in the battle. Sergeant Herbert Thomas, would give his life near the Koromokina. His platoon was forced prone by machine-gun fire, and Thomas threw a grenade to silence the weapon. The grenade rebounded from jungle vines and the young West Virginian smothered it with his body. He posthumously was awarded the Medal of Honor. The attack would come to a halt, to allow a strong bombardment to hit the Japanese positions provided by the 12th marines. The following morning saw another bombardment by 5 batteries of the 12th marines before Lt Colonel Fry led two companies through the 3rd marines position to attack. They crashed into a concentrated area around 300 yards wide and 600 deep. Light tanks supported the attack. However they would only find slight resistance alongside over 250 dead Japanese. Major Miwa had pulled the men out heading further inland to try and join up with Major General Iwasa Shun’s soon to be counteroffensive. The battle cost the marines 17 dead and 30 wounded, but took a hell of a toll on the Japanese. After this action the defensive line behind the Koromokina Lagoon was strengthened. On november 9th, allied dive bombers hit the area to clear it of possible Japanese infiltrators. Patrols in the area would find more Japanese dead and the Marines would ultimately claim over 377 dead Japanese. Over on the Japanese side, the Iwasa Detachment were marching towards the Mission and Numa Numa Trails. These two positions would allow them to thwart a lot of the possible American advance, which they still believed were smaller than they actually were.  Back on November 5th the E company of the 2nd raiders had skirmished with some Japanese at the Piva Trail roadblock. The actions alerted Colonel Edward Craig and he ordered most of the raiders to head north to support the position. On November 7th, Colonel Hamanoue Toshiaki led the 1st battalion to hit part of the roadblock managed by H company. This would be occurring simultaneously with the amphibious assault on the Koromokina. H company supported by some mortars from the 9th marines were able to beat off the attack, giving Major Alan Shapley’s G company enough time to come and reinforce the position. By the afternoon, the raiders were forcing the Japanese to retreat over to Piva village where they dug in. Hamanoues men then began to use their new position to fire mortars and artillery into the marine perimeter. The next day, General Iwasa ordered two battalions to attack the position supported by a mortar barrage. However the swamp land on either side of the trail prevented proper flanking maneuvers so the Japanese were forced into a frontal attack. Companies E and F easily repelled the attack receiving aid from the 3rd raiders. The Americans formed a horseshoe defensive formation connecting the roadblock to the main perimeter. The new position was reinforced with mortars from the 9th marines and some light tanks of the 3rd tank battalion. The Japanese suffered heavy casualties for their efforts. E and F company then attempted flanking maneuvers through the treacherous swamps and did manage to hit the Japanese. The heavy fighting eventually resulted in a stalemate and both sides pulled back. The marines had 8 deaths and 27 wounded while it is estimated the Japanese had 125 deaths. On November 9th Major General Roy Geiger arrived at Bougainville to take command of the 1st Marine amphibious corps. Turnage now turned his attention to clearing the Piva Trail as it could threaten the building of the planned airstrips. He ordered the 2nd battalion, 9th marines led by Lt Colonel Roert Cushman into a support position and two raider battalions to clear the trail. Beginning at 7:30am on the 9th, artillery of the 12th marines began to pound the area as the Raiders advanced forward through the narrow trail between the two swamps. Some Japanese had survived the artillery bombardment and began moving 25 yards within the marines position. The raiders ran directly into them beginning a firefight. The action saw a series of thrusts and counter thrusts at point blank range. The Japanese were trying to breakthrough the marine defenses just as the raiders were coming up to smash them. It was fierce fighting and Private 1st Class Henry Gurke of the 3rd raiders was maning one of the tow man foxholes in the forefront that met the attack. To protect his partner Private 1st class Donald Probst firing with a BAR, Gurke pushed Prost aside and tossed himself over a grenade that was thrown into their foxhole. Gurke was killed, saving his friend. Probst would receive a Silver Star Medal and Gurke posthumously received the Medal of Honor. As the brawl raged on Colonel Craig sent in his reserves to check a flanking maneuver right of the roadblock. The marines gradually overcome Iwasa’s men causing them to pull back again to Piva village. By midafternoon, the Marines reached the junction of the Piva and Numa Numa trails and would dig in for the night. The marines suffered 12 dead and 30 wounded, while patrols would counter over 140 dead Japanese bodies. If accurate this meant the Japanese had suffered 500 casualties during this four-day combined counteroffensive. To strengthen their new position, bombers from Munda began bombing the 50 yard area on either side of the Piva trail going as far north as Piva village. Afterwards the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 9th marines settled into new defensive position along the Numa-Numa trail and began tossing patrols forward. Meanwhile Turnage and Geiger were seeing the arrival of the first echelon of General Beightlers 37th division. Wilkinsons transports landed the 148th regiment, 5715 troops and 3160 tons of supplies. In response Kusaka tossed 15 Kates and 60 zeros to try and hit the transports during the afternoon. They managed to land a hit on the transport Fuller, killing 5 men and wounding 20, but ultimately it did nothing much. The beach situation had improved a bit, so the 129th and 145th regiments, some 10,277 men were beginning to land alongside 8500 tons of supplies between november 11th and 12th. Im sure by hearing these numbers for the landings you are already realizing how dramatically things had shifted for the allies in the Pacific. There was no way for Japan to challenge such landings at this point, the Americans were simply out producing them in every imaginable way.  Admiral Halsey now sought to smash Rabaul again on the 11th. He planned to launch a three pronged air raid. Sherman’s and Montgomery's carriers from the south and General Kenney’s bombers from New Guinea. Yet terrible weather hit New Guinea as it typically dose, preventing Kenney’s aircraft from participating. Thus the carriers would go it alone. Sherman launched his aircraft in the vicinity of Green island 225 miles from Rabaul. Shermans aircraft ran into 68 Zeros over the harbor. The bombers tried to hit the already damaged heavy cruisers Chokai and Maya, but missed. However within the inner harbor was the light cruisers Agano, and single torpedo landed a critical hit, blowing off a large portion of her stern, flooding her engine room. Montgomery launched his aircraft 160 miles southeast of Rabaul. Essex and Bunker Hill tossed 80 aircraft each, Independence tossed 25 and 24 additional Corsairs came to provide CAP. Lt Commander James Vose led 33 Curtiss SB2C Helldivers, the new dive bomber replacing the Dauntless throughout the fleet. The Naganami was hit by a torpedo and forced to be towed into the harbor. The Suzunami was hit by a dive bomb attack and would sink near the entrance to Rabauls harbor. Strafing from the fighters and bombers inflicted additional damage against light cruiser Yubari; and destroyers Urakaze and Umikaze. 6 zeros were also shot down. While Shermans pilots had managed to withdraw from their raid using rain squalls, Montgomery’s group would not be so lucky. Admiral Kusaka responded to the raids by launching one of the largest anti-carrier strikes of the War. The wave consisted of 11 G4M bombers, 27 D3A dive bombers, 14 B5N torpedo bombers and 67 Zeros. Despite radar alerts of the incoming air strike, Montgomery decided to get his aircraft aloft and perhaps carry out another strike. Montgomery was confident in his CAP and his task force was operating a new carrier formation. The carriers were grouped together rather than separated, forming a triangle in a 2000 yard circle with 9 destroyers spaced around evenly around 4000 yards. They would also be utilizing new anti-aircraft fuses. The Japanese pounced on the task force in a battle that would last 45 minutes. The CAP engaged the zeros while the Japanese bombers tried to hit the carriers. Bunker Hill suffered 5 near misses, one one puncturing the hull of the Essec in a number of places. Independence received 4 near misses. It was minor damage and it came at the cost of 2 zeros, 14 kates and 24 vals, absolutely terrible for the Japanese. The action did however stop Montgomery from launching a second strike. In just a week Kusaka had lost 43 zeros out of 82; 38 vals out of 45; 34 kates out of 40; 6 D4Y Susui “comets” out of 6 and 86 pilots out of 192. Such losses were absolutely crushing. Admiral Koga would be forced into a terrible situation later with the invasion of the Gilberts due to a shortage of aircraft. Koga was forced to pull out his surviving carrier planes from Rabaul and replace them with inferior planes and pilots from the Marshalls. But that's it for Bougainville for we are now traveling back to the China theater.  At dusk on November 2nd, General Yokoyam began his offensive into the Changde area. His 39th division advanced southwest of Yidu, followed by the 13th division headed to Nanmu; the 3rd division with the Sasaki detachment headed for Wanjiachangzhen; and the 68th and 116th divisions plus the Toda Detachment attacked the Anxiang. After routing some smaller forces out of the way, the 13th and 3rd divisions attacked the 79th army along the Nanmu-Wangjiachangzhen line on november 5th, while the 116th and 68th divisions hit the 44th army near Anxiang. Commander of the 10th army group, Lt General Wang Jingjiu assembled the 66th army at Niajiahezhen and ordered Major General Wang Jiaben to resist the enemy at all costs. The Chinese were absolutely crushed by the two Japanese divisions and were forced to retreat towards Moshi with the Japanese in hot pursuit.  Meanwhile the 116th and 68th divisions hit both flanks of Anxiang breaking General Wang Zuanxu’s lines held by the 29th army. Zuanxu had to order a withdrawal and from that point the 116th pursued the 44th army towards Jinshi where they annihilated a small part of the unit. To the north on November the 9th the Miyawaki Detachment was advancing to Nanmu and the Sasaki detachment to Xinguanzhen, white the 3rd and 13th divisions were catching up to the 79th army in the Moshi area. The 13th division attacked Moshi while the 3rd division attacked Xinmin. During this battle the 79th army was effectively destroyed as a fighting force. After this, Yokoyama ordered the 3rd division and Sasaki detachment to attack Shimen where the 73rd army was defending. Yokoyama also ordered the 116th division to attack Chongyang and for the 68th division to advance by river towards Hanshou. This was all done in preparation for the upcoming attack against Changde, being defended by Major General Wang Yaowu’s 74th and 100th armies. On November 14th, the Japanese offensive hit Shiman, seeing the defeat of the 73rd army in just two days. On the 19th, the second phase of the offensive began with the 3rd division joining up with the 116th to attack Chongyang. Simultaneously, the 13th division and Sasaki detachment began an occupation of Tzuli. On the 21st the assault of Chongyang began seeing the 51st and 58th divisions of the 74th army crushed. From Chongyang the Japanese forces immediately began an advance towards Changde. The 13th division met tough resistance from the remnants of the 29th army group led by Wang Zuangxu. The Chinese were able to utilize the mountainous terrain to their benefit hitting the Japanese with artillery. The 68th division defeated the 100th army at Hanshou and then annihilated its remaining survivors around Junshanpuzhen. This left only Major General Yu Chengwan’s 57th division defending Changde.  Unbeknownst to Yokoyama, General Xue Yue had dispatched reinforcements led by Lt Generals Li Yutang and Ou Zhen to try and halt the Japanese offensive. By November 23rd, Yokoyama’s assault on Changde began. The 3rd, 68th and 116th divisions surrounded the city. Two days later the 30,000 Japanese began attacking Yu Chengwan’s brave 8300 defenders. The defenders were hit with artillery and aerial bombardment. With each attack the Chinese were pushed back little by little until they only held 300 meters around their main command post. Yu Chengwan’s only hope was to hold on until the reinforcements arrived to try and make a breakthrough, but by December the 1st the 3rd and 68th divisions performed a pincer attack defeating them. On December 2nd, Yu Chengwan was forced to evacuate the city. Changde fell on the 3rd of December and Yokoyama celebrated the success by ordering chemical and biological units to attack cities in the region. Whenever the Japanese found too much resistance they had Unit 516 deploy chemical weapons in liquid or gas forms including mustard gas, lewisite, cyanic acid gas and phosgene. Some of the weaponry was still in experimental stages. Artillery was used to launch shells filled with the gas into cities inflicting massive civilian casualties. Most of the artillery shells contained mustard gas and lewisite. The effect of the chemical weapons caused massive panic to both humans and livestock. Its alleged bubonic plague was also deployed and spread within a 36 km radius of Changde city. It is estimated 300,000 civilians would be killed in Changde alone, alongside 50,000 soldiers. The Japanese began to withdraw on December 9th, but by this time Ou Zhen launched a counteroffensive and managed to reclaim the city. By December 24th, the 11th Army returned to their original positions, for the Japanese it was another hit and run offensive, aimed to cause massive death. The Japanese suffered 1274 deaths and 2977 wounded, though these are their claims and they most likely lost more. The Chinese estimated 14,000 had died with 10,000 being captured.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Japanese counteroffensive against the Marine beachhead on Bougainville was not going according to plan. Admiral Halsey gave Rabaul another crushing air raid and now the Japanese air power in the pacific was dwindling dangerously. Within China the horror of Japan and their chemical and biological units continued. 

  Last time we spoke about the invasion of the Treasury Islands. The time had come to begin operations against Bougainville, but in order to do so the allies had a few tricks up their sleeves. In order to make sure the landings at Cape Torokina at Empress Augusta Bay went safely, the allies would perform raids against Choiseul and the Treasury islands. It was hoped such actions would work as a diversion and confused the Japanese as to where the real operations were aimed. The landing on Mono saw some New Zealanders and Americans annihilate a 200 strong Japanese garrison. On Choiseul Paratroopers boldly raided a force 6 times larger than them. The raid was a success and thanks to John F Kennedy the Paratroopers were grabbed off the island before the Japanese could obliterate them. In the end the landings at Cape Torokina were a success and now a battle would be unleashed.  This episode is the battle of Empress Augusta Bay Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  So last time we covered the planning behind Operation Cherryblossom, the landings at Cape Torokina. As a means of confusing the enemy, the allies also chose to invade the Treasury islands and raided Choiseul. With Operation Cherryblossom in full swing, so begins the Bougainville campaign which we are going to be diving into now. At the end of October, after successfully invading the Treasury islands and the extremely bold attack upon Choiseul where the Paratroopers were outnumbered 6-1, combined with General Kenny’s 5th air force and AirSols neutralizing Rabaul and nearly every airfield on Bougainville, the landings at Cape Torokina were finally launched. In a final act to aid operation cherryblossom, Admiral Sherman’s Task force 38 departed Espiritu Santo on October 28th and Admiral Merrills Task Force did the same from Florida island on November 1st. They hoped to rendezvous near the Buka Passage three days later so they could prepare an attack against the Buka and Bonis airfields.  During the morning of November 1st, Admiral Merrill’s cruisers arrived to their station and began firing upon the arifields. Then Sherman’s carriers arrived off Buka passage to launch two separate air strikes. The first airstrike consisting of eighteen fighters, fifteen dive bombers, and eleven torpedo bombers hit Buka just after daylight. The second consisting of fourteen fighters, twenty-one dive bombers, and eleven torpedo bombers hit Buka again at midmorning. The airstrikes managed to shoot up a number of small ships within the harbor. Meanwhile after firing 2700 5 and 6 inch shells all over Buka and Bonis’s airfields, Merrils task force 39 departed the Shortlands to bombard Poporang, Ballalo and Faisi.  On November 2nd, Sherman performed air strikes against Buka and Bonis’s fields before departing south for Guadalcanal. Within those two days the Americans estimated they had destroyed around 30 aircraft and several small ships at the cost of 11 aircraft lost. The attacks had rendered the two Japanese airfields closest to Empress Augusta Bay basically unusable for when the landings would be made. The Japanese were now convinced that any invasion of Bougainville would have to be countered with all the aircraft and ships available within the southern theater. Yet they could not concentrate their entire naval and air forces against the Solomons, because the American and Australian forces on New Guinea would most likely be performing a landing on New Britain at any moment. Admiral Koga also expected the Americans to attempt a landing in the Gilbert or Marshalls. Thus the two pronged allied strategy was serving to freeze the Japanese army units within the New Guinea and Solomon areas.  Meanwhile Admiral Wilkinson’s task force 31 were making final preparations for transport the 3rd Marine division. The amphibious assault would be facing a landing area defended by roughly 270 men. Once they overcame them, a defense perimeter would have to be hastily made because it was certain the Japanese commander on Bougainville would hammer them hard. General Vandergrift's plan was to land the 3rd and 9th marine regiments of Colonel George McHenry and Colonel Edward Craig and the 2nd raider battalion of Lt Colonel Joseph McCaffery abreast on 11 designated beaches covering a distance of 8000 or so yards. The 3rd raider battalion lt be Lt colonel Fred Beans would land at the same time on Puruata island to overcome an estimated 70 Japanese defenders there. Wilkinson wanted to land the forces abreast as quickly as possible and to have the transport unload the supplies off the bay by nightfall because he expected a rapid Japanese response, similar to what had occurred at Savo island.  On October 28th, General Turnage’s men departed the New Hebrides in 20 combat transports and cargo ships commanded by Commodore Lawrence Reifsnider. The convoy proceeded using different routes, hoping to prevent the Japanese from discovering the size of their force, the three transport divisions would rendezvous with Wilkinsons destroyers by October 31st. Once linked up they would approach Bougainville under the cover of naval PBYs and Liberators. During the morning of November 1st, Minesweepers led by the destroyer Wadsworth were sent in to clear mines from the landing areas and to determine how dangerous the shoals were. The minesweepers found no mines, but did find plenty of uncharted shoals. Wadsworth radar confirmed that Cape Torokina’s position within their naval charts was misplaced. Wadsworth had a number of tasks ahead of her. In addition to helping with the fire support at a range of around 3000 yards, she was to use her radar to confirm the actual location of Cape Torokina, Puruata island and the landing beaches. The coast of Bougainville had been chartered by the German Admiralty in 1890. The Germans had placed Cape Torokina and Mutupina Point around 9 miles southwest of their actual locations. Thankfully the submarine USS Guardfish reported that the air force and naval charts had misplaced Cape Torokina by around 7 miles and this is why Wadsworth was sent to investigate. Unsexy logistical stuff, but gravely important, as you don't want to waste any time during an amphibious landing searching for a lost beach. Wilkinson decided not the land the men until after daylight when it was possible to detect the offshore shoals. Shortly before sunrise, the minesweepers and destroyers began their bombardment. The Sigourney and Wadsworth fired at ranges of 13,000 yards upon Puruata Island, while the Terry bombarded closer to the shore of Cape Torokina. As each transport passed the cape, they fired 3 inch anti-aircraft guns hoping to hit Japanese positions or at least minimize their artillery. By 6:45am the transports began arriving off the beaches around 3000 yards from the shore. At 7:10am the LCVP’s began taking men ashore. Simultaneously Wilkinsons destroyers began systematically bombarding the perimeter while 31 bombers from New Georgia bombed and strafed the landing areas. Within a few minutes around 7500 troops, roughly half of the total force were scrambling ashore and unloading with great speed and smoothness. The preliminary bombardment had failed however to smash the well concealed Japanese machine gun nests located on the southern beaches. These machine gun nests unleashed their lead upon the landing craft. The landing craft bearing a third of the force had immediately come under fire from Puruata island and some pillboxes on Cape Torokina. The 3rd raiders in particular were hit by machine gun fire from Puruata. Around 4 land craft were sunk from this, 10 others were badly damaged, over 70 men would be lost in the process.  The 9th marines landed themselves on 5 beaches to the north and were lucky to find little resistance from the Japanese. Once ashore they sorted themselves out quickly and began to move inland to discover the terrain was a nightmare. The beaches where they were led straight into some impassable swamp land. Nevertheless where there is a will there is a way, the marines began using fallen logs and debris to traverse the swamp until they came across some solid ground. By midmorning they would establish a narrow perimeter and began patrolling the greater area. They would establish a strong outpost on the Laruma River by 1pm. The boat crews were experienced a lot of issues with the high surf, combined with a lock of experience amongst them. Some of the LCVPS found themselves smashing into another, some dropped their men in deep water, some did not lower their ramps properly and the marines were forced to toss themselves over the sides into waist deep water. More than 30 landing craft were wrecked during the initial phase of the operation. Around 64 LCVPS and 22 LCMS were beached, many with damage beyond repair.  The 3rd marines and 2nd raiders would have a hell of a time landing. The 3rd marines landing south of the Koromokina river, they had no issues with shoals, nor the high surf, but they had landed directly in front of the main Japanese defenses. There was roughly 300 Japanese, but they did not have permanent defenses along the beaches of Yellow 2, Blue 2, and Blue 3. As the 3rd marines landed they began fighting with some Japanese killing many and sending them fleeing into the Jungle. Patrols were quickly organized who worked alongside the 2nd raiders patrols to fan out. The raiders upon landing found tougher resistance in the form of a reinforced platoon operating out of two bunkers and trenches located 30 yards inland. Once the raiders had blasted out the bunkers, the remaining Japanese began to retreat into the jungle. Like the 9th marines they would find swamp lands ahead of Yellow 1 making it difficult to advance. By midmorning the raiders reached the Buretoni Mission Trail. The main Japanese resistance hit the men who landed at Blue 1, just adjacent to Cape Torokina. There the Japanese had constructed 25 large and small log and earthen pillboxes around the perimeter of the cape. There were trenches connecting the pillboxes, some of the larger pillboxes measuring 6 feet by 6 feet, containing 75mm field guns. Each pillbox was covered by earth and camouflaged using jungle plants. Only 3 pillboxes had been hit by the naval and aerial bombardments prior to the landings. When the Americans hit the beaches in the area they immediately were forced to charge into the enemy bunkers. The Japanese 75 mm gun at Cape Torokina caused havoc upon the attackers. It was a well placed log and sand bunker and its approaches were protected by two smaller bunkers with a series of trenches manned by numerous Japanese. Sergeant Robert Owens of A company, 3rd marines grabbed 4 marines and charged the two small bunkers directly upon the mouths of some machine guns. The marines entered an emplacement through a fire port and drove the gun crew out. The surrounded trenches concentrated their fire on the brave marines, Sergeant Owns would be found later dead riddled with bullets. He was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for the action. Lt Colonel Joseph McCaffery was immediately mortally struck four times in the chest as he led the marines forward, he was replaced temporarily by Major Alan Shapley for the 2nd raiders. Despite the horrible losses the Americans cleared the Japanese positions and pushed further inland to pursue and kill the fleeing defenders. It is worthy to mention over 24 Doberman Pinschers, the official dog of the USMC between 1943-1945 from the 1st marine dog platoon proved invaluable during this point of the battle. The dogs were able to point out hidden snipers concealed in underbrushed. 549 War dogs would return from the war with only 4 not being able to return to civilian life, all very good boys. The 3rd raiders landing at Puruta had nearly all their boats shot at, but it was mostly small machine gun fire and did little to no damage. The Japanese had 3 or 4 deep well sandbagged emplacement on the seaward side where their machine guns nests fired upon the raiders. It took the raiders two hours upon landing to secure their beachhead around125 yards inland. Beans committed his reserves early in the afternoon, supported by some 75mm guns borrowed from the 9th marines, they moved halfway across the island, encountering sporadic Japanese sniper fire. The Japanese were outnumbered, by 3:30pm their resistance all but ended. The marines suffered 5 deaths and 32 wounded, around 29 dead Japanese would be found. They estimated another 70 Japanese escaped to Bougainville.  Soon after all the landing craft began to pull out, the Japanese began launching air strikes. For around two hours the transports and supply ships were zigzagging for their lives to evade dive bombers and fighters coming from Rabaul. The first air strike consisted of 9 Vals and 44 Zeros, they hit at around 7:35am almost immediately after the landings were made. General Twinning’s 8 Kittyhawks and 8 P-38s managed to fight them off, downing 7 Japanese aircraft. The Wedsworth received a near miss during the battle. 10 minutes later, AirSols beat off another attack taking down another 8 Japanese aircraft. During the last attack, roughly 70 Japanese aircraft came in around 1pm and were met by 34 AirSols fighters. After all three attacked, the Japanese has used around 120 aircraft and lost 26, inflicting no serious damage to allied ships nor the marines ashore. But the air attacks did result in major delays for the unloading of supplies for some hours. To try and speed up the unloading process, Wilkinson stripped some men from the assault units to help unload cargo ashore. Additionally Wilkinson employed a method of light combat loading. It would take some days for the beaches to be fully sorted out, while the naval forces departed Empress Augusta Bay before nightfall to return to Guadalcanal. Thus 14,000 men and 6200 tons of supplies had been successfully placed ashore in 8 hours. By the end of the first day the marines had contested a ⅓ sector and reached their initial objectives, digging in uncomfortably for the night under torrential rain. The divisional perimeter was established by forward landing teams, who had very little to work with for maps. To the extreme left of the perimeter would be Company G of the 9th marines, who were in a vulnerable spot along the Lrauma river. Lucky for them the Japanese were quite disorganized and many were located southeast of Cape Torokina. At dusk there was only sporadic sniper fire directed at the ⅓ in the vicinity of the cape plantation and later an attack was made against the 2nd raiders at a roadblock they established along Mission Trail. General Turnage was now the official owner of a new lodgement on Bougainville. Generals Imamura and Hyakutake were quite slow to react to the landings. They sent the Iwasa detachment led by Major General Iwasa Shun, commanding the 6th infantry group. Backing him up would be the 1st and 3rd battalions of the 23rd regiment. Their first task was to hit the new enemy beachhead. As predicted by the allies, Admirals Kusaka and Samejima mustered every naval and aerial strength they had to try and smash the invaders. As part of Operation RO, Admiral Koga had sent over 250 aircraft from the 5 carriers of Admiral Ozawa’s air fleet. Koga specifically stated the bulk of these were only going to be loaned for a short time, obviously they would have to return to the main fleet. Well the invasion of Bougainville certainly upset the plans, the planes would not be coming back on schedule. As Admiral Fukudome SHigeri, Koga’s Chief of staff would later note “although the planes were not originally to be used in such offensive operations, we could not just stand by and not employ them." By midday on October the 31st, the Japanese had discovered the American task force that had departed Guadalcanal en route for Bougainville. The IJN were determined to interrupt the operation. Kusaka sent a cruiser-destroyer task force led by Vice admiral Omori Sentaro. Departing Rabual Omori had the two heavy cruisers, Myoko and Haguro; two light cruisers, Sendai and Nagara; and two destroyers. Now Omori was the commander of Cruiser division 5 of the Combined fleet, not of the 8th fleet. He just happened to be at Rabaul covering the movement of the 17th division at the time, he was given command of his division and the main strength of the 8th fleet. Omori sailed out at 3pm in the direction of the Shortland islands believing that to be the allied target. Poor weather hindered his force and his search planes failed to locate any allied ships. Thus by 9am on November the 1st he was on his way back to Rabaul. Yet right as his ships were turning around, suddenly they received reports that the Americans had hit the beaches of Cape Torokina. Omori was quickly reinforced with a destroyer squadron and a destroyer transport group consisting of the Amagiri, Fumizuki, Uzuki, Yunagi and Minazuki each carrying 200 troops of a 1000 special trained raider group of the 17th division. This was the 2nd mobile raiding units from the 2nd battalion, 54th regiment led by Major Miwa Mitsuhiro. They were going to perform a counter landing against the marines at Mutupino point near the village of Toroko, due south of the marine beachhead. Within 6 hours, Omoro departed once again to hit the enemy fleet, but he lacked a real battle plan. At 6:30pm Omori rendezvoused with the transports at the St. George channel and together they proceeded towards Bougainville. At 7:20 the convoy was spotted by an american bomber who dropped a bomb nearly hitting the Sendai. Based on this Omori knew the Americans knew he was coming so he concluded a counterlanding was far too dangerous. Instead he decided to send the slower destroyer transports back to Rabaul. Omori believed the enemy transports were still in Empress Augusta Bay, thus if he could sneak in and destroy them, the marines would be stuck on the island without much of their supplies and without hope of quick rescue.  Meanwhile Merrills task force 39 had retired to the vicinity of Vella Lavella, but soon received news of Omori’s incoming convoy. Halsey had to order his only naval force in the area to go out once again to protect the beachhead and intercept the enemy. Merrills crews had been at it for more than 24 hours by this point and were quite exhausted. Now Merrill’s force went in very cautiously, because they were aware the Japanese would be outgunning them and of course the IJN held the dreaded long lance torpedoes. Thus Merrill chose to detach his destroyers who would go out in front to see if they could intercept Omori’s forces before the long lances could be put to use. He intended to take the fight to the west of Empress Augusta Bay where he could block the enemy from the beachhead. He had his leading destroyers 3 miles ahead and deployed his forces along a north-south axis with the cruisers in the center, maintaining a range of 19,000 yards or more from the deadly IJN destroyers and their feared long lances. His plan was to exploit the offensive capabilities of his destroyers by letting them unleash their attacks before he would have his cruisers unleash their 6 inch guns. He hoped his destroyers would be able to sneak into range and hit the Japanese destroyers before they could launch their torpedo salvos. Omori was at a disadvantage intelligence wise, he had no idea about Merrills forces whereabouts. Moreover he had to rely on spotter planes because he was forewarned their radar would give away their location to the enemy if used. As Omori would later tell interrogators  “We had some modified aircraft radar sets in action but they were unreliable. I do not know whether the sets or operators were poor, but I did not have confidence in them.” Thus he had no idea of the position or size of the American flotilla, still he believed the enemy transports were in the bay, though in reality they would be nearly 40 miles south. Omori still lacking any real battle plan arrayed his force in three columns with his two heavy cruisers Myoko and Haguro in the center; Ijuins screen of light cruiser Sendai; and destroyers Shiratsuyu, Samidare and Shigure to the left and rear admiral Osugi Morikazu’s screen of light cruiser Agano; and destroyers Wakatsuki, Hatsukaze and Naganami. As the Japanese approached the area, task force 39 were sailing 20 miles west of the beachhead. Merrills flagship Montpelier was the first to make radar contact with the enemy at 2:30 on November 2nd. Omori’s fleet was 35,900 yards out. Merrill’s changed his course to head due north then reversed south with his cruisers to find a favorable position to try and cross Omori’s T. Merrill sent Commander Bernard Austins destroyed out to hit the Japanese southern flank while Captain Burke was ordered to take an intercept course that would force the Japanese to be in a vulnerable position for the destroyers to launch torpedoes into their left flank. At 2:45am a Japanese aircraft finally spotted the Americans and began dropping flares over them to allowed the light cruiser Sendai to lead the northern column over. However by this point it was all but too late for the Japanese. Burke had closed in on their left flank and launched 25 torpedoes at Ijuin’s column. After launching the torpedoes Burke had his ships separate and it would be an hour before they could all be gathered again to form a full circle and return to their firing positions. The battle would be very chaotic, the US destroyers experienced a hard time trying to maintain contact with each other and several times would fire upon each other by accident. All 25 torpedoes would miss, because Omori ordered his ships to make a hard right turn. At 2:50 the Samidare launched a full salvo of 8 torpedoes which missed their main targets but a single torpedo managed to hit the destroyer USS Foote blowing up a large part of her stern. Cruiser Cleveland and destroyer Spence would accidentally run into each other doing light damage trying to avoid the damaged Foote. Merrill could no longer wait for the results of the destroyer attacks and ordered his cruisers to open fire at 2:50am. Merrills cruisers would unleash a continuous fire using their 6 inch guns while maintaining a coordinated figure 8 pattern to confuse the enemy and avoid torpedoes. The tactic had been very well rehearsed and the commanders were perfectly in tune with another. James Fahey, a sailor aboard Merrill’s flagship Montpelier, described the long night illuminated by lightning, flares, star shells, and muzzle flashes. “The big eight inch salvos, throwing up great geysers of water, were hitting very close to us. Our force fired star shells in front of the Jap warships so that our destroyers could attack with torpedoes. It was like putting a bright light in front of your eyes in the dark. It was impossible to see. The noise from our guns was deafening.” The Sendai was the first to be hit taking a 6 inch shell to her rudder before it exploded near her boiler rooms. Sendai experienced a series of explosions and quickly sank. The destroyers Samidare and Shiratsuyu behind the Sendai collided with another trying to evade the naval gunfire and would end up taking positions around the stricken Sendai already sinking by this point. Merrill then shifted the focus to the other two Japanese columns forcing Osugi’s column to head west running across Omori’s cruisers. The Hatsukaze tried to move between two heavy cruisers and collided with the Omori’s flagship Myoko at 3:07. Hatsukaze was so crippled by the collision she was much easier to hit as a result was found by Burkes reformed 45th destroyer division by 5:30am and 5 of the destroyers proceeded to batter her with shells until she sank at 5:40am. The Myoko meanwhile was hit by 6 shells, but fortunately for her 4 of them were duds, not causing enough damage to slow down the flagship. Next the USS Spence and Thatcher ran into another, but were able to carry on the fight. Both sides were having trouble running into each other, Merrills cruisers performing the 8 pattern at high speed allowed them to evade most gunfire. At 3:20 Omori opened fire with his heavy armament, both torpedoes and naval gunfire from his cruisers. The torpedoes missed, but 3 dud shells hit Denver into her forward section, causing water to slow the ship down. The other cruisers were forced to slow their speed to match her. Light cruisers Columbia received a 8 inch shell hit, luckily it also failed to explode. The Japanese fire was becoming heavier and more accurate forcing Merrill to respond with a smoke screen in front of his cruisers. Merrill made sure to keep his distance from the Japanese. When their range closed in on 13,000 yards at 326 am he ordered a 180 degree turn to the north. The radical maneuvering by Merrills cruisers made it extremely difficult to accurately fire upon them, but also for Merrills cruisers to hit Omori’s. At 3:30am Omori decided to retire in the mistaken belief that his Long Lances had sunk or heavily damaged Merrill’s cruisers. Omori had received a false report claiming “one torpedo hit on leading US cruiser, two torpedo hits on second US cruiser, two torpedo hits on third US cruiser. Shell fire also reported on US Force.” In the meantime Burkes destroyers had re-entered the fray of battle and began firing upon the doomed Sendai. After they pursued the Shiratsuyu and Samidare but both destroyers got extremely lucky when Commander Austin confused Burke into believing that the ship he saw turning northwards was actually the Spence. By 4:00am the Sendai was sinking taking with her 185 crew. Ijuin and 311 other survivors would later be rescued on November 3rd by Submarine RO-104. The Hatsukaze would be the last to sink at 5:40am. As dawn was breaking, Merrill urgently called for all available fighters to come to his aid as he expected the Japanese to toss the kitchen sink of air forces at him. Just before 8am a formation of 80 Zeros and 18 dive bombers arrived and began attacking his cruisers desperately performing anti-aircraft maneuvers. The allied aircraft were delayed by bad weather resulting in only 8 Hellcats, 1 marine corsair, 3 P-38s and 4 New Zealander P40s showing up. The allied pilots would claim to down 16 Japanese aircraft, though in reality it would only be 8. Merrills forces performing a defensive circular cordon would claim to down 17 further Japanese aircraft. The Japanese managed two hits, one causing minor damage to the USS Montpelier. The Japanese had lost their chance to stop the invasion of Bougainville. Merrills handling of the battle, particularly his figure 8 maneuver, had negated the dreaded super weapon of the enemy, the Type 93 long lance torpedo. It was to be the last major surface engagement of the Solomons area. Halsey would later reflect on the Japanese attempt to hit the landing forces at Cape Torokina  “was the most desperate emergency that confronted me in my entire term as COMSOPAC (Commander South Pacific).” Commodore Reifsnider was ordered to bring his transports back to Cape Torokina to resume the unloading. The unloading of the cargo would be completed by 3pm. Vice admiral Omori’s force withdrew back to Rabaul. It was soon joined by four more cruisers and a number of destroyers from Truk. The reluctant Admiral Koga according to Admiral Fukudome decided to commit some of the very best units from the undamaged 2nd fleet “to cooperate with the carrier-based planes which had been sent from Vice-Admiral Ozawa’s fleet in order to check the [US] Bougainville operations.” 7 heavy cruisers, the Takao, Maya, Atago, Suzuya, Mogami, Chikuma, and Chokai; a light cruiser, the Noshiro; four destroyers; and a number of service ships would depart Truk on November 3. The once dominant IJN fleet so surely footed in the early days of the war now was hesitant and indecisive. Nevertheless, Koga would unleash another attack against Empress Augusta Bay. Koga placed the new naval force under Admiral Kurita who would attempt to intercept futher American forces enroute to Bougainville. On November 4th, Wilkinson would be bringing the 21st marines aboard 8 destroyer transports and 8 LSTs. 3548 men led by Colonel Evans Ames, alongside 5000 tons of supplies and equipment escorted by destroyers Waller, Saufley, Philip, Renshaw, Eaton and Sigourney.  Halsey received word of the new Japanese force and realized the situation was critical. If Halsey did not turn back the incoming threat, his forces on Bougainville would not receive their planned reinforcements. Halsey was thus ready to take a risk, he was going to send carriers. As Halsey would later write “perhaps the success of the South Pacific War, hung on it being stopped.”. Against conventional wisdom, that carriers should not be exposed to land-based aircraft attacks, he ordered Rear Admiral Sherman’s task force built around the USS Saratoga and Princeton to face a force of possibly 200 Japanese aircraft. The risks for Hasley were personal as well as professional “I sincerely expected both air groups to be cut to pieces and both carriers stricken, if not lost. (I tried not to remember my son Bill was aboard one of them), but we could not let the men at Tokorina be wiped out while we stood by and wrung our hands.” Halsey’s Chief of Staff, Admiral Carney, recalled that before making the decision to attack with his carriers, his commander “suddenly looked 150 years old.” Shermans task for now designated Task Group 50.4 consisted of carrier Saratoga; light carrier Princeton; and destroyers Stack, Sterett, Wilson, Izard, Conner, Bell, Charrette, Boyd, Bradford and Cowell. He would be supported by General Twinings AirSols in any way possible. Halsey also requested MacArthur allow Kenney’s 5th air force to join in on the battle. On November 5th, aided by some bad weather, a surprise air raid was performed against Rabaul. Sherman’s carrier force was 230 miles away from Rabaul near Cape Torokina when they began launching aircraft at 9am. The Saratoga launched 16 Avengers and 22 Dauntless. Princeton launched 7 Avengers. The carrier aircraft were escorted by 52 hellcats making a formation of 97 aircraft in all. This was their entire payload . The aircraft flew at a low level as they approached Rabaul anti-aircraft defenses by 10:20. They kept a tight formation, flying right through the flak which prevented the 70 Zeros from intercepting them properly. As we have seen during this series, the Japanese anti-aircraft guns were honestly pretty terrible. Added to this, the American aircraft enjoyed much better armor than their Japanese counterparts, particularly the Zero fighter. Commander Henry Caldwell led the bombers towards Blanche Bay where they peeled off at 14,500 feet. The Dauntless dive bombed the targets before them as the Avengers time their approaches to hit the same targets at the same time. Within just 30 minutes the attack absolutely devastated the Japanese plans. Heavy cruiser Maya was trying to leave the harbor during the attack but took a 500 lb bomb hit to her catapult area which set off a series of explosions, blowing up her engine rooms and causing heavy casualties. As Maya was left fully disabled, the Mogami managed to clear the harbor but took a torpedo hit. Her number 1 and 2 turrets were flooded, forcing her crews to scramble to put out fires.  The Atago suffered three very near misses, which damaged her hull, armament, and machinery.  The Takao took a bomb to her starboard side, damaging her hull and machinery. TheChikuma received only slight damage and was able to depart for Truk at 20:38. The Suzuya, which was just preparing for refueling, tried to evade and was only slightly damaged. Aside from this the other light cruisers and destroyers did not receive any damage. 70 sailors died aboard the Maya, 23  died aboard the Mogami, Takao and Atago. Captain George Chandler, a P-38 fighter pilot described how “There were B-24 bombers up high and B-25 bombers attacking right down on the deck dropping ‘frag’ bombs on the airplanes along the runways … we did our best work at high altitude, but we also took part in combat a thousand feet off the ground.” Taking advantage of Hasleys daring attack, General Kenney sent 27 B-24’s and 67 P-38s to bomb the warehouse area on the western side of the harbor. They were challenged by only 15 Zero’s who would lose two in the process. The Japanese facilities were wrecked by the attack. The Americans lost 5 bombers and 5 fighters while taking down 11 Zeros. The cautious Admiral Mineichi Koga withdrew his forces back to Truk. The Japanese Naval threat to the invasion of Bougainville was ended. A Japanese naval officer later admitted that they had given up on Bougainville mainly because of “the serious damage received by several Second Fleet cruisers at Rabaul by carrier attack …” The success of the raid on Rabaul left Halsey ecstatic. “It is real music to me and opens the stops for a funeral dirge for Tojo’s Rabaul.” Sherman grabbed all of his returning places expecting a Japanese counterstrike. A Japanese scout plane discovered Sherman’s task force around midafternoon and Kusaka immediately dispatched eighteen torpedo bombers after the Americans. At around dusk the Japanese discovered what they believed to be the task force and attacked. Although they later claimed a great air victory, in reality they hit at an LCI and a PT boat escorting an LCT back from Cape Torokina. A torpedo lodged in the engine room of the LCI and killed one man. That was the extent of the damage to the "task force." In return, the Japanese lost one plane. It was hardly an even exchange, and no compensation at all for the havoc wreaked earlier upon the 2nd Fleet. Halsey yet again showed what a formidable and aggressive commander he could be, his gamble paid off greatly. The Americans had secured their naval superiority in the South Pacific and it would remain that way for the rest of the war. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Admiral Merrill performed an excellent battle against a larger IJN force. Admiral Hasley lived up to his reputation, he performed a bold gamble and it paid off big time. Now the Americans would dominate the South Pacific for the rest of the Pacific War.  

Last time we spoke about the defense of Finschhafen. Finschhafen was a enormous staging camp for the allies now. The Japanese could not sit idly by allowing such a strategic location to be in allied hands. General Katagiri launched a major counter offensive, kicked off with signal fires from Sattelberg. He sent a force of raiders to try and neutralise some heavy allied artillery, but it ended in failure. Having not neutralised their big guns, the rest of the counter offensive fell to pieces.  The Japanese would officially report 422 killed, 662 wounded. For the Australians they had 228 casualties of which 49 were dead. With the counter offensive done with, the allies now would go back on the offensive. The next large target was going to be the stronghold of sattelberg, but the Japanese were not going to make it easy on the allies. But today we are going to be jumping into some new places. This episode is the invasion of the treasury islands Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  For quite some time now we have been focusing on the New Guinea campaign, such as the offensives against Finschhafen and the Ramu valley. Today we are going to enter a new phase of the Pacific War. With the incoming invasions of the Gilbert and Marshall islands, the Northern Solomons and Western New Britain, General Douglas MacArthur and Admirals Hasley and Nimitz were going to turn up the heat. Admiral Halsey had just seized Vila, Barakoma, Munda and Rendova, gaining their valuable airfields for the forces of General Twinings AirSols to utilise. Within the central Solomons, Bougainville was finally within range of allied land-based aircraft. Lae, Salamaua and Finschhafen were taken, thus Operation Cartwheel would begin a new phase. Back in July, plans were formed for General Vandegrifts 1st Marine Amphibious corps to seize airfields sites at Buin and Kahili, the important Japanese anchorage at Tonolei Harbor, and the Faisi and Ballale islands in the neighboring Shortlands. That same month, the 43rd and 37th divisions were involved in the New Georgia campaign. Of the 5 divisions remaining under his control, Admiral Halsey planned to use the fresh and unblooded 3rd Marine division and the Army’s 25th division for the invasion. He sought to keep the 2nd marine division and 3rd new zealand division in training for the conquest of Rabaul. Yet things had changed. Because of the intense resistance on New Georgia, the 25th division had to be committed. Then the decision to strike Makin and Tarawa in the Gilbert islands removed the 2nd marine division from Hasley’s south pacific area. These changes ultimately dictated he would need a substitution, and it was to be the 37th division, whom had suffered 1100 casualties on New Georgia already. Nevertheless the 37th was in better condition than the 25th. The 3rd marine divisions task went unchanged. Major General Allen Turnage’s 3rd Marine division was going to spearhead the invasion of Bougainville, with a launch date set for September. On top of this Halsey had received some reports indicating the Japanese were heavily reinforcing the Shortland Islands. He decided to bypass them and hit the Treasury island and Choiseul. It is also possible Halsey sought to perform these actions hoping to lure out the Japanese fleet into a major engagement. The treasury islands and Choiseul were lightly garrisoned, but held airfields that could be turned against Bougainville. Meanwhile , General MacArthur was planning the next stepping stone towards the Philippines. His overall plan was to break the Bismarcks Barrier through a series of aggressive leaps along the New Guinea-Mindanao axis. New Guinea as we are all quite familiar with by now, is a logistical nightmare. Lush jungles, raging rivers, cold mountains, every time of geographical nightmare was present. Thus to traverse the western landmass of it only on land was not exactly desired. What MacArthur’s logistical team sought was to secure the 50 mile expanse of sea lying between New Guinea and New Britain. With that in hand Admiral Barbey’s 7th Amphibious force would be able to transport troops along the coast, a significantly easier method than having the poor boys battle through the jungle. Rooke Island split the sea into the Vitiaz Strait and the narrower Dampier Strait. General Wootten’s 9th Australian division were currently fighting for control of Vitiaz, but there had been no effort to date to hit the Dampier. MacArthur decided to capture Kavieng and the Admiralty Islands, because they represented enemy aerial threats against his westwards push through New Guinea. Closing in on the end of the year he also planned to amphibious assault Cape Gloucester, the northwestern point of New Britain which commanded the Dampier Strait. In hindsight the wisdom of landing at Cape Gloucester seems rather dubious. It was not necessary to seize the point in order to make use of the Vitiaz or Dampier strait. The Japanese did not have big artillery on the western end of New Britain to command the channel, the islands infrastructure was largely undeveloped. The only way the Japanese could interfere with the allied use of either strait was by torpedo boats, something they did not have many of. There of course was aircraft based on New Britain as well, but that would be neutralised by Kenney’s AirSols.  MacArthur planned to have the AirSols hit Rabaul continuously; to seize the Green Islands, the Admiralty Islands and Kavieng. The Western New Britain operation was codenamed Operation Dexterity which would be sub divided into Operations Lazaretto and Backhander. There would be a staggered attack first hitting Gasmata performed by the 2nd battalion, 228th regiment. They would establish an air base in the southern coast of the island, this was operation Lazaretto. Operation Backhander would be the invasion of Cape Gloucester. Some of the landings could be carried out in November, but MacArthur chose to wait until the new airfields were established in the Markham and Ramu valleys as they would provide close air support for the amphibious operations.  On September the 10th, Admiral Hasley sent staff to present his plan for the invasion to Bougainville to MacArthur’s staff. Halsey would be surprised to find MacArthur opposed using all their aircraft to strike Rabaul before the invasion of western New Britain. MacArthur proposed instead to continue heavy airstrikes against all Japanese airfields on Bougainville throughout October. Then in late October, Halsey’s forces could occupy the Treasury islands and possibly northern Choiseul. Northern Choiseul could provide radar coverage and PT boat bases. On the 1st of November, Halsey’s forces could then begin landing on Bougainville to form a beachhead before constructing a new airfield to host the AirSols so they could hit Rabaul just in time to take some pressure off MacArthur's troops advancing in New Guinea and New Britain. Thus MacArthur was determined to make the main goal of the operation not the securance over the entirety of Bougainville, but just a portion of it where an aerodrome could be established then used to batter Rabaul. Halsey was presented two options for his landing site: there was Kieta Harbor sitting on the northeast coast and Empress Augusta Bay on the southwest coast. Kieta seemed the better location from which to launch air strikes against Rabaul. Kieta also held a protected harbor, requiring Halsey’s forces to move up the longer outside passage to secure Choiseul first. Empress Augusta Bay was on an exposed side of the island during an approaching monsoon season. It was closer to Rabaul and would only require the securing of the Treasury islands first. After further reconnaissance there was indications airfields could be constructed midway up the west coast of Bougainville at Cape Torokina on Empress Augusta Bay. Halsey chose it for the landing site stating on September 22nd “it’s Torokina. Now get on your horses!”  The operation against Cape Torokina was codenamed Cherryblossom and its task was handed to the hero of Guadalcanal, General Vandegrift who formed the plans but it would not be he who lead the operation. Vandegrit was promoted to commandant of the Marines, the first serving marine to become a four star general, he had to depart for Washington. His replacement was Major General Charles Barrett the former commander of the 3rd Marine division. Barret was given command of the 1st Marine Amphibious corps and the responsibility over operation Cherryblossom. His mission statement read “land in the vicinity of Cape Torokina, seize and occupy and defend a beachhead including Torata Island and adjacent island— 3,750 yards west of Cape Torokina—allowing approximately 2,250 yards inland from the beach and 3,600 yards east of Cape Torokina. To prepare and continue the attack in coordination with the 37th Infantry on arrival.” However the mission statement was to be his last major contribution to the war.  On October 8th Barrett accidentally fell from the third floor of the officers quarters at Noumea and suffered a cerebral haemorrhage. He soon died afterwards and was recorded as an accidental death, but there was heavy speculation it was in fact a suicide. Thus the job fell to Major General Roy Geiger, the director of the marine aviation corp in washington. For the naval aspect of the mission Hasley had to do with what he had on hand. He would not be receiving any significant naval reinforcements, because Admiral Nimitz feared that any vessels lent to the 3rd fleet would not be able to come back in time to help with the invasion of the Gilberts. What Halsey could count on was task force 38 commanded by Rear Admiral Frederick Sherman built around carrier Saratoga and later joined by the Princeton; Admiral Merrills task for 39 comprised of cruiser division 12 and destroyer division 23; and Task force 31 commanded by Admiral Wilkinson consisting of three destroyer squadrons, transports and covering ships. It would be Admiral Wilkinson who would bring over the 3rd marine division, the 1st brigade and 3rd New Zealand division to invade the Treasury islands. Rear Admiral George Fort would take the reigns of the first offensive and Wilkinson would looked over the Torokina landings. Wilkinson would have 12 Attack transports and Amphibious cargo ships for the landings, just enough to get every echelon with their equipment over. The 3rd Marine division was reinforced with the 3rd marine defence battalion, the 198th coast artillery, the 2nd provisional marine raider regiment and the 1st marine parachute regiment. After landing at Cape Torokina they would later be reinforced by General Beightlers 37th division. The 29th, 34th and 36th New Zealander battalions of the 8th brigade group led by Brigadier Robert Row would hit the Treasury islands and help establish long range radar stations and a landing craft staging area. There was a final last minute change to the overall plan made by Halsey. They decided not to attempt seizing northern Choiseul but to instead send a marine raiding party around 656-725 men of the US 2nd Parachute battalion led by Lt Colonel Victor Krulak there to persuade the Japanese to divert forces to Choiseul from southern Bougainville.   To support the operation General Kenny’s 5th air force would smash the airfields in Rabaul while the AirSols 489 aircraft would hit airfields in and around Bougainville. General Twinning tactics were to harass the Japanese every day, so he launched a total of 158 flights in October, comprising 3259 sorties and land and naval targets in Hahili, Kara, Ballale, Buka, Bonis and Choiseul. The result of this incredible air campaign was 5 Japanese airfields pulverized, 136 enemy aircraft claimed destroyed at the cost of 26 allied aircraft shot down. Meanwhile on October 12th, Kenney launched a raid using 349 aircraft smashing airstrips, shipping and supply dumps. The 6000-ton IJN transport Keisho Maru was sunk alongside two smaller craft. On the 18th 54 B-25’s took off from Dobodura, but only caused minor damage. On October the 23rd, 24th and 25th daylight raids consisting of 45 B-242’s, 62 B-25’s and 61 B-24’s respectively managed to shoot down 9 enemy planes, destroyed 25 aircraft on the ground and damaged another 27. On October 29th, he tossed a raid at Vunakanau’s airdrome using 41 liberators covered by 75 P-38’s and managed to destroy around 10 aircraft. The enemies attention was certainly diverted away from Rabaul. Now the Japanese knew an invasion of Bougainville was coming. They believed the main target of such an offensive would be first against the Shortlands or Kahili. General Kanda’s 6th division was deployed to reinforce these places. His 1st battalion, 45th regiment was placed at Kieta, the rd battalion and 4th south sea garrison was sent to reinforce Bougainville while the rest were sent to the Shortland islands. Bougainville was given north/south/east/west sectors garrisoned by numerous forces under Kanda. Admiral Koga also launched Operation RO, a plan devised to strengthen Rabaul. Koga’s intelligence indicated the Pacific Fleet was on a warpath, so he decided to take the entire combined fleet from Truk to Eniwetok, which Koga considered a good advance position where he could sortie and annihilate the enemy in a decisive naval battle. The combined fleet stayed a week in the uncomfortable and lonely lagoon until they departed having not found the allied pacific fleet. By October 24th the combined fleet travelled back to Truk while the aircrews of carriers Zuikaku, Shokaku and Zuiho reinforced Rabaul.  82 Zeros, 45 D3As, 40 B5Ns and 6 Yokosuka D4Y reconnaissance planes. 192 trained air crews in total would be in Rabaul by November 1st. They were just in time to intercept one of Kenney’s raids consisting of 75 b-25’s and 80 p-38s. The Japanese airmen claimed to have downed 9 B-25s, 10 P-38s at the cost of 20 aircraft and 3 small vessels. Koga alerted the 12th air fleet who were in Japan to prepare to head over to Rabaul, but instead of also sending the 8th fleet, he kept them back, still thinking a decisive naval battle would be on the menu soon in the central pacific.  General Sakai’s 17th division were transported to New Britain in late september. Their first echelon comprising of the 53rd regiment arrived on october 5th and immediately began to move west to reinforce Cape Gloucester and the 3rd battalion went to northern Bougainville. The remainder of the 17th division would arrive between November 5th and 12th, though the auxiliary cruiser Kurita Maru caring the 1st battalion, 81st regiment was sunk by the USS Grayson. 1087 men, most of the battalion, were lost.  The invasion of the Treasuries codenamed Operation Goodtime. They would establish a staging area, an advanced naval base at Blanche Harbor and a radar station on the north coast of Mono Island. It was hoped the assault on the Treasuries would confused the Japanese as to where the major effort would actually be. At this time there was a short supply of assault forces throughout the Pacific and the Bougainville invasion was mere days away. Thus it was difficult to comprehend why an entire brigade would be used to subdue a tiny enemy garrison on one small island. It has been theorised that Halsey and Vandegrift were reluctant to use some untried New Zealand troops in the more ambitious undertaking, but were also under pressure from their Anzac allies to see some action. For whatever reason the Treasury island operation would be one of the few examples of Allied overkill during the mid Pacific War.  The 8th Brigade had limited shipping available to them. They would have eight destroyer transports, eight LCIs, two LSTs, eight LCMs, three LCTs and two APCs, under the command of Admiral Fort who was using the USS Raton as his flagship. The 34th battalion was going to land on the north side of Stirling Island to secure a nearby airfield; the 29th and 36th battalions would land abreast near Falami Point on southern Mono and Major George Logan D company of the 34th, designated Logan force would land at the mouth of the Soanotalu River to establish a radar station with the help of 20 seabees. The USS Pringle and Philip would perform a bombardment to help. The operation was set into motion on October 27th when the convoy departed guadalcanal and the Russells. George Fort’s destroyers approached Blanche Harbor during a storm and began their bombardment. The assault waves raced through the harbor in two columns. As was suspected the 34th met zero resistance, they immediately went to work sending out patrols to make certain if there were any Japanese on the island they would not get to surprise them. Mortars were set up on the nearby Watson island, cool theres an island bearing my name to support the landings on Mono. The landings on Mono met very little resistance, basically just a bunch of surprised Japanese naval troops who offered some half hearted gunfire before withdrawing. The New Zealanders went to work establishing a perimeter as the Japanese began opening fire using mortars which managed to knock out two LST’s killing 2 and wounding 30 men. Interesting to note this was the first amphibious assault launched by Kiwi’s since the horrible Gallipoli campaign of 1916 and it was the second combat operation undertaken by Kiwi’s during the Pacific War. The real resistance would come in the form of a air raid consisting of 25 vals who bombed the beachhead and support ships. The destroyers Cony  took two hits; eight crewmen were killed and ten wounded. An allied fighter patrol managed to shoot down 12 vals during the raid. To their north, the Logan force faced no difficult landing at the mouth of the Soanotalu river. They quickly formed a 150 yard perimeter and began working on the radar station. By the end of the day, all but one LST had successfully unloaded and cleared Blanche harbor, however during the night the New Zealanders tossed back numerous counter attacks, particular around the Saveke river. By the 28th the Japanese survivors were retreating north in the hope of escaping to Bougainville, but along the way they ran into the Logan Force. On October 29th during the late afternoon, 20 Japanese attacked the western part of the Logan Forces perimeter. They were easily beaten off with mortars and rifle fire, leaving 5 dead Japanese behind. The next day saw some intermittent firing against concealed Japanese. Scouts eventually figured out there was a larger number of Japanese to the west of the perimeter, but the area between Soanotalu and Malasi was clear of the enemy.  November began with the rest of the brigade coming over. The radar station was already up and running and the Logan Force had built themselves a small blockhouse near the landing barge. That said blockhouse immediately became the objective of the Japanese, since it represented the only hope of them escaping the island. As Brigadier Row’s men began to occupy the central and northern parts of Mono, the Japanese began to infiltrate the Logan Forces perimeter. On the night of November 1st, the main breech was made across the News Zealanders line. A ton of Japanese had infiltrated the lines and managed to cut telephone wires from the blockhouse to the company HQ. Soon after this was accomplished a concerted attack was made against the blockhouse. 6 New Zealanders and 3 Americans defended it. They had automatic weapons, some 50 and 30 cal machine guns, but they were soon put out of action by the attacking Japanese who could have numbered between 70-100 men. The fight for the blockhouse would continue until dawn, with the surviving defenders beating off numerous attacks, mainly by tossing grenades. Captain Kirk, Sergeant DD Hannafin were both killed during the fight. Command of the blockhouse then fell to a cook of D Company, Private J.E Smith. By daybreak the Japanese finally were beaten off as the 3 remaining survivors were all wounded. 26 Japanese had been killed trying to overrun the blockhouse and seize the landing craft. Elsewhere across the perimeter the Japanese attacked throughout the night seeing another 15 dead Japanese in the western section and 9 in the east. It was to be there best chance at taking the blockhouse, for the next few days their attacks were much smaller and by November 4th, New Zealander patrols were fanning out and killing or capturing stragglers. The last significant action on Mono would be on November 6th when a dozen Japanese were routed from a cave during a two hour firefight east of Soanatalu. Operation Goodtime resulted in the annihilation of a Japanese garrison roughly 200 men strong, but it came at a cost. 40 New Zealanders and 12 Americans were killed with 174 wounded. The allies got their supply bases and radar station. Over on Choiseul, Operation Blissful was about to kick off. In an attempt to make the Japanese believe the Shortland islands were the target for their offensive, General Vandegrift tossed Lt Colonel Victor Krulaks 2nd Parachute battalion, roughly 656 men at a beach near the village of Voza. On October 27th the men and their equipment were loaded onto 8 LCMS and during the night the paratroopers were transferred over to four destroyer transports, the Kilty, Ward, Crosby and McKean, the same ships that had just been used to transport the New Zealanders for Operation Goodtime. Forts destroyers provided escort as the Paramarine landed at Voza shortly after midnight without any resistance. During the morning of the 28th they began unloading supplies from landing crafts that had been concealed on a smaller island offshore. Once landed they carried them up a narrow trail leading from the beach a mile northwest of Voza upon some high ground which would be their first base camp. Nearly a hundred friendly natives helped the marines carry the equipment up the beach and they also helped guide the men. Allied radio broadcasting finally alerted the Japanese to the imminent danger to southern Bougainville as Krulaks men began establishing their perimeter. The morning of the 29th brought an enemy strafing attack upon them and the native guides reported to Krulak that there was a barge staging base at Sangigai, the main Japanese position on Choiseul bay, garrisoned by around 150 men. Krulak decided that was to be the first objective, he sent out patrols going north and south. In the north Lt Averill with the help of native guides discover considerable evidence of the Japanese presence, abandoned equipment and rations, but no Japanese. In the south two patrols scouted the Japanese base near Sangigai. Krulak led one of the patrols personally and managed to surprise some Japanese who were unloading a barge. They killed 7 Japanese and sunk the barge before pulling out. The other patrol group ran into a Japanese platoon and got into a skirmish seeing another 7 dead Japanese. Thus Krulak got his confirmation there indeed was a Japanese base at Sangigai.  Early on the 30th, Krulak requested an air strike at it arrived at 6am. 12 Avengers with 26 fighter escorts hit Sangigai. Unfortunately some of the planes mistook the marines at Voza for the enemy and strafed them as well. No marines were killed but one of their boats was sunk, that Krulak had planned to use. As a result of the boat getting sunk, Companies E and 5 departed Voza overland to hit Sangigai. A Japanese outpost along the Vagara river opened fire on the paratroopers, but was easily overwhelmed. Krulak then divided his forces to perform a two pronged assault. Company E led by Captain Robert Manchester would advance along the coastline to hit the Japanese from the north, while Krulak with Company F would move inland to hit them from the rear.  Company E quickly advanced along the coast and began shelling the town with mortars and rockets during the afternoon, only to find out it was abandoned. The Japanese had taken up a new position on some high grounder in the interior. So the paramarines began destroying and looting the village. Meanwhile company F were advancing through rough terrain to try and secure some high ground near Sangigai where the retreating Japanese were just passing through. The Japanese literally walked right into F company and a hour long fight broke out. The Japanese outnumbered F company and as Krulak would later report “the outcome appeared to be in question, until the Japs destroyed their chances by an uncoordinated banzai charge which was badly cut up by our machine guns. Seventy-two Japs were killed and an undetermined number wounded. Marine losses were 6 killed, 1 missing and 12 wounded." The marines had 6 deaths, 12 wounded and one man missing. Krulak was wounded as well as F companies commander Spencer Pratt. The Japanese suffered a devastating 72 casualties Back over at E company after plundering the village they came across some documents  and Krulak reported "The one that fascinated me, it was a chart that portrayed the minefields around southern Bougainville. When I reported this, the night after the Sangigai attack, I saw my first flash message. I had never seen one before. It came back and said, "Transmit at once the coordinates of the limits of the minefields and all channels as shown going through it." So we laboriously encoded the critical locations and sent them off. To an armada going into that area this is not incidental information. This is necessary information. Halsey in true Halsey fashion was not satisfied to know where the minefields were; he, before the Torokina landings, sent in a minelayer there and dropped mines in the entrance ways to those channels and they got two Japanese ships.” E company then retired to the Vagara river and was later evacuated by boat back to the Voza area. F company followed suite but was delayed by the heavy engagement they had. The men stayed to bury their dead. The friendly natives reported a Japanese concentration to the north near the Warrior River, so Krulak sent a strong patrol up by boat to check it out. On November 1, the large patrol of 87 paratroopers from Company G,  led by Major Warner Bigger, headed north by landing craft towards Nukiki with orders "destroy the southern outposts of CHOISEUL BAY, and if possible to shell the Jap supply depot on GUPPY ISLAND." Major Bigger began an overland march along the eastern bank of the river and after crossing the warrior, their native guides became lost so they all had to bivouac for the night. In the early morning of November 2nd, Biggers men found themselves surrounded by Japanese who began infiltrating their perimeter from the rear. Bigger had the men continue north along the beach where the surprise attacked a small enemy outpost of 4 men. They managed to kill 3 of 4, but the last man ran away, thus the element of surprise was gone. Bigger knew the jig was up he could not hope to attack the main objective so instead he ordered the men to go shell Guppy island.  G Company setup some 60mm mortars in the water and fired 143 rounds at the island setting up two large fires, one looked to have hit a fuel dump. The Japanese were taken by surprise there and only offered resistance in the form of some poorly directed machine gun bursts. On the way back G company had to fight their way through because of the infiltrators. Krulak was notified of the situation and alerted a PT boat base at Vella Lavella. Lt Arthur Berndtson had 5 PT boats under his command there, 2 were already assigned to other missions, another was under repair. PT 59 only had ⅓ tanks worth of fuel, but her commander, Lt John F Kennedy, yes he is back in action, agreed to rescue the boys. Kennedy believed he had enough fuel to get to Choiseul and another boat could tow them back to base. Despite overheating the engines, at around 9:30 PT 59 escorted a small convoy to Voza and Bigger’s men were off loaded. The PT-59 ran out of fuel on the return trip down the slot and was towed back to Lambu Lambu Cove. By this point the landings at Cape Torokina had been carried out, so a diversion was not really needed anymore. Furthermore the Japanese were moving in on the base camp from all directions. On the night of November 3rd, just in the nick of time, 3 LCIs from Vella Lavella arrived to successfully load Krulaks paratroopers and got them out of there before dawn of the 4th. The Paratroopers had been outnumbered 6-1. They managed to kill an estimated 143 Japanese, destroyed a major staging base at Sangigai, sunk two barges and destroyed a considerable amount of enemy fuel and supplies on Guppy island. The cost was 13 dead and 13 wounded. Krulaks after action report mentioned evidence that the Japanese had sent reinforcements from the Shortland islands to counter the Choiseul operation. On November 1st, the day of the Cape Torokina landings, the Japanese had sent a large bomer force south to Choiseul hunting a reported Task Force. The Japanese found nothing, and by the time they diverted back to Empress Augusta Bay, the landings were done, American fighters were ready to deal with them. It seems the Japanese had been greatly confused from all the activity around Bougainville, particularly from many intercepted messages. Its hard to say how successful the Choiseul raid actually was. It’s possible the Japanese fell for the diversion, but no one really knows. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The diversionary raids may or may not have had an effect on the landings at Cape Torokina. Regardless the multiple operations were all successful and the Japanese seemed none the wiser. Now the stranglehold over Bougainville would begin.

Last time we spoke about the ongoing operations around Finschhafen. The Japanese had technically lost Finschhafen in a rather quick fashion when the allies landed, but they had not given it up. General Katagiri was preparing a massive counter offensive against the allies while a large defensive effort was made at Sattelberg. Meanwhile the Australians and Americans had underestimated what it would take to secure the region and required time to reinforce themselves. Some ground was still gained and much patrolling was done, but the real battle for Finschhafen was just about to be let loose. We also spoke about the terrible situation in Bengal where a man made famine was not only hurting the people of Bengal but also bolstering the Free India Movement, led by Subhas Chandra Bose. Today we are going to continue these stories and more! This episode is the defense of Finschhafen  Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    Episode 100, oh my god how time flies by! Just wanted to say a huge thanks from myself and KNG for continuing to listen to me ramble on, you guys are awesome. We are going back to Finschhafen, which was described by Australian Historian Garth Pratten "to be one of the largest bases in the Southwest Pacific Area". Its certainly a true statement, Finschhafen would act as an enormous staging camp with a divisional capacity, a wharf for LSTs, several airfields and fuel dumps. General Wootten’s 9th division had finally arrived to help bolster Brigadier Windeyer’s 20th Brigade, just in time to meet the increasing Japanese attacks. Simultaneously General Katagiri managed to bring the bulk of his 20th division to Sattelberg and was now ready to unleash his strong counteroffensive. Katagiri’s officials orders read "After dusk on X Oct, the main strength of 79th Infantry Regiment will attack the enemy in Arndt Point area from the north side. The assault boat Butai will penetrate through the north coast of Arndt Point on the night of X-day. Instructions to this "Boat Penetration Tai" were that "ammunition dumps, artillery positions, tanks, enemy H.Q., moored boats, barracks, etc. should be selected as objectives". "X-day," will be decided on X-minus-1-day at 2200 hrs and a fire will be seen for 20 minutes on the Sattelberg heights. When the fire is seen answer back at a suitable spot (by fires)."  Katagiri’s plan was for the Yamada detachment to perform a surprise attack against Jivevaneng while the 79th regiment led by Colonel Hayashida Kaneki would attack in the direction of Katika with three companies of the 2nd battalion and another company of the 3rd battalion kept in reserve, while the rest attacked Scarlet beach in the northern part of Arndt Point. Additionally the 2nd battalion, 26th field artillery regiment and two companies of the 1st battalion, 79th regiment would perform a diversionary attack north of the Song river against Bonga, and the 10th company of the 79th regiment would join a detachment of engineers with explosive and demolition charges to make a seaborne attack against Scarlet Beach.  This unit was called the "Boat Penetration Force", under Lieutenant Sugino, the commander of 10 Company. The counteroffensive was set to kick off on October 16th with the signal being a large fire lit at sattelberg. Now Wootten was aware there was something big coming, but he was unsure the direction of the offensive. Australian intelligence believed the enemy would counterattack towards Finschhafen airfield, Langemak bay or perhaps both. So Windeyer was ordered to coordinate the defense of Langemak Bay while Brigadier Evans would command the defenses of scarlet beach. On October 15th, a patrol of the 2/28th managed to capture a Japanese officer’s satchel in the wareo-Gusika area, containing a copy of Katagiri’s operation order for the offensive. The document was readily translated and reported back to Wootten. The Australian eyes were thus all turned west towards Sattelberg. Wootten instructed everyone "All units whose location permits will establish lookouts to report immediately… the lighting of any fires at night on Sattelberg heights and any answering fires.” Wotten believed that October 16th had to be X day and wondered why there was no sign yet of the diversion attack from the north. Wootten reaffirmed his orders to Evans to hold the site at Wareo at all costs as he believed the enemy would be advancing through there. Unbeknownst to Wootten, the bulk of the 79th regiment had already begun infiltrating the Katika track and the Yamada detachment were in position to hit Jivevaneng. Just before dawn on the 16th, the Japanese counteroffensive kicked off, as 3 companies of the 3rd battalion, 80th regiment launched their attack against the 2/17th battalions positions. The 2/17th were taken completely by surprise as many Japanese had crawled within 20 yards of their battalions HQ sitting on the eastern edge of Jivevaneng. Most of the attacks wre beaten back by components of Major Maclarns HQ company as well as the battalion HQ staff. For 2 hours after 7:30am the main track and positions occupied by a platoon of machine gunners and one mortar crew were subjected to sever shelling from a 70mm and 75 mm gun. The day would see 4 major attacks against the defensive positions, but all would be repulsed. At 3:15pm the battalion HQ was heavily damaged by mortar fire and grenades from cup dischargers. They suffered 19 casualties including 5 deaths. Yamada had also sent a small decoy unit of 150 men who raised cooking smoke in front of Kumawa trying to ruse the enemy over and prevent reinforcements going to Jivevaneng. Meanwhile the 79th regiment infiltrated the widely dispersed companies of the 2/3rd Pioneer battalion and the 155 man Boat Penetration force of Lt Sugino departed Nambariwa at dusk in four barges, successfully repulsing the interference of enemy PT boats on the way. General Adachu wrote of these actions in great detail  "The above units, having received orders to prepare to attack the enemy's rear by boat in connection with the division's operations to annihilate the force which has landed north of Finschhafen, undertook intensive training for about 20 days under command of company commander 1st-Lieutenant Sugino at Nambariwa base. The men all awaited the appointed day firm in their belief of certain victory. On 16th October 1943, at the time of the attack by the division's main strength to annihilate the enemy north of Katika, the unit received orders to penetrate the shore south of the mouth of the Song River. After drinking the sake graciously presented to the divisional commander by the Emperor, the unit vowed anew its determination to do or die and departed from the base boldly at dusk on the same day. Repulsing the interference of enemy PT boats on the way, the unit arrived at the designated point at 0230 hours on the 17th.” As night time came, so did torrential rain. The Australians anxiously watched sattelberg for the signal fire to emerge. It seemed impossible for a large fire to be lit with such rain, but a company of the 22nd battalion over at Logaweng reported seeing a large fire emerge on Sattelberg’s crest at around 8:30pm. Unfortunately this report failed to reach the divisional HQ. None the less the Australians expected a seaborne attack at any minute. At 3:15 am on October 17th a heavy Japanese bombing raid hit Heldsbach and Arndt point. 66 bombs were dropped over the course of two hours, producing little damage and few casualties. At 3:55am Australian coastwatcher Captain D. C Siekmann at Gusika reported seeing 4 Japanese barges heading south. Nearly an hour later another 3 barges hiding in rain squalls approached Scarlet beach. Evans prepared his 2/43rd and 2/28th battalions for battle. At 4:10am the barges were approaching the north end of Scarlet Beach as companies A and D of the 2/28th, Captain Harris’s 10th light anti-aircraft battery, a detachment of the 2/28th anti-tank platoon and a detachment of the 532nd EBSR were sitting on Bofor guns, two pounders, 37mm and Browning .50 caliber waiting for them. When the barge were 50 yards from the shore the Bofors were the first to light them up followed by the rest. However the Bofors were aimed to high to effectively fire on the barges allowing 2 barges to hit the beach. The 37mm, small arms and .50 Brownings fired upon the Sugino’s raiders. Meanwhile Private Nahan Van Noy withheld two flamethrower units to wait for the enemy to approach. The Japanese came surging out of their barges tossing grenades and as they closed in, Van Noys flamethrowers jumped up and fired upon them. The flamethrowers stopped the Japanese charge in its tracks as the Brownings cut them to pieces. Van Noy’s legs were nearly blown off by multiple grenade hits. Sugino’s raiders were pinned downed in the mayhem but they continued to lob grenades in the cover of darkness. The grenade onslaught destroyed 3 anti aircraft guns, 4 fields guns, two ammunition deports, two machine guns and two pom-pom automatic cannons and numerous small arms. As light began to emerge the Japanese were becoming more and more exposed so Sugino ordered the men to crawl north along the split across the Song. 40 Japanese dead littered the beaches out of an estimated 100 who landed. 60 managed to escape north, but 24 of them would be killed by hunters of the 2/43rd battalion later. The raiders had not been able to disable the allied guns, but much akin to how pilots exaggerate their kills, so to did the raiders. General Adachi wrote in his report  “Defying fierce artillery crossfire, the troops landed from the boats immediately. Taking up positions indicated beforehand the three platoons advanced in columns in different directions. The infantry and engineers advanced as one body creeping through the jungle. They annihilated the panic-stricken enemy everywhere, and achieved glorious and distinguished success. They killed more than 430 of the enemy, destroyed seven AA guns, five machine-cannons and MG's and five ammunition and supply dumps. Moreover they blew up the enemy headquarters and bivouac tents, thus destroying the center of command [these were in fact the tents of the casualty clearing station]. Raiding the area at will and with raging fury, they surprised and overwhelmed the enemy. By disrupting his command organization they established the foundation for the victory of the division's main strength. With the company commander as the nucleus, the entire group put forth a united effort and demonstrated the unique and peerless spiritual superiority of the Imperial Army… All those who fell severely wounded committed suicide by using hand grenades, and, of the total of 186 men, all except 58 became guardian spirits of their country.”   By the late morning, the Japanese had assembled around one mile west of Katika just behind the three Pioneer battalions, finally unleashing their attack directed at Lt Colonel Alfred Gallasch’s HQ. The Australians fought like lions, repelling 3 consecutive attacks before the enemy managed to capture a steep hill overlooking their entire position by nightfall. In the end the Pioneers HQ laden with the bulk of reserve ammunition and rations had to withdraw back towards Katika proper, leaving its dispersed companies behind enemy lines without a secure supply route. But Gallasch’s men’s determined efforts had gained valuable time for Brigadier Evans to redispose his forces and for General Morshead to call in the urgent movement of the 26th brigade to Finschhafen. Evans was forced to abandon the Bonga area so he could reinforce the Song river mouths area. Meanwhile Admiral barbey provided 14 LCI’s and 6 LST’s to carry the urgent reinforcements. Colonel Norman’s 2/28th were ordered to recapture the Pioneer HQ position in order to re-establish communications and a supply route to the now isolated companies.  The next morning, the Australians prepared their counterattack, but they were met with an attack against Katika and around the Siki creek. The Australians managed to repel the initial assaults thanks to artillery of the 2/12th regiment which Katagiri had no answer for as the Sugino raiders were supposed to have taken them out. However the Japanese soon gained momentum as Evans tried to strengthen Scarlet Beachs defenses by arranged a semicircle of infantry companies between the Song and Siki. By midday an Australian platoon led by Lt Wedgewood gained a position north of the Katika track who reported killing 33 Japanese and suffering 11 casualties in the process. Norman ordered Wedgewood to get his men out of there, but the platoon commander asked permission hold the position which he thought was critical. It seems Wedgewood was correct in his assessment, as his platoons little position on the track caused Hayashida to pause his attack. Meanwhile Katagiri launched his diversionary attack north of the Song at 3:30pm. This effectively held up the 2/43rd battalion over at North Hill. Simultaneously Hayashia ordered some troops to advance south of Siki Creek to try and outflank the 2/28th’s position and they remarkably made it all the way to Siki Cove doing so. This breakthrough threatened the entire Australian defensive position, effectively creating a wedge between the 24th and 20th brigades. Wootten ordered Evans to hold his lines at all cost, including at North Hill and between Scarlet beach to Siki Creek. The Japanese now threaten Scarlet beach from both the west and south, forcing Evans to order a withdrawal of the 2/28th from Katika. It was a controversial decision that would anger Wootten. Norman bitterly pulled out of his dominating position at Katika and likewise the gallant Wedgewood platoon were forced to depart their isolated forward position to maintain a tighter defensive perimeter around scarlet beach. Wootten then ordered half of the 2/13th to defend Heldsbach plantation and protect the supply area at Launch Jetty. To make sure to contain the threat, Wootten placed this unit directly under Windeyer and ordered him to move into the south bank of the Siki. Hayashida’s men found Katika abandoned by dusk and proceeded south of it to hit Heldsbach and then Finschhafen. Yet just in the nick of time, Windeyeres troops arrived to prevent the 79th regiment from crossing the creek during the night. Meanwhile the 80th regiment continued their assault against Jivevaneng. The assault was that of a static fight along the Sattelberg road and Kumawa track. Some infantrymen who fought there wrote this in their diaries "I eat potatoes and live in a hole, and cannot speak in a loud voice. I live the life of a mud rat or some similar creature.” Another diary read “What shall I eat to live? What has happened to the general attack… the enemy patrol is always wandering around day and night." A third diary read "Heard that [79th Regiment] has forced the enemy in the sector of Arndt Point to retreat. This is the first good news I have heard since I left for the front." The 2/17th were completely surrounded, the 80th regiment had effectively raised a siege of Jivevaneng. On the 18th the 2/17th’s diarist wrote this "this morning revealed that the enemy had cut the main Sattelberg Road to our east and was sitting astride the track". Japanese sniper rounds, mortars and grenades from cup discharges reigned hell upon the trapped defenders. With the enemy advancing along the Sattelberg road, Windeyer ordered the isolated Pioneer companies to hold the road in front of Zag. With so many allied units isolated behind enemy lines, emergency air drops of ammunition were flown by pilots of the No. 4 Squadron. On October 19th after repelling an enemy attack against Scarlet Beach, Colonel Norman moved in to hit back at Katika surprising the Japanese. aT 3:50pm Coppocks company of the 2/28th followed by two platoons charged Katika under artillery support. The Japanese defender were taken by complete surprise when the Australians hit them from the north, so quickly after losing the position. The battalion diaristwrote "Enemy… appear slightly peeved and evidently had not appreciated the possibility of our reoccupation of these positions.” The Japanese bitterly gave up the vital area and this was couple with a sudden unexpected Australian presence south of Siki. Hayashia in response had to reorganise his units. By nightfall Brigadier Whitehead’s 26th brigade reinforce with a tank squadron landed at Langemak Bay by midnight thanks to admiral barbey. The next morning, Norman ordered a company to dislodge the Japanese at Siki cove. At 8:38 am on the 20th, two platoons charged the cove and were met with japanese fire from a razorback to the south. By 9:26am the platoons became pinned down. Lt Wedgewoods platoon attempted an encirclement maneuver but was also pinned down. The Australians took too many casualties forcing Norman to withdraw them. Although the assault on Siki cove was unsuccessful, the Japanese machine gun positions were now located, so at 2:30pm some Vickers were placed forward to hit the cove. The 2/28th diaries wrote "This caused considerable retaliation by the enemy, and terrific fire-fight ensued causing mild panic amongst beach defense personnel who thought enemy were breaking through." Eventually the Japanese machine-guns were silenced, mainly by 3-inch mortar fire. Throughout the rest of the day the Australians repulsed a number of attacks on Katika and the Sattelberg road. After days of resisting tooth and nail, the isolated Pioneer companies along the Katika Track were forced to pull back towards the beach. At 9:15am a Boomerang dropped a message on the Pioneers stating "You will rejoin main body North Hill, Scarlet Beach or Zag. Suggest route crossing Song River moving along it to North Hill." Nearly an hour later another plan dropped 3 canister of ammunition, though the men had hoped for rations. The men buried their surplus ammunition and began marching single file north. The Pioneers had borne the brunt of the main attack, and their mere presence had caused concern for the advancing enemy. The Japanese counter attack halted just when Wootten received his 3rd brigade. He therefor believed the time was ripe to steal the initiative and issued orders to Whitehead and Evans to drive the enemy from Siki Creek, while the entire 2/13th would advance up the Sattelberg road to support the 2/17th. On October 21st, Hayashida’s battered forces prepared to abandon Siki cove retreating westwards. The 79th regiment had sustained huge losses, the men were exhausted, food was running low leaving many to live on a few potatoes. On the 22nd, reports came in that the Japanese could be seen withdrawing, prompting Norman to push further west of Katika while one of his other companies hit Siki Cove. During the afternoon, the Japanese launched a surprising counter attack against Katika, but were repulsed. Despite fighting them off, the Australians would be unable to advance further for the day. Katagiri then decided to reinforce Hayashia with two companies of the 1st battalion, 79th regiment trying to break the allies hold over Katika. On October 23rd, Evans men finally got some breathing space so they could reorganise the forces. The 2/43rd were ordered to hold the area from the coast through north Hill to the Song river while the 2/28th would hold the area from the Song going south 1000 yards and the 2/32nd would hold the Katika and Siki areas At this point the 79th regiment had suffered so many losses, Katagiri began to seriously consider calling off the counteroffensive. On the Katika front, the Australians reported numerous piles of Japanese dead, the 2/28th estimated 308 corpses were on the north side of the track alone. Hayashida continued his resolve and ordered attacks during the night, but none held any significant success. Morshead preparing to bring the 4th brigade over to Finschhafen and the American 808th engineer battalion would also land at Langemak bay. A constant stream of American units, vehicles and stores began to pour unto Dreger Harbour to construct new airfields. On the 24th, the Japanese would launch their last attacks west of Katika. While the Australians continue their advance. Wootten and Morshead visited the 24th brigade HQ and began lambasting Evans for his decision to abandon Katika. Evans was sure had had done the right thing pulling back to the perimeter around Scarlet Beach, but Wootten and Morsehead felt he had sacrifice vital ground for no reason. They argued the enemy had concentrated most of its attack on a continuous line which did not include Katika. Evans had neglected to keep up an adequate reserve, which could have been used to punch any Japanese force breaking through around Scarlet Beach. In the end it was Woottens prerogative as divisional commander to determine tactical objects and Evans duty to conform. It was not the first time Evans used his own judgement. For this Evans would be sacked by November 1st and replaced by Brigadier Selwyn Porter. Finally on October 25th, Katagiri ordered his battered men to concentrate at Sattelberg and reorganise for future counter offensive. For the next three days, the 24th and 26th brigades pushed forward their defensive perimeters, giving a depth of over 1200 yard inland from Scarlet beach and Katika. The Sattelberg road situation remained unchanged, with each side exerting pressure, but unable to shift the other. Katagiri’s counteroffensive had failed. The Australians estimated 679 Japanese had died, with many more killed by artillery and mortar fire. Wootten’s staff estimated the overall casualties for the Japanese to be around 1500. The Japanese would officially report 422 killed, 662 wounded. For the Australians they had 228 casualties of which 49 were dead. On October 28th, Wootten received the 4th brigade at Finschhafen and prepared a offensive against Sattelberg and Wareo yet again. This time Windeyers forces would regain full control over the Sattelberg road up to Jiveveaneng. The 2/13th advanced to Coconut Grove by October 29th in an effort to support the 2/17th as they attacked east of Jivevaneng. For the next few days the Australians pressed upon Jivevaneng with a series of assaults, but Yamada’s men held on tenaciously. By the end of the month, the 2/17th were suffering from sniping attacks, sickness and a precarious supply line. The battalions diarist wrote this “The battalion at present is rather uncomfortable owing to the almost incessant rain over the past 48 hours. This afternoon mist obscured the whole area and seriously hampered vision. Everyone presents rather sorry spectacle as we are now reduced to one set of clothing. A relief will be welcome when it arrives. The main Sattelberg Road has been cut now for 13 days but it is hoped that this situation will be rectified in the very near future.” On November 1st, the 2/17th and 2/13th resumed their attacks against the Japanese pocket, but were repelled each time suffering terrible casualties. On November 2nd, pandemonium broke out when the 2/13th fired all of their weapons for 15 minutes in a grand diversionary demonstration as the 2/17th successfully launched an attack taking a position north of the road, around 150 yards from the 2/13th. The enemy was now firmly wedged between them.  Also on November 2nd, it was expected the 20th and 26th brigades plus their tank squadron would relieve them. Wootten ordered WIndeyere to reopen the Sattelberg road so another fierce attack could occur. Just as this was about to happen, the Japanese were preparing to evacuate their pocket. Finally on November 3rd, after abandoning their positions, the road was opened and the vanguard of the 26th began to arrive and Windeyers battered men began to pull back. Meanwhile Whitehead assembled his forces along the Sattelberg road preparing for the new offensive. Wootten’s intention was for the 26th brigade to capture the high ground of Sattelberg-Palanko and to subsequently advance to the Gusika-Wareo line. He had 18 tanks to toss up the Sattelberg road and he stressed to all his men to conceal them until the attack occurred. He also sent advance patrols who discovered a number of the enemy had posts west of Jivevaneng, such as a prominent feature called Steeple Tree Hill. Brigadier Porter's 24th brigade patrols would also find Japanese defending Bonga and Pino Hill. General Adachi visited the frontlines in late October where he found most of Katagiri’s units had been reduced to below half strength and the division was suffering from supply difficulties. Despite this, Katagiri was confident his men could pull through and planned to gradually annihilate the enemy via a series of smaller limited attacks. Thus the 80th regiment would secure Sattelberg heights and the 79th would secure Nongora just in front of Wareo. Adachi also visited Kirai where the 51st division had just arrived. There he ordered Nakano to deploy his forces along the coast between Madang and Sio. The Japanese were going to make the road to sattelberg a road to hell. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Australian and Americans managed to thwart General Katagiri’s large counteroffensive against Finschhafen. It was some brutal fighting that greatly hurt the Japanese, now they were again on the defensive and the road to sattelberg would soon be covered in more blood.   

Last time we spoke about the end to the battle over Vella Lavella, the continued offensive against Finschhafen and some special operations. The Naval battle of Vella Lavella saw the last fight over the island and another successful evacuation. Over on New Guinea the fight for the Finschhafen area continued to rage on, but ultimately was crashing to a bit of a halt for the allies as they moved cautiously and awaited further reinforcements before taking the the fight to places like sattelberg. Then we spoke about some special operations to explode mines against enemy ships at Singapore harbor, a new network of coastwatchers 2.0 and the Japanese finally cracking down on poor little Portuguese held Macau. Some ships were blown up, some unfortunate souls were captured in Aitape and the Japanese basically made Macau a protectorate.  This episode is on to Shaggy Ridge Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    The Japanese had once entered the Southwest Pacific as conquerors, rapidly grabbed forward bases in places like New Britain, New Guinea and the Southern Solomon Islands. Yet now in 1943, they were being pushed back, their resources were shrinking and their troops morale was crashing. With the allies becoming stronger with each passing day, General Imamura and Admiral Kusaka had very little hope of emerging victorious in the coming battles. All either man could do was prepare the best possible defenses they could and hope for a miracle to delay the allied advance. General Nakai’s forces prepared to make a stand on the Finisterre range and General Katagiri prepared a counterattack against Finschhafen.  Over in New Guinea, General Vasey’s men were continuing their fight against Nakai in the Finisterre Range. Since their advance on October 9th, Colonel Bishop’s 2/27th battalion had dug in on Trevor’s ridge and John’s Knoll. Just after dawn on October 10th, a small enemy force charged up Trevor’s ridge. The small attack was beaten back, the battalions diarist wrote of the action “Tojo startled the early morning air with his usual heathen chorus, known to so many as a prelude to an attack; however, 13 Platoon showed him the error of his ways by killing two and wounding one of the six noisy intruders.” Meanwhile the bulk of the 2nd battalion, 78th regiment had pulled back to a place known as Shaggy Ridge which dominated the area around it. Shaggy Ridge stood 5600 feet tall with only a single track going along its ridge line. Lachlan Grant would describe the track "had places. . . only wide enough for one man to pass with sheer drops on either side". The Japanese had concentrated along the Faria river area seeking to unleash another counter attack. They just received reinforcements in the form of the 1st battalion, 78th regiment. Company 3 were sent to Gurumbu, Company 4 to Boganon, Companies 1 and 2 went to help out the 2nd battalion while one company began to attack Australian supply lines at Pallier’s hill. During the afternoon two Japanese artillery pieces began to open fire from the Faria river area at very close range. The first shell passed close to the top of Trevor’s Ridge, causing native carriers to freak out and disperse while the shell exploded thousands of yards father on. By 2pm Bombardier Leggo acting as F.O.O noticed the gun flash and launched a counter battery against it using a 25 pounder at a range of around 8000 yards. He successfully silence the mountains guns for awhile. The Japanese guns would fire later that afternoon at nearly point blank range, hitting the battalions area causing 8 casualties, but Leggo once again silence the guns. Meanwhile, Brigadier Dougherty ordered his 2/14th to hold a position at Kumbarum to support Bishop’s advance while Brigadier Eather ordered his 2/33rd battalion to mop up the Japanese out of the Boganon mountain area. The 2/3rd quickly advanced up a track going 4100 feet high into the Boganon mountains. At 5pm Kittyhawks strafed the Japanese positions at the crest of a ridge and a Boomerang dropped a message on the advancing men that told them the Japanese were in foxholes and trenches immediately over looking them. During the aerial attacks the Japanese tried to fire back using machine gun and rifles, but doing so apparently they did not see a forward company of the 2/33rd closing in on them. The 2/33rd crept up the ridge under the cover of darkness as the Japanese were unaware too busy during daylight hours focusing on the Kittyhawks. During the night the Australians surprise attacked the Japanese sending them into a flight, man men at first ran then got themselves together trying to fight but by that time the momentum was on the side of the Australians who soon seized the ridge. On October 10th, Vasey ordered his forces to patrol extensively. The 2/7th was patrolling the Kesawai area; the 2/2nd concentrating in the Faita area; the 2/16th went west of Bebei and the 2/27th patrolled around Trevor’s ridge towards the faria river. The 2/27th skirmished with the enemy who were defending their artillery positions. To the east of the Faria and Uria Rivers the 2/33rd were patrolling past the feature they just captured. Their patrols ran into ambushes and were forced to pull back. On October 11th, Japanese raiding parties attacked a supply line going between the 2/14th and 2/27th battalions forcing the former to send a platoon to seize Palliers Hill. A platoon of the 2/14th led by Lt Pallier. The were only able to advance up the hill in a single fill as most of it was to steep. At around 5 pm men atop the nearby Kings Hill supported them with artillery, mortars and machine guns. The support was so strong, Palliers platoon made it up the first mound without opposition. Upon the mound Pallier deployed a Bren gun and 2 inch mortars. Palliers men were surprised at the lack of enemy fire and rapidly made their way up Pallier’s Hill. As they got closer to the summit artillery stopped, leaving just mortars and machine gun fire support. The hill began even steeper and when they got within 20 yards of the Japanese their support fire ceased. The Japanese were about a company in strength and began firing everything they had. During the mayhem at a critical moment many Japanese raised their heads from their weapon pits and rolled grenades down on the Australians 20 feet below. Most of them rolled too far down doing no damage. The Australians began tossing their own grenades as they charged forward driving the enemy out. Lt Palliers platoon had attacked a Japanese company well entrenched in a seemingly impregnable position routing them it was outstanding. Despite the heavy support getting up the hill, the Japanese should have easily held their positions. Pallier lost 3 men dead and 5 wounded including himself while they killed an estimated 30 Japanese and captured vital ground to keep their supply line running. The capture of Palliers hill was of a great relief to Dougherty who watched the thing personally. Had the supply line been cut longer the 2/27th may have run out of ammunition and rations. Back over in the Finschhafen area, Brigadier Windeyer now realized he needed to seize Sattelberg in order to secure his gains. General Yamada continued his attacks against the most forward Australian position at Jivevaneng. At 6:15am on October the first the Japanese cut the telephone lines to the Australians forward positions and began probing their lines with attacks. The Japanese were driven off with 2 and 3 inch mortars while the Australians cautiously made their way up the Sattelberg road. They were about at quarter mile from their objective when the leading platoons leader, Lt Dost was shot dead. Lt Richardson took another platoon forward to investigate and was wounded by gunfire. By this point the defensive lines had repulsed numerous attacks. Both sides were taking heavy casualties, but the Japanese were failing to stop the advance. Still the 2/43rd were forced to dig in around 400 yards from their besieged company.  After the technical fall of Finschhafen, Windeyer assigned most of his brigade to defend the southern portion of it while the 2/17th advance north to capture Kumawa. Windeyer was realizing the dual tasks were simply too much for his meager forces but luckily for him, Generals Herring and Wootten held a meeting at Lae on September 30th, where they decided to reinforce him with General Heavy’s brigade. General Heavy’s men would secure Finschhafen and then perform an offensive against Sio. On October 1st General Blamey decided the time had come to give Herring a rest, he appointed Lt General Leslie Morseheads 2nd corps to take over the New Guinea offensives. On October 7th, Morshead arrived at Dobodura, Herring departed for Port Moresby and then Australia, he would never return to the front lines. It was supposed to be General Iven Mackay that would relieve Herring, but he ran into squabbles with General douglas macarthur over reinforcements for Finschhafen. The junior officers felt Mackay should have forced the issue and enlisted Blamey for help, but ultimately both were set aside for Lt General Sir Leslie Morshead. Prior, Mackay had convinced Blamey, that Herring was becoming increasingly difficult to work with as a result of stress and fatigue which led to Herrings relief. Blamey maintained his faith in Herring who would retain command of the 1st corps on the Atherton Tableland, where he could train his men in amphibious warfare for the next operation, but Herring’s period of active service was over. Herring had given able service in a high appointment through a year of fierce campaigning, he quite simply could use the rest. Herring assumed he would come back to relieve Morshead, but in February of 1944 he would be appointed Chief justice of the supreme court of Victoria instead. Back over at the front, the Australian commanders decided it was necessary to capture the Tami islands. The 2/32nd battalion departed Lae on October 2nd arriving off Wonam island. Major Mollard took command of the battalion and received another company called the “Denness Force” consisting of a rader detachment, pioneers, mortars, signals and a section of 6 .50 caliber machine guns, 2 LCMS and 14 LCV’s from the 52nd EBSR. When the men landed on Wonam island, they were greeted by 4 friendly natives waving their arms. An interpreter spoke to the natives who told him there were no Japanese on the islands. Then the natives took a few of the men with some paddling canoes around Kalal and Wonam islands showing them no Japanese. The natives were then rounded up, 74 in all and asked to help establish a radar station on Kalal. The natives had very little food because of the terror of bombers and strafers in the area, they had actually been living in some caves and dug out coral instead of their huts. Apparently they were treated very well and helped the work effort. It’s not said that often, but native populations made a huge difference in the pacific war. You keep hearing me say “native carriers” and such, war was literally thrust onto these people, most of whom were just going about their peaceful lives. The Japanese often showed brutality, its not as if it was 100%, but statistically the Americans or Australians in the Pacific were much more known to be favored by the natives, particularly in New Guinea.  Now the following day, the 2/17th departed Kolem on a extremely difficult route ironically named Easy Street, haha thinking of Negan from walking dead. Easy street went towards Kiasawa and then Kumawa. David Dexter described it as  "It was so steep and muddy that, on one occasion, two tractors were attached to one jeep but all were bogged." The Australians were surprised to see no enemy attacks against Jivevaneng at this time. The 2/43rd attempted an attack at 5:45 pm led by Lt Combe’s company. The Australians tried desperately to attack well-dug in enemy positions along a route the enemy knew better than them. Soon the company became pinned down and casualties were mounting. Combe was wounded when his Owen was shot out of his hand, he assessed the situation, 17 casualties with 6 deaths, so he ordered the men to pull back. The 2/43rd by this point had a total of 47 casualties, with 14 deaths and 5 missing. The 2/43rd had failed to break again, thus the decision was made to have their forces evacuated.   To the north, the 2nd battalion, 80th regiment had burst into the scene, advancing through Wareo and Gurika. Fearing the Japanese threat to Scarlet Beach, the 2/3rd pioneers and 2/2nd machine gun companies were sent to contain the threat. By this time the 2/17th battalion had just reached Easy Street junction. Windeyer wanted them to hit Kumawa as it seemed one of the most likely places the Japanese would have retreated to from Finschhafen. However he also knew the new threat required additional forces so he divided the 2/17th into two groups. Two companies led by Major Pike and Captain Sheldon detached and formed a separate HQ under Major Maclarn to stop the Japanese from attacking Scarlet Beach, while Colonel Simpson led the remainder to Kumawa. On October 4th, suddenly the enemy eased up on both fronts. The surrounded company of the 2/43rd took the opportunity to break out to the east. Patrols began reporting that the Japanese had also withdrawn, so the bulk of the 2/43rd gradually moved to reoccupy Jivevaneng.  Meanwhile Maclarn’s 2/17th detachment attempted their first attack against the enemy. Maclarn sent two platoons north of the Song River who quickly found themselves in a firefight with the enemy. They were forced to withdraw, then at 11:30am an LCV came over the Song drawing fire from the Japanese, allowing Maclarn to pinpoint exactly where the enemy was. At 2:15 Maclarn sent a platoon to make contact with the Japanese again, followed up at 5pm with Pike’s company. The Japanese were hit with an artillery bombardment as Pike’s company single file advanced to an assembly position around North Hill. The next day North Hill’s area was seized and just as the Australians had managed to encircle the enemy’s position, scouts reported they had abandoned it. It seemed to the Australians that the Japanese had withdrawn into the mountains again. In truth General Yamada was preparing a counterattack. As for General Katagiri by late September he had ordered his 2nd battalion, 79th regiment to advance through a native inland path avoiding the coastal roads over some western hills that led to Sattelberg. The battalion arrived at Boringboneng by October 7th, while the rest of the division got to Sattelberg by October 11th. With the reinforcements on hand, Katagiri planned a major counterattack aimed at Arndt point, due for mid October.    Meanwhile on October 5th, the 2/17th successfully seized Kumawa after fighting a small engagement against an enemy post in the village. The 2/15th were quickly directed to relieve them at Kumawa, as the 2/17th began to see continuous counterattacks. Simpsons 2/17th were being hit from northeast, west and south. His position was too thin leading to a large danger of encirclement. The Japanese performed numerous infiltrating attacks, trying to break his lines of communications and to add to Simpsons misery, the supply of ammunition and rations being carried by natives along a track were being delayed heavily by torrential rain. The native carriers were likewise in danger of enemy fire, it seemed evident the Japanese were quite alarmed at losing Kumawa.   On October the 6th, Yamada’s 3rd battalion, 80th regiment successfully severed the communications between the company and her HQ by taking a position on a track between them. For 3 hours the Japanese made several assaults on Kumawa, until 1pm when the track was reopened and a telephone line was quickly relaid. The Japanese continued their harassment, but then the 2/15th arrived turned the tide against them. The men were low on supplies as the heavy rain made it impossible for jeeps to advance up the track to Kamawa. Since the 5th of october the 2/17th had been eating meager amounts, by the 8th they had nothing left. Windeyer felt because of the lack of supplies he had to halt the advance of the 2/17th and 2/15th.  The 2/17th Battalion diarist, describing the defense of Kumawa, wrote: "The enemy caused us no trouble… but our stomachs did." Colonel Grace likewise turned down an offer by Windeyer to arrange an air drop because he believed that the Japanese did not yet know of his men's presence in Kumawa. This would lose him the chance of intercepting any belated parties moving towards Sattelberg along the track from Tirimoro.    On October 9th, Maclarn decided to capture a vital feature in front of Jiveveneng known as the “knoll”, to improve his tactical position, I guess they just ran out of names or something.  Maclarn opened up the attack with artillery, as Sheldon’s company performing an encirclement maneuver led by Papuan scouts to sneak platoons 10 yards from the Japanese positions. Suddenly at 11:10am the forward platoons unleashed fire on the Japanese and charged their outposts. As the men charged the Knoll itself, only a single Japanese would be seen as countless had fled, leaving 9 dead. By 1pm Sheldon’s company were digging in on the knoll where they had found 60 Japanese foxholes. The Japanese launched a counter attack, began with a bugle call and the usual screams as the charged within 5 yards of the Australians new defensive positions. Grenades were rolled down the knoll and automatic fire kept them at bay until the Japanese finally backed off. At 6:45 the Japanese attempted a second counter attack, this time as a full company, but they were likewise repulsed. The next day saw more Japanese counter attacks against the Knoll, the defending Australians reported hearing them scream “ya”, to which they screamed it back at them. Apparently they also screamed Ho, so the Australians screamed Ho back. The Japanese were also sending many patrols to search for viable approaches for the upcoming counteroffensive while they awaited reinforcements and supplies. The Australians noted the considerable enemy movement, believing a large number of Japanese reinforcements were due to arrive from the north.    Back over at Lae, General Wootten’s HQ and the 24th brigade had finally begun their departure for Finschhafen. When Wootten landed, he decided to reorganize his forces to gain control of the approaches to Wareo and Sattelberg, hoping to also provide an opening to launch an offensive against Sio. He divided the Finschhafen area into 3 sectors of responsibility. The 24th brigade would defend the Scarlet beach area; the 20th brigade would perform an offensive against Sattelberg and the 22nd battalion would defend the Dreger Harbor area. On October 11th, the 2/17th finally re-secured Jivevaneng and on the 12th, Wootten sent Captain Gore with C Company of the Papuan battalion to perform a large scale deep patrol looking into the Wareo-Sattelberg-Mararuo area. On the 13th, the 2/15th hit back at the Japanese west of Kumawa. At 9am they began a fire fight about 150 yards apart using machine guns mostly. Casualties were high for both sides, but Sergeant Else kept the forward platoons advancing, refusing to allow his forces t obe pinned down. The Japanese had 39 deaths before they began fleeing, the Australians suffered 5 deaths and 30 casualties. For the next two days things seemed to be relatively quiet, but it was to be the calm before the storm, as Katagiri earmarked October 16th for his counteroffensive. Wootten knew something was on its way and was greatly relieved to see the arrival of the 2/28th and 2/32nd battalions on October 15th. However he was also quite bitter about the lack of cooperation between the Australians and Americans which he believed prevented them from quickly reinforcing Finschhafen. By the 15th, Wootten had 2/rd of his division in the area and a signal from Morshead informed him that General HQ had ordered the 26th brigade from Lae to Finschhafen at 30 hours notice. It was heartening news, but it also contrasted strongly with the protracted negotiations allowing for the 2/43rd to go to Scarlet Beach by the end of September. It was also indicative of the gravity of the situation; various commanders had learnt brutal lessons. The Japanese were given a chance to seize the initiative. General Mackay would write to Blamey on October the 20th  “Through not being able to reinforce quickly the enemy has been given time to recover and we have not been able to exploit our original success. Through the piecemeal arrival of reinforcements the momentum of the attack has not been maintained. As was proved in the Lae operations the provision of adequate forces at the right place and time is both the quickest and most economical course.” Windeyer received orders to coordinate the defense of the Langemak bay and "hold important ground at all costs". He was to perform a defense in depth, maintain a mobile reserve, organize coastwatching stations and beach defenses. Wootten went to work ordered forces to put up positions on track junctions in the Bonga area, North Hill, all of the high ground going two miles west of Scarlet Beach through Jivevaneng, Kumawa, Tirimoro, Butaweng, Logaweng and for the 532nd EBSR base at Dreger Harbour. The allies were preparing for a major storm. Over at the Finisterres, on October 11th, General Morshead had just flown in for the first time to Dumpu where he told Vasey that because of “administrative limitation” there could be no further advance into the mountains for the time being. The day morning, Colonel Bishop’s 2/27th over at Trevors ridge were hit by Japanese mountain guns. At 10:45 the 2nd battalion, 78th regiment launched an assault against their position. The attack was supported by 5 Woodpeckers, those are being the Japanese type 92 heavy machine gun, alongside two mountain guns, mortars and light machine guns. Trevor’s ridge and Johns knoll got the full bombardment treatment, then the Japanese charged tossing grenades with fixed bayonets overrunning the Australian positions on the lower early slope. However this lower slope could be hit hard from the crest above, so the Japanese soon found themselves in a mayhem of fire and were dislodged quickly. After the vicious attack, Bishop sent reinforcements to John’s Knoll allowing the lost positions to be regained. 4 more attacks would be launched during the early afternoon at a great cost to the Japanese. Bishops men repulsed them all, but he began to worry about his ammunition situation. In the forward areas, he had only two Vickers guns and a 3 inch mortar. The Vickers were being used to counter the Japanese heavy machine gun fire, and the mortar only had 18 bombs left, placed up on Johns knoll. When the enemy had reached within 20 yards of the Australians positions during the first assault, Sergeant Eddy rushed forward to direct 12 mortar bombs upon the enemy causing absolute havoc, winning the day. With ammunition running low and no sign of an supply train coming, Bishop wondered if the next attack would beat them off their high ground. Bishops men went to work searching the dead Japanese. Teams were collecting ammunition from the dead enemy, from the HQ and from units of Trevor’s ridge, rushing it all to Johns knoll. The positions on John’s knoll was obviously dangerous and the men all knew they likely would have to pull out if no supply train came. To relieve the pressure on John’s Knoll, Bishop sent two platoons to launch a counter attack against the enemys right and left flanks. Lt Paine’s platoon took the right and Lt Trenerry the left. Paines men were climbing 20 yards up a razor back when the saw the enemy and began firing. Paine recalled "things got a bit sticky so we withdrew down the hill a little then made our way back to the end of the razor-back’. Pains men withdrew a bit, but continued to harass the enemy, who greeted them by rolling grenades down the razorback. To the left, Trennerys men cautiously moved around the rear of the Japanese forward troops attacking Johns Knoll and launched a 16 grenade attack killing many. In the confusion and terror the Japanese dispersed running straight into Australian gunfire. With just 5 men Trenerry had cleared a track to Johns koll while 5 other of his men cleared another track in the opposite direction. Trenerry would report   "Both groups clearing the track ran backwards and forwards shooting at opportune targets,". Private Blacker had killed 5 Japanese shooting his Bren from the hip; Private May killed 4 Japanese before taking a hit himself and most of the men on average killed two Japanese each. Trennerry’s men would come back to Johns knoll estimating they had killed 24 Japanese with small arms and a bunch with grenades.   During the late afternoon, a company of the 2/27th also advanced northeast of John’s Knolls who could hear the platoon counter attacks. At 5:30 upon hearing heavy fire from some high ground east of Johns knoll they launched an attack and quickly overran a woodpecker position. Lt Cook leading the company would write “I met Mac and he gave me all he knew so I pushed forward to contact the enemy. I handed 5 Platoon over to Sergeant Underwood, commonly known as "Underpants". The laps were expecting us for they opened up with their Woodpecker and did they whistle but the boys kept pushing on. I sent Sergeant Yandell round on the right flank while a section from B Company and Corporal Fitzgerald's went around on the left; well, Lum's [Yandell's] section on the right did a wonderful job and made it possible to wipe out the Woodpecker. The boys must have killed 20 or more Japs on the first knoll and by the way they bawled you would think they were killing a hundred of them. We continued on along the ridge for another 100 yards when 3 LMGs opened up on us and inflicted our first casualties, 2 killed, 4 wounded. One of the killed was Dean who had done a fine job killing several Japs while firing his Bren from the hip as he advanced. At about this time I found [a young soldier] of B Company alongside me so asked him what would win the Goodwood whereupon he told me not to be so bloody silly, it was no time to talk about races. Well, we had to shift these gunners so Lum kept moving his section forward on the right flank and two of the gunners got out while the other covered them. Then Lum volunteered to go over the top after the remaining one himself so I slipped up behind him to give him covering fire, but as Lum went over the top the Japs cleared off into the kunai”. By nightfall the enemy attacks ceased, the allies had not yielded an inch of ground.   A supply train came at midnight to the great relief of the defenders. Hunkering down the way he did, Bishop had won a notable battle. The 2/27th lost 7 men dead and 28 wounded, but estimated they had killed 190 Japanese. More importantly the Australians refused to be pushed from their vantage points. The Japanese would continue their attacks on Trevor’s ridge with their Woodpecker from a new position just above the plateau across the Faria. Thus the defenders hard work was not over, Brigadier Dougherty decided to relieve the exhausted 2/27th with the 2/16th. After the fierce fight at John’s Knoll, the Japanese had pulled back to the Shaggy ridge line, that ran in front of the Kankirei saddle. It was here General Nakai was determined to make his last stand. Additionally, back on October the 9th, the first echelon of Admiral Mori’s forces had at last reached Kiari. Men who performed the march recalled  “the track deteriorated and was ‘only passable on bare feet without any heavy packs’ and some simple scaffolding had been set up by the engineers to help the troops pass. The cold increased as the group climbed higher and the ‘Precipitous cliffs continued, one after another.’ More men began to die from the cold and from losing their footing. This was at the head of the Sanem River valley where there was a sheer drop on one side of the track and a sheer rock face about 90 meters high on the other. The final climb to the summit was made over a muddy one-man track where the line came to a stop and the men sat with their legs dangling over the edge of the track”. The men took 4 days of rest before they would march onwards for Sio.   For 10 days, General Nakano’s forces continued their retreat to Kiari. Local natives had been enlisted to help carry the food and medical supplies that landed at Kairi up to the troops moving down the coast. Originally 20 landing craft were supposed to help move the food from Madang, but they were being used for troops transport following the Australian landing at Finschhafen. The Japanese began setting up a series of food caches in villages seeing tonnes of rice carried and placed in key positions. The 4th echelon reached Kiari on October 18th, 33 days after they had departed Lae. From the original 6600 IJA and 2050 IJN forces that left Lae, a total of 6544 men, 5001 IJA and 1543 IJN had survived the retreat across the Saruwaged range, arriving safely to the coast. It was clear, General Blamey’s earlier assessment that “a few of the enemy remnants will escape the hardship of the mountain tracks” was very wrong. Now thats all we have for Green hell today, for we are going to be jumping back over to the CBI theater next.   Now there had been considerable developments in the global war for the allies. The Japanese were gradually being pushed back in the southwest pacific; The Kingdom of Italy signed the armistice of Cassibile, as allied forces were occupying Sicily soon to hit Italy proper and Germany was about to lose Ukraine. The tide had distinctly turned against the Axis. In the China theater, the 7th war area of General Sun Lianzhong had dispersed into the fertile plains of Hunan province. The commander of the China expeditionary army, General Hta Shunroku deemed it necessary to perform a crushing blow against him. He ordered General Yokoyama to advance upon the Changde area, where Sun had his HQ.Yokoyama concentrated his 5 divisions, the 39th, 58th, 3rd, 116th and 68th divisions of the 11th army, along the Yangtze river area between Yichang and Yueyang by late October. Once his forces had concentrated enough on the left bank of the Yangtze, Yokoyama planned out an offensive set to launch on November 2nd. Defending the Changde area was  the 6th war zones 10th, 26th, 29th, 33rd army groups as well as some riverine units and two other corps, making a total of 14 corps in all. It was going to be a brutal offensive aimed not at actually capturing the city of Chande, but rather tying up the NRA to reduce its combat ability in the immediate region and to thwart it from reinforcing the Burma theater.   Over in Indie the horrible Bengal famine of 1943 had kicked off. Back in March of 1942, after the Japanese began their occupation of Rangoon, a major consequence was the severing of routine exports, such as Burmese rice to India and Ceylon. In June the Bengal government established price controls for rice and on July 1st fixed prices were at a level considerably lower than the prevailing market price. The fixed low prices thus made sellers reluctant to sell leading to stocks disappearing, getting stored or being sold on the black market. In mid October, south-west Bengal was hit by a series of natural disasters that destabilized the price more, causing another rushed scramble for rice, boosting the Calcutta black market. On March 11th, the provincial government rescinded its price controls, resulting in dramatic rises in the price of rice, due partly to speculations. This caused a massive period of inflation between March and May of 1943. May saw the first reports of death by starvation in Bengal. The government tried to re-establish public confidence by insisting that the crisis was all being caused by speculation and hoarding, but their propaganda failed to dispel the public's belief there was in fact a shortage of rice. The Bengal government never formally declared a state of famine, even though the “Famine Code” would have mandated a sizable increase in aid. The unrest gave fuel to the Free India Movement, led by Subhas Chandra Bose and many troops would have to be diverted from Burma to help maintain the order. Bose made his famous proclamation “give me blood! I will give you freedom!” as he assumed leadership over the reformed INA on July 4th of 1943. The new INA 1st division under Major General Mohammed Zaman Kiani had drawn many Indian POW’s who had previously joined Mohan Singh’s first INA. They also drew POW’s who had not joined in 1942. Their new force consisted of the 2nd Guerrilla regiment known as “the Gandhi brigade” which consisted of two battalions under Colonel Inayat Kiani; the 3rd Guerrilla regiment known as “the Azad brigade” consisting of three battalions under Colonel Gulzara Singh and the 4th Guerrillas known as the “Nehru Brigade” lead by Lt Colonel Gurubaksh Singh Dhillon. The 1st Guerrilla regiment “Subhas brigade” was led by Colonel Shah Nawaz Khan and was an independent unit consisting of 3 infantry battalions. Special operations group “Bahadur group” were operating behind enemy lines. There was also a separate all female unit created under Captain Lakshmi Swaminathan. This unit was intended to have combat commitments. They were named Rani of Jhansi regiment after the legendary rebel Queen Lakshmibai of the 1857 rebellion. Their member swerve drawn from female civilian populations from Malaya and Burma.   The reformed INA were reinvigorated and causing a lot of mayhem. The Indian government responded with a scorched earth policy to deny foodstuffs to the Japanese and Free Indian army who might try to invade India. They established a Foodstuffs scheme to manage the distribution of good, ensuring that those in high priority roles such as civil servants, police and the armed forces received top priority. A second “boat denial policy” was also implemented. Under this policy the army confiscated approximately 45,000 rural boats, severely disrupting riverbourne movement of labor, supplies and food. This cost the livelihoods of boatmen and fishermen.  Leonard G. Pinnell, a British civil servant who headed the Bengal government's Department of Civil Supplies, told the Famine Commission that the policy "completely broke the economy of the fishing class". Transport was generally unavailable to carry seed and equipment to distant fields or rice to the market hubs. Artisans and other groups who relied on boat transport to carry goods to market were offered no recompense; neither were rice growers nor the network of migratory laborers. The large-scale removal or destruction of rural boats caused a near-complete breakdown of the existing transport and administration infrastructure and market system for movement of rice paddy. No steps were taken to provide for the maintenance or repair of the confiscated boats, and many fishermen were unable to return to their trade. The Army took no steps to distribute food rations to make up for the interruption of supplies.   Meanwhile military build ups cause massive displacement of Bengalis from their homes and farmlands which were used to construct airstrips and camps. Nearly the entire output of India’s cloth, leather, silk and wool industries were sold off to the military, leaving the rural population to suffer through a “cloth famine”.  President of the Ramakrishna Mission in Bombay July 1943 would report  "The robbing of graveyards for clothes, disrobing of men and women in out of way places for clothes ... and minor riotings here and there have been reported. Stray news has also come that women have committed suicide for want of cloth ... Thousands of men and women ... cannot go out to attend their usual work outside for want of a piece of cloth to wrap round their loins"   The Bengali population suffered tremendously. With the arrival of 500,000 or more Burmese refugees, bringing hungry mouths, and diseases like dysentery, malaria, smallpox, cholera, needing food, clothes, medical aid and other resources, this stressed Bengali past its max. Despite all of this, Bengal continued to export rice to Ceylon for months, even after the famine was apparent. To make matters worse, local rice crops were becoming infected with brown spot disease and on October 16th, Bengal was hit by a massive cyclone. This resulted in the deaths of 14,500 and 190,000 cattle. The cyclone unleashed 3 Tsunami’s which overwhelmed the sea walls and flooded 450 square miles adding more misery to 2.5 million people.  Bose went to work exploiting the crisis, backed enthusiastically by the Japanese to established the Azad Hind Provisional Government of Free India at Singapore in October. The first INA was roughly 40,000 troops strong, the reformed 2nd INA would begin with 12,000 troops, and as a result of Boses dynamic appeal would peak to around 100,000 volunteers and combatants at around 50,000. Bose would say "Local civilians joined the INA, doubling its strength. They included barristers, traders and plantation workers, as well as Khudabadi Sindhi Swarankars who were working as shop keepers; many had no military experience." It is also estimated, 20,000 Malayan Indians and another 20,000 ex-Indian army member volunteered for the INA. In the end, an estimated 2.1-3.8 Bengalis died out of a population of 60.2 million. They died of starvation, malaria and diseases brought on from malnutrition, population displacement and lack of health care. In the man-made famines aftermath, millions would be left impoverished and the social fabric had been torn to shreds. Nearly 1.6 million families disintegrated, men sold their farms and left home to work or join the Indian army. Women and children became homeless, traveling to larger cities in search of relief. It was a vicious cycle of death that would help bolster the Indian independence movement. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The battle for Sattelberg was about to begin and so was the battle for Changde. Within India a horrible man made famine led to tremendous devastation and in turn this helped bolster Subhas Chandra Bose’s Indian National Army. Japan was given a rare chance to obtain a powerful ally.  

Last time we spoke about operation Se-Go and the continued drive on Finschhafen. The evacuation of Kolombangara, designated operation Se-Go showcased how the Japanese were becoming experts at large scale evacuations. Nearly 10,000 men were safely evacuated from Kolombangara at the cost of some barges. Then in New Guinea, the Allies became aware the taking of Finschhafen was not going to be a cake walk. In fact Wootten sent word to the other commanders that he believed he was facing the full 20th division at Finschhafen. The other commanders were sending their men through the Ramu and Markham valleys finding rearguards everywhere they looked. Rivers and ridges were being taken at a quick pace and Finschhafen was technically seized, but certainly not secured. Now the allies would have to attack the stronghold of Sattelberg. And Today we are going to see some action upon land and sea. This episode is the naval battle of Vella Lavella Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  The Japanese had accomplished another astounding evacuation, managing to pull out nearly 10,000 men from the marooned and isolated Kolombangara. They managed this with limited craft and boldly under the nose of the enemy who enjoyed superiority over land, air and sea. Yet as you can imagine this certainly showcases how the tide of the war in the south pacific had decisively turned. Japanese naval operations were becoming increasingly concerned with evacuating troops as their positions grew hopeless. The campaign for the central solomons was falling apart for Japan, the invasion of Bougainville was imminent. However because of the evacuation of Kolombangara, one of its results would be the establishment of a staging base for barges and landing craft over at Horaniu, the northeast shore of Vella Lavella.  Now in  last episode we spoke about the actions of the Tsuruya unit who were busy delaying Brigadier Potter’s New Zealander forces. The Japanese had their backs against the wall at Marquana Bay, holding by just a threat. They had little food or ammunition left with no possibility of re-supply or reinforcements. Despite insufficient resources, Admiral Samejima was determined to rescue the doomed Tsuruya unit. Samejima managed to convince Admiral Kusaka to carry out yet another evacuation, this time of Vella Lavella, slated for the night of October 6th. Before dawn on the 6th, Admiral Ijuin departed Rabaul with 9 destroyers divided into three groups. The first group led by Admiral Ijuin consisted of the Akigumo, Isokaze, Kazagumo and Yugumo. The 2nd group led by Captain Kanaoka Kunizo was aboard Fumizuki accompanied by Yunagi and Matsukaze and a transport unit of 6 barges, 30 folding boats and the transport Usaka Maru. The third group was led by Captain Hara Tameichi aboard the Shigure with Samidare as backup. A fourth group led by Commander Nakayama Shigoroku consisting of 5 subchasers, 3 vedettes and a barge would also depart Buin to help. Ijuin was to be the strike unit, Kanaoka the transport unit and Hara the Guard unit. Ijuin planned to have Kanaoka and Hara standing off Marquana Bay supported by the incoming 4th unit led by Shigoroku. Further support would be given in the form of 8 floatplanes that would try to bomb Potter’s men with 20 zeros providing air cover.  During the morning of the 6th, Admiral Wilkinson received reports the Japanese might be attempting an evacuation of Choiseul. At that time his 10th echelon was underway transporting the IMAC advance base to Vella Lavella, leaving the only available force Captain Frank Walker with destroyers Selfridge, Chevalier and O’Bannon. Walker was just returning from a run up the slot passing by the Russells on his way home. Wilkinson sent word to Walker to pay specific attention to the coast of Choiseul as he passed around. During that afternoon, Admiral Halsey sent an alert to Wilkinson that the Tokyo Express was definitely about to make a run, but it was not to Choisuel, instead it was to Marquana bay. Wilkinson dispatched 3 destroyers from the 10th echelon, Ralph Talbot, Taylor and LaVallete with Commander Harold Larson to reinforce Walker around Sauka point to try and intercept the Japanese. Shortly after sending the orders, Walk received further intelligence. At 7:30pm he learnt that an unknown number of destroyers, 3 torpedo boats and 6 subchasers were enroute, expected to be in the area by 10:30 with an embarkation time of 11:30. At 9:02 he was told that possibly 9 destroyers were coming. A few minutes later another report passed on by some B-25’s attacking buin stated they spotted 4 IJN destroyers or possibly Jintsu-class cruisers. Thus pretty uncertain of what was actually out there, Walker’s crews were warned to expect the worse and they would sound General Quarters by 7pm. 40 minutes later the 938th seaplanes began harassing them. At 9:50 Walker announced over the TBS “When we round the corner close the gap and be ready for anything. I want to get the fish off without guns if possible.” Wilkinson’s reinforcements only made it to the rendezvous point by 11:40, leading Walker to have to start the battle alone. Since the days of John Paul Jones, American naval lore had honored and applauded commanders who unleashed bold attacks on superior enemy forces, but in this case Walker would prove to be too rash.  Walker took his force around the north coast of Vella Lavella that night and began scouting the area finding no sign of the enemy. Meanwhile Ijuins strike force followed by Hara and Kanaoka proceeded to their staging point arrived at 10pm. Minutes later a scout plan reported 4 cruisers and 3 destroyers northeast of Vella Lavella on a western course. The plane most certainly saw the Selfridge, Chevalier and O’Bannon coming up the slot but mistook them as cruisers. Ijuin ordered Konaoka to take his group west towards the Shortlands while he and Hara turned back to meet the enemy. However Hara’s force were a bit further west and having difficulty due to mist causing lack of visibility. at 10:30 the Americans made their first radar contact of the enemy and 5 minutes later lookouts aboard the Kazagumo sighted the Americans to their south. Consequently, Ijuin had just turned to port heading southwest to cross Walker’s bows, but he misjudged the distance and instead opened the range. Walker responded by increasing his forces speed to 30 knots to try and head off the enemy. Upon seeing this, Ijuin changed his course at 10:45 to south-southeast to close the range, then at 10:48 ordered a 45 degree turn south. These maneuvers actually worked to the Americans advantage, and upon seeing he was presenting an easier target, Ijuin ordered another simultaneous turn to port which staggered his ships in line abreast on a course opposite and nearly parallel to Walker with their range rapidly closing. The maneuvering blunder allowed the Americans to pull up to the nearest group of 4 IJN destroyers and launch a half salvo of torpedoes. Most of the torpedoes were fired at the Yagumo which was being mistaken as a possible cruiser. Commander Osako Higashi aboard the Yagumo ordered 8 torpedoes to be launched before the guns began to fire. The Americans opened fire with their guns after the torpedoes turning Yagumo into a burning wreck quickly. Ijuin tried to course correct again going south then west.  But by this point, Hara had just made it to the battle at 11:01 the Americans saw his forces to their southwest and closed in to engage. This put Hara ahead and parallel to Walker giving the Americans the perfect position to launch another salvo of torpedoes. At the same time one of Yagumo’s torpedoes hit Chevalier detonating her No 2 Gun Magazine, blowing the ship in two. Her brigade and aft section swung across O’Bannon’s path forcing O’Bannon to ram into her starboard engine room. The force of the collision was mitigated by Commander Donald MacDonald who ordered an emergency full speed astern when he saw the explosion on Chevalier. Two minutes later a torpedo, most likely fired from Chevalier, hit Yagumo. At 11:06, one of Hara’s destroyers landed a torpedo hit on the Selfridge, shearing off her bow and wrecking everything from the bridge forward. In just 5 minutes, 104 American sailors were dead and 66 were wounded. Both sides continued the brawl, at 11:17 Ijuin still taking a westward course, ordered torpedoes to be fired at what he thought were cruisers, probably the O’Bannon and Chevalier. He received a claim that one was sunk, so he decided to break off the battle and head for home. Meanwhile Geoerge Peckham aboard the Selfridge believed he had been hit by torpedo boats and wildly ordered men to track where they might be. It was an age old naval case of both sides fighting ghosts ships basically. Meanwhile Commander Nakayama’s group began to approach Marquana bay from the north and Wilkinsons reinforcements group led by Larson were arriving from the south as well. At 10:55 Larson had received ordered from Walker to execute “William” which was the codename for torpedoes and “dog” was naval gunfire. Larsons group passed Yagumo who was undergoing her death throes and by 11:40 the group was in the battle area. Larson could not make out a contact on enemy ships and by midnight simply headed for Marquana bay, seeing nothing but crippled ships. Chevalier was beyond saving so she was scuttled, Selfridge was able to be repaired by 3:15am and would make a slow but safe journey home. Walker notified COMAIRSOLS they needed air cover as Nakayama’s group passed east of the battle area but did not engage. Japanese barges began to load men as the 938ht floatplane harassed the New Zealanders artillery. Many New Zealanders reported hearing naval gunfire and what sounded like barges scraping against reefs. By 3:10am, Nakayama left for Buin with all 589 men of the Tsuruya unit. The Americans captured 74 survivors of the Yagumo who were marooned at Biloa, while 27 others would make their way to Buin using motorized whaleboats. Ijuin had lost 179 men dead with 74 captured. On October 8th, Potter’s men determined the Japanese were indeed gone so they began occupying Marquana bay. Thus ended the battle of Vella Lavella.  The 1st battalion, 27th regiment landed at Ringi Cover on southern Kolombangara on October 6th finding 49 abandoned artillery pieces and some scattered Japanese who had been left behind. By October 15th Admiral Hasley declared operation Toenails terminated. Two days prior the Japanese had likewise terminated operation Se-go. Admiral Samejima would be forced to carry the blame for the loss of the central solomons. He went on the record to say this “The relations between the Army and Navy units in this area were extremely harmonious and satisfactory, and the foregoing is due to the character and judgment of Maj-Gen. Sasaki and Rear Admiral Ōta. However, because of my inexperience in commanding land operations, there were times when I failed to dispatch appropriate orders to Maj-Gen. Sasaki in conducting our operations. And the fact that there is evidence that I left the operations up to the arbitrary decisions of Maj-Gen. Sasaki to some degree clearly reveals the folly of placing a Naval Commander like me in charge of land operations involving Army and Navy units.” In the end his forces managed to hold back the enemy for nearly two months and he had pulled off a pretty incredible evacuation. Operation Toenails was a success for the allies managing to secure 4 new airbases at Munda, Segi, Ondonga and Barakoma. These acquisitions would have a huge impact on future campaigns against Bougainville and Rabaul. Admiral Halsey would receive some criticism for underestimating both the terrain and enemy during operation Toenails. Major General Harmon went on the record to say “Munda is a tough nut –much tougher in terrain, organization of the ground and determination of the Jap than we had thought,.  The Japanese agreed; an intelligence report dated 11 August stated that the “reasons for the slow advance of the enemy in Munda, etc, are due to the courage of our forces and the difficult fighting in the jungle.” The allies learned some important lessons such as the necessity of adequate medial support; the implementation of effective evacuation procedures; close air support for ground troops; the effectiveness of naval gunfire support or lack thereof it; and the 3 most effective weapons against the Japanese; the 155mm gun, tanks and dive bombers. These 3 weapons would be put into effect on Bougainville. The central solomons campaign saw 995 US Army, 192 marine and 500 US navy death with 4407 wounded. The New Zealanders and Fijians received 200 casualties. For the Japanese it was estimated 4000 died with 4500 wounded. Now we need to head over to New Guinea. General Vasey’s men were preparing for an assault against Dumpu, while being harassed by the infilitration specialists of the Saito Unit. The Saito units had performed infilitrations against Dakisaria and Marawasa. On October 2nd, while the bulk of the 21st and 25th brigades were establishing bridgeheads to cross the Gusap and Tunkaat river. The 2/7th independent company at this time were trying to cross the Ramu into Kaigulin where a Japanese outpost was. The outpost was guarded by the Saito unit, 80 men of the 10th company, 78th regiment supported by the 3rd company. The Saito unit gave them hell, forcing the commandos to cross the Ramu elsewhere trying to hook around their right flank. They managed to pull the flanking maneuver and in the battle killed 6 Japanese. Interestingly Lt R.D Watts decapitated a Japanese using a katana he had acquired in a previous battle, a case of the turntables. I am now realizing when I make this dumb joke many of you might not have watched the office, I must sound even dumber than I am. The following day, Brigadier Dougherty ordered his men to only patrol as he was waiting for Brigadier Eather’s forces to assemble in the Bumbum area. Yes, there is a place called Bumbum, I thought Nuk Nuk would be my favorite New Guinea area, I was wrong.  On the morning of October 4th, Dougherty ordered the 2/14th towards Wampun and the 2/16th to capture Dumpu. By 2pm, Captain C.L McInnes lead a company of the 2/14th to find Wampun deserted which was expected. However the men had marched all day in the heat, without any water. McInnes company was sent to Karam to search for water. Another company followed McInnes company soon after and a mile or so out they came across a banana plantation. They saw some troops cutting down banana leaves and assumed it was McInnes men, however these were actually Japanese of the Saito Unit. The forward patrol were carelessly advancing towards the banana plantation when bursts of machine gun and rifle fire hit Colonel Honner and Sergeant Pryor. Pyror wounded in his chin and chest tried to drag his commanding officer back, but Honnor had taken a shot to the leg and could only crawl. Honnor began screaming to his men to figure out the position of the enemy and this led Private Bennet to lead a small party to do so. The Japanese continued to fire upon them and Honnor was hit in his hand to add to his misery. Luckily for them the 2/14th sent a rescue party to extricate Honnor. Honnor was moved to safety by 5pm as Colonel O’Day prepared to attack the Japanese at the banana planation. At 6pm O’day led two platoons to rush their position where they killed 11 troops and a Japanese officers, driving the rest to flee into the jungle. The next morning they would also kill a few stragglers, the action cost 7 australian lives of the 2/14th while killing an estimated 26 Japanese and taking a single prisoner. Meanwhile the 2/16th had successfully crossed the Surinam River without facing any opposition. They sent a platoon ahead led by Lt Scott to check out Dumpu. At 4:40pm he reported back that it seemed Dumpu was still occupied. Major Symington led forward a company to prepare to attack Dumpu, but when they reached its outskirts they could visibly see Japanese fleeing the area. Thus Dougherty’s men grabbed Dumpu without a fight. General Vasey believed 78th regiment had failed to relieve pressure on the retreating 51st division, but unbeknownst to him, General Nakano’s men were already marching through the formidable Saruwaged range. The range had an altitude of 3000 meters where temperatures fell below 10 degrees. Anyone who tried to start a fire from the moss-covered wood would find it unbelievably difficult. Many men reported heating gunpowder from rifles to start fires. A lot of rifles were burnt away because of this. Their rations ran out quickly, leading to starving men turning upon the dead….and even the living. Private Kitamoto Masamich recalled “seeing three soldiers had pinned a trooper to the ground while one of them stabbed him in the heart with his bayonet. I watched shocked as the remaining three soldiers cut slices of the dead trooper’s thigh and began to devour the human flesh. I shouted at them as flies swarmed about their faces… They had become mad with hunger and fatigue.’ Kitamoto covered the corpse and moved on. Cannibalism reared its ugly head often for the Japanese, particularly in some parts of Burma by late 1945.  Until now the 7th division was enjoying a pretty uninterrupted advance to Dumpu. The Benabena was pretty secure as well, but General Nakai was establishing strong defensive positions along the Kankirei saddle. This would soon turn the campaign in the Ramu valley and Finisterre range into a gritty holding operation. In the meantime, the allies were being directed towards the FInschhafen campaign, with General Herring ordering Vasey to hold the Dumpu-Marawasa area. There he was to establish a new landing strip at Dumpu and to not make any large advances. Only the 2/27th battalion of Lt Colonel John Bishop would be allowed to advance into the Finisterre foothills. Dougherty hoped the 2/27th might reach Kumbarum within the Finisterre foothills and during a torrential rainstorm they overran the area with no opposition. Bishops men patrolled around and found the enemy was occupying the key feature guarding the exists of the Faria and Uria rivers from some mountains northwest of Kumbarum. Under the cover of rain, Lt King took 8 men to scramble up the feature which panicked the Japanese there causing them to flee without a fight. Thus it was named King’s Hill and would become an important tactical position and observation post. Apparently Kings men had come up just when two battalions were changing their troops dispositions, and a platoon guarding King’s Hill had retired before even seeing the allied forces. Regardless a company was sent to the Boganon mountain area, that rose some 41000 feet. The torrential rain caused a ton of delays for the construction of the new landing strip. In the meantime the 21st brigade patrolled as much as they could. The 2/16th and 2/14th patrolled west of the Mosia river finding no enemy. On the 6th, the 25th brigade sent patrols in all directions north of the Ramu Valley. They found signs of the enemy recently leaving the Boparimpum area; the same at Koram. Just a bit north of Koram, it looked like there was a Japanese outpost on some high ground. Patrols took care near this outpost as it was expected Japanese snipers were there, but when further prodded it seemed abandoned. The 2/2nd independent company patrolled the area of Sepu towards the Waimeriba crossing of the Ramu finding only signs the enemy had recently vacated the area. A small patrol skirmished with the enemy between Saus and Usini. Kesawai would be found unoccupied on the 5th. Overall it was concluded the Japanese had abandoned the Ramu Valley entirely.  On the 6th, Generals Vasey and Wootten received a signal that the 2/2nd, 2/4th, 2/6th and 2/7th independent companies would become cavalry commando squadrons which did not sit well with the experienced commandos. Since the beginning of 1943, the term “commando” had been increasingly used to describe a member of an independent company. The term was quite alien to the Australian Army, and the tasks undertaken by independent companies since the beginning of the pacific war were not at all like that of what British commandos did. In the short space of two years, the independent companies had built up a proud tradition  and the men regarded the term “independent company” as a much better description of what they did than the terms “cavalry” or “commando” and thus resented the change of title. The next day, Dougherty’s 2/16th battalion occupied Bebei and the 2/27th battalion cautiously investigated the upper reaches of the Uria and Faria river valleys. When the men went past the Faria river towards some high ground they suddenly came across a party of 8 Japanese. A fight broke out as they killed 3 of the 8 Japanese receiving no casualties themselves. The Japanese looked to be withdrawing and the Australians dug in for the night in a place designated Guy’s Post atop Buff’s Knoll. These prodding actions prompted Nakai to order the 2nd battalion, 78th regiment to launch a counterattack against Buff’s Knoll. An hour after midnight during a particularly rainy night, a Japanese platoon charged up the knoll. The first attack lasted about half and hour before petering out. The Australian company consolidated around Guy’s Post established a defensive perimeter through out the night. However the night attack ultimately failed for the Japanese as they were not familiar with the terrain and the heavy rain made a mess of their advance. On the morning of October 8th, the Japanese tried to push again while the 2/27th consolidated their position in the Faria area. The Japanese barely budged the Australians and on October 9th, Colonel Bishop ordered the company to advance forward astride the main Japanese route going east towards the Kankiryo saddle. The man at Guy’s Post followed them an hour or so behind as they skirmished with Japanese towards Trevors ridge and John’s knoll. They would kill roughly 11 Japanese as they occupied both Trevors ridge and Johns knoll. Yet this is all for today on New Guinea as we are going to travel back to the CBI theater who we have not talked about in some time. Going way back to 1942, the Japanese empire had been at its zenith forcing the allies to come up with some special operations such as the Chindits. Our old onion necklace wearing friend Brigadier Wingate was running that show, but General Blamey also created his “inter-allied Services Department” known as the ISD. They were a military intelligence unit formed around several British special operations officers who had escaped Singapore before it hell. Inside the ISD later named the Services Reconnaissance Department, a raiding/commando unit was formed called the Z special unit. They were primarily Australian, but also held some British, Dutch, New Zealander, Timorese and Indonesian members. After escaping places like Singapore, and Sumatra, British Captain Ivan Lyon joined the units and became one of their leaders. He devised a plan to attack Japanese shipping in Singapore Harbor. His plan designated Operation Jaywick, called for traversing to the harbor in a vessel disguised as an Asian fishing boat. Then they were to use folboats or folding canoes to get over to enemy ships and attach limpet mines to them. Lyon was promoted to Major and began rigorous training 17th volunteers at Camp X,  a clifftop overlooking Refuge Bay to the north of Sydney. The men worked for weeks digging, breaking rock and clearing scrub around the campsite and parade ground, which worked as prelude to the long, and progressively longer days they would spent canoeing. There were plenty of route marches across rocky hills which Lyon said “consisted of point-to-point walking or scrambling, compass work, stalking and attacks’. The men were tested on elementary navigation, chart reading, tide tables, visual signaling with semaphore and morse and the use of prismatic compasses on land and sea. They trained using a variety of weapons such as Owen sub machine guns, Brens, Lewis guns, all with the view to shoot down enemy aircraft. The practiced unarmed combat, grenade tossing, limpet mining and gelignite. They also received numerous lectures on ship engines. By early 1943, the 17 men had been reduced to 10. They were then given a captured Japanese coastal fish carrier named the Krait which was powered by a Deutz four cylinder engine, had a beam of 11 feet and a range of 8000 miles with a max speed of 6.5 knots. They modified  the vessel to increase her storage capacity. On August 4th, the Krait departed Cairns en route to the submarine base at Exmouth Gulf on the northwest corner of Australia. On September 2nd, Lyon’s commandos began their long and dangerous voyage sailing through the Lombok strait to Singapore. None of the men knew about the plan prior to the attack nor their destination.  It was on the third day that Lyon gathered the men to disclose the truth. ‘He said, “Righto, do you know where we’re going?”’Some of the men said they believed it was Surabaya in East Java. After Lyon revealed their destination, Moss Berryman recalled ‘They couldn’t believe it when they were told they were going to Singapore “to blow up a few ships”’Lyon could see one or two of the men were stunned at the thought of going so deep inside enemy territory. Jones recalled ‘Nobody expected to be going that far and there was sort of talk about how dangerous it was,’. Lyon reassured the men that wasn’t the case. ‘This is not a dangerous trip, it’s an experience.’ But for anyone who didn’t fancy it, Lyon said he understood and he would ‘drop you off at the first island we come to and if you’re there when we come back we’ll pick you up’. It was a smart psychological play as he knew on one would dare lose face in front of his mates. Lyon stared at their faces and they returned his gaze. No one moved. They were all fully committed. Their safety depending on maintaining the disguise of a local fishing boat, so the raiders stained their skin brown with dye to appear more Asiatic, I guess its sort of like the prime minister of my country on Halloween. Cramped on the Krait, the commandos reached the Java sea and passed the south west corner or Borneo getting 50 miles off her coast by September 14th. The enemy’s high activity in the area forced Lyon to detour towards Panjang island with the intention of making their way to Durian island. Yet when they approached Durian island they spotted a observation post so they turned back to Panjang which lies approximately 25 miles south of Singapore.  On september 20th, 6 men on 3 canoes carrying 9 limpet mines each departed the Krait enroute to Singapore harbor. The raiders passed through Bulan and the Batam islands on september 22nd, reaching Donas island the next day. On the 24th Lyon sighted 13 sizable ships in the harbor, so he told the men they would be hitting them that night. Lyon distributed cyanide pills to all the men and told them ‘I leave it up to yourselves to decide what you want to do. But I can tell you now that if you get caught you won’t have a very good time of it. They’re not known for being gentlemen, the Japanese. Don’t delude yourselves in thinking you are tough enough to resist interrogation. You could be tortured enough to give away the whole story. You may not be able to do anything about it. Above all, they had to think of their mates on the Krait. If they fell into enemy hands, the Japanese would want to know how we arrived in Singapore’ The men rowed through the capricious tide, but it soon forced them back towards Dongas, instead they moved to Suber island the next day. On the night of september 26th, Lyon’s raiders departed again, Canoe 1 held Lyon and Huston; Canoe 2 Davidson and falls and Canoe 3 Page and jones. Canoe 2 would hit the north shipping in Keppel Harbor while 1 and 3 would hit examination anchorage and the wharf at Pulau Bukon. Canoe 2 had the strongest men and was given the additional task of returning to Pompong to rendezvous with the Krait  Canoe 2 steered through an anchored ketch on the edge of the main channel, continuing between the islands of Biakang Mati and Tekukor. They arrived to Keppel Harbor and set their sights on a 6000 ton cargo ship sitting low in the water, indicating she had a full load. The found a second target, also a 6000 ton cargo vessel and a third ship of similar proportions, though the last looked not fully loaded. At 1:15am they attached the last of their 9 limpet mines, 3 per ship and made their escape towards Panjang.  The other two canoes had a much easier paddle from Subar. The tide was running east to west, allowing them to go with ease to their target. The paddled together until 9:30 when they separated. At Pulau Bukom an older freighter was mined amidship and around the engine rooms. Then they spotted a modern freighter with engines after and 3 sets of goalpost masts and another 6000 ton old freighter. Over in Examination Anchorage nothing suitable was found, so the raiders mined a tanker even though it was probably impossible to sink with mines. All 4 ships were mined, the men ate some chocolate rations and made their escape towards Dongas. The ships combined comprised around 39000 tons between them. On the way back, the exhausted commandos heard the distant explosions and the chaos that erupted in Singapore. When dawn broke, in Examination anchorage one ship was partially submerged, while two more would sink and 3 were heavily damaged including the tanker Shosei Mary. Canoe 2 and 3 waited until the commotion died down before returning to Panjang, reuniting with everyone aboard the Krait by October 2nd. Their return back to Australia was relatively uneventful, except for one tense incident in the Lombok strait when a IJN minesweeper approached their ship. The commandos remained cool and the minesweeper simply carried on.   The Japanese would retaliate for what happened during Operation Jaywick. On October 10th, the Kempeitai, those are military police of the IJA for those of you who dont know, you can sort of picture the Gestapo, but not quite the same. They went to Changi Prison in Singapore and began reading out a list of civilian names. These named men were taken away for interrogation, torture and in many cases execution. Over the course of 6 months, 50 Europeans and Australians suffered a brutal inquisition. They were beaten with knotted ropes, electrically shocked, had nails driven into the feet, the old cigarettes burnt onto their hands, arms and on their genitals ouch. They were waterboarded and in total 16 men would die. But no credible information was taken from any of them. The Japanese were far more brutal to the Malays and Chinese. Countless were tortured, interrogated and many executed with their severed heads put on posts around the city. After it was all said and done the Kempeitai filled a report speculating the raid had been carried out by two chinese and one Malay. They didn’t believe it and their superiors did not either. The 6 months of horror is known as the Double Tenth Massacre.   There was another unit formed known as the M special Unit, which was a joint Australian, New Zealand, Dutch and British reconnaissance unit formed as a successor to the Coastwatchers. Their role was to gather intelligence on Japanese shipping and troop movements. To do this, small teams were landed behind enemy lines by sea, air and land. One of their first operations was Locust led by Lt Jack Fryer. A group of 4 men departed Benabena overland on January 21st and advance to Lumi airstrip. They formed a base camp thee and began observing the Japanese. In conjunction to Locust was operation Whiting, which was a team of 5 Dutchmen led by Sergeant Huibert Staverman who also departed Benabena to establish a coast-watching station in the hills above Hollandia, reaching Aitape by mid september. Unfortunately the operation would be a catastrophe as the Dutch were ambushed around Aitape. Sergeant Staverman, Corporal D.J Topman, privates H Pattiwal, M Reharing and radio operator Sergeant Len Siffleet were publicly executed at Eitape beach on October 24th of 1943.   Another important development was the Japanese seizure of Macau. Unlike the case of Portuguese held Timor taken in 1942, the Japanese has respected Portuguese neutrality in Macau. However there was a huge influx of Chinese, American and European refugees coming from Guangdong and Hong Kong and this aroused Japanese suspicions. After the fall of Hong Kong, the British had established a clandestine support organization inside Macau trying to gain intelligence on the Japanese in an effort rescue the prisoners from Hong Kong. British army aid group known as BAAG, was under the command of Lt Colonel Lindsay Tasman Ride. They operated out of Hong Kong, Waichow, Guilin, Sanbu, Kaiping, Kunming and other places. They had planned out escape routes from Macau for local Chinese using the route through Shekki or via the sea to a place called To Fuk. Guangzhouwan was another escape route that wealthy Chinese and other nationalities with resources could buy passage through. Another route used a heavily armed motor junk that went to the north west point of Macau, Kong CHung and took them as far as Sam Fau. From there with aid, they could get to Guilin and then Chongqing.    But then a blockade was imposed on the Chinese mainland. Macau’s survival depended upon receiving rice and fuel from places like Vichy controlled Indochina and Guangzhouwan, but after the Japanese occupied them Macau suffered critical food shortages. Macau’s ships were not allowed to be used by Portuguese to carry food and thus were dependent on foreign ships. On the night of August 18th, the British ship Sian, under Portuguese protection was commandeered by a combined fleet of Japanese and pro-Japanese Chinese run ships, which illegally entered Macau’s inner harbor. There was a shootout leading to 20 dead British sailors and the Japanese allegedly discovered that the ship was transporting a shipment of illegal weapons to be sold to the NRA. The next morning Lt General Tanaka Hisakzu of the 23rd army ordered troops across the border who clashed briefly with Macau police forces before Lisbon ordered them to not resist.    Governor Mauricio Teixeira was forced to collaborate with the Japanese who starting in September demanded the installation of Japanese advisors or full blown military occupation. The result was Macau becoming a protectorate. The isolated port city became a center for smuggling and black market activities…which it kinda still is today haha.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The battle for Vella Lavella was over, the Japanese yet again proved themselves experts at the art of evacuation. The battle for Finschhafen was not over by any means and now the allies were cautiously proceeding forward lest they repeat any mistakes learnt in Buna-Gona, Lae and Salamaua.   

Last time we spoke about the Huon Gulf offensive. The Japanese until now had not considered their losses at Guadalcanal and Buna-Gona as irretrievable, but with the loss of Salamaua and Lae there was a brutal realization they were going to have to pull back their defensive line. The absolute defense line was established as the entire empire of the rising sun took two steps back. Meanwhile General Douglas MacArthur and the allied war planners decided to revise operation Cartwheel. The enemy was in disarray and this provided an opportunity to keep them off balance and maintain the momentum. They decided to launch an offensive against the Huon Peninsula, to hit places like Finschhafen. The offensive began with another bang as forces landed and advanced to seize immediate objectives to the misery of the retreating Japanese.  This episode is Drive to Finschhafen  Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Before we leap back over to New Guinea, we first need to talk about some developments in the Solomons. Admirals Kusaka and Samejima were about to launch Operation Se-Go, the evacuation of Kolombangara. Now after the battle of Vella Lavella, Brigadier Potter’s 35th battalion was closing in on the Marquana Bay area by September 26th. Potter sent two New Zealander Platoons as a vanguard. To face them, Captain Tsuruya had organized his meager forces and successfully surrounded the New Zealander Platoons. This began a fight for the New Zealander’s survival that would last until October 2nd. Worried about the fate of his two platoons, Potter ordered Lt Seward with 3 companies to rescue the platoons. Seward described the endeavor as running straight into a hornets nest. They ran straight into some Japanese machine gun positions, which they nicknamed Machine Gully, and it cost them 18 dead and 10 wounded. Tsuruya managed to halt their advance using Machine Gully, which was a dense rainforest concealing his men. On October 2nd, the two platoons were finally rescued. The horrible casualties prompted Potter to halt attacks until every landing craft could bring over the 37th battalion from Tambala bay to hit the other side. The 37ths movement down the rugged coast would be sluggish, giving the Japanese ample time to prepare for the evacuation of the Tsuruya unit. Meanwhile General Sasaki and Admiral Ota were getting their forces ready for the evacuation. Each unit was responsible for its supply and had to carry enough rations to last until october 5th. All the troops had to carry their weapons and as much ammunition as they could, while medical supplies were divided amongst them. Mountains guns, quick fire guns, heavy machine guns could be disassembled and carried if possible, everything else was to be destroyed. And I mean everything, even street signs were destroyed. Sasaki moved all the wounded to the north shore of Kolombangara who were to be the first loading onto the destroyers. Ota was in charge of all matters related to the embarkation such as communications; locating hiding places for the barges and loading which would take place between September 28-30th. They were expecting to evacuate 7660 men in all. Operation Se-Go began on the 27th, as General Yoshimura’s barges headed for Kolombangara in separate groups and Admiral Ijuin prepared his force of 11 destroyers to run towards the northern coast the following day. Only one of Yoshimuras groups led by Commander Tanegashima were intercepted as they headed down the slot. 5 destroyers, the USS Claxton, Spence, Dyson, Foote and Charles Ausburne led by Captain Martin Gillan pounced on the force destroying 4 barges, but the rest eventually escaped to Kolombangara by the 28th with the other groups. Ota hid the barges as he awaited Ijuins destroyers. Ijuin’s force were spotted by a PBY due northeast of Green Island, prompting Generals Moore and Twining to launch an air raid. A strike force of radar equipped B-24’s of the 394th bombardment squadron intercepted Ijuin’s destroyers as they were passing Bougainville strait. None of their bombing attempts found a hit luckily for Ijuin. Meanwhile the barges began to depart up the slot towards Choiseul seeing zero opposition. At Tuki point the barges awaited the destroyers before the loading process began. The only major mishap would occur when the commander of the barges carrying 735 men from Jack Harbor to board the Amagiri steered too widely, missed the signal light from the destroyers and began heading for Vella Lavella. By the time they figured out the mistake and returned to the loading area, the destroyers were gone, with only 1950 men aboard. With the 1950 men aboard, Ijuin’s destroyers made their first dash, but would be intercepted again, this time by 27 B-24’s. The strike was thwarted by Zero fighter escorts and bad weather allowing Ijuin to arrive safely at Buka by the 29th. After this, the Americans were now fully alert to what was going on and responded by bombing Choiseul. At 9:15am on the 29th, Kakasa was attacked by 17 Dauntless, 12 Avengers and 56 fighter escorts. Destroyers Patterson, McCalla, Foote and Ralph Talbot led by Captain Frank R Walker were sent up the slot to hunt barges as well. On september 29th, Tanegashima headed for Choiseul with 11 barges carrying 1100 men. At 10:30 the Americans found them. There was no moon that night, and frequent rain squalls dotted the slot. Upon seeing the Americans, Tanegashima ordered the barges to scatters and Walker detached McCalla to hunt a small group while the rest of his force hit a larger one. Yano, whose battalion was on the barges recalled his barge running at full speeds as shells flew all around them. No barge was sunk or seriously damaged as they made a quick escape. Thus the first stage of operation Se-Go saw the rescue of over 6000 men, relying on the combination of surprise and gambling to be honest. But 25 barges were lost in the process. For stage 2 Samejima would reinforce the surviving 43 barges and 5 vedettes with 3 torpedo boats and two other armed boats. Yoshimura and Ijuin planned to toss 3 destroyers Kazagumo, Yugumo and Akigumo to be a diversion for the Americans. On the other side, Admiral Halsey ordered Admiral Merill’s task force 39 consisting of Light cruisers Montpelier and Denver; and destroyers Eaton, Waller, Cony, Renshaw, Spence, Claxton, Dyson, Selfridge and Charles Ausburne, to sweep the slot. Commander  Chandler with four destroyers, Pringle, Saufley, Radford and Greyson was in the lead, followed by Merrill with two cruisers and nine destroyers.  On the night of October 1st, while Yoshimura’s barges were leaving Choiseul en route to Kolombangara. The Americans spotted the decoy destroyers northwest of Choiseul at 9:20 via a VP-54 Black Cat that began tailing the force as it heading in the direction of Vella Lavella. Now Merill had orders to not risk his cruisers unless heavy Japanese units were found, so he turned back and allowed Wilkinson’s destroyers to advance. The American chased the decoy towards Vella Lavella as Yoshimura’s barges went by relatively unmolested, though a small group of barges would be fired upon by US destroyers, losing 2 in the process. On the morning of October 2nd, Ijuin departed Rabaul with 9 destroyers and at Vila, the Yokosuka 7th guns would fire their last rounds before moving towards the coast. That night, Ijuin approached Kolombangara as Tanegashima awaited with 2100 men to be transported onto the destroyers. They managed to load 145 men by 10:35, but then the destroyers were forced to pull back as Americans had been spotted in the slot. Tanegashima nonetheless, headed for Sumbe Head with the rest, 600 men in all.  Commander Harold O. Larson with three destroyers, Ralph Talbot, Taylor and La Vallette dashed across the slot to hit barges. Largson located the barges and began firing upon them when Ijuin’s destroyers appeared at 10:42. The Americans closed in on the Japanese and fired torpedoes at 11:25 scoring no hits. They then opened fire with their guns targeting the Minazuki. The Japanese scattered, prompting a chase, but it fell into nothing by midnight. In the end the Americans managed to sink 5 of Tanegashima barges. With that the Japanese had successfully completed operation Se-Go rescuing 4000 men in the second stage, for a near total of 10,000 men in all. The Japanese had truly proved themselves capable evacuatee’s if that is a word, with the evacuation of Guadalcanal, Kiska and Kolombangara. That's all for the Solomon’s as now we need to venture back to Green Hell. Poor General Adachi’s 18th army was not giving a single break. Just a week after the fall of Lae, General MacArthur’s southwest pacific area had launched two new offensives aimed at the Ramu Valley and Finschhafen. Operation Cartwheel had initially scheduled an offensive against the Huon Peninsula to take place 6 weeks after the taking of Lae, but MacArthur pushed this forward due to intelligence indicating the Japanese were in the process of sending heavy reinforcements from Madang to aid Ramu Valley and Finschhafen. The first objectives for the allies were Kaiaput and Dumpu in the Markham and Ramu valleys where airfields could be constructed to help General Kenney extend his arm. Lack of air and naval capability meant the Japanese would be forced to march nearly 200 miles to reach places like Finschhafen with reinforcements, giving MacArthur ample room to hit the port before they could.  Now in the previous episode we saw Brigadier Windeyer successfully land is forces at Scarlet Beach, with the 2/17th advancing further to secure the Song River area; the 2/15th captured Katika and the 2/13th were advancing southwards towards Heldsbach and Tareko. Just like at Lae, the Japanese were taken completely off guard by the landings, prompting General Adachi to order General Yamada to hit the enemy at the most opportune moment while General Katagiri’s 20th division were quickly dispatched on 20 large barges for a coastal advance. Katagiri’s men reached Sio by barge on September 21st and from there he dispatched his 2nd battalion, 79th regiment with 3 machine gun platoons and an artillery company to the Kalasa-Kelanoa area while the rest would concentrate around the Sio area until september 30th. Yamada ordered his forces to concentrate at the Sattelberg mountains, a important point 1000 meters above sea level which dominated the Finschhafen area. It was hoped holding such a point would allow a launching pad for future counter offensives. Meanwhile Windeyer ordered the 2/15th battalion to lead an advance towards the Bumi river while the 2/13th consolidated at the Heldsbach plantation Launch Jetty area. Yet Wootten also gave Windeyer that task of securing Sattelberg, so he ordered Lt Main’s company of the 2/17th with an additional platoon for the job. On September 24th, Main signaled “Coy less one pl now approx 3 miles along main track and proceeding to Sattelberg. Patrol P.I.B moving ahead of coy”. Sattelberg was an interesting spot to defend. It was initially a 19th century German mission, about 5 miles inland with a height of 3150 feet. It offered a birds eye few of the coastal area making it a particularly important point. Allied intelligence misjudged how inaccessible it was and there was the belief its occupation was merely a method of guarding one's right flank. Yamada’s men were easily able to slip into Sattelberg via the Tirimoro, Gurunkor and Kunawa, this certainly would not be the same case for the allied forces. On September 22, the 22nd battalion had departed Hopoi. They marched through a swampy terrain towards Wideru without opposition. By 8am on the 23rd, they saw their first signs of the Japanese occupation. They also ran into locals who began reporting to them the Japanese had spent the night at Buiengim. At 1:35pm they reached Bua where leading troops had a small skirmish with a Japanese outpost which quickly withdrew. By 4pm part of the Australian forces seized a steep ridge where the track cut around 250 yards east of Bua. When it began to get dark they began to be fired upon from a mountain gun. The fire was coming from an area near the mouth of the Mongi river. Meanwhile the 2/15th battalion were advancing along a coastal track with its leading platoon reaching the mouth of the Bumi by midday. The river looked to be fordable, what they didnt know was two mixed companies of the 85th naval garrison had fortified and wired positions on its southern bank. When the Australians began crossing they were fired upon, prompting Lt Shrapnel to order 6 3 inch mortars to be brought up to support the Bumi crossing. The battalion continued their advance along the foothills of the Kreutberg Range. This was the first time any units of the 9th division apart from the 2/24th battalion and some individual companies had done any hill-climbing on New Guinea. It was a very tough initiation. There was no track and zero water, the force had to cut their way for about 800 yards through dense jungle and then go up a slope so steep that any man carrying a heavy load had to have it passed up to him. Several tin hats clattered down the hillside and the stretcher bearers left all but two stretchers going half way up. The unsexy stuff about war, but terrain can be just as much of an enemy to you and your objective than the actual enemy. They reached the crest of the ridge, took a breather and then began advancing south. The next day the 2/13th began to join them, allowing the 2/15th to move off towards the Bumi. However to their amazement, upon reaching the river at 10am, they found it unoccupied on the southbank. Barbed wire was seen, but no Japanese. Then as they advanced some more they were fired upon, it was a deception. A company led by Captain Snell was ordered to cross the river to create a beachhead on the opposite bank. The men entered the waist deep water further down, seeing one man killed by enemy fire. Bullets were flying around as the Australians were providing cover fire. As the men crossing went further down they found an area not occupied by the enemy and formed a bridgehead. From there more men were able to safely get across. However the position under pouring rain forced the Australians to improvise. They had a supply issue and needed better access, so they cut a track around the foothills to the bridgehead positions. The difficulty was that the rain had really begun to kick in and it was causing enormous delays. Windeyer ordered a jeep track to be established from the coastal track due north of Kamloa to the bridgehead to compensate. A platoon of the 2/3rd pioneers and some men of the 2/17t7, 2/13th and 2/15th were employed to carry supplies along the current path until the track was made to their misery.   On September 25th Lt Mair led a patrol of the 2/13th out to deal with some troublesome enemy mortars to the east. At around 9am they found a Japanese outpost 20 feet above them. They were fired upon losing 2 men dead and 4 wounded. The enemy was firing from some bunkers and foxholes with barbed wire coming up from the river. Other patrols were made prodding the area as the 2/3rd field company and the pioneers of the 2/15th finished cutting the new jeep track. When the track was completed, Windeyer ordered the men to not advance south of the Bumi for another two days to allow more supplies to be brought up near the river crossing. Back over at Scarlet beach, Japanese aircraft were striking them early in the morning as allied aircraft hit airfields on New Britain. At 12:30pm on September 24th, a Japanese airforce of 12 bombs and 20 Zeros hit Australian positions at the north end of the airstrip. Artillery pieces that had been pounding Kakakog and the Salankaua plantation areas were hit hard. 60 or so bombs were dropped leading to 18 gunner casualties and the 2/3rd field company had 14 deaths and 19 wounded. Despite the airstrikes, by September 25th there was something worse to worry about emerging from the west. After the 2/17th began its advance to Sattelberg which Papuan infantryman had reported was unoccupied, it soon became apparent this was false. After passing 800 yards beyond Jivevaneng, the same papuan infantry could visually see the Sattelberg area was anything but unoccupied, it was heavily fortified. Now the 2/17th were still on the merry way to Sattelberg none the wiser, in fact they reached Jivevaneng and mistook it to be Sattelberg, not realizing they had to cross a place called Coconut Ridge to get to Sattelberg. Windeyer received brand new reports from the Papuans that Sattelberg was heavily fortified while simultaneously the 2/17th vanguard patrols ran into some forward defensive lines around Sattelberg. The 2/17th patrols were hit hard by mortars and grenades forced to pull back quickly. Windeyer decided he was stretched to thin in the area so he ordered everyone to pull back to Jivevaneng. The Japanese now saw the Australian presence on the Sattelberg Road, General Yamada planned an offensive against Heldsbach to cut the enemy off north of Arndt Point. Meanwhile by 2pm, Colonel Grace of the 2/13th was ordered to seize Snell’s Hill a high ground southeast of the bridgehead. By 9am some platoons were patrolling the area, when Lt Webb’s platoon ran 400 yards into a Japanese position sitting on a Spur controlling a track from Tirimoro. Lt Webb reported it in prompting Colonel Grace to call in for support. The men would be facing around 150 men of Yamadas 85th naval garrison.   Two companies of the 2/15th took up the job and would begin by literally falling and tumbling 150 yards from their assembly line. They were tripping over vines, bamboo and heavy timber descending down a valley. When they got 450 yards from the slope of Snell’s Hill they were pretty exhausted. However Yamada’s naval troops gave them no time to take breath as they began lobbing grenades down at them. Luckily the grenade shower was rather ineffective. The Australians used cover fire as they could not hope to toss grenades them themselves lest they tumble back down upon their charging men. The Australians charged up the slope bayonets fixed and as they came to its summit, many of the Japanese turned and fled. Sergeant Fink took his men through a kunai patch to try and hit the Japanese rear, managing to clear some machine gun nests in the process. During his sweeping maneuver 10 casualties were inflicted upon the Australians. Finks men drew a lot of the enemy fire, relieving pressure from the others who led a frontal and left wing attack. Over on the left wing Captain Stuarts men charged through some kunai grass overrunning two 13 mm machine gun nests. 40-50 Japanese panicked upon seeing this and ran back to an observation post. Soon the Australian platoons began to consolidate and applied pressure. Stuarts advanced in what he termed “an extended line-desert formation, not in a file according to orthodox jungle tactics”. Three 13mm guns were captured, 7 LMGS, a ton of mortars and rifles and 52 Japanese would be buried on the summit. It was an intense actions seeing potentially 100 casualties inflicted by the 2/15th who in return had 3 deaths and 7 wounded.   While the 2/15th had been tackling Snell Hill, the 2/13th tried to cut across the Tirimoro track to another high ground called Starvation Hill. Around 5 minutes after the Snell battle started, some gunfire could be seen coming over from the other high ground. A few platoon of the 2/13th were immediately ordered to check it out. As the men advanced along the Tirimoro track they came across thick vegetation along the slope going up to Starvation Hill. Companies 7 and 8 of the 238th were defending Starvation Hill and they held a great field of fire looking down. The men began to crawl through it going up along the slope. Men were on their hands and knees going through thick bamboo, the progress was slow and noisy because the bamboo would make sharp snapping sounds. The two leading platoons took what cover they could as a storm of fire erupted. Japanese LMG’s were opening up forcing the Australians to try and pull back safely 150 yards and hunker down for the night. 9 men were cut down during the mayhem.  Over in the north, Yamada ordered the 3rd battalion, 80th regiment to hit Scarlet Beach. Enroute to Scarlet beach was Major Pike’s company of the 2/17th who were guarding the approaches to the beach from Katika. Pike had sent a small patrol out and 2500 yards to the west they ran into patrols of Yamada’s force. At around midday, 30 Japanese attacked a position west of Katika held by Lt McLeod. Two Japanese were killed, including an officer who had a marked map and what looked like an operation order on him. To the south Windeyer received a report of what was going on and ordered Pike to send out a stronger patrol to hit and locate the enemy so their artillery could fire upon them. A platoon went out in the afternoon and after 2000 yards or so found the enemy and ordered the artillery fire in. The platoon was met with heavy fire, leading Sergeant Brightwell to be shot dead as the men pulled back to Katika. Thus Yamada’s plans to hit Scarlet Beach quickly dissolved into back and forth patrol skirmishes in the Sattelberg and Katika areas.   The new threat to the west, forced Windeyer to request reinforcements. Reluctantly, General MacArthur and Admirals Barbey and Carpender authorized the sending of reinforcements to an area they had assumed had a small enemy presence. General Herring met with Barbey aboard the Conyngham informing him Finschhafen would required an additional brigade. Barbey declined to transport the extra troops to Finschhafen on the grounds it was against MacArthurs orders. Apparently MacArthur’s planners felt that Finschhafen was going to be a pushover and they had pretty much considered the operation won and down already. Herring then asked Carpender to help transport the additional units, but was amazed to discover that the Americans would not comply unless the matter went first to MacArthur. None the less Carpender planned to transport the units via small craft staging out of Lae when Finschhafen was cleared. Then Windeyers urgent requests for reinforcements came in, indicated things were not won and down and Finschhafen had not fallen. Herring then sent a secret signal to Blamey and MacArthur pleaded for additional help, which finally secured him the 2nd battalion of the 43rd regiment by the end of the month. Back over at Jivevaneng on the 27th telephone lines to Zag were suddenly cut and one of hte 2/17th’s patrols made contact with the Japanese. The 2/17th at Jivevaneng opened fire with artillery  upon the Sattelberg area and along the main track. Then after dusk a platoon of screaming Japanese apparently screaming Tojo charged the Jivevaneng defensive lines. 6 of them were killed in the attack. Windeyer ordered what became known as the Sattelforce, two companies of the 2/17th led by Lt Main and Lt Pike to take control of the Sattelberg track and the tracks leading back to the beachhead. On the 28th, Sattelforce began probing, but between 3-8pm a company of Japanese made three consecutive attacks against them. All the attacks were coming from the front and left flank, seeing screaming Japanese charging madly upon them. Main’s company was soon running low on ammunition and they feared a dawn attack was approaching. Main estimated the enemy had suffered up to 60 casualties at this point. During the morning of the 29th, Main’s assumption about a dawn attack came true, as they were hit by a Japanese platoon, but after this the Japanese retired. Main’s men found 30 dead Japanese after performing a intense defense in a rather isolated position. The 2/43rd battalion landing at Scarlet beach at 3:30am and their commander Lt Joshua was immediately ordered “you will relieve the troops known as Sattelforce…This relief to be completed as speedily as possible to enable 2/17 battalion to concentrate for operations against Finschhafen”. 13 Hours later they did just that. On september 27th, Windeyer ordered the 2/13th to exploit the gains made by the 2/15th to capture Kakakog, while the 2/15th would attack the Salankaua Plantation. Back over at Starvation Hill, Mortar Sergeant Chown led a patrol, getting as close as possible to the hill. A telephone wire was carried up and Chowne found himself an observation point at the edge of a bamboo patch, just 20 yards or so near the Japanese. Despite being dangerously close to the enemy, he directed 3 inch mortar fire down upon them. He only had 15 mortar bombs, thus this led him to be so critical with his positioning. Before firing them off he sent word to the other Platoon leaders that an attack could be made. A platoon led by Sergeant McVey advanced to the edge of the bamboo ready to pounce. Chown lined up McVeys men called the mortar fire and they charged up the slope. The Japanese were caught by complete surprise seeing the enemy suddenly on top of them. Many of the Japanese fled at the offset, thus Starvation Hill was captured with pinpoint precision. Unbeknownst to the Australians, the only Japanese atop Starvation were rearguards as the 7th and 8th companies of hte 238th regiment had already withdrawn over to Sattelberg that morning. The next day, the 2/13th made their way cautiously over to Kakakog. Their objectives were three demolished buildings known as the “triangle” and the remains of the Kakakog hospital designated “the city”. These were found on the west and east ends of Kakakog respectively. D Company led by Lt Cribb and A company led by Lt Cooper crossed over a spur on their way to hit the triangle. Cribb took the left and Cooper the right as they advanced upon the objective. They were met with a heavy bombardment, but the aim was apparently so bad the men joked “we were under more danger from falling coconuts than the gunnery itself”. Their attack only got 300 yards past Snell’s Hill by september 29th. The next day the men continued to advance, and now the enemy’s artillery took a toll upon them causing them to halt. Two other companies led by Lt stuart and Colbin were penetrating east of the Ilebbe Creek without any opposition. They got within 50 yards of the Salankaua Plantation but had to cross a bridge to close the distance. To ford the river was just as dangerous as attempting the bridge leading the companies to launch smaller patrols to prod out options. It quickly became apparent by the late afternoon the element of surprise was lost. Luckily for the frustrated men, the Salvation Army and YMCA were up with the troops. The religious and welfare organizations looked after the mens physical and spiritual comfort. After the war there were few Australian ex-soldiers who would not put a coin in a Salvo’s box when it was passed around the pub or street corner, as it brought back memories of their aid during the fighting. One soldier who fought across the Bumi wrote  “Another army came down to the Bumi—its weapons a coffee urn, its captain a Good Samaritan. Proudly he hoisted his unit's flag… He came not to reproach us for past sins or preach of the men we might have been. It is ideal, practical Christianity; he succoured the wounded and sick, revived the tired and weary; his was a happy little half-way tavern for those that passed.”   The next day, the 2/17th were relieved and would advance south, while the 2/13th came up for another assault against Kakakog. At 6:20am Colvin reported back to Windeyer there was going to be delays as the men needed to first take some higher ground. Windeyer back over in Scarlet beach decided he would come over to see it for himself. In the meantime some patrols were poking around the Triangle and to their surprise they saw no sign of the enemy. When Windeyer arrived it was decided the men would attack from the northwest. The 2/13th hit the Triangle while the 2/17th hit Salankaua plantation. On October 1st they were supported by an aerial strike at 11am followed up by artillery. For some reason know one ever found out why, this all began at 10:35am instead. 10 Vultee Vengeances and 8 Bostons bombed and strafed Salankaua plantation and Kakakog, doing little damage, but keeping the Japanese hunkered down. As the aircraft disappeared the infantry had run to their assembly points just in the nick of time to be ready to advance under artillery barrage. When one platoon got 250 yards near the City, grenades and mortar fire occurred. The australians could now see the enemy was hiding in the area and waiting for them to advance. As men forded the Ilebbe creek they were fired upon heavily suffering a few casualties before the men dispersed for cover. Instead of continuing across many changed direction and joined the assault upon the Triangle. The Australians were getting pinned down in every sector, seeing men trying to hide behind anything they could. The situation seemed desperate, then suddenly Lt Crawford took charge of the situation and organized a bayonet fixed direct attack across the Ilebbe. Crawford ordered the men to toss their grenades over the top of two platoons charging over the creek in an attempt to rush the enemy post on the other side. One Private Rolfe stood up at the bank of the creek and began firing his Bren from the hip providing wild cover fire. The men charged over the creek, being fired upon by Japanese snipers from tree tops. Despite their firepower, the Japanese were unable to stop the bayonet charge as the Australians ran them down. Crawford was wounded during the action, but they practically annihilated the entire outpost, bayonetting many Japanese. Due east of them near the Salankaua plantation, the men began to take out the tree top snipers. 12 2 inch mortars helped keep the pressure and momentum going. The Creek area was secured seeing 50 dead Japanese at the cost of 27 Australians. With the Ilebbe Creek cleared out, the pressure increased against the Triangle and City. Artillery was raining down upon them, likewise heavy fire was coming back from Kakakog ridge. By 3pm the Australians found themselves pinned down again. Yet again they had to halt their attack and dig in for the night as they had 10 deaths and 70 wounded, though they estimated that they had killed between 80-100 Japanese atop Kakakog ridge. The casualties would force the Japanese to abandon the Salankaua plantation. Meanwhile  after advancing to Kasanga, the 22nd battalion was able to seize Timbulum and Logaweng without opposition and were now preparing to cross the Mape River. On October 2nd, the 2/13th would find Kakakog ridge abandoned, but they very cautiously checked every nock and cranny upon it expecting Japanese ambush. A forward patrol went to the triangle and saw signs of an evacuation, numerous dead Japanese and abandoned equipment everywhere. The 2/17th likewise found the mouth of the Bumi unoccupied and easily secured a bridgehead before finding Salanakaua plantation unoccupied as well. With the enemy gone, the 2/15th were set forward towards Simbang and the 2/17th towards Kolem. With that, Finschhafen had fallen. It was a bitter fight, but by early October it was evident the enemy were yielding the coastal stip to assemble further west at the peak of Sattelberg which dominated the entire area. The 2/17th had already found out the hard way what it was to approach Sattelberg, and now the 2/43rd were trying to rescue one of their companies pinned down at Jivevaneng. Though Finschhafen was theirs, it was by no means secure. Papuan infantry and friendly locals were sending reports the Japanese were entering the wareo-sattelberg area from the north. The cost for this victory had been 73 Australians killed, 285 wounded and 301 sick. To the west at Kaiapit, the Australians were consolidating their position along the Markham valley and preparing to resume their advance on Ramu. Brigadier Dougherty’s brigade were flown over to Kaiapit to relieve King’s valiant commandos. Meanwhile General Nakai ordered the Saito unit to infiltrate and raid the Australians position. The 80 men of the Saito unit were led by Captain Morisada who organized his men into 4 smaller attack groups. Back on September 23rd, 3 Saito groups carried out their first operation, successfully blowing up the billet of a commanding officer and setting fire to a entire kunai patch that delayed an Australian advance. Meanwhile the bulk of the Nakai detachment withdrew back to the Ramu valley where they established fortifications at the Kankirei Mountains. Kankieri means “summit of joy” and was named so on June of 1943 when troops of the 20th division reached its peak to look down upon Ramu valley, cheering as they did because they had just completed the road from Madang. However by late september the Australians now looked to be approaching said road to Madang.   By the 23rd the 2/16th battalion captured Antiragen and the Umi river crossing. The next day was quite a handful for them alongside the 2/6th independent company. Both had patrols probing the Sagerak when they ran into some Japanese rearguard. 2 inch mortars and rifles pushed the rearguard to pull back and soon some patrols were moving on towards Narawapum. Meanwhile a papuan company was patrolling its northern foothills trying to find a fast route for the Australians to take to catch up to the Japanese in the Boana-Wantoat areas. Around midday the 2/16th and 2/6th were crossing the Umi to secure some high ground south of Sagerak. They clashed with around 20 Japanese carrying full packs in the Narawapum area causing them to flee. All of these Japanese forces were from the 1st battalion, 78th regiment, struggling to estalbish decent delaying actions.    General Vasey then appointed a new objective, Dumpu, where he hoped to catch General Nakano’s men whom he assumed were retreating up the Ramu Valley towards Bogadjim. In reality, Nakano’s 51st division were withdrawing through the Saruwaged Range, whose track deteriorated as it went up the upper reaches of the Sanem river. Private Kitamoto who was traveling with the 51st would recall “After we escaped the clutches of the enemy we were confronted by nature. Here the living had to walk across the dead to stay on the track. Using the dead bodies as stepping stones and clinging to the slippery lichen covered rocks, the men made their way up the mountain. Fresh red blood ran from the mouth of the dead when they were stepped on and their glassy eyes stared us in the face. Approaching 4000 meters, the cold bit hard into the light summer uniforms the soldiers wore but the exhausted men could not stop to sleep or they would freeze to death. The screaming voices of the men who slipped from the log bridges to their death in the canyons below, and the wailing cries of the men who could move no more and were asking for help. It was a sense of hell, something quite out of this world.’   Under the belief there was a strong enemy presence covering the withdrawal, possibly the full 20th division, Dougherty decided to order the 2/16th back across the Umi river on september 25th. At the same time, Nakai had ordered the bulk of his 78th regiment to take up a position in the Gurumbu-Kankirei area;  for the 1st battalion, 26th field artillery regiment to defend the seashore in the Erima area; and for the 2rd battalion 78th regiment to advance into the Yokopi mountain area to defend Kesawai. Meanwhile the last battalion of the 21st brigade had just arrived to Kaiapit, so Vasey ordered Brigaider Eathers 25th brigade to be the next one flown in.  General Herring had decided to place the Bena Force under Vasey’s command, which was ordered to cross the Ramu and assault Dumpu and Kesawai. For the next few days, heavy patrolling was conducted at Dumpu, the upper Ramu valley, Kaiapit, Sagerak and eventually past the Umi. Patrols would find no enemy at Kaiapit, nor Sagerak, this prompted Dougherty to believe there were no enemy east of the Umi. On september 28th, Dougherty ordered the 2/16th battalion to recross the river and successfully began occupying Sagerak as the rest of the brigade made their way over after. On the 29th, the 21st brigade were advancing west, taking Wankon Hill and Marawasa facing no opposition. On that same day, some Australian commandos of the Bena Froce led by Captain Dexter were advancing west of Kesawai where they established a new abmush position. The Australians tried to lure the Japanese to the ambush area with 3 men boldly coming over to the Japanese base, drawing their attention. The 3 men ran back to the ambush position and wondered if it worked, and soon 60 Japanese appeared. Their commanding officers were within 30 yards of the ambush are, when the Australians opened fire. The Australians had taken a semi circle position and the effect was like “a reaper’s sycthe”. A larger group of Japanese then rapidly came over once they heard the gunfire and the Australians were soon running low on ammunition. Dexter was wounded, another man was killed, so they began a quick withdraw, racing back for the Ramu in broad daylight. While this was going on Eathers forces were beginning to assemble at Kaiapit.  On September 30th, Dougherty’s units advance to the Gusap River which divided Markham and Ramu. In the battalions report of the crossing of the Gusap, they described it as such "It was a complete surprise to most of the battalion to learn that during the day's march—actually just before reaching Arifagan Creek—they had crossed the divide between the Markham and Ramu River basins. The divide was impossible to pinpoint on the ground as the gradients were imperceptible. The only visible indication that a divide had been crossed was that rivers were now flowing in the opposite direction from the Markham drainage basin." It was at this point Vasey realized he might not be facing the full strength of the 20th division as he received a report Wootten was apparently fighting them over at Finschhafen. Upon looking over the matter, Blamey and Herring decided to not heavily commit to Markham and Ramu Valleys, but instead prioritize the battle for Finschhafen. The commanders met at Lae on October 1st, where Herring agreed to allow Vasey to push towards Dumpu, but he would not allow him to remove the whole of two independent companies from the Benabena plateau. Vasey  ordered Dougherty and Eather to concentrate on the Gusap area and for the 2/7th independent company to scout the Bumbum area. God I love new guinea.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Japanese pulled off another incredible evacuation, similar to that of Guadalcanal and Kiska with operation Se-Go. Over on Green Hell the battle for Finschhafen was turning out not to be a pushover, and it was looking like another major offensive was afoot.   

Last time we spoke about the conclusion to the Lae-Salamaua campaign. Operation postern was unleashed with a bang. The Japanese were taken by complete surprise when the allies landed in the Lae Area. General Nakano frantically withdrew the forces from Salamaua over to Lae having been duped by the allied deception. Despite their fighting withdrawal, the Japanese not only lost Lae to the surprise attack, but ironically lost Salamaua at the same time. It was a race for the allied divisions to see who would seize both objectives. As the allies marched into Salamaua they realized it was so desolated, it probably would not be of use as a forward base, but Lae would prove extremely beneficial. Ultimately Nakano managed to get 8000 or more men out of the mayhem, now marching north for salvation, but the allies were not done yet. This episode is Huon Peninsula Offensive Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    Before we venture back to the boys on Green Hell, there had been some developments in the Solomons. On September 18th, Admiral Wilkinson brought over the first units of General Barrowcloughs 3rd division, the 35th and 37th battalions of the 14th brigade. They were brought over to Les Gill’s plantation located at Joroveto north of Barakoma and they landed without any conflicts. Unbeknownst to them however, Admiral Sakamaki had launched an airstrike of 12 vals and 48 zeros. Luckily the allies tossed an interception in the form of 17 F4U Corsairs, 6 Hellcats and 4 P-40’s which ran into them just over Baga island as Admiral Wilkinsons escorts force of 7 destroyers were making their escape. The air battle spread towards the east where the landing area was, but no shipping was damaged as the allies claimed to have knocked out 15 enemy aircraft at the cost of 3 Corsairs. Once he got ashore, Barrowclough assumed command of the Northern Landing force and set up his HQ on the eastern coast of Vella Lavella. In response, Wilkinson spread his fighter cover more thinly and scattered his LSTs away from Barakoma’s anti-aircraft guns. On September 25th a large convoy carrying the 30th battalion, 14th brigade and some marines and Seabee units arrived at Ruravai. They began establishing an advance Marine base for an upcoming operation against Bougainville. This prompted Sakamaki to launch another air strike, this time of 8 vals and 40 zeros. Brigadier General James Moore had roughly 20 fighters to cover the convoy, but some of the vals managed to slip past them. At 11:13, 12 Hellcats intercepted the enemy, leading to dogfights with the Zeros, but two minutes later the Vals had come out from hiding in front of the sun. The vals were targeting the IMAC landing site at Ruravai where the 77th seabees had been clearing a beach area. The marines had some 40mm guns already set up when the Vals struck. Two bombs hit LST-167 forcing it vessel to beach itself while the rest of the bombs scattered across the beach killing 32 men and wounding 58. Sakamaki followed this up with another air strike on October 1st consisting of 8 vals and a dozen zeros again against Ruravai. The 1st marine parachute battalion was landing at the time, as Sakamaki’s bombers successfully evaded allied rader and fighter patrols to hit the LSTs. LST-334 took a hit and near miss causing damage but no casualties. LST-448 was hit twice leaving her bursting into flames, killing 52 men with many more wounded. LAST-448 was hit again leading to her sinking while under tow. It was some pretty devastating air strikes, but it was also to be the last as the Japanese were in the midst of evacuating their troops from New Georgia and the 26th air flotilla was withdrawing from Buin. To the northwest, Fijina commandos ha discovered the Horaniu defense force were now scattered in an area between Tambala Bay and Marquana Bay. Barrowclough decided to order Bridagider Leslie Potter’s 14th brigade to take out the enemy there. Potter planned to take the 35th battalion and his HQ up the western coast to Matu Soroto Bay while the 37th battalion would land at Doveli cover on the northern coast, hoping to trap the Japanese between both forces. On September 21st, Captain Tsuruya Yoshio had just arrived from Buin to take command of the rather disorganized Vella Lavella forces and began concentrating at Marquana Bay establishing a defensive perimeter. Potter’s forces successfully landed at the designated points by september 24th and prepared their advance for the next day. Meanwhile Admiral Samejima and Kusaka were planning the evacuation of Kolombangara. To help them General Imamura was tossing over Major General Yoshimura Masayoshi’s 2nd shipping detachment alongside 30 barges. Plans were quickly formed back in early september for Yoshimura to carrying out the evacuation in two stages beginning on September 28th and October 20th via the Choiseul route. Admiral Ijuin proposed using the 8th fleet destroyers for both transport and cover. Kusaka approved the plans and granted an additional 6 destroyers for Ijuins task, taken from the combined fleet, while also arranging some air cover from Sakamaki over Choiseul. The operation designated Se-gō, was mostly complete. Yoshimure assumed command over the Barges designated the 17th army sea battle unit, while under command of Samejima. He would have ultimately at his disposal 70 barges. Yoshimura had armed the barges usually with heavy machine guns and trained the crews to expect attacks from American destroyers and PT boats. He also outfitted them with repair tools. One of the largest problems he faced was how to move 70 barges and 9 small naval vedettes to the forward bases while keeping them hidden from enemy aircraft. The NGAF would confirm this problem on September 20th, when 8 Corsairs were patrolling and came across some barges. They managed to destroy 5 out of the 8 they found. Yoshimura recalled “it was an inauspicious start to the operation”. But he carried on none the less. Leaving buin on september 23rd, they arrived at Sumbe Head by the 25th where the 8th fleet sent a detachment of the Kure 7th to establish a base of operations. Kusaka flew into Vila to meet with General Sasaki and Admiral ota, landing in the midst of exploding shells. To prepare for the withdrawal Sakai had established 3 boarding points along Kolombangara; Jack harbor, Tuki point and Hambare harbor. At the same time he tried to conceal his intentions by increasing patrols and firing off the Yokosuka 7th guns against the enemy. Alongside this he had demolition teams blowing up all the airfield installations, which was mingling with General Barker’s artillery. Construction units were beginning to cut trails to the boarding points. Against them was Admiral Halsey who held intelligence indicated the Japanese were planning to either reinforce or evacuate Kolombangara. Halsey send Admiral Merrills task force 39 to move up the Slot while Admiral Wilkinsons destroyers would swing south up Vella Gulf with the objective of catching the enemy between them. Halsey called it a “mouse trap”. On september 25th however, both the USS Columbia and Clevland reported sighting torpedo wakes, indicating a possible submarine force prompting Halsey to pull back the cruisers before the mousetrap was sprung, leaving only Wilkinsons destroyers to pounce on the evacuating Japanese. But thats all for the solomon’s for now as we are jumping back to Green Hell. Salamaua and Lae had fallen. General Adachi was now determined to hold the Finisterre range, the Ramu Valley and the Huon Peninsula. He ordered Nakai detachment consisting of the 78th regiment less one company and a battalion of the 26th field artillery regiment led by Major General Nakai Masutaro to take up a position at Kaiapit. Masutaro’s boys were to try and help halt the enemy pursuing General Nakano’s fleeing 51st division. To make matters worse, although the original orders were for the fleeing men to carry their weapons, the Japanese progressively began to abandon their equipment as they fled. Rifle ammunition was the first to go, followed by helmets, then rifles. Kitamoto Masamichi ordered his engineers to gather as many of the abandoned rifles as they could and use their files to erase the chrysanthemum insignia off them. For those of you who don’t know, the chrysanthemum is the symbol of the emperor, so they were going to literally waste time and resources to mitigate what they thought was a disgrace. Men also dropped rice, personal belongings, clothes, whatever they had to in order to survive. The logical thing to do is survive, not take time to file off the symbol of your emperor off the rifles. Major Shintani’s 1st battalion of the 80th regiment apparently carried all their weapons across the Saruwaged, including 4 heavy machine guns. Shintani had told his men “the soldier who abandons his arms will be shot to death”. Shintani actually died during the crossing of the Saruwaged, but his men carried on his orders. Some of you might know already, but I am a Dad Carlin fanboy and he said it quite right in his piece on the pacific war about the Japanese. They did everything to the extreme. You just don’t see the same radical behavior from the other belligerents of WW2. I find we often mock the Japanese naivety about believing their spirit would overcome the material difference, but by hell come high water they tried. They marched north via the Markham valley while General Katagiri’s 20th division was sent to help defend Finschhafen. The Japanese had to shuffle their strategic plans at this point. Thus far they had not regarded the losses of Guadalcanal and Buna-Gona as irretrievable, always believing a decisive victory could be obtained allowing for their recapture. Now after losing Lae-Salamaua, the central solomons and the Aluetians, a brutal realization had dawned on them. With a new thrust into the central pacific, they now saw their perimeter was overextended and they needed to withdraw it. This created what became known as the absolute zone of national defense also called the absolute defense line. Tokyo drew the new perimeter line from western New Guinea through the Carolines to the Marianas, leaving most of the southeast area on the outpost line. The main goal was to build strong fortifications along the perimeter while General Imamura and Admiral Kusaka held the enemy at bay as long as possible.  General Imamura kept his 38th division to defend Rabaul and dispatched the 65th independent mixed brigade to Tuluvu. The 65th were ordered to develop a shipping point there and to maintain its airfield. Back on September 5th, Imamura sent Major General Matsuda Iwao to assume command of all the forces at Tuluvu which at that time consisted of the 65th brigade and the 4th shipping detachment, thus together they would be designated the Matsuda detachment. They were going to defend the coasts of western New Britain. Lt general Sakai Yasuchi’s 17th division were dispatched from Shanghai to Rabaul to reinforce New Britain while Lt General Kanda Masatane’s 6th division were sent to Bougainville to defend it at all dost. The 2nd battalion, 238th regiment would defend gasmata and the 51st transport regiment were deployed at Lorengau in the Admiralties. Now back over with the allies, when Lae was captured with such ease, this caused General Douglas MacArthur’s HQ to revise the Cartwheel schedule. Originally it was planned to hit Finschhafen, the primary Japanese base for barge traffic. This was supposed to occur around 6 weeks after the fall of Lae. But like I said, because of Lae’s quick capture, combined with some intelligence indicating the Japanese were heavily reinforcing Finschhafen and the Ramu Valley, MacArthur decided to order and immediate operation to secure the villages of Kaiaput and Dumpu in the Markham and Ramu valleys and to construct airfields for Kenney. Allied intelligence indicated the number of Japanese defending the immediate area of Finschhafen was roughly 350 men, providing MacArthur and his staff some optimism. It would be later discovered General Adachi had 5000 available men there. On September 17th MacArthur ordered Admiral Brabey to begin amphibious attack plans for Finschhafen to commence as soon as possible. The Markham and Ramu valleys were like a giant corridor some 115 miles long running from southeast and northwest, separating the Huon Peninsula from the rest of New Guinea. From end to end of the river corridor were large mountains rising on the north and south. The valley itself was flat kunai grass land, very suitable for airfields.  General Vasey’s 7th division were earmarked to advance along the Markham and Ramu valleys as far as Dumpu. Dumpu would provide General Kenney with airfields required to isolate the Huon Peninsula. From there Kenney could hit Japanese supply convoys moving between Madang, Wewak and Hansa Bay. Meanwhile General Wootten’s 9th division were given the task of amphibiously assaulting Finschhafen before exploiting along the coast to Sio and Saidor. Yet before any major operations could be unleashed there was still work to be done at Lae. General Milford’s 5th division was given the task of cleaning up Lae so it could become a major forward base of operations. On September 22nd Milford moved his HQ to Lae. The western boundary between the new Lae Fortress and 7th division would be a line running north and south through Nadzab. The southern boundary would go as far as Nassau bay. Milford had the 15th, 29th and 4th brigade at his disposal. Milfords men immediately set to work clearing the interior approaches to the town of Lae against any possible Japanese counterattack while simultaneously aiding in the pursuit of the fleeing Japanese. The successful evacuation by the Japanese of Salamaua and then Lae had shocked the Australian commanders despite the fact they had been informed as early as May of intense Japanese patrol activities along the interior trails. A young Australian officer had earlier reported that the Japanese were surveying interior trails for a possible retreat across the mountains. On September 8th they acquired a order of evacuation document leaving no doubt how the Japanese were going to withdraw north. Mildfords HQ deduced the line of retreat was going to be from the Melambi river, Boana, Melasapipi, Iloka and Ulap. However this would prove to be deception on the part of General Nakano who changed the direction of the march to a steep trail along the east side of the Atzera range towards Sio.  Going back to the Quadrant Conference held in Quebec city between August 17th and August 24th, the allies had decided to make some major changes to Operation cartwheel. The main focus was now shifting to the Central Pacific and the Joint chiefs of staff planned to employ the 1st and 2nd marine divisions. For the southwest and south pacific areas this meant the central thrust was going to take a bunch of warships, transport ships and cargo ships. MacArthur was livid at the idea two marine divisions would basically prevent him from his objective of Rabaul. Thus in Quebec, it was decided to neutralize Rabaul rather than capture it. MacArthur also brought up the question of invading the southern philippines, but received no answer. He feared that even if the idea was approved, it might be handed over to Admiral Nimitz. Thus to bypass Rabaul, MacArthur’s forces would seize Kavieng and the Admiralties. MacArthur would also have to neutralize Wewak and liberate the valuable Vogelkop Peninsula along New Guinea’s northern coast.  Back over in New Guinea, General Nakano’s men were continuing their withdrawal with the Australians in hot pursuit. On September 17th, th 2/14th battalion crossed the Atzera Range to capture Boana. The Japanese 30th independent engineer regiment and 51st engineer regiment were constructing a small bridge across the busu river using jungle wood. General Nakano had rejoined his HQ with the second echelon of men and he had such a rough time marched he had to be carried by four soldiers. On September 18th the 2/24th battalion reached Musom and Gawam. The Japanese defending Markham point had been completely cut off as of september 14th, receiving no supplies from Lae nor any information about the fact Lae and Salamaua had fallen into enemy hands. On the night of september 16th, 100 men of the 2nd battalion 328th regiment evacuated from Markham point, retreating towards to coast trying to get to Salamaua or Finschhafen. On the 18th, Captain Proctors company of the 15ht battalion were at Labu when they saw a group of 30 armed Japanese trying to escape in folding boats across the Labu lagoon. His company fired upon them forcing the Japanese to quickly row away and flee into the jungle. At 5:10am the next day the Japanese returned to attack Proctors company, trying to break out of what had become an encirclement. Three consecutive attacks were made, with the third reaching the edge of Proctors defensive perimeter when the fighting fell into hand to hand combat. The Japanese were driven off after they had 13 deaths, including their commanding officer. The rest of the Japanese would disperse into the jungle or die to future mop up operations. The next day Boana was taken and now the 2/14th were being held up by a Japanese rearguard on the upper reaches of the Busu. On September 20th, Nakano’s first echelon finally crossed the Busu river and by the 22nd the other 3 echelons did likewise. In pursuit, a platoon of the 2/24th began to hit the Japanese at Kwapsanek, but Wootten’s forces ultimately failed to catch the Japanese rearguard. In the end the Australians prepared to launch a new offensive against the Ramu valley and Finschhafen, the pursuit units were gradually called back allowing Naknao’s men to reach the north coast almost unmolested. General Blamey predicted the remnants of the enemy would need “to escape the hardship of the mountain tracks”. I believe he was quite right on that one. The men of Colonel Watanabe’s 14th field artillery regiment continued their march going up the range carrying their single mountain gun towards Lumbaip and then Kemen. Kane Yoshihara noted the officers and men “clung on to the rocks with truly formidable spirit”. General Nakano recalled “I was deeply stirred by their sense of responsibility but could not overlook their suffering”. Nakano ordered the last of the regiments guns to be abandoned. He recalled “the gunners with tears in their eyes, bade a formal farewell as they did so”. Colonel Watanabe would survive the trek alongside 280 of his men. There was a saying amongst the Japanese armed forces that “Java is heaven, Burma is Hell, but you never come back alive from New Guinea”. An American soldier once referred to New Guinea as ‘a green hell on earth”. The conditions were so horrible a veteran of the 32nd division went on the record to say “If I owned New Guinea and I owned hell, I would live in hell and rent out New Guinea”. Vasey and Blamey decided the next objective would be Kaiapit as they believed Naknao was retreating through the Markham and Ramy valleys. They earmarked Captain Gordon King’s 2/6th independent company to quickly capture the village before the Japanese could get there. On september 17th, King’s company flew over from Port Moresby landed at Sangan on the western bank of the Leron River. Two platoons from Captain John Chalf’s Papuan infantry battalion company also reached the western bank of the leron that day coming overland from Chivasing. They would act as a screen ahead of King’s men. Kings men began their march for Kaiapit and against them would be Major General Nakai Masutaro who had departed from Bogadjim with the 78th regiment on september 7th. He dispatched the 3rd battalion and Morisada company towards Kaiapit while the bulk of his forces advanced towards Nadzab where they planned to hit its airfield. The Takano Platoon, a reconnaissance unit were the only ones able to reach Kaiapit by September 19th just as the Australians were approaching. King have strict orders to the men that no movement was to be on the track to the village itself as it was believed the enemy would be covering such an approach. Instead the men came through kunai patches, bringing their 2 inch mortars close in to hit the enemy. The mortars began to smash the enemy forward positions sending Japanese fleeing or dying at their posts. The Australians then began to pin down the defenders using grenades and rushed their positions. Japanese treetop snipers unleashed hell, but soon the Australians began firing upon the treelines and village huts where they were hiding. The storming of the village was intense and fast seeing 30 dead Japanese and the rest fleeing. King lost 3 men dead with 7 wounded for the assault. The Australians quickly went to work creating a defensive perimeter placing booby traps everywhere they could. Vasey’s decision to swiftly hit the village had paid off big time. The following morning, 300 men led by Major Yonekura Tsuneo arrived to Kaiapit, under the belief it was still in Japanese hands. Just before dawn of September 20th, the Australian commando’s saw the incoming Japanese column and immediately opened fire upon them. The Japanese erupted into pure chaos as men of all ranks bunched up and milled about in confusion. Some of the men could be heard screaming in Japanese “we are Japanese let us through!”. Others soon realized Kaiapit was in Australian hands. Thousand of rounds were fired back at the Australians, but their positions were well concealed. King watched as the confused enemy did exactly what he taught his men not to do, shooting at shadows, wasting ammunition and firing high “In all that enormous activity of firing, nobody got hit nobody got hurt at all”. The situation came as a shock to King as well, because the sheer volume of return fire indicated it was a considerably large force. Some of  King's men wanted to advance, but he advised caution. Platoon leader Watson waited for King’s signal for when he could advance and King recalled “each second seeming like a minute as the Japanese gathered in the half light. Watson was standing up there, looking back to me waiting”. When King dropped his arm, Watson blew his whistle and his men charged. Lt Bob Scott of section 7 recalled “we killed over a hundred Japanese in the first 100 yards”. Scotts group had cut down Yonekura and his command group in the first wave of Australian fire. Lt Bob Balderstone of section 9 sent his men into the right flank as Lt Jack Elsworthy’s section 9 took up the left flank. The Australians had seized the moment and inflicted hellish pain on the Japanese. Watson’s platoon lost 8 men killed, 14 wounded. King tossed another platoon through the right flank to grab Mission Hill which dominated the battlefield. As the men advanced, they drove off Japanese in their path and would seize the deserted hill. Once it was captured the Australians had a bird’s eye view that allowed them to better direct their forces. Seeing the hill secured, Watson judged the time was ripe to continue the advance so he ordered Balderstone and Elsworthy’s sections forward. Balderstone was hiding behind a coconut palm when a bullet nicked his right arm prompting him to scream out “who did that!”. It was not a serious wound, but he was fired up and he yelled to his men to surge forward. Balderstone personally tackled a Japanese machinegunner afterwards. After clearing some machinegun positions below mission hill, the enemy was becoming surrounded. The casualties had become so severe the Japanese began to rout in disorder towards Antiragen and Narawapum. It was an incredible victory for King, they buried 214 Japanese and believed many more were dying or wounded. General Vasey arrived around midday and walked over the corpse strewn battlefield to Mission hill stating ‘My God, my God, my God,’. The scale of the carnage and size of the force against a single Australian company was incredible. Gordon King was resting a wounded leg on a shady spot atop the hill when Vasey approached him. King struggled to get to his feet and Vasey said ‘No, no, sit down,’ But King stood up to talk nonetheless. Vasey told him to get the first available aircraft out before adding, ‘Gordon, I promise that you’ll never be left out on a limb like this again.’ Vasey then returned to his plane, which headed back down the Markham Valley. Some months later, Vasey told King, ‘We were lucky, we were very lucky.’ King replied, ‘Well, if you’re inferring that what we did was luck, I don’t agree with you, Sir. Because I think we weren’t lucky, we were just bloody good.’ For this victory King had lost 14 men dead, 23 wounded, it was something out of a Rambo film. Brigadier Dougherty's 21st brigade were beginning to land at Kaiapit on september 21st. Kings victory allowed Vasey to bring a fresh bridge into position to keep the advance going against Markham and Ramu valleys. The Yonekura battalion had nearly been wiped out to a man, thus General Nakai ordered the 1st battalion to rescue the battered force. Most of the Morisada company were unscathed as they did not engage in the battle at Kaiapit, alongside them were some stragglers left behind and around 40 men who managed to escape the carnage. Aided by the rescue battalion they managed to withdrew back towards Marawasa by September 24th. A volunteer unit was formed under Captain Morisada named the Saito unit, which consisted of around 80 men from the 10th company 78th regiment. They would work as a special infiltration unit who would begin raiding operations. Back over at Lae, Generals, Blamey, Herring and Wootten began to plan their offensive against Finschhafen. Towards midnight on the 17th, Herring arrived to Lae by PT boat for a meeting with Wootten. Wootten had warned Blamey and Herring that he might be required to carry out an attack on Finschhafen at short notice, leading Wooten to order Brigadier Windeyer to look at Finschhafen on the map because it might be of interest to him soon. Before Herrings arrival, plans were already being formed. At 9am of the 18th, Windeyer and his staff attended a 9th division conference at the HQ on the Bunga river. There Herring outlined a plan for the capture of the Finschhafen-Langemak Bay-dreger Harbor area with a quick swoop which would gain control over the eastern coast of the Huon peninsula and thereby Vitiaz strait. Windeyers 20th brigade would be join General Heavy’s 532nd engineer boat and shore regiment and Admiral Brbey’s landing craft armada to perform an amphibious assault against Scarlet Beach. Scarlet beach was on the southern part of the Song River just due north of Finschhafen where it was believed the Japanese would not be expecting a landing. From there it was possible they would be able to cut off the Japanese supply lines. Wootten and Blamey tossed up an additional brigade, but the available crafts: 4 destroyer transports, 15 LCI’s and 3 LSTs were only capable of lifting a single brigade. In the end the decision was made that after the landings, the 22nd battalion would advance round the south coast of the Huon Peninsula to try and deceive the Japanese as to where the real direction of the threat was coming from. Windeyer planned to hit the beachhead with two battalions, the 2/17ths on the right and the 2/13th on the left. Once the beachhead was secured, the 2/15th would advance south along the main road towards Finschhafen. Additionally an expedition would be launched from G Beach on the night of September 21sst to also land at Scarlet Beach the following morning. To support the landings a large air armada of both American and Australian planes would protect the convoy during the daylight. General Kenney would be tossing air strikes against Cape Gloucester with Liberators, while the RAAF hit Gasmata with Kittyhawks and Bostons and Mitchells against Finschhafen. All of the key airfields and supply points between Wewak and Finschhafen would get smashed. Barbeys destroyers likewise would bombardment Finschhafen as well. To meet the boys coming to the beaches was Major General Yamada Eizo commanding the 1st shipping detachment, a naval force based around the 85th naval garrison. Around 1200 men were stationed at Finschhafen, many of them however were barge operators and mechanics. But there were some combat units; Major Shigeru Tashiros 2 battalion, 238th regiment had companies 7 and 8 at Finschhafen with company 5 at Tami islands. Additionally there was the bulk of the 80th regiment coming over from Madang via the coastal road that would arrive just in time to meet the Australian offensive. In the end Yamada’s combat strength would be roughly 4000 men strong. On September 10th, after the allies landings at Lae and Nadzab, General Katagiri marched the rest of his forces from Madang to Finschhafen in a grueling advance along the coast. The first elements of his 79th regiment assembled at Gali by September 21st. Because of all of this, Madang was left pretty much undefended. The 239th regiment was chosen to reinforce the base, departing Wewak on October 3rd. Over in Finschhafen, Yamada began deploying the bulk of his forces at Logaweng; with 4 companies holding the Mongi river’s mouth and two mixed companies of about 50 engineers and 300 naval personnel holding the Bumi river. To the north, Yamada could only deploy company 9th company of the 80th regiment towards the Song River to secure Sattelberg. Looking at it all on paper it seemed the Australians were set to face little resistance. On the afternoon of September 21st, Barbey’s force of 8 LCM’s and 15 LCV’s departed Lae for Scarlet Beach.  Windeyer’s landing plan called for two companies of th 2/17th battalion were going to land on the right beach while two companies from the 2/13th would land on the left. While the rest of the brigade landed, the right companies would hit North Hill and the left companies would hit Arndt Point. Barbey’s convoy arrived off Scarlett Beach at 4:45am and the barges began to lower. After an 11 minute bombardment by destroyers Perkins, Drayton, Smith, Lamson and Flusser the barges began to speed over to the shore. However due to the darkness of the night, the whole wave landed a bit further south than intended and as a result the 4 assaulting companies were landed not only on the wrong beaches but also got mixed with other groups. This caused a fit of confusion as a platoon of the 2/13th drew fire from some machine gun nests near the mouth of the Song River. They quickly engaged the enemy with grenades and small arms, gradually silencing the two enemy posts. When the 2/17th battalion began to become organized in the area the platoon moved further south to rejoin its company. This all resulted in a failure to secure Scarlet Beach, forcing the second wave to veer further left and beach near Siki Cove under heavy enemy fire. But the LCI’s of the 2nd and 3rd waves responded to the heavy fire with their 20 mm guns sending the Japanese fleeing. After that Scarlet beach was secured. Funny enough, if it was not for the misstep landing further south, the operation would have seen more casualties amongst the Australians, as the Japanese machine guns proved to be sited in a deadly position to hit Scarlet Beach. As the remaining waves disembarked, Lt Gibb’s platoon of the 2/17th advanced inland and were soon met by some machine gun nests. Within half an hour of combat, the platoon killed 7 Japanese and sent the rest fleeing. Other platoons of the 2/17th began to advance up the Song River fighting only limited skirmishes. The 2/13th meanwhile were sending two companies towards Siki Cove where they had to clear a few pillboxes taking some Japanese prisoners. Windeyers forces then launched an attack against Katika. Makes me think of the show Vikings haha (do a Floki thing). A company led by Lt Pike passed through Katika at 6:45am, heading for some high ground beyond. There Pike’s men ran into some strong resistance. Another platoon led by Lt Birmingham ran into a Japanese position who tossed a ton of well directed grenades their way killing 3 men and wounding 7. Pike’s platoon stormed some huts seeing the Japanese begin a encirclement maneuver against him. Luckily the encirclement was thwarted with the help of another platoon led by Lt Cribb. Companies of the 2/17th and 2/13th were led by Pike and Cribb respectively and both found themselves close against one another. Cribb informed Pike he would launch a bombardment upon the enemy holding some high grounds allowing Pikes men to make a hook maneuver to hit the enemy. Under the cover of 15 3 inch mortars they hit the Japanese, ultimately taking the village at the cost of many men.  While Scarlet Beaches defensive perimeter was being consolidated, the 2/13th advanced south towards Heldsbac and Tareko as Barbey’s destroyers were attacked by an air strike. 20 bombers, 10 torpedo bombs and 40 fighters had come over from Rabaul to hit the landing beach. Three American fighter squadrons were waiting to intercept them, successfully shooting down 10 bombers and 29 fighters, while losing 3 lightnings. Likewise the destroyers anti aircraft fire managed to take down 9 torpedo bombers, without receiving any significant hits back. Scarlet Beach was now in allied hands. 5300 troops, 180 vehicles, 32 guns and 180 tons of supplies had been landed successfully. The cost amounted to 20 dead australians, 65 wounded and 9 men missing. For the Americans 8 engineers were killed with 42 wounded. Yet again the rapid pace of the allies had caught the Japanese off guard upsetting their plans to reinforce Finschhafen. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The landing at Scarlet beach was a large success. The Japanese had planned to reinforce Finschhafen with 5000 troops, but now they had been caught completely off guard and would only have a fraction of the troops they wanted to support the area. In New Guinea, when it rains it pours.   

Last time we spoke about the unleashing of Operation Postern and the continued advance towards Salamaua. The landings at Lae and droppings at Nadzab went pretty uncontested. Red beach and yellow beach were secured with minimal Japanese aerial raids trying to hinder the movement of men and supplies. defensive perimeters were quickly established and units began their drive towards Lae and Nadzab. Meanwhile the offensive against Salamaua raged on while the Japanese commanders received the shocking news of the landings in the Lae area. General Adachi frantically ordered forces to withdraw from the salamaua area to rush over to Lae’s defense. Meanwhile Shoge and Mukai took the little forces they had and prepared to mount a defense to the death to try and hold back the allies from claiming their ultimate prize. But in the end would it not result in the loss of both?  This episode is Fall of Lae-Salamaua Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  So as we concluded last time, the landings were a success. The Australian 9th Division, transported by five destroyers, landed to the east of Lae on 4 September. Aside from a few air raids from Rabaul it all went unopposed. As Admiral Barbey noted “Unloading of LSTs, each containing 400 men, 35 vehicles and 80 tons of bulk stores was excellent. One LST was unloaded in 1 hour 42 minutes. Unloading of the remainder was completed within 2 hours 15 minutes.”By 10.30 a.m. 7,800 troops and 1,500 tons of stores were ashore. The 503rd parachute infantry regiment dropped at Nadzab pushing small amounts of Japanese forces. And at Salamaua, General Milfords forces held down the bulk of the Japanese troops, who now had to frantically rush over to Lae. General Milford’s 5th division were applying an enormous amount of pressure upon the Salamaua defenses, trying to tie down the bulk of General Nakano’s forces. Despite the frantic orders to withdraw over to Lae, the Salamaua defenders would continue to offer strong resistance against Milford’s attacks as they still wanted to retain Salamaua. North of the francisco river, the Japanese had considerable artillery to support a defense and continued to fire upon the advancing attackers. In response at 5am on september 5th, Captain Dawsons 2/6th field regiment directed their artillery concentration upon Rough Hill and Arnold’s Crest. A patrol of the 58/59th and 2/7th battalions tried to peak at both and were forced back under heavy fire. During the afternoon, the 12th platoon of Lt Albert Farley’s B company attacked the pimple, a prominent feature near the middle of what was being called E ridge. It was a razorback that approached along the Lokanu ridge. It allowed no flanking maneuvers. The platoon was met with australian grenades, it seems the Japanese had stolen at some point. During the night, a detachment of SNLF marines performed a surprising counterattack. They began with a mortar attack before creeping within 10 meters of the Australian lines. According to Keith Ross, the Japanese did not even have bullets in their gun spouts, believing someone might prematurely fire a shot making the enemy aware of their presence. When they got within 10 meters they began to cock their weapons. Ross recalled ‘When they charged the magazines they made a hell of a racket and we realized they were there.’. The Japanese charged with fixed bayonets and were met by a wall of fire, forcing them to withdrew. Over on Charlie Hill Companies 1 and 3 of the 66th regiment led by Lt Usui Genkichi were trapped, so they set up ambush positions to try and cut off the supply lines of A and B companies of the 42nd battalion. As a ration train was moving around the western slopes of CHarlie Hill to supply Greer’s B company, the Japanese fired upon them from a newly established position on a ledge. The next day another ration train was hit 100 yards down the ridge to the west. This prompted Davidson to have the ration trains bypass the ambush areas more widely. Usui then ordered his men to light fires that would burn towards the Australian positions. Using wind, Usui hoped to dislodge the Australians. On the 6th, the 12th platoon maneuvered to cut off the Japanese supply line, but at 5pm a kunai fire forced them out. The 10th platoon rushed over to retake the position but likewise was burned out. The following morning another platoon came over but the Japanese were already there digging in. This little fire trick protected the Japanese from being completely cut off. It was a surprising victory for Usui and worked to prevent the allied supplies from getting through, forcing the assault upon Charlie Hill to a halt. Meanwhile, on September 6th, General Nakano accompanied the 3rd battalion, 102nd regiment with some SNLF marines as they debarked Salamaua aboard 73 barges enroute to Lae. Over at Lae General Shoge and Admiral Fujita were commanding the meager amount of combat forces they had alongside numerous inexperienced non-combatants to try and halt the allied advance. Nakano ordered his forces to commence their withdrawal towards Lae on September 8th. He began by deploying the 1st battalion, 115th regiment at Buang, near the coast north of Malolo to cover the retreat. His forces south of the Francisco river were to pull back across the river while 200 men of the 15th independent engineer regiment would hold the line connecting Yalu and Markham point. Against them, Brigadier Evan’s had established a supply point at G Beach which was on the western mouth of the Burep River. There he had set up the 24th brigade’s HQ and brought up two 25 pounder guns for support. This greatly lessened the supply line to the front.  Meanwhile, Brigadier Whiteheads men were beginning to reach the east bank of the Busu river and General Woottens 2/24th and 2/28th were advancing towards Busu. When Lt Ed Shattock’s platoon of the 2/24th battalion reached the Busu, Shattock was ordered not to cross it. He recalled ‘The Japs were not in position opposite me; we could have done it,’. In reality his force had reached a point on the Busu that held a extremely fast current. Perhaps his best swimmers may have been able to ford it without clothes or equipment, but it would have been dangerous as hell, especially if the Japanese caught them on the other side. Whitehead was eager to cross it, but knew the danger so he waited to bring bridging equipment over. He also ordered the 2/4th independent company over in Burep to advance west through some thick jungle to take a position east of the Busu. Over in the coastal area, Lt Colonel Colin Norman’s 2/28th battalion reached the Busu in the afternoon. They noticed the 3rd battalion, 102nd regiment were assembling at the Busu river line, along with remnants of the 3rd battalion, 115th regiment led by Major Mukai. The river looked to be swollen from recent heavy rains, thus the Japanese likewise needed to build a bridge to get across. Back over at Nadzab, the 871st airborne engineers continued their labor, under terrible torrential rain allowing the 2/33rd battalion to arrive by September 9th. This was the same battalion that underwent the terrible accident when a B-24 liberator crashed on take-off after clipping a branch and rammed into 5 troop trucks full of soldiers waiting to debark. Its 4 500 lb bombs exploded tossing 2800 gallons of fuel in all directions killing 59 and wounding 92. Thus the weakened battalion alongside the 2/25th would begin an advance down the Markham valley towards Lae. They were met with the traditional New Guinea welcome, torrential rain, most of Nadzab’s airtrip was so flooded it delayed the arrival of the 2/31st battalion until September 12th, much to General Vasey’s dismay.  Back over at Charlie Hill, the isolated Japanese were taking advantage of the torrential rain. They began evacuating pill boxes upon the knolls between Charlie Hill and Lewis Knoll. During the night of september 8th the whole of the Charlie-Lewis-Breger hill area would be evacuated. At 9:30am the next day, a mortar barrage began as platoons crossed their start lines on the northern slopes of Charlie hill. 15 minutes later the first platoon managed to occupy the first part of the Japanese perimeter without opposition. The second platoon passed through them and occupied the rest of the perimeter, Charlie Hill was now in Australian hands. Wasting no time, Davidson ordered the B Company now under the command of Captain Ganter to pursue the fleeing Japanese towards Nuk Nuk, which I had to say 3 times before not laughing. God I love New Guinea. At the same time, the 47th battalion also found abandoned pillboxes facing them, so they began a pursuit of the fleeing enemy. Colonel MacKechnies men found the same situation over at Berger Hill. On September 9th the 15th battalion were carrying out a two pronged attack upon the crest of scout ridge. C company came from the Bamboos while D company performed a outflanking maneuver from the enemy’s rear. Both forces had a limited approach area allowing only a platoon front. At 2:40pm the outflanking companies forward platoon reached the crest of Scout ridge finding no opposition. At 3:35 they reached the southwest edge of the Japanese position facing the Bamboo’s and alongside the other companies platoons began an attack. The enemy fired green flares and withdrew upon seeing them leading to only a minor skirmish.  Over on Lokanu ridge, Lt Turner was leading a platoon assault under artillery and mortar support. They attacked the last Japanese strongpoint on its eastern tip overlooking the sea. The Japanese had hastily evacuated the position fleeing into the jungle below, leaving many dead and abandoned a lot of equipment. Further patrols from the Bamboos completely what was becoming a relieving picture, the Pimple and Knoll on Lokanu ridge were abandoned. After a 10 day initiation in the battle area, Lt Colonel Jack Amies commander of the 15th battalion signaled Milford late on September 9th “the 15th now holds line of Lokanu ridge complete from sea at Lokanu to crest of scout ridge”. The brigadiers met on the 9th with Milford who ordered them to speed up the divisions advance so they could give the enemy no respite to reorganize and occupy new positions. Thus the race to Salamaua was on. Brigadiers Hammer and Monaghan began a competition to see who would reach Salamau first. Hammer would state that Monaghan and come in at the “death knock” and Monaghan replied “that Hammer could relax and leave the battle to the 29th brigade who would clean it up for you” Meanwhile General Wootten’s men were preparing to cross the Busu. During the morning their patrols had gone across to find suitable crossing points, but finding none. Over at the coast, one patrol reached a large island, named Rooke’s Island as Lt Rooke led the patrol. The island was in the center of the Busu’s mouth, Colonel Norman ordered Captain Leo Lyon’s A company to attempt a crossing. They sent one platoon across via a sandbank at the mouth, while the remainder of the company covered them with fire from Rook’s island. Captain Leo Lyon watched as two leading scouts moved across the sandbar about 50 meters apart with their rifles over their heads. The lead scout got about 80 meters from the far bank when the Japanese began opening fire from near the mouth of the river on the west bank. Both men fall and were washed out to sea, but one was only wounded and fought his way back through the current to the allied side. Worried by the delays, Wootten ordered his brigadiers to seize some bridgeheads over the Busu. Norman assembled his battalion on the east bank near Rooke’s island and crossed the last channel of the Busu in four extended lines by the late afternoon. After stealthily forded over to Rooke’s island, the 2/28th egan crossing the channel under the cover of 25 pounder fire at 5:30pm. Each company moved to the startline one after another at two minute intervals. It was a very difficult crossing, many were swept off their feet by the fierce current. Many had their weapons snatched from them. As men began to be swept off, they tried grasped for anything on the western bank, like overhanging boughs and kunai. This shocked the Japanese, they had not considered it possible to cross. Most of the Japanese machine guns and grenade launchers were at the mouth point tip and thus when they began scrambling to hit the allies fording the channel it was too late. Norman’s men lost apparently 25% of their weapons crossing and suffered 13 deaths, but they gained Wootten’s desired bridgehead.  On September 9th, at the height of the battle, Admiral Mori arrived at Lae via the I-174. He relieved Admiral Fujita, who would return to Rabaul on the same submarine. He soon discovered most of the navy’s forces were allocated to support tasks while Nakano directed the IJA forces to man the main defenses of Lae. The 2nd machine gun company of the 238th regiment and the 25th machine cannon company were sent to Munum and Ngasawapum to keep the road open to Boana.  Back over at Norman’s bridgehead, some Japanese units crept through some kunai grass to surprise attack them using machine gun and mortar fire. But it was all for naught, as Norman’s C company counterattacked with fixed bayonets charging into a waist deep swamp where the Japanese were hiding. B Company came to support them and gradually the Japanese scattered after 63 deaths while the Australians suffered 21 casualties. Feeling more confident, Evans had the 2/43rd battalion hand over their weapons to be ferried across over to the 2/28th. A LCVP was able to make 40 trips taking some 1200 troops and much supplies over to the west bank of the Busu. To the north, Whitehead’s 26th brigade had been delayed 36 hours waiting for some rubber boats and suitable rope to get their men across. The 2/24th battalion began to work with the engineers to get across the Busu at a place where the river separated into 3 channels around 20, 30 and 14 meters wide. Their currents ran around 25 kms per hour with a depth of over 2 meters. With all the rain, it became apparent the crossing was going to be impossible with the materials on hand. None the less when there is a will there is a way. Warrant officer Bill McCallum and two engineers swam the river with signal wire and managed to drag a rope across, securing it to the west bank. However when they began hooking boats to the rope there soon became swamped, ruining the entire ordeal. Further north the 2/4th independent company managed to bridge and cross the Sankwep river which lay on a junction of the Busu. They soon established an ambush position on the east bank of the Busu near the Kunda bridge. It was at this point General Herring decided to reinforce Wootten with Brigadier Cedric Edgar’s 4th brigade, consisting of the 22nd, 29/46th and 37/52nd battalions. They would take over the beachhead areas after landings were made. They departed Milne Bay in 6 LST’s and 6 LCI’s on September 9th, successfully landing at Red Beach by the night of the 10th. Meanwhile to the north the 2/25th battalion had reached Jensen’s plantation when they were fired upon for the first time. The Australians had taken over 5 days from capturing Nadzab to contact Japanese positions west of Lae and the delay unnerved the Japanese commanders. General Yoshihara would write  ‘The movement of the units which had dropped on Nadzab were very sluggish; if they had attacked with their vast strength, it would have been the hour of death of Lae in a matter of a few hours. It was a piece of good luck in the midst of misfortune’, the Japanese command, although ‘unable to understand the reason’, was given time to bring troops across from Lae and Salamaua to defend the western approaches of Lae.” Thus the Japanese had been given a minor window to retreat some of their forces from Salamaua to Lae. Back over at Salamaua, the heavy rains continued to mask the Japanese retreat across the francisco river, while simultaneously hindering the Australians from crossing it. Brigadier Monaghan’s men managed to reach scout hill. The 15th battalion began their pursuit of the enemy going north east of scout ridge on the 10th. In their rapid advance they managed to kill a few stragglers and secured some high ground overlooking the mouth of the francisco river. Patrols south west of Nuk Nuk linked up with the 42nd battalion. North of the Francisco, Brigadier Hammer began testing enemy defenses at Rough Hill. Captain Jago’s C company of the 58/59th tossed 3 platoons at Rough Hill, Bob Lanes 7th, Ted Griff’s 8th and Arthur O’Rourkes 9th. Each made up up the hill around 50-100 yards before being fired upon and forced to pull out. After this Lewin’s platoon from the 2/3rd independent company fought its way up Savige Spur were they too faced heavy fire and had to pull out. They gradually managed to capture the Savige Spur, leading to an encirclement of the position. Meanwhile the 2/7th battalion along with 3 other companies of the 58/59th and two independent company platoons moved up Sandy Creek. The Japanese launched a counterattack dislodging units from the outskirts of Rough Hill and Arnolds Crest, preparing for a final withdrawal that was set to begin the following night.  Thus when the Australians launched their attack the next day they found an abandoned Rough Hill. To the south, C company of the 15th battalion crossed the overflowing francisco river near its mouth to dominate the isthmus. Davidson’s B company crossed the francisco river in the morning and advanced northeast across the Salamaua airfield without opposition quickly captured Logui I. As the Australians entered Salamaua it appeared to them like a shell. The allied bombing campaigns against Salamaua had been devastating. Private Ted Griff would write “The isthmus was lined with bomb craters.” Private Peter Hemery wrote “not a building is left standing – just an occasional heap of scattered wreckage”. Private Jack Glynn wrote ‘Salamaua was a shambles; a building wasn’t left standing, by the look of the place it was very good bombing.’ The bombing had killed an estimated 200-300 Japanese in Salamaua, many were left unburied leaving a terrible nauseating stench in the air. A great quantity of supplies were discarded or destroyed. Two cargo ships laid offshore, and further down the beach were numerous wrecked barges. The aircraft hangers had roughly 40 damaged aircraft and it looked obvious the airfield had not been used since the 9th division had landed.To be blunt, most of the Japanese stationed there were relieved to depart it. In the end it was Monaghan who won the race. Over to the west, after crossing the river, the 47th battalion advanced unopposed and converged with Hammer’s forces. They soon captured Arnold’s crest, Edwards Spur and launched their first attacks against Kela ridge known as “the hand”. The Japanese had concentrated at Malolo where they were evacuating by barge towards Law on the night of september 11th. To cover them, General Nakano ordered units from the 80th and 238th regiments to defend a last line that ran from the Kela ridge all the way to Malolo. Wootten brought up 14 25 pounders to support the advance. Australian forces now past the Busu began to unleash hell with their artillery. The Japanese command at Lae believed the artillery spelt their doom. Meanwhile the 2/24th battalion had unsuccessfully tried to bridge the busu using some felled logs supported on stone pylons. The men tried to build the bridge placing the felled logs around the large stone pylons and were initially successful when it was just a 20 meter stream. However during the night the river rose and the logs went up with them. The current was so strong the logs that did not rise because they were stuck with the stone just snapped in two. The men had to abandon the attempt. Lt Evans was forced to strip the 2/43rd battalion of their weapons and ferried them over the Busu during the afternoon by rope. Eventually Evans managed to arrange a deal with some American boatmen to lend him an LCVP for a few trips which allowed for his 2/28th fully equipped to get over. Logistics logistics logistics. The 2/28th managed to create a bridgehead with a sigh of relief I imagine. To the north, the 25 pounders were gradually moving closer to hit Lae more accurately. The 2/25th battalion ran into 200 men of the 15th independent engineer regiment who had the unfortunate task of delaying them. The Japanese defensive positions were strung out back along the road behind Whittakers bridge and strongpoints north of Lae airfield known as Heaths, Edwards and Jacobsens. 30 of them were killed outright as the withdrew past heaths plantation. The 2/33rd battalion and 2/2nd pioneer battalion advanced towards Markham point. C company of the 24th battalion launched and attack, beginning by lobbing 126 mortars and 8 rounds of smoke at a point called River Ambush. As the mortar fire ceased the leading platoons surged forward, but the Japanese defenders advanced past the smoke and quickly repulsed the incoming attackers. The next day, the 2/31st battalion arrived to the scene and joined the 2/25th battalion to clear Jenyn’s plantation. They encountered some heavy resistance further down the road at a bridge near Whittakers plantation. The 24th battalion made another attempt against markham point on the 12th. Four platoons hit some southern pillboxes, but were repulsed quite quickly. Lt Richards went on the record to say "that a further ground attack without support will not be successful and application has again been made for a synchronized air and artillery attack." Over on the coast the 2/32nd and 2/43rd battalions had just arrived and Evans directed the 2/28th to continue the advance towards Malahang while the 2/43rd would hit New and Old Yanga. Captain Catchloves company patrolled towards New Yanga while Captain Gordon’s company patrolled towards Old Yanga. During the morning both skirmished and dispersed enemy patrols then at 2:30pm it was reported that New Yanga looked abandoned. At 3:35 Catchlove was organizing an assault against the outskirts of New Yanga when suddenly heavy firing came out from the direction of a hut. The Australians were surprised by this but quickly called in some artillery support from the 14 25 pounders brought up from Red Beach alongside mortars. They hit New Yanga with 525 shells as the infantry tried to storm in but they were met with heavy casualties. They attempted a second assault during the afternoon, but again the Japanese held them back. Back over at the Salamaua area, the Japanese continued their frantic withdrawal as the 5th division began mop up operations. Patrols combed the peninsula finding two naval and two anti aircraft guns, large quantities of unused arms, medical supplies, some wireless transceivers and a portable generator. The Japanese HQ were some well furnished huts, allies found food still on the table, indicating it was a rushed withdrawal. The Japanese had built several camps on the waters edge and inside cave networks. Some patrols found female clothing, lipstick and powder indicating the presence of women, and you can imagine what that was.  The 42nd Battalion would manage to occupy Kela Point; one of Major Warfe’s patrols reached the coast half way between Kela Point and Mission Point; and the 2/7th Battalion would capture the now-abandoned Kidney Hill before continuing forward towards Malolo. The Japanese at Kela ridge continued to fire back upon the enemy performing a bitter fighting withdrawal, until their final evacuation by barge on September 13th. By the 13th the bulk of General Nakono’s 51st division had reached Lae and were now preparing to withdraw even further to the Kiari-Sio area. Nakano had devised two plans to withdraw the Lae garrison; one plan was to go across the Saruwaged Range to the north coast, the other was to go over the foothills of the Finisterre ranges heading west parallel to the Markham valley. Engineering officer Kitamoto Masamichi who knew about both routes was asked to give his opinion and he recalled ‘It was a responsibility too heavy for just a Lieutenant to decide, I thought, but, well aware that Allied aircraft could easily interdict the route through the open kunai of the Markham Valley foothills. The second plan is impossible. The first plan is difficult but there is still some chance of success. I would choose plan one. However, the sacrifice will be great.We should ready our packs as we would retreat over the mountains from 10th to 15th of September,’’ Nakano agreed and issued the withdrawal orders which went out to all units on september 8th.  Beginning on the 12th, the 7th base force main units consisting of Admiral Mori’s men began their withdrawal. The original plan called for them to cross the Busu river at the kunda bridge, then to travel via Gawan and Bungalumba to the summit of the Saruwaged Range. However the kunda bridge was blocked by Australian commandos, so they would need to find another way across the Busu then the Boana while fighting the enemy back. Engineers of the 51st and 30th engineer regiments were sent first to construct and repair the road to Mount Sarawaget. Colonel Araki commanded the second group coming over from Edwards plantation, consisting of the 51st divisional HQ, the 66th regiment, the 3rd battalion 21st regiment; the 1st battalion, 80th regiment and the bulk of the 14th field artillery regiment. The last group who would act as a rearguard were the 2nd and 3rd battalions of 115th regiment coming from Malahang and Busu, the 15th independent engineer regiment and the 1st battalion of the 11th regiment coming from Whittaker, Heaths, Edwards and Jacobsens plantations. Admiral Mori’s men were ambushed from the start by and american patrol of the 1st battalion, 503rd parachute regiment due east of Nadzab. This forced them to divert into the jungle towards Yalu. Over at the Lae field hospital were patients who were unable to be evacuated via submarine nor was it possible for them to be carried across the mountains, so they volunteered to protect the divisions rears. Meanwhile Salamaua was now destined to become a large allied base. When General Herring arrived at Milfords HQ on september 14th, he took one look at the insanitary shell of what was Salamaua town, its poor airfield and near by swamp. He immediately wiped it as a base, it was to be discarded to ruin. Some Americans camped nearby it would call it "a filthy, rat-ridden, pestilential hole". Perhaps a lackluster jewel after fighting bitter months for it. The Salamaua campaign was over. The 15th battalion charged up the coast chasing after the Japanese catching some south of the Markham river. The campaign was a brutal one. The 17th brigade reported 135 killed, 354 wounded;  the 15th Brigade reporting 124 killed and 346 wounded; the 162nd Regiment reporting 81 killed and 396 wounded; and the 29th Brigade reporting 76 killed and 155 wounded. Against them, Nakano’s 51st Division suffered an estimated 2200 casualties since the end of July, for a total of over 8000 casualties, including 2722 killed, in the entire campaign.  Back over at Lae, the evacuation saw standard infantry equipment being carried at 120 round of ammunition, 2 grenades and provisions for 10 days. Infantry had to carry their machine guns, small mortars, while artillery units had to carry their 75mm mountain guns and machine cannon company’s their 20mm guns. With supplies no longer being sent to the Salamaua front, there were provisions available for the withdrawal. General Yoshihara would write later that the generally healthy men of the Lae based naval forces were able to carry enough provisions for 14-15 days, but the IJA units most of whom had been fighting for Salamaua for months, were in extreme exhaustion and only able to carry half the amount. Over to the east the 2/24th battalion on september 13th began constructing a box-girder bridge over the Busu. It was launched after midday under enemy fire. When it nearly got across the gap, it overbalanced and was swept away downstream. Later in the afternoon more box-girders were brought over. A 25 meter single box-girder bridge was assembled using 3 box and 2 hornbeam sections. 100 men picked up the bridge and carried it through water over a meter deep across the first 20 meter channel to a mid river island. However they had no beachhead thus on the far bank only a mortar barrage could keep the enemy at a distance. They began to doubt the crossing would ever be made, so Whitehead on the 13th asked Wootten permission to send 120 men over the Busu at its mouth to advance north to the other side where the 2/24th battalion were. An hour later, Lt Colonel Ainslie of the 2/48th brigade crossed and began advancing north, but the jungle proved difficult and communications were bad. Further north the 2/4th independent company tried to cross the river, but the Japanese held them back. The men were led by Lt Staples and as they forded the river he was wounded by a Japanese sniper. The remainder of his section were swept off their feat and scattered along the bank of the river. This prompted other men to try and use the kunda bridge. The Japanese employed a trick often used against them, they allowed a bunch to cross the bridge before unleashing their guns. 7 men were cut to ribbons, many other became marooned on the wrong side. In the desperate situation private Jaggar charged and attacked two enemy machine gun nests and a mortar post killing several Japanese and capturing a lot of equipment. Jagger then waited for darkness before swimming back. The platoon that had gotten over lost 7 men with several wounded. Along the coast the 2/43rd found New Yanga unoccupied while the 2/28th encountered stiff resistance at Malahang. Lt Connor’s platoon were advancing at 11:20am when they ran into the enemy who were entrenched at a track junction 1000 yards east of Malahang anchorage. Connor went ahead with Corporal Torrent to charge 3 foxholes where 6 Japanese including an officer were killed. Connor was killed, so Torrent took command and he ordered an advance at 3:30pm where they found Japanese abandoned positions. The defenders were hitting the men as hard as they could. Artillery commander Lt COlonel Sukenobu Watanabe believed that the artillery troops were of no use ‘if they could not fire a shot on the battlefield’. Thus for his tired and weakened unit, ‘one cannon would be enough but they must also carry some shells’. His men sacrificed carrying sufficient food as he led them up the Saruwaged carrying mountain gun components weighing up to 50 kg’s each. Meanwhile Hiromatsu Sato’s anti-aircraft unit abandoned their guns in the Atzera Range in order to carry additional food. Sato and his men had enough food for 4 days and were told it could take 20 days to reach the northern coast. ‘We were stricken with apprehension, the effect of salt worked wondrously… those of us without salt became weakened… I used my salt sparingly and never drank unboiled water’.  Back over to the west, Brigadier Eather ordered the 2/25th to put pressure on Whittakers plantation while the 2/33rd moved around south to establish a roadblock at Heath’s plantation. Artillery and mortar fire began the advanced as Major Robertson’s company of the 2/25th captured the bridge at Whittakers while Captain Gow and Captain Butler’s Companies advanced towards heaths plantation. There was a fierce battle but a single platoon managed to overrun the enemy HQ on the northern sector of heaths plantation. Meanwhile two patrols advanced west and southwest converging towards Heaths plantation only to find it abandoned. Thus the 2/33rd occupied Heaths plantation without a fight.  During the night, the Japanese had evacuated Whittakers and the second echelon of forces had successfully departed Lae to march north to the Butibum rivers and than towards Boana. At 5pm on the 14th, Eather learnt from divisional HQ that one of the documents captured by the 2/25th the previous day indicated the Japanese operation order dated september the 8th. It showcased the evacuation of Lae which was of great excitement for General Vasey when he found out. Now every member of the division sought to race the 9th division to Lae, also hoping to prevent as many of the enemy from escaping as possible. Vasey’s staff concluded the Japanese were already withdrawing up the Busu. Thus Vasey believed that it would not be a good idea to weaken Eather’s assault on what he now realized were stubborn Japanese rearguards, remembering how brutal the Japanese rearguards were in the Papuan campaigns. So he ordered the 25th brigade to push vigorously towards Lae. Eather elected to quickly seize Edwards plantation. On september 14th Eather’s forces drove the Japanese from their positions at Lane’s bridge and continued to pursue them in the direction of Edwards plantation.  Over to the east, Whiteheads engineers were at last able to create a bridge over the third channel, allowing Captain McNamara’s company of the 2/24th to get across. The Japanese were surprised by this and began to unleash as much fire as they could on the newly established bridgehead. But Whitehead quickly sent another company led by Captain Finlay to support the bridgehead successfully fighting the Japanese off after 4 hours of combat. The rest of the battalion crossed afterwords uncontested, then the 2/23rd and the 2/48th. Along the coast, Evans 24th brigade advanced against harsh Japanese resistance. Evan’s received word the 2/43rd were approaching Wagan from the north so he sent the 2/32nd battalion to hit Wagan from the south. Lt Day was leading a platoon around the right flank when he began getting sniped from tree top Japanese. Day’s platoon suffered heavy casualties and he himself took a shot through his spine. He was dragged away by Warrant officer Dalziel, but Dalziel was shot dead in the process. Day was then killed by a grenade, prompting Sergeant McCallum to take over, who advised the situation was quite warm and required some mortar support. The men backed up to give room for mortars to fire off and at 4:15, 12 3 inches and 10 2 inches began lobbing. This time a few platoons with machine gun crew support made a frontal attack with others hitting flanks. They met heavy fire back at 30 yards or so and suffered 6 more casualties. The Japanese began to waver as the platoons continued their assault and soon it became a full flight towards the village. As the platoons charged, many mopped up the snipers and apparently some fowls who would be destined for the nights dinner. The 2/32nd captured Wagan village by dusk while the 2/28th while the 2/28th advanced towards Malahang anchorage. The men began infiltrating a road behind a Japanese position. At 9;15am they unleashed an attack killing 12 Japanese without any loss and at 12:40pm killed another 14. A company found two abandoned 75 mm dual purpose guns north of the anchorage during the afternoon patrol. A few patrols went further north of the anchorage circling around establishing positions that would seal the anchorages fate. Wootten ordered the 2/24th to recross the river and reinforce the kunda bridge position while Vasey earmarked Brigadier Dougherty’s 21st brigade to advance upon the Boana. On September 15th, Whitehead was finally able to launch his main offensive, tossing the 2/23rd battalion against Kamkamun and the 2/48th battalion at the Malahang airfield. A bit to the south the 2/32nd were capturing Malahang mission and the 2/43rd were just entering Wagan village. To the west, Eather’s men were facing strong resistance from Japanese rearguards at Edwards plantation. The 2/33rd were performing a frontal assault trying to draw enemy attention while the 2/31st moved around the right flank to secure some high ground behind the Edwards Plantation. Despite their resilience, Edwards plantation was completely surrounded and by the late afternoon the Japanese were forced to make a break for it, heading north over Edwards bridge, thus completely abandoning Lae to its fate. As they fled, 64 Japanese would be cut down by machine gun fire, trying desperately to climb a spur, being pursued by Eather’s men.  Along the coast, the 2/28th were moving through Malahang anchorage with just a few skirmishes occurring. Both divisions raced to be the first to enter Lae. General Nakano’s 8650 men, including 2500 naval personnel had managed to get out, heading north towards the Busu. Southeast of Yalu, Admiral Mori’s first echelon were intercepted by the 3rd battalion, 503rd parachute regiment. The Paratroopers clashed with a vanguard of 34 men forcing the rest to head northwest across the Atzera Range.  Despite being closer to Lae, Wootten’s men halted their advance at the Bumbu river by midday on september 16th. Eather’s however considered his advance was not speedy enough, therefore he urged the leading company to hasten. In the words of Captain Butler “Up at daylight and off again. "C" Company leading the Brigade this time. Men are a bit nervous again and went pretty steadily. Sick Japs along track kept holding things up and we expected to run into something at any moment. Then along the track and into the middle of us came a jeep crowded with Brigade HQ. Passed me and up to the leading platoon. The old Brig jumped out and started urging the troops to hurry along. The troops weren't very impressed as they thought the Jap was in front. Finally the Brigadier, armed with a pistol, acted as leading scout, and the troops followed in column of route behind… A brigadier is not an ideal section leader. The whole reason for his action was that he wanted the brigade to be first onto the beach. He managed it O.K. I had to send a patrol down the beach and back so we have that honour—doubtful one—as there were no Japs. Unfortunately we advanced too quickly—due to no opposition—and the Yanks came over and strafed us.” Eather’s men took Jacobsen’s plantation without opposition, then a patrol reached Lae’s Voco Point at 11:30. Not knowing Vasey had won the race, Wootten launched a final attack preceded by an aerial strike and artillery barrage after midday. They actually mistook the 2/25th to be Japanese almost leading to calamity, but Wootten stopped his artillery quickly when it became apparent. Both divisions finally entered Lae, ending the Lae-Salamaua campaign. Operation Postern was a success, though they were unable to prevent the Japanese from evacuating Lae. The overriding failure on the allied side was due to an underestimation of the enemy. There had been an overriding assumption that the Japanese forces at Lae would fight to the death to hold it. Back on September 8th, General MacArthur, cause you know I have to say something don’t you. Well he put out a triumphant communique, claiming they had enveloped 20,000 Japanese. Wootten’s staff estimated there had been around 8240 Japanese at Lae and 6934 at Salamaua. Vasey’s staff thought it was 6420 at Lae and 7041 at Salamaua. In truth Nakano had roughly 11,000 men and the majority got away, over 8000, a considerable feat.  The Japanese had inflicted 150 deaths and 397 wounded on the 9th division and 38 deaths and 104 wounded upon the 7th division. Wootten wrote upon seeing Lae "It was in an indescribably filthy condition and had been very thoroughly wrecked", Vast dumps of stores and discarded weapons littered the area. The airfield had not been used since just before the landing, the hangars were wrecked and about forty damaged planes were mute witnesses to the power of the Allied air force. The typical nauseating stench of an area occupied by the Japanese army pervaded Lae as it had Salamaua six days before. Lae would become a major forward base of operations, as Buna had become earlier. Another stepping stone to Tokyo. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. And thus ends the Salamaua-Lae campaign. The deceptive strategy to pressure Salamaua to entice the enemy to loosen its grip on Lae resulted in both bases being overrun in a dramatic fashion. Now the allies had a major forward base of operations to continue the push north.  

Last time we spoke about the mop up operations on New Georgia and the continued drive upon Salamaua and Lae. Munda had fallen, New Georgia was certainly a lost cause, but that did not mean there wasn’t come cleaning up to do. The Americans were stuck mopping up places like Arundel and Baanga seeing fierce Japanese resistance. Sasaki ordered his men to fight as hard as they possibly could while others made their way to evacuation points. Over on Green Hell, the Australian and American forces had just taken Mubo and Lababia ridge, prompting General Nakano to create a last line of defense in front of Salamaua. Now the allies had to cross the francisco river and face multiple hills, ridges and knolls. Forward units forded the francisco river and grabbed a few knolls catching a glimpse finally of Salamaua, but a glimpse was all they were going to get as the Japanese fought tooth and nail to push them back. This episode is Operation Postern Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  The time has come at last. For months, we have seen the Australian and American forces fight for each hill, ridge and knoll, cross over ravines, rivers, swamps, a green hell of a landscape filled with more horror than just the Japanese. From the Jungles of Way to the rugged mountains of bobdubi and Komiatum, through the endless rain, mud and death. Operation Postern was to finally be unleashed, landings at Lae and Nadzab would commence. Now back in August, Admiral Barbey and General Wooten were forced to postpone D-day for September 4. For Lae the plan called for two battalions of Brigadir Victor Windeyer’s 20th brigade to land on Red Beach; the 2/15th battalion would hit the eastern flank and the 2/17th to western flank closer to Lae. The 2/13th would hit Yellow beach; the 2/23rd battalion with a company of engineers, a field ambulance, a force of artillery and light anti-aircraft section would join the landing phase; the 26th brigade would follow up the initial landings and move right through the beachhead. The planners were concerned with possible Japanese naval action against their beachheads at night, as this had occurred at Guadalcanal and Milne Bay, so the defense of Red Beach would be coordinated with the 2/2nd machine gun battalion. Red Beach was selected as it was close to Lae, just a bit due east, but out of range of her large gun batteries. Yellow beach was further east and selected as an additional landing area to protect the eastern flank of the main beachhead that would be at red beach. The allies could not provide continuous air cover thus Brigadier Victor Windeyer’s 20th brigade would have to land and unload quick as all hell. The initial plans called for a time of landing known as “h hour” to be between 3am and 4am in line with Wooten’s request that it occur two hours during moonlight before dawn. They estimated they would need 9-10 hours for the unloading phase, the LST’s would then retract at around 1pm. However, when the landing date was postponed for September 4th, this changed everything. Now there would be no morning moon, thus H hour could not be scheduled until after sunrise to allow time for the allied navy to identify the correct beach on a coast that was covered by a low-lying swampy jungle terrain, there was no prominent landmarks it would be difficult. This delayed the landing until 6:30am, resulting in the loss of around 3 hours of unloading time. Alongside that came the decision to retract the LST’s by 11am as the allied air cover could not be guaranteed after 11am. This the unloading time was now reduced to 4.5 hours, that a hell of a lot less than they needed. It was also expected that the troops would take at least 1 to 1.5 hours to disembark leaving just 3 hours to unload supplies. Again logistics are not sexy, but this is the kind of problems needed to be overcome to win wars. So Brigadier David Whitehead’s 26th brigade was going to follow up the initial landings, moving straight through the beachhead with the 2/2nd machine gun battalion who were earmarked to guard red beach. Furthermore General Heavy’s brigade would dispatch some amphibian scouts with the 532nd engineer boat and shore regiment to go in on the first wave to establish red and yellow markers for the two beaches. To make things even more confusing, there was this enormous fringing reef along the thousand mile coastline with a few breaks. One break in the reef line near a village called Tauali was going to be marked Green beach as a back up landing area. The one and half mile of good narrow beach was to be Yellow beach 1, and yes there was a yellow beach 2, closer to Silimati. Admiral Barbey was going to employ every vessel he had; 4 Destroyer transports, the Gilmer, Humphreys, Brooks and Sands; 20 LCI’s, 18 LCT’s and 13 LSTs. From August 20-22nd Barbey had a full-scale landing rehearsal carried out at beaches on the south coast of Normanby island. The men learnt a few things from this experience. The first was that the surfacing of tracks with steel mesh was too slow to allow the vehicles to clear the beach. They decided that more stores would be loaded as bulk cargo and more labor would be provided to clear the landing crafts. Thus on August 29th, the 2/13th battalion was taken to Normanby island on destroyer transports were the men were disembarking from the LCVP’s up to their necks in water. There were major differences as you can imagine for the conditions in Australia vs New Guinea. As Patrick Bourke remarked ‘the country fringing the beach was the worst we had been in. Almost impenetrable jungle grew in waist deep swamps, crisscrossed by much deeper creeks.’ There was also a pre-emptive naval bombardment of Finschhafen as reports began to come in indicating enemy troops and supplies were being moved down the coast from Finschhafen by night. Vice Admiral Carpender ordered Captain Jesse Carter, commander of destroyer squadron 5 to sweep the Huan Gulf by night and hit Finschhafen. One of Carpenders staff noted  ‘It will be worthwhile to prove the Navy is willing to pitch in, even if we get nothing but coconuts,”. On August 22nd, destroyers Perkins, Smith, Conyngham and Mahan departed Milne bay enroute for the Huon Gulf. This was the furthest allied vessels larger than PT boats had ventured along the New Guinea coast since the beginning of the pacific war. Early on August 22rd, they opened fire on Finschhafen, firing 540 rounds of 5 inch shells within 10 minutes before hauling ass out of there. It was the first naval bombardment of Japanese forces in New Guinea. As for the battle for the skies, General Kenney was preparing to launch a series of air raids against Lae to support Operation postern. On the day before the landing, 21 allies bombers would hit Lae Airfield to try and knock out their aerial capabilities. Now all of that was just for the Lae landing, we got an entire other operation to hit Nadzab, designated as Z-day which because of the postponement was changed to September 5th. 96 C-47’s, 82 carrying the regiments, 5 carrying artillery and 9 for supplies would be employed by Colonel Paul Prentiss’s 54th troop carrier wing to transport Colonel Kenneth Kinsler’s 503rd parachute regiment. Alongside this, Brigadier Eather’s 25th brigade were earmarked to be the first flown in after the initial landings. On August 31st tossed 3 battalion commanders, their operations and communications officers with supplies using a Flying fortress at a very low altitude over the drop zone. They were acting as a sort of reconnaissance and they would uncover vital information to ensure safe location markers for accurate future drops. Hell they even performed meteorological analysis to figure out the wind conditions for jump areas. Meanwhile they keep saying everyday here in montreal its gonna be sunny and its rained for 5 days straight.  There would be rehearsals for the parachuting forces before September 3rd when the final plan was issued. Kinsler’s 1st battalion led by Major John Britten would hit field B with the task of securing the Nadzab airfield site before establishing a defensive perimeter and beginning work on the airfield. Meanwhile the Australian 2/2nd pioneer battalion led by Lt Colonel J.T Lang would cross the Markham to help construct a new airfield. Alongside this Kinsler’s 2nd battalion led by Lt Colonel George Jones was going to hit field A to capture the Gabsonkek area which would prevent the Japanese from advancing from the north or northwest. Kinsler’s 3rd battalion led by Lt COlonel John Tolson would hit field c to capture Gabmatzung and prevent the Japanese from advancing from the east. Furthermore Prentiss would drop 22 dummy paratroopers in the forests south of Yalu right where Japanese forces occupying Heath’s plantation would be able to see them. It was hoped this deception would delay advances towards Nadzab. By the way I took the time to educate myself a bit more on what is known as Paradummy’s, because honestly until writing this episode I had no idea it was a thing. These were burlap cases filled with straw and plant waste, they kind of look like sackboy to be honest. As you can imagine from ground level looking fairly high up they do look like real paratroopers and they often were dropped alongside real paratroopers to give them a fighting chance against enemy bullets. The more you know.  After all the planning was done Barbey’s little armada departed Milne Bay on the morning of September 3rd. Their journey was uneventful as they disembarked at Buna for a short break before re-embarking in the afternoon. After this point Heavy’s Morobe base was hit by 9 Rabaul based Betty’s with 27 Zeros for escort which tried to high altitude bomb them, doing little damage. Because of the deceptive campaign against Salamaua, termed the Salamaua magnet, very few IJA forces were left guarding Lae. At Lae were Companies 10 and 11 of the 115th regiment to the right bank of the Markham; Company 6 of the 238th regiment at Markham point; the 2 machine gun company of the 238th regiment were spread between the Bunga river and Bulu River; the 15th independent engineer regiment, 2nd company of the 5th battalion of heavy field artillery, the 25th, 29th and 30th machine cannon companies would all be at Lae proper. Aside from the few IJA troops, Rear Admiral Fujita Ruitaro had the 7th base force, formed around the 5th Yokosuka and 5th Sasebo SNLF and the 82nd naval garrisons anti-aircraft and coastal defense units. The Japanese were having a hell of a difficult time supplying their forces at Lae. To supply the near 10,000 or so men present within the Lae-Salamaua area each month required, 150 barges carrying 1500 cubic meters of supplies. Only large type barges could manage to get through the Dampier straits rather rough sea, smaller barges were too dangerous for the task. After each passing month, the naval ships used for transports were decreasing and by May the supplies were being carried by 6 submarines, cutting the volume in half the following month. After that supplies began to be carried overland from Wewak and Madang and a new barge route was established through Sio and Finschhafen. Regardless the Japanese were barely able to keep Lae and Salamaua supplied. This saw barely 300 fit men left to guard Lae with 2650 troops, malnourished, sick, wounded or suffering tropical ailments. The Japanese did have some big guns however, 28 75mm, 4 105mm and two 155mm for the coastal defenses, but their ammunition supply was quite limited. The 155mm’s only had 30 shells a piece, while the 105mm had 50.  By late July, General Adachi decided to place Major General Shoge Ryoichi in command of the defenses at Lae, talk about a shitty promotion haha. Ryoichi’s rd battalion, 238th regiment was sent first to Salamaua, then Company 6th and the 2nd machine gun company of the 238th regiment managed to reach Lae, but by the time things cooked up the rest would be stuck in Finschhafen. Therefore Rear Admiral Mori Kunizo was sent to grab command of the 7th base force in the meantime while Fujita would lead all the IJN and IJA units currently at Lae. By nightfall on September 3rd, the final voyage began. The allied vessels got to the assembly area unhindered and undetected and by 5:50am on the 4th identified the beach markers. The destroyer transports lowered the landing craft carrying the first wave while performing a 6 minute bombardment. The first landing craft hit the beach at 6:30am and at his guard post at the Japanese anti-aircraft positions overlooking the Lae airfield, private Wada Kiichi heard the sound and saw the flashes of a naval bombardment out in the Guon Gulf. He wrote this ‘Suddenly, there was a booming sound from the sea, and in a split second, I sighted red and yellow tracers come flying on a half moon ballistic arc. Where would the huge fleet land?‘Aren’t they, in fact, landing right here in Lae?  ‘If I must die, I will fight with courage and die like an imperial navy man without shame.’ Brigadier Windeyer’s troops began to land at Red and Yellow beach, only meeting 30 members of the 2nd machine gun company of the 238th regiment who they brushed off around the Bulu plantation. General Kenney unleashed air raids against the Japanese airbases. At 7:45am 13 RAAF bombers, 10 Beauforts and 3 A-20 Bostons hit Gasmata; at 9am 24 Liberators hit Lae; at 9:30am 9 Mitchells hit Tuluvu on Cape Gloucester and 3 Bostons returned to hit Gasmata again in the afternoon. As the 22nd squadron War diary noted of the Gasmata raid “the strip is considered unserviceable”. The second wave approached the beach in the larger LCI’s, managing to unload 6 companies without any opposition other than some very annoying reefs near the shore. Thus two waves hit the ground uncontested, but danger did lurk in the skies above. 6 Ki-43 Osca’rs and 3 Ki-51 Sonia’s took off from Lae at 7am and 4 minutes later the Oscars began strafing 7 LCI’s carrying the 2/23rd battalion and its division HQ while the Sonia’s bombed two LCI’s. One of the bombs crashed through the main deck of LCI 339 just forward of its pilot house setting the ship on fire before it began listing to port taking on water. The LCI ran ashore and was abandoned by the crew, 10 of which were wounded. Another bomb narrowly missed LCI 341 exploding near the bottom of the vessel, blowing a large hole amidships on her port side flooding two compartments. The list to port was corrected and the LCI managed to run ashore and would be salvaged later. 9 men were killed with 45 wounded during the attack. 8 Boomerangs and 2 Wirraways came over from Tsili Tsili to aid the next echelons as they began to unload units. The LSTs began clearing the landing area by 11am. The LCT’s took a lot longer to unload than expected, they had arrived at 8am but only cleared the area over the course of 6 hours. Meanwhile, General Imamura frantically launched a strong air raid towards Law consisting of 12 Betty’s, 8 Val’s and 61 Zero’s. The 81 aircraft strong party departed Rabaul, but was soon discovered by destroyer USS Reid lingering off Cape Cretin at around 1pm. Reid’s report gave enough time for the allies to toss a counter air wave to intercept them consisting of 40 Lightnings and 20 Thunderbolts. A few vals tried to bomb Reid in the meantime, resulting in all misses. The interception saw the loss of 23 Japanese aircraft, mostly Zero’s while only two lightnings were shutdown. However many Japanese aircraft continued towards Morobe where they descended upon the 6th echelons LSTs just off Cape Ward Hunt at around 2pm. These were carrying the Australian 2/4th independent company and the 2/2nd machine gun battalion, just 33 kms east of Morobe heading for Lae. 6 Vals managed to land two bomb hits on LST-473 and the Betty’s one torpedo hit against LST-471. This killed 51, wounded 67 mostly from the 2/4th independent company. The Japanese lost an additional 4 Zeros and 3 betty’s while 15 other aircraft were badly damaged. The remaining LSTs continued on towards Red beach, while some were ordered to divert course to assist the damaged LST’s from the aerial attacks. Destroyer Humphrey’s would grab the wounded and bring them back to Buna. Everything arrived on schedule by 23:00. Thus Admiral Barbey had managed to land 7800 personnel, of which 3780 were combat troops, alongside 3300 tons of supplies. After the landings, engineers at Red and Yellow beach got to work constructing roads while Windeyer’s combat troops began to extend their perimeter. By nightfall the 2/17th battalion had crossed the Buso river and by 7:30am the 2/7th field company had built a single-girder bridge across it. To defend against further aerial raids upon the beachheads, a battery of the 2/4th light anti-aircraft regiment landed two detachments at Red and yellow beach. By mid afternoon the 2/13th had extended the yellow beach perimeter around 3000 meters inland and 2000 meters east to west. Lt Colonel Colvin’s 2 companies of the 2/13th advanced inland towards the Bulu plantation sending the 30 Japanese who tried to contest them earlier further north towards some hills. Aside from them there were no signs of other enemy, by 2pm patrols of the 2/13th and 2/15th were forded the Suez river between Bulu river and Red beach. Colonel Grace’s 2/15th battalion were given the task of protected the beachhead, while Lt Colonel Simpson’s 2/17th began to advance towards the Buso river at 9am. Two companies of Major broadbent advanced northwest across the Buso going another 4 miles finding no enemy. Two companies of the 2/13th would also advance east along a track going towards Hopoi where opposition was expected. General Wootten wanted to speed up the advance towards Lae to prevent the Japanese from any time to organize a defense east of the Busu river. Wootten gave Brigadier Whiteheads 2/17th battalion the task of passing through the 20th brigade and continued the advance towards Buso river. Over on the other side Admiral Fujita began deploying his forces in a defensive perimeter between the Markham and Busu Rivers, with most of his naval units taking up positions on the right bank of the Busu while Companies 10 and 11 of the 115th regiment, around 127 men were sent to hold Singaua point. General Shoge rushed over as quickly as he could to take command at Lae, while General Nakano sent Major Mukai Masatake to assume command of the frontline actions. The next day the Australian advance going east and west continued still with no opposition. Simpson’s men went west, advancing through some horrible wet and boggy terrain. To simpsons north was Broadbents men who got lost for a little while fording rivers until they made it to the Singaua plantation. Meanwhile the 2/23rd and 2/24th battalions followed behind them led by Lt Colonel Gillespie and Major McRae. They bivoucked south of Apo where Whitehead placed his HQ. During the morning hours, Brigadier Bernard Evan’s 24th brigade embarked on 20 LCI’s over at Buna and began to land at Red Beach by nightfall. As the Lae operation was moving along full swing, it was now time for Z-day. A B-24 liberator crashed on take-off after clipping a branch and rammed into 5 troop trucks full of soldiers waiting to debark. Its 4 500 lb bombs exploded tossing 2800 gallons of fuel in all directions killing 59 and wounding 92. It was a horrible disaster and a bad omen. The armada of C-47’s were being escorted by 48 Lightnings, 12 Airacobras and 48 Thunderbolts a very intimidating force. Generals Kenney, Vasey and MacArthur accompanied the armada aboard some flying fortresses. Kenney said to MacArthur “They’re my kids and I want to see them do their stuff”, apparently MacArthur hesitated for a moment before replying “you’re right George We’ll both go. They’re my kids too”. Kenney worried about the consequences of both of them being killed by “some five dollar a month Jap aviator”. MacArthur only worried about becoming airsick and throwing up in front of his colleagues. General Vasey who had witnessed German paratroops in action over Crete back in 1941, watched the drop from above and would write to his wife “I wanted to see paratroops land from the top rather than the bottom as in Crete”. Over 302 aircraft crossed the Owen Stanley range. Heading the armada at 1000 feet were B-25 strafers carrying 8 .50 caliber gun in their noses and 60 frag bombs in their bomb bays. Behind that at about 500 feet were A-20’s ready to lay smoke as frag bombs exploded. At around 2000 feet behind them were 96 C-47’s carrying the paratroops, supplies and artillery. To all their sides were the fights sitting at around 7000 feet. Following this were B-17’s loaded up with 300 lb parachute bombs to be drop ordered by paratroopers. Then even further behind that were B-24’s and more B-17’s who were going to hit Japanese defensive positions at Heath’s plantation and other points between Nadzab and Lae. Air attacks against the defenses would be followed up with smokescreens. At 10:22am the C-47’s began to drop their paratroopers over their target zones. Each C-47 dropped its men in less than 10 seconds and the whole regiment was unloaded in 4 and a half minutes. The whole of the Nadzab area was landed upon and taken uncontested. Watching it unfold Kenney was impressed going on the record to say “the operation really was a magnificent spectacle. I truly don’t believe that another air force in the world could have put this over as perfectly as the 5th Air Force did.” By 2pm, the 2/2nd Pioneer battalion crossed Markham arriving at Nadzab during the night. The 2/2nd Pioneer battalion began hacking and burning kunai grass off the airstrip to clear it up before successfully extending it from 1500 feet to 3300 feet. This would allow the 871st airborne engineer battalion to land so they could construct two additional airstrips. On September 7th, Vasey’s 7th division began to land at Nadzab, only facing some challenging weather. C Company of the 24th battalion led by Captain Arthur Duell departed Deep creek on the 4th to attack Markham point acting as a diversion. Lt Fred Child’s 14th platoon performed the initial attack from the southwest followed up by Lt Maurie Yong’s 13th platoon who advanced down a ridge near the river. Two other platoons covered them as they all blasted mortars over the Japanese camp and unleashed 2 vickers guns on Labu island. 100 men of the 6th company, 238th regiment were taken by surprise. They had dug in behind some barbed wire for several months astride a razorback ridge along the Markham river. Their surprise wore off quickly as they unleashed heavy fire killing 12 men and wounding 6. The allies were forced to pull back after killing 18 Japanese. Further to the south, General Nakano was facing some pressure from General Milford’s 5th division. During late August the Japanese had been fighting tooth and nail to hold their last defensive line in front of Salamaua. The Japanese forward positions had been hit by heavy artillery for a long time, but their defenders were hunkering down. Brigadier Monaghan elected to send a company to cross the western slopes of Charlie Hill and occupy a position on its northern portion, thus isolating the Japanese. This was the same strategy that had been employed against Mount Tambu. However Milford instead elected to toss a frontal assault, believing his artillery support would win the day. Zero hour for the assault was to be 3:20pm, from 11:30am until then artillery smashed the Japanese positions with 2000 shells, 450 mortar bombs and 6000 rounds of machine gun fire. When zero hour hit, D company of the 42nd battalion began their climb. Lt Garland’s 17th platoon led the way, immediately receiving enemy first after the first 100 yards. Two other platoons crossed around to the left and right only getting a few yards further. The approach to Charlie Hill from the west was a very steep thickly clad razorback. Garland’s men had not even seen the enemy and 5 of them were hit. Two hours after the attack had begun, platoon leaders signaled down the slope that no progress could be made, it was simply too steep. Up above there were 4 well camouflaged machine gun nests unleashing havoc. The assault was canceled and the men withdrew. Over to the west, the 47th battalion launched two attacks against the Kunai spur. Captain Aubrey McWatter’s A company began their attack at dusk on august 28th. Sergeant George Pitt’s 9th platoon took the left as Barnett’s 7th platoon to the right. The assault fell into hand to hand combat quickly, Barnett was twice wounded and his men were forced back. Pitt’s platoon ran into heavy machine gun fire from a well dug in log bunker and were forced back having two deaths and two wounded. On the 30th, Major Idris Leach’s C company made their attack but were forced back by heavy fire. Major Idris Leach and Sergeant Bill Eisenmenger lost their lives in that attack. On that same day, there was a request to increase artillery fire. 200 shells were lobbed upon the enemy the next day, then on september 1st after 5 hours of shelling, two platoons attacked again. They were supported by vickers guns as men scrambled to climb the ridge to its crest. The artillery softened up the enemy somewhat. Platoon leader Lt Ernest Anzac Walters died leading his men in the bloody carnage. They achieved the objective by the late afternoon sending many Japanese fleeing from their positions. Owen guns and grenades broke them. Around 60 dead Japanese were found on the Kunai spur, around 40 of them had been killed by artillery fire, some pillboxes took direct hits. The Kunai Spur was renamed Lewis Knoll after Captain Eric Lewis of B Company. To the east, after seizing Lokanu ridge, Milford ordered Lt Colonel Jack Amies 15th battalion to head right of the Americans and penetrate the Japanese defensive line at all cost without delay. At first light on the 31st, Lt Doug Matthew’s 18th platoon of D company, reached a junction between Lokanu ridge and a razorback. The Japanese hit Matthew’s men with mortar and machine gun fire. Despite the heavy fire, Matthew and his men crept up 75 yards, but at 12:50pm were met with a shower of grenades from enemies on a crest above them. Matthew decided to wait for reinforcements and artillery support before attacking up Scout ridge. Lt George Matthew’s, brother Lt doug Matthews arrived with the 14th platoon after 1pm and organized a company attack, despite still not having artillery support nor mortars. Lt Doug led the 18th platoon forward, leading to 11 men becoming wounded, Doug likewise received a shot to the leg. George helped his brother get down the ridge and Doug told him before being carried off for care “About six weeks, I think”. George would later recall “I didn’t worry too much about it. I thought on of the family has got out of it”. Lt Doug Matthew died the next day. The 15th battalion forces kept up the pressure sending C company, but they were repulsed likewise. On September 1st, Colonel Davidson sent B company around the west side of Charlie Hill intending to cut off the Japanese supply lines. Captain Frank Greer’s B Company crossed a creek during the night and advanced 300 meters from the crest of Charlie Hill. They set up an ambush position, unknowingly 30 yards below the enemy perimeter on Charlie Hill. The Japanese tossed multiple counterattacks while A Company managed to establish their own ambush position nearby in some thick undergrowth on the eastern side of Charlie Hill. On September 4th, A Company joined up with B Company to the west, completely sealing off the enemy position. Meanwhile Captain Yates C company was advancing northwards from Lewis Knoll. Their patrols ran into Japanese losing many men in the process. At 7:15am the next morning they came across a razorback running towards a strongly held enemy position on Twin Smiths. Captain Yates led an attack upon the Twin Smiths, but the enemy fire was too much, forcing him to withdrew.  After the defeat at Arnold’s Crest, Brigadier Hammer had resorted to harassing actions against the enemy. The 2/7th were hitting Arnold’s Crest while Major Warfe’s 58/59th and 2/3rd independent company were hitting rough hill. Hammer sent Lt Garland’s men from C Platoon to infiltrate the Japanese rear and to carry out a diversionary ambush. On September 3rd, Lt Garland ordered Arnold’s Crest to be shelled, so that the noise would cover his men as they began their infiltration. They departed at 9am, moving along the Buiris Creek between the Japanese positions. They ambushed a supply track at 11am, just when the shelling stopped. Garland recalled ‘My men made their way forward through the jungle canopy like deadly green ghosts. I never heard a sound as they moved forward and adopted their ambush positions.’ Garland positioned his men on the southern side of the track with around ten meters between them, covering more than a thousand meters of track, watching while hiding; a difficult balance. Garland noted ‘You soon learn to look through the jungle, by slightly moving your head from side to side, whilst preserving your concealment.’ After two hours of waiting, Garland’s men killed 8 Japanese in an ambush, after this they pulled out. Finally, Scout Ridge was devastated with artillery and mortar bombardment, allowing Lt George Matthews men to gain its crest where his brother had died. On September 3rd, detachments of the 5th Sasebo and 2nd Maizuru SNLF marines counterattacked and forced the australians off. While this was occurring, Lt Tom Cavenagh’s A company of the 15th battalion seized the unoccupied Lokanu knoll. They crept up the knoll under artillery support to find freshly dug trenches, weapon-pits and foxholes all recently abandoned. By nightfall the SNLF marines attempted to reoccupy the positions but were forced to dig in on the northern side of Lokanu Knoll. On the night of september 4th, General Adachi learnt of the Lae landings and immediately ordered General Nakano to withdrew from Salamaua and to assemble at Lae by september 20th. Japanese forces were going to withdrew towards Kaiapit or Sio through Salawaket. Adachi sent the main body of the 20th division to defend Finschhafen, resulting in the suspension of the construction of the Madang-Lae road. The Nakai detachment of Major General Nakai Masutaro currently at Bogadjim was ordered to defend Kaiapit and hold back the allied advance to help Nakano’s withdrawal. Nakano ordered the 5th Sasebo and 2nd Maizuru SNLF to cover the movement by barge of the 3rd battalion 102nd regiment towards Law, departing on september 6th. Meanwhile the 51st division prepared a fighting withdrawal and at Lae, General Shoge and Major Mukai just arrived to grab command of the IJA forces. Shoge’s attitude was considered to be the ideal representative of a commander. He often went a day or two without opening his mouth, he was a fighting man who did not display signs of joy or sorrow, nor pleasure or pain. Holding the enemy back to the east and west, even within close range, he remained cool. He never lost his composure and he was a large influence upon his officers and men. Shoge concentrated the whole strength of the Lae garrison to block the superior allied forces while Mukai personally led platoons and companies to direct the fighting at the frontlines. Meanwhile on september 6th, Wootten’s men continued their advance. The 2/13th battalion reached the Buhem river and captured the overgrown Hopoi airfield. The 2/23rd battalion moved past the 2/17th arriving to the left bank of the Buiem river. From there they pushed back some Japanese to the Singaua plantation. By the late afternoon the Japanese were being hit from the east and north, forcing them to retreat. Ever since D-day, the Japanese had been tossing air raids against Red Beach, the Aluki track and the amphibian craft plying between the beaches, but they were unable to hinder the movement of men and supplies. At midnight on the 6th, 5 LCV’s and 3 LCMS landed supplies from Red Beach to Apo village alleviating the severe ration and ammunition shortage for the forward troops and shortening supply lines. New plans were formed. On September 7th, the 24th brigade would takeover the costal advance while Whiteheads 26th brigade would advance further inland up the Burep River. The climax for the Lae-Salamaua campaign was nearly at hand. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Operation Postern finally kicked off and the amphibious invasion seems to be a resounding success. The Japanese were completely bamboozled and now frantically tried to get men in the Salamaua area over to defend Lae, but would they lose both as a result of it? 

Last time we spoke about the major planning leading to a thrust into the central pacific and General Kenney’s neutralization efforts of the Lae area. Admiral Nimitz and Douglas MacArthur had been battling it out for a long time leading finally to some concrete plans for twin campaigns, one in the Central Pacific and one in the South and Southwest Pacific.  Countless meetings, deals and minds were put to work trying to figure out how to prepare the gradual advance towards the Japanese home islands. To finally make some waves into the central pacific it was to be the Ellice Islands, Gilbert Islands and Nauru as first objectives. Meanwhile in New Guinea the advance upon Salamaua and Lae raged on, but to really break them first air supremacy was required. Kenney unleashed a massive campaign with some innovative new toys completely desolating Wewakes airpower. This episode is Mopping up in New Georgia Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  New Georgia was falling apart for the Japanese. When Munda was seized it spelled doom. General Sasaki ordered his forces to withdraw to places like Baanga Islands after fighting a series of desperate holding operations against the forces of General Griswold. Again, the seizure of Munda was a colossal undertaking. The Americans had tossed 30,000 troops to overcome 5000 Japanese. The Americans lost 1136 of said troops and the Japanese 1500. The Japanese managed this type of bulwark defenses by building up a network of entrenchment systems around Munda Point. The US air supremacy over New Georgia gave them little advantage because the island was simply too dense in vegetation to properly spot enemy positions. Rear Admiral Turner likewise learnt a valuable lesson, that no matter how many transport boats were tossed into an invasion plan, more would always be needed. These lesson led to some radical rethinking of strategy going forward for future operations, like in the Central pacific. Admiral Ota used his fleet of barges to move 5 to 8 in a group, every night. Colonel Tomonari’s 13th regiment and Sasaki’s HQ were moved to Vila in an effort to reinforce  what would be the new main Japanese outpost in the Central Pacific. Further north the Americans successfully invaded Vella Lavella, completely bypassing Kolombangara and thus cutting off the enemy’s supply line. In response to this Admiral Samejima established a barge staging base at Horaniu. Samejima then advised Sasaki to simply proceed with the course of action he thought best. Sasaki decided to do what he had been arguing for sometime now, to concentrate all his forces at Kolombangara. However with Zieta in the hands of the Americans, he would have to figure out a clever way to carry out the logistics of such a plan. Thus he split his forces in two, taking up positions at Bairoko and Baanga. Ota was given the task of evacuating the northern forces at Bairoko using his barge fleet, but the men to the south in Baanga were going to perform a fighting withdrawal of both Baanga and Arundel. Luckily for the Japanese, the 27th regiment had bypassed the Yano battalion in Baanga, to advance upon Piru Plantation and Sunday inlet. The forces at Baanga would be facing against the landings of 3 battalions; the 2nd and 3rd battalions, 169th regiment and the 3rd battalion, 172nd regiment led by General Barker. While Barker was getting his men to assembly positions, the Yokosuka 7th’s 12cm guns and two mountains began to fire upon Munda Field. This caused only slight damage with some casualties, but it was a nuisance nonetheless. On August 16th, Barkers 136th field artillery battalion positions at Munda began counter firing against the Yokosuka guns. This was followed up by aerial attacks by 13 Avengers and 17 Dauntless who performed carpet bombing. For those who don’t know this is the practice of bombing over a large area simultaneously. Imagine hitting a km area of vegetation by spreading your aircraft and timing everything just right, it produces what would look like a carpet of bombs hitting. So when you take a carpet and toss it over your floor, that was kind of the mental image received by this maneuver. The results were devastating. The Yokosuka 7th guns would not fire again.  Meanwhile the recently landed 2nd battalion, 169th regiment faced the strongest pocket of Japanese as they attempted pushing the defenders further west. The 3rd battalion, 172nd regiment would eventually join in on this attack. When the 2nd battalion was showing signs of slow progress, Barker decided to toss the 172nd in on August 18th. But the fiercest fighting would be seen between the 3rd battalion, 23rd regiment who continued to resist against Barkers 4 battalions as Sasaki’s men were crossing over to Baanga and Arundel island. On August 19th, the 1st battalion finally managed to break through to the southwestern coast, where they came across the now abandoned 12cm guns of the enemy. During that night the 3rd battalion, 23rd regiment had slipped through a swamp making their way north to join their fleeing comrades over to Arundel. By nightfall of the next day all had successfully gone over. The cost of mopping up Baanga as recorded by the 169th was 44 dead, 74 wounded and 300 non-battle casualties, the ever present dangers of tropical island warfare. For the 172nd records, it was 8 dead, 36 wounded and nearly 200 men requiring evacuation from tropical diseases. For the Japanese there was no estimation or rough counts for casualties. Such dire numbers would see General Wing replace Barker as commander of the 43rd division effective August 20th. Now Admiral Halsey also wanted to see Arundel seized as it had become an important position, but the allies did not realize the amount of forces that had been snuck onto the small island. Meanwhile the 25th division continued their advance north through painfully rough swamp terrain, pursuing a rather elusive enemy. As the regiments advanced, bulldozers of the 65th engineer battalion tried to build jeep trails behind them. However the rain was so bad they became a nasty type of tropical mud and the bulldozers were struggling. Thus the supplies would have to be carried onwards to the front by hand, typically on the men’s backs, or occasionally via air drops. By mid August the 161st regiment would finally reach the rendezvous point at Mount Bao where General Collins planned to have them turn west to secure an artillery position at Mount Tirokiambo. Once the artillery was set up, it could support an assault of Bairoko. Bairoko would be hit from the west by the 3rd battalion, 145th regiment of Colonel Dalton and from the east by the 1st battalion, 27th regiment of COlonel Liversedge. But mother nature is a cruel mistress and she places some impassable swamps, preventing the 140th field artillery battalion from reaching Mount Tirokiambo. On August 21st, the marine defense battalion tractors had to pull the 155mm’s of the 136th Field artillery battalion over the soft road to get onto a position on Zieta Hill. However this took too long and while it was occurring the Japanese had successfully evacuated Bairoko. Admiral Ota’s fleet of barges had been running to Bairoko every night under the cover of darkness and the cover of some guns placed on Kolombangara that fired upon US PT boats trying to harass the barges. American intelligence believed all of this activity was actually reinforcing Bairoko, thus they planned for a daylight raid to hit the barges in their bases. Rendova launched some PT boats, the 15th corps lent some demolition teams of the 117th engineer battalion and the NGAF provided fighter cover. The raid failed and the boats were forced to retreat.  On August 23rd, Dalton and Liversedge’s men entered Bairoko to find a completely deserted base. On that same day, the 27th regiment arrived to the Piru Plantation after slogging through swamps prompting Collins to remark “Crossing that swamp was the toughest physical test I underwent during the war.” On August 23rd, Samejima sent new orders to Sasaki, instructing him to hold the Gizo-Kolombangara-Arundel line and to wait until a proper evacuation date was set. Sasaki sent the 1st company of Major Kinoshita Seishu to occupy some high ground on the western part of Arundel and the 4th company of 1st lt Ito Saburo at the base of the Stima Peninsula on its northeast coast. On August 25th Ota’s barges were continuing to run nightly runs to Arundel bringing the 6 and 7th companies of Major Yamada Tadaichi over to Vila. By late August most of the other units arrived to Vila, with the Kure 6th SNLF taking the task of defending Kolombangara’s western coast and the 229th regiment were deployed at Mbambare Harbor to protect its eastern coast. In addition, Captain Miyazuki Toshio departed Rabaul with 3 destroyers, the Hamakaze, Shigure and Isokaze to evacuate men at Rekata Bay back on August 22nd. However they were harassed by a PBY around Bougainville and realizing the Americans might toss a naval mission against them, they were forced to abort.  Another evacuation run was attempted 3 days later, seeing Admiral Ijuin leading light cruiser Sendai and 2 destroyers to escort Captain Toshio's group. The diversion was discover by Australian coastwatchers and soon Toshio was intercepted by 10 PBY’s in the Bougainville strait. The Hamakaze’s forecastle was hit by a bomb that caused 36 casualties again they had to abort. Two days after this light cruiser Sendai the destroyer Sazanami finally broke through to Rakata Bay and managed to grab most of the troops there. To grab the rest of the troops, 6 flying boats and a submarine were sent. Detachments of the Kure 7th SNLF would be landed at Sumbe Head and Sambe Head over on Choisuel, who would work to establish new staging bases for the rest of the troops being brought back to Buin. Over at Horaniu, the Japanese were constructing a new barge deport. Admiral Wilkinsons 3rd echelon led by Captain Grayson Carter consisting of 2 LSTs and the destroyers Philip and Waller were sent over to Barakoma on August 20th. They were intercepted by enemy planes in the Gizo strait which saw Philip collide into Waller providing some slight damage. The last convoys of the month would manage to unload at Barakoma under excellent weather and good air cover. Altogether Wilkinsons landed 6505 men, 1097 tons of rations, 843 tons of petroleum, 2247 tons of ammunition and 2528 tons of vehicles, By September 27th the field would be fully operational. The Americans also managed to construct an airfield at Ondonga, giving General Wing further support to mop up Arundel. On August the 29th, the 2nd battalion of the 172nd regiment were moving to the east coast while the 1st battalion moved west. Both had to advance over mangroves and hardcoral shorelines, because the interior was far too dense with underbrush.  Meanwhile over on Vella Lavella, Wilkinsons turned command over to General Griswold on September 3rd. The americans expected no resistance as they planned to occupy the entire island. Admiral Halsey gave the task to Major General Harold Barrowcloughts 3rd New Zealand division who were scheduled to arrive in mid september. But in the meantime, Griswold landed the 1st battalion, 145th regiment at Brakoma to allow Major Delbert Munsons 1st battalion, 35th regiment to advance up the east coast to secure the Kokolope Bay area, where the American wanted to set up a new radar site. Munson’s men made good progress as the reached Lambu Lambu cove by September 4th. From there they dispatched Companies A and C with some Fijian commandos to patrol. The patrols got to the Boko Mission where A company ran suddenly into a strong Japanese patrol. A firefight broke out taking the lives of 12 Japanese. The men examined the bodies and their equipment and sent word back that they were facing recently landed enemy forces. The next morning, the 4th company of the Mikami battalion assaulted A company who were dug in at the Boko Mission. A company managed to fight them off, but had 2 deaths and 2 wounded in the process. Because of the attacks, General McClure sent forward his 3rd battalion followed up by units of the 64th field artillery battalion. The artillery men took up a position at Ruravai to support the advance. At the same time Munsons men cleared up the Boko Mission area, allowing for supplies to come up to it by boat. Munson then directed his forces to hit the main Japanese defenses at Baka Baka. As the men advanced they faced a steep ridge holding Japanese machine gun nests which greatly hindered their progress. Meanwhile on September 5th, the 2nd battalion, 172nd regiment discover the main enemy positions on Arundel while the 1st battalion was landing at Bustling Point trying to secure a forward artillery position. The 1st battalion would then occupy the tip of Bomboe Peninsula. The Japanese units meanwhile were reporting great success in their efforts and also requested they be allowed to assault the enemy artillery at Piru Plantation. On the last day of August, the 9th defense battalions 155mm’s at Piru Plantation had begun opening fire on Kolombangara. They also dropped some leaflets upon the Japanese at Vila describing the agonizing death their artillery would provide them, cheeky. The leaflets read “ask the survivors from the 229th what it was like on Bakudan Hill”. The next morning Takabayashi told the 3rd battalion  “enemy shelling and firing will be intensified in the future, any rambling activity must be avoided and everyone must always be on the alert.” All of this prompted Sasaki to order a counterattack.  At around midnight on September 9th, Takabayashi’s 3rd battalion, 13th regiment aided by a platoon of the 6th engineers snuck across the Blackett strait using barges to Sagekarasa island, their orders were to drive the enemy out of northern Arundel. Just a few hours later, Griswold ordered Colonel Sugg’s 27th regiment to Bomboe Village to attack from the west. Sugg’s men began their advance on September 12th, and his 3rd battalion forded the Bomboe Lagoon to seize Sagekarasa Island, effectively cutting off the 13th regiment. The Japanese were taken by surprise and began counterattacking with Takabayashi from the west and Ito from the east, but the Americans held on. Further south, Sugg’s 2nd battalion ran into the Japanese main position, meeting heavy gun fire. Additionally the 1st battalion, 169th regiment began an occupation of the Fringe Island and the 82nd chemical battalion began deploying their 4.2 inch mortars at Bomboe to prepare a killing field for the Japanese at Safekarasa. From their positions on Fringe Island, the Americans were able to observe and track the Japanese barges with moonlight seeing them depart Vila and approach the landing area. This provided Sugg’s the perfect amount of information to launch a deadly accurate mortar bombardment. The proceeding bombardement took countless lives including the 3rd battalion commander Takabayashi. On the night of September the 15th, Colonel Tomonari brought his HQ across and ten minutes later while he was sitting on a log listening to a company commanders report, he was killed instantly by a mortar shell that landed at his feet. Kinoshita took temporary command of the 13th regiment, 3 days later Colonel Muta Toyoji would become the new 13th regiment commander. On that same day the Americans attacked the main Japanese position, but were beaten back. Griswold  responded by bringing forward the 1st battalion, 27th regiment from Enogai with 5 marine tanks of the 11th defense battalion the following afternoon. On September the 17th the tanks charged forward with 3 rifle companies lined abreast behind them. Artillery and mortar concentrated upon Kinoshita’s position, shocking the Japanese and forcing them to pull back. However the following day, the Japanese had quickly learnt their lesson and came back with anti-tank guns. They knocked out two tanks before pulling back to the Stima Peninsula. After two more days, the Japanese began evacuating Arundel. During the night, the 3rd battalion evacuated under some heavy mortar and artillery fire while the Yokosuka 7th guns covered them. The following night barges grabbed the 1st battalion troops, bringing the battle of Arundel to a close. For Colonel Muta Toyoji’s 13th regiment, the fight for Arundel was a costly endeavor, they suffered 243 killed, 363 wounded, including many officers. For the Americans it was 31 dead and 225 wounded. Back on September 10th, McClure's batteries began to arrive at Lambu Lambu and as soon as they were put into position they began firing against the Japanese. You see during one of the fights between the Japanese and Munson’s forces, a dead Japanese officer was found to be carrying a sketch map of the Japanese positions at Horaniu. Captain Jorn Burden translated the Japanese sketch onto their maps and added details from other patrol reports. This gave A and C batteries an incredibly accurate firing grid that proved to be deadly. The concentration of fire was so accurate the Japanese were forced to abandon their positions almost immediately. When troops later came to the area they found the dugouts had suffered direct shell hits with corpses still holding picks and shovels in their hands. The Japanese realized the American gunners knew exactly where they were located so they made a panicked withdrawal to the northwest coast. On September 14th Munson finally unleashed an attack upon Horaniu only to find the dugouts empty. Fijian commandos were sent to pursue the fleeing Japanese as the 1st battalion moved back to Lambu Lambu and the 3rd battalion occupied Horaniu. The New Zealanders would take over the fight for Vella Lavella, but now we need to venture back over to Green Hell. With the loss of Mubo and Lababia ridge, General Nakano was forced to establish a rough arc of defensive positions in the heavily timbered ground from Bobdubi on the south bank of the Francisco river through Komiatum village to the Tambu Peninsula on the coast. Nakano had risen to the bait of General Blamey who had hoped he would and poured more men into this area in order to defense Salamaua from what he believed to be the actual allied goal. Naknao reinforced the area with the 3rd battalion, 238th regiment and the 3rd battalion, 21st regiment who had been stationed at Lae. The new key position in the Japanese line was Charlie Hill. The new Japanese defensive line ran east along the Yamada Yama known to the allies as Scout ridge to the coast at Lokanu and north over the Francisco river along the ridges of Rough Hill, Arnold’s Crest, Kidney Hill and the coast near Malolo. Charlie Hill held 4 perimeters. Below ground the Japanese constructed an intricate tunnel system to protect them and their supplies from bombardments. The entrance shafts had vine covered ladders that went down 6 meters. Galleries branched off the main tunnel like catacombs with benches cut into the sides for sleeping. Near Charlie Ridge was Davidson Ridge where Nakano deployed some new reinforcements from the 115th regiment. On August 24th, Nakano told his men “If this line cannot be maintained, the division is to be honorably annihilated.” Meanwhile, Colonel MacKechnie was tossing patrols past Roosevelt ridge. On August 16th I Company, down 2/3rds of its strength, basically down to a single platoon level, crept forward to toss grenades at some Japanese around Scout ridge while Sergeant Warren unleashed mortar cover. The Japanese sought revenge that night and performed a dusk to dawn attack, but grenades and mortars held them back. It was to be the start of two bitter weeks of such small skirmishes, and the Japanese hunkered down in their foxholes guarded Scout Ridge with their lives. On August 18th, K company performed a frontal assault along the ridge, but Japanese barricades and machine gun fire kept them back. 3 Americans were killed, 7 wounded for their efforts, including a courageous medic who ran into the fray. The Japanese positions on Scout ridge were very strong, with lines in depth going back all the way towards Salamaua. Scout ridge provided the defenders with countless defensive positions along its crest with four intersecting ridges behind Roosevelt ridge. On August 20th, Colonel Davidson ordered his men of the 42nd battalion to capture what he thought were only two knolls to the north of the battalion's positions on Davidson ridge. The smaller knoll was occupied without opposition and the other knoll only had slight opposition. However the next morning, scouts reported there was another feature, they called Bamboo Knoll about 600 yards farther north. Davidson then ordered it captured and it was with little opposition. Crouching in some kunai grass atop that knoll, the scouts could see Salamaua and allied artillery hitting it. They could not see the airstrip because another hill was in the way, that hill was Charlie Hill. Davidson’s intelligence told him they had already seized Charlie hill because their maps were not quite accurate. This caused a lot of headaches for historians going through diaries, trying to piece together the movement of troops. Thought I would try to add some frustrating information on their part.  Now to intercept the enemy fleeing from Mount Tambu into the area between Komiatum and Davidson ridge, Brigadier Monaghan’s 29th brigade were assembled east of Mount Tambu. Meanwhile Major Warfe was performing an offensive against the junction of Bobdubi, Komiatum and the Bench Cut Track. Warfs A Platoon led by Lt John Lewin had cut off a point at a junction between Bobdubi and Stevens track on August 14th. Warfe planned to toss A and B Platoons against the enemy while the 2/7th battalion’s D company took up a further point on the track. At the same time the 58/59th battalion were going to launch a diversionary attack against Erskine Creek. On August 17ths, Warfes commandos advanced south under artillery and mortar support attacking the enemy along Buirali creek and Salamaua track. However the enemy proved too intense to overcome, leading the commando platoons to pull back somewhat. Then the 2/7th company came to the right of A platoons position filling a gap in the center of the enemy line. They exploited the gap and advanced towards the western edge of the main Japanese camp. Lewin’s A company kept prodding the enemy lines until 6:30pm when the Japanese made a vicious counterattack causing 5 deaths including Lt Barry and 11 wounded. By dusk the Australian attacking force was thrust like a wedge into the enemy positions with Lewin and A platoon on the left, the 2/7th company in the middle and B company on the right. The following day the Japanese were forced to pull back to the line of the Komiatum track By August 19th, the Japanese were being hit hard. On their northern lines they had 23 deaths, the commander of the 80th battalion, Major Jinno was dead. The Komiatum track was cut by the 17th brigade at Laver’s knoll. They were withdrawing across the front, most were now taking up positions further east at Charlie Hill and Kunai Spur. Brigadier Hammer’s 58/59th were able to occupy Erskine Creek and C company of the 2/7th seized Orodubi. The following day the 2/7th battalion occupied the junction of Bobdubi and the salamaua track. They captured quite a few forward pill boxes, found the enemy was still holding some in the back so they began raining mortar upon them. At dawn on August 21st patrols found the Komiatum track abandoned, now they could push further on. On august 21st as a result of the enemy giving so much ground, Hammer ordered the mento ford the Francisco river to put more pressure on Salamaua. Lt Henry Mallett’s 11th platoon of the 2/7th battalion forded the Francisco river near its south end at Bobdubi ridge. They advanced over a razorback spit towards Rough Hill where they ran into Japanese machine gun fire. They were quickly bolstered by another platoon and by 3pm took the position, to gain fire support to allow others to cross the river. During the afternoon a composite platoon led by Lt Owen Edwards advanced further to occupy a dominant hill, which was named Arnold’s Crest after captain Ted Arnold the commander of C company. Like I said if you wanted a mountain, ridge, or hill named after you it seems New Guinea was the place. By August 22nd Hammer’s men were occupying Arnolds Crest giving covering fire to allow more forces to cross the river. Once enough men had crossed they began expanding the perimeter. Then on August 27th 420 Japanese from companies from the 115th and 80th regiments counterattacked Arnold’s Crest, successfully cutting off the allied line of communications to the south. The Australians did not give it up without a fight however, the counter attacked trying to seize the nearby Fisher’s knoll. The Japanese were forced to give up Fishers Knoll but repelled the allied attacks upon the crest itself. Despite still holding Arnold’s Crest the following morning saw the Japanese withdrawing westwards. Now it seems Hammer got too excited when he ordered his forces to occupy so many forward positons. Hammer signaled his new divisional commander, General Milford “unreliability of 58/59th battalion troops has forced me to withdraw to hold a tighter line Buiris Creek”. Basically he believed he had overextended the 58/59th who were currently surrounded by a company or so of Japanese. The 58/59th were down to less than 30 or so men, carrying many wounded back and sending reports they were running low on ammunition. However on the ground, John Bethune’s B company were holding strong, keeping the situation together. Another company commander named Newman went on the record stating “Hammer had weak companies flung out into the blue where they could not be reinforced or supplies” After all was said and done, upon reflecting on the situation, Hammer would sign off on a recommendation to award John Bethune a military Cross, writing “‘Displaying grit and determination Lt Bethune tenaciously held the area until shortage of amn [ammunition] and supplies forced him to withdraw.’ The situation forced Hammer to tone down the aggression somewhat lest a catastrophe were to occur. He ordered the men to form a defensive line from Rough Hill to Arnold’s Crest, while more forces came to prepare for another offensive. On August 21st, the Taylor Force had rejoined its regimental force, allowing MacKechnie to launch a new attack in force. On August 27th, A company advanced along a trail going up George Ridge successfully cutting the Japanese supply line. The men dug in, expecting a lot of angry Japanese counter attacks. Captain George of A company wrote this of the experience “‘We began to feel chill in the stomach. Every rush meant firing a few more clips, throwing a few more grenades. As the dark suddenly quietened, our hands counted blindly the few clips left in our belts, the last grenade or two on the parapet – like a thirsty man in the desert checking his last water. For when ammo ran out, they would overwhelm us – waves of many Japs with long bayonets. Home was a long way off indeed, over dark waters to Oregon.’” The fighting fell into hand to hand combat, from foxhole to foxhole. Men fought and died around George who knew the position could not be held. The next day George heard 4 rifle shots signaling permission for his battered unit to withdraw. They fought off 10 consecutive counter attacks before tossing in the towel.  Not all was lost on the action for George’s men however, so many Japanese were employed for the counter attacks, they had to give up a position they held known as Bald Hill. Other companies of Taylor force seized the hill as the Japanese retreated to positions on Berger hill and Egg knoll. Over to the west, Brigadier Moten’s battered 17th brigade were relieved by Monaghan’s men who took up positions north of Mount Tambu. Davidson’s 42nd battalion occupied Bamboo Knoll after tossing back a ton of Japanese counterattacks. Davidson then tossed some patrols towards Charlie Hill, which would receive its name after Davidson’s given name. The Japanese presence on Charlie Hill was far to strong for smaller units to prod it, so more forces would be brought up.  Back over to the north, Warfe’s commando’s attempted to overrun the Kunai Spur, a dominant position blocking the way along the Francisco river to Salamaua. On the morning of August 22nd, B Company of the 58/59th crossed the Buirali creek and one of their patrols advanced north to Kunai spit. Three simultaneous attacks were directed on Kunai Spur the following day by Captain Cramps 2/7th company from the north, Sergeant Tom Pot’s 58/59th platoon from the west and Lt Russell Matthews 58/59th platoon from the east. It was a very steep climb, when Matthews men finally go atop the spit they were face to face with a machine gun nest that nearly took them out. On August 25th the 2/7th platoon managed to outflank the enemy position near Buirali Creek which caused them to counter attack. They failed to take the Kunai SPur and were relieved by Lt colonel Ken Montgomery’s 47th battalion on the 26th. At this point Monaghan took command, and his first order of business was going to be an assault against Nakano’s last line in front of Salamaua. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The allies were cleaning up on New George while continuing their deceptive assault on Salamaua on New Guinea. General Nakano’s men were beginning to feel the wall behind their backs as the allies closed in on Salamaua, but still they did not realize Lae was the actual target. 

Last time we spoke about the beginning of mop up operations after the fall of Munda, the amphibious invasion of Vella Lavella and the fall of Kiska. New Georgia was a lost cause for the Japanese with the fall of Munda and now all efforts were being made to perform a withdrawal while buying time for forces to be brought over to places like Bougainville. Admiral Halsey ultimately choose to bypass Kolombangara and targeting Vella Lavella, which saw a successful amphibious invasion with a minor naval scuffle during the process. Then the Americans and Canadians invaded Kiska at long last. Although there were numerous reports that the island was abandoned it was decided to go forward with the invasion, at minimum it would be good training for the men. All they found were booby traps and some abandoned dogs as they ushered in the conclusion to the aleutian islands campaign.  This episode is Into the Central Pacific Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    So its been nearly a year since the start of the allied offensive in the Pacific. Way back when the Japanese were trying to recover from the Midway disaster, the Americans had no idea if they could manage a major land victory. For nearly a year, the allied campaigns in New Guinea and the Solomons showcased what both sides were capable of. But the US Navy wanted something else, they wanted a drive through the central pacific. Now to begin a thrust into the central pacific meant performing two parallel Pacific campaigns north and south of the equator. Admiral Nimitz did not yet possess the naval, specifically carrier forces required to wage a central pacific offensive, hell legions of troops required months of amphibious training, is was an enormous feat. Admiral Halsey likewise never ceased calling for reinforcements to carry his fight through the central and northern solomons.  Ever since the Casablanca Conference, Admirals King and Nimitz had been analyzing the idea of a central thrust in the pacific. They were looking specifically at a thrust in the direction of Truk-Guam and to hit the Marshall Islands. The victory over Guadalcanal had allowed the allies to secure lines of communication and supply to Australia and King presumed Rabaul would fall in 1943. On June 10th King began demanding hard deadlines for a central pacific campaign stating “In order that effective momentum of offensive operations can be attained and maintained, firm timing must be set up for all areas.” The joint chiefs of staff four days later told Nimitz to prepare an invasion of the Marshall Islands with a tentative sailing date of November 15th, 1943. As for the direct thrust, King declared  "establishing a base in the northwestern Marshalls and then proceeding to Truk and the Marianas." To pull this off MacArthur was expected to release the 1st marine division in time to participate in the operation with most of Halsey’s naval and amphibious forces as well. As you can imagine MacArthur was outraged and objected the demands of his Cartwheel campaign to preclude any transfer of troops or ships from his theater to Nimitz. MacArthur wanted covering support from the Pacific Fleet’s new fast carrier task forces to help raid Rabaul, Truk and other Japanese bases on a southern route. Halsey likewise was anxious about withdrawing aircraft from the south pacific area to support operations north of the equator. He warned Nimitz on June 25th that if airpower were diverted from the drive on Rabaul “it would seriously jeopardize our chances of success at what appears to be the most critical stage of the campaign.” Without borrowing forces from the south pacific, Nimitz could not realistically tackle the Marshalls until early 1944 and many members of the planning staff counseled patience. They argued to Nimitz, the new offensive should await the arrival of a large fleet of Essex carriers. By February or March of 1944, they predicted a much expanded 5th fleet could simply steam into the Marshalls and seize 4 or 5 of the largest Japanese bases simultaneously. If the combined fleet came out to fight, such an American force would willingly and confidently give them battle. But King simply wanted action in 1943, he insisted the northern line of attack be opened before the final assault on Rabaul. This would prevent the enemy from concentrating their defenses against either prong of the westward advance. Enemy territory simply had to be taken, somewhere in the central pacific by the end of the year.  There was a lot of arguing going about. The joint chiefs had clearly intimated that the Philippines were to be approached through the central pacific, but MacArthur concluded that a drive through the Marshalls and Carolines would have to occur without land-based air support, thus it would be slow and extremely costly to naval power and shipping. MacArthur argued the central pacific route was unwise and thought after Rabaul was captured it should be southwest pacific forces advancing along the north coast of New Guinea and onwards to the Philippines. This would require the neutralization of various islands like Palaus and others in the Banda and Arafura seas to protect their flanks. This long range plan that he prepared was designated RENO.  Now all of this of course was intended to cut Japan off from her vast riches in the Dutch East Indies, the thing keeping her war machine alive. The British also had their own desires who applied much pressure onto their American allies, prompting General Marshall to assure them that a Gilberts-Marshalls-Carolines campaign would be undertaken “with the resources available in the theater”. DuringQuadrant conference, the British chiefs had agreed to back King’s demand for resources in the central Pacific in return for more forces against Nazi Germany. However during the Trident conference in May, which was not concerned so much with the Pacific strategy, the joint chiefs of staff submitted a plan titled “the strategic plan for the defeat of Japan” which called for a large, sustained air offensive against the home islands in preparation for an invasion. For this all to occur, China had to be maintained, and that meant the Americans and British would need to right their way into China finding a good secure port to move materials properly, most likely this would be Hong Kong. In the meantime the Americans, British and Chinese would work together to recapture Burma to try and drive through the strait of Malacca to Hong Kong via a series of amphibious operations. The Americans would also attempt a drive through the Celebes sea to Hong Kong from the central pacific aided by some subsidiary efforts from the south and southwest pacific areas, good luck getting a penny from MacArthur.  The Central Pacific was the most advantageous and logical route because it was shorter than the southern route, it would require less ships, less troops, less supplies and the bases in the Marshalls, Marianas and Carolines would isolate Japan from her overseas empire. The Japanese would only be able to mount limited air and ground forces on the islands in the central pacific, but nonetheless the American planners were forced to make twin drives along the central and southern axes. It has been argued, President FDR was swayed by Marshall’s insistent demands for a southern push, because MacArthur held considerable political weight and could have been made a republican nominee for presidency in 1944. There were positives to running twin operations of course. For one thing it would prevent the Japanese from being able to guess the time and place of forthcoming advances keeping them off balance. It also allowed for opportunities for mutual support. Some of the operations would require a behemoth amount of resources, take for example the estimations they ran for the capture of the Bismarck Archipelago which was required to secure the line of communications to Australia and provide access to the Celebes sea. They estimated it would require 7 divisions, 5 of which needed to be amphibious units. If Rabaul fell or was neutralized, perhaps the division numbers would be less. The Marshall operation would require two reinforced amphibious divisions, 4 heavy bombardment and two fighter groups of land based aircraft. On top of that was the naval aspect, they estimated that they needed four battleships, three more auxiliary carriers, twelve cruisers, sixty-three destroyers, twenty-four attack transports, forty-four tank landing ships (LST's), plus landing craft. Garrison forces would include one reinforced division, 10 defense battalions, 545 planes, and 18 motor torpedo boats. For the Carolines, the Combined Chiefs estimated that they would require 3 reinforced amphibious divisions, 2 heavy bomber groups, 10 carriers of the Enterprise and Essex classes, 7 auxiliary carriers, 4 modern battleships, 9 old battleships, 31 cruisers, 108 destroyers, 20 submarines, 45 attack transports, 15 attack cargo ships, 6 LSD's , 3 headquarters ships, and miscellaneous auxiliaries. To garrison the islands would take two reinforced divisions and three defense battalions, plus aircraft. Talk about a shopping list. By the end of the year it was expected that one Marine and 3 Army divisions would be allocated to the Central Pacific while the South Pacific would gain 2 marines, 5 US Army and 1 New Zealand division and in the southwest pacific 4 US infantry, 1 US airborne, 1 US marine and 11 Australian divisions. So calculated all that, the Joint chiefs estimated 2 more divisions would be needed for the Marshalls, 2 more for the Carolines and 3 more for New Guinea. The strategic plan got the stamp of approval by the combined chiefs of staff on May 22nd. For the planned central pacific offensive, Nimitz decided his first objective would be the Marshall Islands. Their seizure was essential to extend the line of communication to the Celebes sea and to shorten the routes to Australia. From the Marshalls, land-based aircraft could support naval operations against the enemy’s communication lines and there was always the possibility that by hitting the Marshalls, this would lure the combined fleet out for a fight. By July 20th, it was decided that instead of directly hitting the Marshalls, which would be extremely costly requiring a large force, they would instead capture Nauru and the Gilbert Islands as a preliminary springboard to invade the Marshalls. There had been two competing suggestions debated at CINCPAC HQ. Captain Forrest Sherman the chief of staff to Vice admiral John Henry Towers advocated to recapture Wake Islands and employ it as a springboard to invade the Marshalls. Wake was around 500 miles south of the Marshalls. Admiral Spruance favored opening a campaign south and east where the fleet could count on greater land-based air support from rear bases in the south pacific. He was the one advocating to invade the Gilberts, which were 600 miles southeast of the Marshalls. Spruance persuaded Nimitz who persuaded King thus, the Gilberts won the day. Code named Operation Galvanic, was the offensive to simultaneously invade the Ellice Islands, Gilbert Islands and Nauru by November 15th 1943. For Galvanic, Nimitz would have at his disposal all surface forces of the Pacific Fleet, the air forces of the pacific excluding those in the south and southwest pacific areas, elements of the 7th air force, the 2nd marine division of Major General Julian Smith over in New Zealand currently performing amphibious training, 3 aviation engineer or construction battalions, a port battalion and 3 marine defense battalions. The 7th air force led by Major General Willis Hale had already carried out some reconnaissance and bombing missions against Nauru and the Gilberts back in January, February and April. In spite of some heavy interception they managed to hit the runway on Nauru and a local phosphate plant as well as some installations on Tarawa. The 7th air force were utilizing air bases on Canton and Funafuti which were the only ones in range of the Gilberts. To seize the Ellice islands and build new airfields, Nimitz ordered the 5th and 7th defense battalions and 2nd airdrome battalion accompanied by the 16th naval construction battalion to conduct neutralization and reconnaissance. Nimitz sought to build new airfields at Nukufetau and Nanomea which were around 600 miles south and 350 miles east of Tarawa. On August the 18th an advance survey party landed at Nanomea determining it to hold no enemy presence thus the first elements of the 7th defense battalion began occupying it 10 days later. On August the 22nd an advance party of the 2nd Airdrome battalion landed at Nukufetau finding no enemy presenced allowing the remainder of the battalion to follow suit 5 days later. Transforming the atolls into air bases was rapid work. By September 7th a 5000 foot airstrip was operational on Nanomea, by the end of the month a full squadron of aircraft were operating from it. Over on Nukufetau work was slower, but its strip would be operation by October 9th. Back on August 11th, the 804th aviation engineer battalion was sent to develop Baker island, a already american held island 480 miles east of the Gilberts. They began their work on September 1st, taking a week to build a strip capable of supporting fighters. All of this gave Nimitz and Hale the bases they needed to prepare Operation Galvanic.   Now over in the southwest pacific, Generals MacArthur and Blamey were continuing their planned invasion of Lae codenamed Operation Postern. By early 1943, MacArthur had devised plans that made Blamey the commander of “allied land forces” only in name. As we have seen, the creation of the Alamo Force led by General Krueger was MacArthurs attempt at seizing overall command. This led Blamey to gradually realized his only functions would be that of the commander of Australian military forces. MacArthur would reconstitute the United States Army Forces in the Far East USAFFE, for his command in the Philippines with himself as its commander. Now the original date for operation Postern was August 1st and it was to have two stages: the first was an amphibious assault neat the Lae coast and the second was an air-ground operation against Nadzab airfield to its west, this would prevent the enemy from reinforcing Lae overland.    The Amphibious operation would be carried out by General Vasey’s 7th division, who would depart Milne Bay and move north of Buna to land near Lae utilizing small landing craft. Admiral Barbey estimated it would require 65 LCVPS (landing craft, vehicle personnel or Higgins boats) and LCTs from the 2nd engineer special brigade. To train for the operation the 7th would be sent to trinity beach near Cairns. However continuous outbreaks of malaria led it being believed the unit could not be used without endangering the civilian population. Major General George Wooten’s 9th division not yet exposed to the conditions on Green Hell and malaria free ended up taking the amphibious role. After two weeks of amphibious training with higgins boats. The 9th moved to Milne bay by August 12th and would be followed by General Heavy’s units who would help further train them at Morobe.    Now I had mentioned the second part was an air-ground operation, originally it was to consist of the 2/503rd american parachute battalion to take the airfield. Then the 25th and 21st brigades of the 7th division were to cross the Markham river and assist the parachute battalion to occupy the area. But it would turn out, when they arrived to Markham, the Australians first had to advance through the Bulldog road to reach Wau, and although a ton of work had been done on it the Bulldog road had not reached Markham river yet. At first General Berryman boldly said to General Kenney that he would be him a bottle of whisky that a jeep could simply cover the gap to the road by august the 1st, he lost the bet. Thus it was decided transport aircraft would be required to take the 7th division directly from Port Moresby into the overgrown landing ground at Nadzab. The parachute battalion would not receive any support from Markham. MacArthur decided to instead employ the full 503rd parachute regiment led by COlonel Kenneth Kinsler to hit Nadzab on August 8th. Now thanks in a large part to cooperation between Generals Vasey, Herring, Whitehead and Kenney the planning for the operation went well. Extensive air and land reconnaissance of the area was the key to success. With all the preparation done, D-day for the 9th division’s amphibious assault was scheduled for September 1st, Z day for the 7th divisions operation against Nadzab would be September 2nd. Like all good operations, a diversion was going to be implemented. General Savige’s forces had been conducting a series of attacks in the Salamaua area for months. The “Salamaua magnet” had successfully convinced General Nakano the allies intended to hit Salamaua. Nakano also believed holding Salamaua would keep Lae safe. General Adachi would go on the record to state, orders given to him and other forces was to hold Salamaua as long as possible, probably until the last man if it came down to it. Adachi knew if Salamaua fell, Lae was pretty much a lost cause. The irony of course was this all led to troops being pulled away from Lae to bolster Salamaua, when Lae was in fact the target.  Air supremacy over the Huon Gulf was going to be a necessity for Operation Postern to succeed. Generals Berryman and Kenney needed to acquire new airfields that would be used to neutralize Wewak and Madang, two key Japanese air bases. The allies began building airfields at Benabena and Tsili Tsili which could act as advanced fighter bases and refueling points. Benabena already had a functioning airstrip, but Whitehead wanted to develop it further, Kenney was concerned as he knew the Japanese were aware of the site. Kenney wanted to divert the enemy’s attention away from the airfield being built at Tsili Tsili which the Japanese did not know about yet. The Japanese were tossing wave after wave of air raids against Benabena, doing minimal damage. Meanwhile a military road was being constructed from Bogadjim on the northern coast up the valley of Mindjim river to Yaula and Yokopi and it was intended to extend past the Finisterre range into the Ramu Valley. On August 1st the New Guinea force HQ estimated the road would reach Ramu Valley within 8 weeks. THe development of the road and other activity in the Ramu valley was drawing attention from the Japanese, thus the 2/2nd independent company as sent to reinforce the 2/7th at Benabena. As this occurred, the secret construction work at Tsili Tsili raged on using some innovative ideas. The construction workers were using camouflage and careful timing of flights to hide the existence of Tsili Tsili’s airfield, and managing to do this successfully for two months. An enormous amount of air transport and equipment was allocated for the task. The 871st airborne engineers battalion were sent in to hammer the job out and soon 3 dry weather runways were operational by september. Over on the Japanese side, they were reorganizing their air forces in New Guinea. After receiving alarming reports of enemy airfields being constructed at Mount Hagen and Benabena, knowing full well these would threaten their airfields at Wewak and Madang, it was decided the air strength of New Guinea would be bolstered by the 7th air division of Lt General Sudo Einosuke. From June 19th onwards, aircraft of the 7th division began arriving at Wewak from the Dutch East Indies. The 6th air division had moved its HQ from Rabual to Wewak on July 9th of 1943, 324 aircraft strong. The 7th air division brought another 156 aircraft, alongside this the 4th air army was brought over to Rabaul on August 6th placed under the command of General Imamura’s 8th area army. Additionally to support the defense of Wewak and Madang, General Adachi was planning to toss 3000 soldiers under Lt General Katagiri Shigeru’s 20th division against Benabena while Lt General Mano Goro’s 41st division would occupy Mount Hagen. Such operations were scheduled to begin in early september. A detachment of the 30th independent engineer regiment of Lt Kitamoto Masamichi were sent over to Kaiapit alongside patrols further into the Ramu valley. They gradually occupied Dumpu and Wesa. But the increasing allied threat to Salamaua and Lae prompted Adachi to postpone the Benabena attack until August 1st and as a result Lae’s airbase was being abandoned. Since early july, Lae was facing a substantial issue maintaining aviation fuel, it had been a point of refueling for aircraft going between Rabaul and other airfields like Madang and Wewak. Alongside this, Lae was within allied medium bomber range, and the threat prompted the Japanese to build 3 new airfields on the northwestern coast of New Guinea at But, Dagua and the Boram Plantation. It was the 20th and 41st divisions who ended up providing most of the labor to construct these airfields. On August 14th Tsili Tsili saw its first two squadrons of P-39 Airacobras of the 35th fighter group led by Lt Colonel Malcolm Moore. These arrived just in time to meet the beginning enemy attacks. Japanese aircraft had finally spotted the secret airfield during some reconnaissance flights on August 11th. On the morning of August 15th, 7 Ki-48 Lilly’s escorted by 36 Ki-43 Oscars attacked Tsili Tsili. The bombers were intercepted immediately and all were shot down by 26 Airacobras and 3 Lightnings. However the Oscars managed to shoot down two C-47’s of the 21st troop carrier squadron. The other C-47’s scrambled to escape back to Port Moresby by flying at treetop level. The allied fighters then intercepted the Oscars lading to 3 Oscars being downed at the cost of 4 Airacobras. The following day saw another raid, but Thunderbolts and Lightnings intercepted the raiders downing some 15 Oscars. After receiving such a blow, the Japanese commanders at Wewak decided to conserve further air strength. Unbeknownst to them the situation was far more dire than they thought. You see the Japanese commanders did not believe the enemy fighters and medium bombers had the range to hit Wewak.  To geek out a bit, when such aircraft like Mitchells first arrived in Australia, they were equipped with a lower turret. Now when they began performing operations in New Guinea, it required low altitude flying and thus the turrets became useless, so they were removed and replaced with forward firing guns at the nose. General Kenney’s air depot at Townsville working tireless to modify 172 Mitchells between July and September of 1943. The removal of the large turrets allowed for an additional square shaped 11,500 liter metal fuel tank to be installed, which was suspended by hooks from a bomb shackle. These fuel tanks gave the aircraft an extra two hours flying time, just enough to give them the range to hit Wewak. These tanks were very vulnerable to catching fire during combat or from crash landings so they were made dischargeable. A minor innovation, that made all the difference. On August 1th aerial photographs indicated the Japanese had 8 medium bombers, 31 light bombers, 69 fighters at Wewak and Boram plus 34 medium and 34 light bombs with 23 fighters at Dagua and But. Thus Kenney elected to hit them and he had at his disposal two heavy bomber groups the 43rd and 90th bomb groups with 64 bombers alongside two medium groups, the 3rd attack group and 38th bomb groups with 58 modified mitchells.  Kenney’s plan was to toss 8 squadrons of heavy bombers for night raids against Wewaks 4 airfields followed up by 5 squadrons of Mitchells. Fighter could refuel at Tsili Tsili to help escort and boy would they, an unprecedented 99 fighter escorts would take part in the raids. On the night of August 16th the first raid occurred seeing 12 B-17 and 38 Liberators take off from Port Moresby, all but two reached Wewak by midnight. For 3 hours Colonels Harry Hawthorne and Aruther Rogers led the 43rd and 90th bombardment groups to pound the 4 airfields causing tremendous damage. Countless aircraft tried to take off the next day at Boram only to fail due to damage. The next morning, two squadrons of Mithcells of Lt COlonel Brian O’Neill’s 38th bomb group left Port Moresby to hit Dagua and But while two squadrons of Colonel Donald Hall’s 3rd attack group would hit Wewak and Boram. They would be employing some new toys, the first parachute retarded fragmentation bombs or also called Parafrags. They had been developed from standard 10 kg fragmentation bombs which were carried in a honeycomb rack in the bomb bay. A small parachute slowed and straightened out the course of the bomb allowing the bomber to get out of the blast range before it exploded. Further work was also going into the development of “daisy-cutter” bombs, which were bombs wrapping with wire to iron rods onto them to produce a ground level fragmentation effect when used with a ground proximity fuse. Nerd stuff.    The 3rd group bombers ended up catching some newly arrived Japanese aircraft perfectly lined up on each side of the runways. The Mitchells strafed them before dropping 786 10 kg paragraph bombs, annihilating 60 aircraft. Meanwhile the 38th group Mitchells faced some issues discharging their auxiliary fuel tanks, leading to only 3 bombers reaching Dagua and none to But. The 3 who reached Dagua strafed and low level bombed it with 105 ten kg parafrags destroying and damaged at least 17 aircraft and intercepting a single Oscar. Not a bad haul at all for just 3 Mitchells. The following day, Kenney tried to repeat the raids, but this time only half of the 49 heavy bombers reached their targets and the bombing was quite inaccurate. However, most of the 62 Mitchell’s reached the target this time, but they would be pounced upon by Japanese fighters and anti-aircraft fire from an enemy that was waiting for them. A flight led by Major Ralph Cheli, commanding the 405th bomb squadron was jumped by nearly a dozen Oscars. Cheli’s plane was badly hit, his right engine and wing catch fire. Yet despite this Cheli led his flight across Dagua airfield before crashing into the ocean. He was captured and sent to Rabaul where he would later be executed. For this brave action Cheli was awarded the Medal of Honor. In the end 15 Oscars were destroyed at the cost of 2 lightnings and 1 mitchell. Two additional raids were conducted on August 20th and 21st.   The 5th air force claimed to have destroyed 20 enemy aircraft on the 20th and 70th on the final day, half of which were shot down in air combat by the Lightnings. An estimated 174 Japanese aircraft were put out of action during these attacks, almost 90% of which came from Wewaks total air strength around 200 strong. Even before it had a chance to derail the battle for Lae, the 4th air army had been completely annihilated. Wewak was neutralized, the door was open to smash Lae. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. A ton of planning was raging on and now there was to finally be twin operations to thrust into the central pacific and south pacific. With some new toys, Kenney’s airforces had all but smashed what the Japanese had created to defend Lae. Now the door was wide open for Lae to be assaulted.

Last time we spoke about the Komiatum Offensive in New Guinea. The drive to Lae and Salamaua was raging on New Guinea. Mount Tambu was assaulted and the allies received hellish casualties trying to take it. The legendary Bull Allen saved countless lives during this action, but Mount Tambu simply couldn't be captured. The allies chose to isolate and surround mount Tambu instead. The allies secured took the sugarcane knoll, the timbered knoll and then found a path heading to Komiatum. Nakano ordered his men to hold Komiatum ridge, but their situation became more and more desperate. Allied artillery and aerial bombardment alongside the enveloping maneuvers were taking a toll, the Japanese had suffered 900 casualties since July 23rd. With more men dying minute by minute, Nakano ordered a withdrawal from Komiatum still believing the primary target of the allies was Salamaua. This episode is the Fall of Kiska & Battle of Vella Lavella  Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  So before venturing back to the frigid northern aleutians, we have a lot of action to talk about in the south Pacific. On August 3rd, General Sasaki was forced to order a withdrawal from Munda. General Griswold sent a message over to Admiral Hasley declaring “Our ground forces today wrested Munda from the Japs and present it to you as sole owner”. Halsey in his typical fashion replied “keep ‘em dying”. Despite the blood, sweat and tears taking Munda, as a whole, operation cartwheel had fallen a month behind schedule. As Griswold noted “the months fighting had not been the Americans’ finest hour in the Solomon islands campaign”. Halsey would add to it “the smoke of charred reputations still makes me cough”. Now just because Munda had fallen did not mean the work was all done, there was to be cleanup operations of course. General Sasaki ordered his forces to retreat northwards, most were enroute to the Kure 6th farm; the 13th regiment and Sasaki’s HQ were going to Bairoko; the 3rd battalion, 23rd regiment and Yokosuka 7th guns were heading to Baanga island. The Americans would be in hot pursuit. General Griswold divided the cleanup operations, giving the 25th division the task of advancing across New Georgia to seize Bairoko Harbor and the Piru Plantation. General Hodge 's 43rd division was given the task of seizing the islands of Arundel and Baanga. General Collins would deploy the 1st battalion, 27th regiment and Colonel Dalton’s 161st regiment to advance up the Bairoko trail; the rest of Colonel Douglas Sugg’s 27th would advance along the Zieta Trail towards the Piru plantation. General Sasaki learnt on August 6th, the American navy had scored a small but conclusive victory when 6 US destroyers sunk 3 IJN destroyers, the Arashi, Kawakaze and Hagikaze during the Naval battle of Vella Gulf. This of course meant the Japanese reinforcement convoy had failed, thus Sasaki wasted no time ordered a general withdrawal to Kolombangara by the way of Baanga Island. Sasaki needed to give the men more time, so he reinforced the Yano battalion with the 12th company of the 3rd battalion, 23rd regiment who were left to defend the Kure 6th farm. Major Yano Keiji, a veteran of Guadalcanal, selected a rough terrain east and south of Zieta village and the Kure 6th farm to dig in. The Americans would later refer to it as “Zieta Garden”. The garden was to be Yano’s first line of defense across the Zieta river. There was a bit of high ground due north of Zieta Village which would have been easier to defend, but he needed his men to protect the trail running to Lulu Channel and Baanga, his only line of communications. The 3rd battalion, 23rd regiment in the meantime were securing Baanga. General Sasaki radioed his plans to the 8th Fleet, but to his surprise was told to hold onto New Georgia until late September for “future operations”. Sasaki was bewildered by this, but understood Admiral Samejima then commanding the 8th fleet was trying to direct a land battle, and obviously he was not experienced in such things. What Sasaki did not know at the time was Samejima was being instructed by General headquarters to do this. On August 7th, the Army and Navy had agreed to pull out of the Central Solomons and would cooperate to bolster Bougainville’s defenses. A revisión later on August 13th would instruct Koga, Kusaka and Imamura to hold onto as much of New Georgia as possible while Bougainville was being reinforced. Full evacuation of New Georgia was set for late September to early October, but the actual dates were dependent on the Bougainville progress. On August 8th Sugg’s 2nd battalion advanced through a deep ravine going roughly 2 miles up the trail when his men were met with heavy machine gun fire. The Yano battalion was defending the barge supply route through the Lulu channel as their comrades and supplies made their way to Baanga. On August 9th, the 27th began their assault upon the Kure 6th Farm, employing a envelopment maneuver. The Yano battalion was holding them at bay, but gradually the allied forces were confining the Japanese into a smaller and smaller pocket. Meanwhile the 1st battalion was advancing north along the Munda-Bairoko trail where they joined Colonel Liversedge’s men. On the 10th, Hodge ordered the 169th regiment to hit Baanga and on the 11th patrols from their 3rd battalion had located the Japanese strongpoint on its southwest tip. By nightfall, the American assault of the Kure 6th Farm forced Colonel Yano to withdraw back across the Zieta River to form a new defensive perimeter. His men performed a fighting withdrawal throughout the night seeing many Japanese scream and throw rocks at the Americans. The usual night time activities that kept the allied forces miserable.  On the 12th the Americans unleashed an artillery bombardment upon the Kure 6th Farm positions not realizing they had already been abandoned. The 89th had fired 2700 rounds, the heaviest concentration of the operation on completely empty positions. The Americans advanced over Yano’s old positions, crossed the river and fell upon Yano’s new defensive perimeter. On that day General Barker assumed command of the 43rd division as General Hodge returned to his command of the Americal Division. Barker began by sending L Company of the 169th regiment to occupy Baanga. L Company were met with unexpectedly heavy Japanese fire suffering 28 casualties before they were forced to pull back.    Meanwhile on August 13th, Sugg’s 3rd battalion with E company managed to launch their main assault against the Yano battalion. They were attempting a envelopment maneuver against Yano’s flanks, but heavy resistance saw Yano’s right flank repel the attack. On the left there was a marshy plain that hindered the American advance forcing them to go too far left and thus failing to apply enough pressure. Although the assault failed, the unexpected left advance saw some gain. A patrol from H company stumbled across a heavily used trail leading to the Lulu channel. They established a roadblock that night allowing ambush efforts to hit the trail. The roadblock convinced Yano he was soon to be cut off, so he immediately prepared a withdrawal to Baanga.    In the meantime, Barker decided to use Vela Cela island as a launching point for an assault against Maanga. On August the 14th, the 3rd battalion, 169th regiment began occupying the small island before using it as a springboard to land at Baanga. However the Americans quickly found themselves surrounded by a mangrove swamp and the Japanese began tossing counter attacks until night fell.  Yano’s forces repelled numerous American attacks from the 3rd battalion throughout the day, afternoon and night. The Japanese threw back one attack led by four marine tanks, which had crossed the river on a bridge engineers built. While doing this his men also began their retreat westwards. H Company met a brief exchange with Yano’s men, but Yano decided not to seriously clash with them and withdrew his battalion to Baanga by the 15th.  The 27th occupied Zieta village, making contact with Schultz 3rd battalion, 148th infantry over on Zieta Hill to the north. After this the 27th would advance upon Piru plantation and Sunday Inlet, too which they also ran into mangrove swamps greatly hindering them. The fight for the Zieta area had cost them 168 casualties, the americans were seeing a continuous flow of fierce counterattacks at Baanga, prompting Barker to decided he would reinforce the beachhead with the 2nd battalion 169th regiment and the 1st and 3rd battalions of the 172nd regiment.   At this point General Griswold and Admirals Halsey and Wilkinson were trying to figure out what to do next. Halsey’s original plan after the taking of Munda was to attack Kolombangara, but the recent performance of the Japanese defenders made the Americans quite skittish about performing an amphibious invasion. The battle for Munda point was one of the fiercest defenses the Japanese had put up. More than 30,000 troops had been brought over to face 5000 Japanese defenders within their network of entrenchments. As pointed out by the commander in chief of the US Navy planning memorandum “If we are going to require such overwhelming superiority at every point where we attack the Japanese, it is time for radical change in the estimate of the forces that will be required to defeat the Japanese now in the Southwest and Central Pacific.” Munda Point airfield would become a landmark victory because of the 6000 foot runway it would soon provide, alongside taxiways and its capacity as a base of operations. Halsey would later declare its airfield “to be the finest in the south pacific” and the Seabees would be awarded with a citation for their great efforts. Commander Doane would receive a special mention “by virtue of his planning, leadership, industry, and working ‘round the clock’ to make serviceable the Munda Airfield on August 14th, 1943, a good four days ahead of the original schedule.” The seabees work was a testament not only to their morale and organization, but also the fact they held superior equipment. Admiral Nimitz would go on the record to state “one of the outstanding features of the war in both the North and South Pacific areas has been the ability of US forces to build and use airfields, on a terrain and with a speed which would have been considered fantastically impossible in our pre-war days.” Overall the Georgia campaign would go on the be an essential component in the strangulation of Rabaul, as pointed out by historian Eliot Morison “The Central Solomons ranks with Guadalcanal and Buna-Gona for intensity of human tribulation. We had Munda and we needed it for the next move, toward Rabaul; but we certainly took it the hard way. The strategy and tactics of the New Georgia campaign were among the least successful of any allied campaign in the Pacific”.   Allied intelligence indicated Kolombangara had roughly 10,000 Japanese defenders, thus Halsey was inclined to seek an alternative method rather than slugging it out. He thought perhaps they could bypass Kolombangara completely and instead land on Vella Lavella. If they managed to pull that off, it would cut off the Japanese supply line to Kolombangara which was basically surviving on fishing boats and barges based out of Buin. Halsey noted “Kolombangara was 35 miles nearer the Shortlands and Kahili. According to coast-watchers, its garrison numbered not more than 250, and its shoreline would offer at least one airstrip.” A reconnaissance carried out back on July 22nd reported very few enemy troops on the island and that it held a feasible airfield site at Barakoma which also had beaches capable for LST’s to land at. Thus Halsey approved the plan and Griswold formed the Northern Landing Force, placed under the command of Brigadier General Robert McClure. The force consisted of the recently arrived 35th regiment of the 25th division attached to the 25th cavalry reconnaissance troops, all led by Colonel Everett Brown; the 4th defense battalion, the 58th naval construction battalion and the Naval base group.  To hit Vella Lavella they would require air supremacy and artillery planted upon Piru Plantation and the Enogai-Bairoko area. General Twinnings AirSols had 161 fighters back on July 31st, but by August 18th they would have 129 functioning. Twining had sufficient strength in bombers as the number of light and medium bombers had dropped by less than a dozen, at around 129. For heavy bombers his increased from 48 to 61. It was critical Munda airfields be fully operational by mid august, sothe Seabees of the 73rd and 24th naval construction battalions went to work. Admiral Fitch’s plan for Munda airfield called for a 6000 long foot runway with a minimum 8 inch coral surface and taxiways and revetments ready for over 200 fighters by September 25th. Eventually this would also include 48 heavy bombers. The immediate job was the fighter strip as always, you prepare your defenses against air attacks before you bring in the heavy bombers. He had a week to make the field operational. Commander Doane of the 73rd Seabees had two critical assets. The first was Munda was by far the best airfield site in the Solomons. Beneath one to 3 feet of topsoil was solid coral and there was a plentiful supply of live coral which hardened like concrete, great for the surfacing. Second the 73rd was the best equipped battalion yet to arrive to the solomons with D-7 and D-8 bulldozers, ¾ yard power shovels, 8 yard carryalls and 7 ton rollers. Weather was good and the moon was bright for the week permitting night time work without lights. The immediate threat would have been a 12cm of the Yokosuka 7th SNLF at Baanga, but they never fired upon them. Again, wars are won by logistics and it can't be expressed enough what a colossal amount the Seabees did for the Pacific War. By August 14th, Mulcahy flew over to set up his HQ and the VMF-123 and VMF-124 flew into the base with a R4D carrying their gear and personnel. For the incoming invasion P-40s would be coming from Segi while Corsairs would be launched from Munda.  Admiral Kusaka had reformed his 1st Base air force thanks to the arrival of his long-sought reinforcements. In mid July reinforcements arrived to the Solomons in the form of the 201st Kokutai Aerial Bomb group and carrier Division 2’s naval bombers from Ryujo. The overall strength of the 1st base air force was now at around 230 aircraft of various types. The land-based bombers would go to Rear Admiral Ueno Keizo’s 25th air flotilla over in Rabaul. They were tasked with night bombing raids against Guadalcanal and New Georgia now. Naval fights and bombers would be merged into the 1st combined air attack force, later reformed into the 26th air flotilla led by Rear Admiral Sakamaki Munetake. There job was to destroy any enemy shipping in New Georgia and to conduct interceptions over the Munda-Buin areas. It was understood the Americans held numerical superiority, but the Japanese were willing to take them on hoping their fighting spirit would prevail. Meanwhile, back on the night of August 12th, Admiral Wilkinson deployed an advance party of 14 men led by Captain George Kriner to perform a reconnaissance of Vella Lavella. They would be reinforced by Companies E and G of the 103rd regiment when the scouts found 40 Japanese around Biloa and another 100 5 miles north of Barakoma. They had reached the island secretly using 4 PT boats, though Japanese floatplanes would made to bomb one of them. After the successful arrival of the advance party at Barakoma, F Company of the 103rd landed on August 14th to reinforce the beachhead.  The main invasión force designated Task Force 31 led by Admiral Wilkinson  would consist of 10 destroyers, 5 destroyer transports, 12 LCI’s, 3 LST’s and two subchasers. At 3:05am  the 1st transport group of the force departed consisting of the destroyer transports with 6 escort destroyers were carrying the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 35th regiment. Captain Ryan led the group aboard Nicholas while Wilkinson was aboard Cony. The second transport group made up of the smaller vessels carried the Seabees and support personally following an hour behind with 4 destroyer escorts led by Captain William Cooke. After the force departed Guadalcanal they were to approach the Gizo Strait around midnight, before beginning to unload in the early hours of august 15th, under the cover of fighters.  However Wilkinson would not be aware his force was spotted by a G3M Betty bomber which reported back to Admiral Samaki who immediately launched a strike force. By 8am, the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 35th regiment had landed. While the 3rd battalion began their unloading process enemy aircraft appeared. 48 Zeros and 6 Vals were intercepted by American fighters. By 9:15 all the troops were landed, now the equipment began to be unloaded. The Japanese launched two waves from Buin, the first appeared at 12:30, made up of 48 Zero’s and 11 Vals. They were intercepted leading to no damage being done to the landing forces. 7 Zeros came in low to strafe the beach but were turned away by fire from 65 automatic weapons aboard the LST’s. LST’s in the past lacked adequate anti aircraft protection, thus 20 20mm guns were borrowed from Guadalcanal and set to use. At 5:30 32 Zero’s and 8 Vals showed up but they too were intercepted. By 6pm the LSTs were beginning to retract. The strikes had amounted to 12 men killed on the beach and 40 wounded, it could have been much worse. The Japanese reported losing 9 Zeros and 8 Vals for the day while the Americans would claim to have lost a total of 5 fighters. Without any real land battle the amphibious invasion of Vella Lavella was a resounding success. After darkness settled in, Admiral Ueno’s 5th air attack force over in Rabaul launched their final attempt against the American convoys. At 5:30pm, 3 Betty’s that had launched out of Vunakanau were spotting the convoy and reporting their movements. They came across the LCI’s southeast of Gatukai and the LSTs as they were approaching the Gizo strait. 23 Bettys in 3 Chutai’s, one armed with torpedoes the other two with bombs approached. The torpedo armed Betty’s attacked the LCI’s while the bombers went for the LST’s. The American destroyers tossed up a lot of anti aircraft fire as the torpedoes and bombs failed to hit targets. 4 Betty’s would be damaged badly for their efforts. The Japanese reaction to the terrible results was to form an unrealistic plan to wipe out the American invasion by sending a single battalion to the island. When the landings became known, officers of the 8th fleet and 17th army formed a conference. They estimated, with accuracy surprisingly, that the landing force was around a brigade in strength. One officer proposed the idea to send a battalion to counterland. General Imamura’s HQ calmly pointed out that sending a single battalion against a brigade would be like “pouring water on a hot stone”. The men were desperately more needed for the defense of Bougainville. The Japanese knew they were vastly outnumbered in the Solomons and that the fight for the central solomons was pretty much lost. They believed their only chance to successfully defend the rest of the solomons was to carry out a slow retreat in order to build up forces in Bougainville and Rabaul.  It was decided that two rifle companies of the Miktami battalion and a platoon from the Yokosuka 7th SNLF would be sent to Horaniu on the northeast corner of Vella Lavella. These forces would establish a barge staging base between Kolombangara and the Shortlands. Alongside this Rekata bay would be evacuated and its 7th Kure SNLF would set up a relay base at Choiseul. Imamura nad Kusaka planned to hold Horaniu for as long as possible, trying to establish a new supply route along the west coast of Choiseul.  For the Horaniu operation, Admiral Ijuins destroyer squadron of Sazanami, Shigure, Hamakaze and Isokaze were going to escort 22 barges, supported by 3 torpedo boats and two subchasers. The small armada departed Rabaul on August 17th, but Ijuin’s destroyers were spotted quickly by an allied search plane 100 miles out of Rabaul. In fact, Wilkinson was anticipating the Japanese heading for Kolombangara or perhaps Barakoma. He sent 4 destroyers, the Nicholas, O’Bannon, Taylor and Chevalier under Captain Thomas Ryan. Ryan had been an ensign in Yokohama during the 1923 Great Kanto earthquake, where he saved the love of one Mrs. Slack from the burning Grand Hotel. This earned him the medal of honor making him 1 of 18 men to receive the medal of honor during the interwar period of 1920-1940. Ryans force departed Tulagi while the other American convoy, the 2nd echelon led by Cooke were landing equipment at Barakoma. By nightfall Ryans squadron were coming up the slot while the enemy convoy was being harassed by 4 Avengers. The Avengers failed to score hits, but the anti aircraft gunfire alerted Ryan, as the Japanese were reversing course heading in his direction. At 12:29am on August 18th O’Bannon made radar contact and a few minutes later the Americans could see the Japanese ships. At 12:32 the Japanese spotted Ryans force, prompting Ijuin to order a 45 degree turn northwest to try and lure the enemy away from the convoy. As his ruse succeeded there would be a pretty ineffective long range gun and torpedo duel seeing Hamakaze and Isokaze taking slight damage. Meanwhile the Japanese barges were racing to the coast. Ryan believed he had foiled the reinforcement when he engaged the destroyers . But because Chevalier was facing some mechanical failures and could not keep up speed to chase the Japanese destroyers, Ryan decided to turn back to engage the already landed reinforcements at Horaniu. However they managed to escape north too quickly, thus the Horaniu operation was quite a bit of success, with a lot of luck at play. Now we are shifting over to the frigid north waters of the Aleutians. The fall of Attu and Munda were pivotal moments of the Pacific war that completely changed the course of their respective campaigns. When Munda was taken, the Japanese realized the central solomons were a lost cause and began to move all resources and men they could to Bougainville. When Attu was taken, the Japanese realized the Aleutian islands campaign was a lost cause and decided to evacuate the forces on Kiska. The battle of the pips and miraculous evacuation of Kiska was completed by the end of July. Kiska was pummeled on July 26th and 27th under clear sunny weather. 104 tons of bombs hit Kiska’s installation on the 26th in a large attack consisting of 32 B-24’s, 24 P-38 lightnings and 38 P-40’s. On the 27th it was hit with 22 tons of bombs. On August 1st Lt Bernard O’Donnel conducted the first reconnaissance sweep since the July 27th bombing and observed no Japanese fights, no anti aircraft fire and no ships at harbor. Meanwhile the blockade was being performed by Giffen and Griffen’s task force who bombarded Kiska. Intelligence crews working on aerial photographs of the island and its installations noted a number of odd features. Practically all the buildings around 23 in all appeared destroyed, but with rubble patterns suggesting demolition rather than bombing. The Japanese also appeared to have done no repair work on the craters in the north head runway, which was very odd, it was around the clock kind of work for them. All the garrisons trucks seemed to be parked on the beach in clusters and it seemed they were not moving day to day. Some pilots reported a bit of activity, like narrowly missing flak and some vehicles and ships seen moving below, but Kinkaids HQ noted all these reports were coming from green pilots. Experienced fliers were not reporting such things. Radio traffic had vanished, some wondering if the bombing was so tremendous it destroyed all the radios. Generals Butler and DeWitt believed the Green pilots, but Generals Buckner and Holland Smith were very suspicious, pointing out that the Japanese had already carried out a secret massive evacuation at Guadalcanal. In fact Buckner and Smith kept asking Kinkaid to toss some Alaskan scouts ashore in rubber boats at night prior to an invasion to report if the island was abandoned or not. But Kinkaid had the last say in the matter and declined to do so. Kinkaid’s decision was to go ahead with a full scale invasion of the island. In his words “if the enemy had evacuated the island, the troop landings would be a good training exercises, a super dress rehearsal, excellent for training purposes”.  On August 12th, Captain George Ruddel, leading a squadron of 4 fighters circled low over the anti aircraft gun positions on Kiska, received no flak so he landed on her North head runway dodging nearly 30 craters. The 3 other fighters followed suit and the pilots performed a tiny expedition for some time. They found no sign of people, just destroyed buildings and abandoned equipment. Nonetheless Ruddels report would not stop Kinkaid, only some scolding for doing something so dangerous. The invasion of Kiska, codenamed operation cottage, was set for August 15th. The invasion force was 30,000 Americans and 5300 Canadians under the overall command of Major General Charles Harrison Corlet. It consisted of Brigadier General Archibald Arnolds 7th division; Buckner’s 4th regiment; Colonel Roy Victor Rickards 87th mountain infantry regiment, the 13th Canadian Brigade known as the Greenlight Force which consisted of the Canadian Fusiliers regiment, the 1st Battalion of Winnipeg Grenadiers, the Rocky Mountain Rangers regiment and Le Regiment de Hull led by Major General George Pearkers; there was also Colonel Robert Fredericks 1st Special Service force consisting of 2500 paratroops of elite American-Canadian commandos. Kiska marked the first time Canadian conscripts were sent to a combat zone in WW2. The men were equipped in Arctic gear, trained mostly at Adak, practicing amphibious landings using LCI’s and LCT’s. The naval forces were commanded by Admiral Rockwell were more than 100 warships strong, with Admiral Baker leading a group to bombard Kiska with over 60 tons on August 14th. The journey to the abandoned island was pretty uneventful. On August 15th, Admiral Rockwell dispatched the transports to gather off Kiska during a period of light fog. Major General Corlett’s plan was to stage a diversionary landing using a detachment of Alaskan Scout led by Colonel Verbeck to hit Gertrude Cove which was assumed to be heavily fortified. While this occurred an advance force of the 1st, 2nd and provisional battalions of the 1st regiment, 1st special service force would secure the western side of the island, known as Quisling cove. The main force would land at a beach on the north near the Kiska volcano. Colonel Verbecks scouts and Colonel Robert Fredericks commands were the first to come ashore. They were met by empty machine gun nests as they climbed Lard Hill, Larry Hill and Lawson Hill, interesting names. They investigated caves and ravines only to find destroyed equipment. But perhaps the enemy was simply further up in the hills saving their ammunition to ambush them. During the morning the main force landed on Kiskas northern side whereupon they immediately began climbing some cliffs to reach objectives. In the process each battalion of the 87th mountain regiment captured Robber Hill, Riot Hill and Rose Hill. US Army Lt George Earle recalled this of the unique landscapes of Kiska “At one end was a perfectly shaped steaming volcano, cloudcushioned, well- wrapped […] all around were cliff-walled shores and, when visible, a bright green matting of waist-high tundra scrub and deep lush mosses – a great green sponge of slopes rising to a rocky knife-edge crest nearly eight hundred feet above the shore up in the fog, and zigzagging its ridge-line backbone toward the […] four-thousand foot cone of the volcano”. Lt Earle also noted the incessant rain and fog, Kiska saw roughly 250 days of rain per year on average and held a ton of clouds blotting out sunshine. On the day the allied force landed the island was blanketed with a thick fog. As the allied forces advanced they ran into a variety of booby traps the Japanese had taken a lot of time to leave behind, these included; typical land mines, improvised 155m shells with trigger wires, M-93 mine’s laid upside down wired to blocks of TNT, timed bombs, candle bombs, and the classic grenades with trip wire. There was to be several casualties from booby traps. In the fog as timed bombs or other traps went off, allied forces opened fire towards noises believing the enemy was upon them. There was some friendly fire incidents amongst the Americans and Canadians, but not as much that has been perpetuated by quite a few videos on Youtube mind you. Its actually a myth thats been perpetuated in many books, in fact the main source I have been using for the Aleutian islands campaign is guilty of it sad to say. The friendly fire incidents on Kiska was not a large skirmish between American and Canadian forces that resulted in many deaths or wounded, no that was pretty much summed up to booby traps, a lot of them. If you want to know more about this, I did a podcast interview on my youtube channel, the Pacific War channel with Brad St.Croix, a historian focused on Canadian military history. The episode is titled the Canadian experience during the Pacific War, and Brad had a lot of, going to admit, vented anger about debunking this myth haha. Please go check it out, I have to admit of all my podcast episodes it has not received many views and I am sad at this because there’s a lot of interesting stuff, like how Canada was going to be part of Operation Downfall. Anyways. The Americans and Canadians suspected the Japanese might be retreating into the interior or hiding in fight pits, so they were tense the entire time, after the stories from Attu who could blame them. The crack of a single rifle fire, would be met with more, but it always died down quickly. Corlett’s forces continued to climb uphill towards Link Hill and Ranger Hill in the direction of the main enemy camp at Kiska harbor. They found all the fortifications they came across abandoned. The second wave of the main force were brought over consisted of the 1st regiment, 1st special service force who landed at Little Kiska Island unopposed. By August 18th Corlett was confident the enemy was not on Kiska, but he continued the search nonetheless, into the caves and ravine, until August 22nd. To quote Ian Toll’s 2nd book of his pacific war trilogy  “Considering the expenditure of naval ordnance and aerial bombs on an island that had been vacated by the enemy, and the tremendous investment of shipping and troops in a bloodless invasion, the Kiska operation had been slightly farcical. In Pearl Harbor, the news was received in good humor. Nimitz liked to tell visitors how advance elements of the huge invasion force, creeping inland with weapons at the ready, were warmly greeted by a single affable dog that trotted out to beg for food” Indeed the capture of Kiska which ushered the end to the Aleutians campaign, was kind of a enormous blunder when you consider the amount of resources allocated to it. You always have to consider these resources could have been brought to the south pacific, but hindsight is hindsight. After the battle of Attu, the allies expected an absolute bloodbath on Kiska. For Corlett’s men, the americans suffered 18 deaths, 170 wounded, the Canadians 4 killed and 4 wounded, 130 men also got trench foot. The destroyer Abner Read struck a Japanese mine on August 18th, suffering 70 dead and 47 wounded to bring the total casualties to 313. Generals Buckner and DeWitt sought an invasion of Paramushiro, but the joint chiefs of staff would gradually reject the idea because it was simply seen to be easier to drive through the central or south pacific to Japan. But I would like to point out, if the south and central pacific campaigns did not go well, the idea of hitting the Japanese home islands from the Aleutians could have been a very real thing. Kinkaid, Butler, Eareckson amongst many others would leave the north pacific to deploy in other theaters. It was only really Buckner who remained, DeWitt returned to the west coast, as did the majority of forces. Wanted a feel good end to this one. So the allied forces on Kiska found more than just booby traps, turns out the Japanese had abandoned a number of dogs on the island, so the allied troops adopted many of them and turned them into unit mascots and pets. Surviving photos of the soldiers and the dogs are abundant and cute. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The amphibious assault of Vella Lavella was a huge success, though now the battle for the small island was on. The farcical battle of Kiska had ushered in the end of the Aleutian islands campaign, birthing a long persisting myth to this very day of an incredible friendly fire battle. 

Last time we spoke about the intense battle for Munda. The most important objective of the New Georgia campaign, the seizure of Munda had come at long last. The 43rd, 37th and 25th divisions all performed an envelopment offensive against Munda, but in their way were extremely formidable Japanese fortifications. It was a real slogfest seeing tremendous casualties for both sides of the conflict. However the Americans were able to breakthrough some of the Japanese bunkers, tunnels and pillboxes thanks largely to the use of flamethrowers which were becoming more and more popular on the battlefield of the Pacific. Munda was finally captured and now the Japanese had to withdraw to other areas like Vila to keep the fight alive. On the seas, commander Frederick Moosbrugger unleashed some improved mark 14 torpedoes at the IJN and scored a major victory sending 3 destroyed to their grave and countless sailors and soldiers.  This episode is the Komiatum Offensive Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    So last week we talked exclusively about the New Georgia campaign, so today as you guessed it we are diving back over to New Guinea. You know when it comes to the big and popular aspects of the war, Guadalcanal usually takes the leading role, but campaigns like New Guinea seem to always fall to the wayside as they say. Yet the battle for New Guinea was just as important, it took significant resources away from the Empire of Japan. We are soon to reach the climax of the Lae-Salamaua campaign, things are really starting to heat up. Now the last time we were over on Green Hell, Brigadier Moten had just ordered the 2/6th battalion to secure Bobdubi ridge, while the 2/5th assault Mount Tambu. By the end of July, the Coane Force was beginning to occupy Tambu Bay. The 3rd battalion, 162nd of Archibald Roosevelt were securing the Boisi area with two of their companies hitting slopes west of Tambu Bay, while the 2nd battalion assembled itself at Tambu Bay. By seizing Tambu Bay, the artillery could now take up a good position to better support the troops. Further north, Brigadier Heathcote Hammer was reorganizing his 15th brigade for a new attack against the Old Vickers position. On July 24th, he held an officers conference at Gwaibolom. Hammer laid out plans to employ the 58/59th battalion against Erskine Creek and Old Vickers. The commander of the 58/59th, Lt Colonel Patrick Starr received the order from Hammer, but also a letter directed at him. In the letter Hammer laid out a ton of criticisms against his unit, some of his officers and by implication Starr himself. The main criticisms were based largely on ineffective ground operations such as the unit lacking adequate knowledge of where their neighboring units were or that of the enemy. But as we know, this unit had not received proper training and it really was a baptism under fire kind of situation. But like they say about swimming, sometimes you gotta be thrown into the pool, and boy were they. Following some rather poorly planned and failed attacks back on June 30th, the 58/59th now adopted a more measure approach against the Old Vickers position. Hammer also helped with his reorganizing efforts. Hammer ordered Company A to head further north, while Major Warfe’s commandos would take over the defenses for Gwaibolom; General Savige was assigned the 2/7th to help reinforce the 15th brigade; the 2/6th were ordered to advance along the Sugarcane Ridge to clear a way forward, but would run into a 100 Japanese strong position north off the ridge. On July 26th, the Australians concentrated their 25 pounders upon the ridge before launching a frontal assault. Meanwhile Brigadier General Ralph Coane renewed their attack against Roosevelt Ridge on July 27th. Coane ordered the still assembling 2nd battalion, 162nd regiment for the task. 100 men of E company advanced using a creek line parallel to the ridge, going through some thick jungle. They marched single file, hooking back towards a spur that led towards a small knoll on its crest, looking for a way to break the Japanese defenses. But once they reached the crest, they began taking heavy fire and although they established themselves firmly on a shoulder of ground below the ridge, they could advance no further. Meanwhile the 2/6th were lobbing 25 pounders accurately over the Old Vicker’s position, forcing the Japanese to flee to the refugee of their underground shelters. It basically had become a routine of taking a bombardment and awaiting some screaming Australians or Americans afterwards for most of the Japanese defenders by this point. However no assault came. On July 28th another bombardment was on its way, but this one was directed on the Coconuts area. Starting at 2:45, two 25 pounders from Tambu Bay fired hundreds of rounds alongside some 3 inch mortars in an attempt to thwart the Japanese from sending reinforcement over to the Old Vickers position. During the final 5 minutes of what was a 15 minute bombardment, it turned into a creeping barrage allowing C Company of the 58/59th to advance. The bombardment made a ton of smoke aiding the men. Three platoons attacked the Old vickers position simultaneously. Platoon 7 of Butch Proby charged across some exposed ground at the center of the position; Platoon 13 of Lt Jack Evans attacked the left; while Platoon 15 of Sergeant Vic Hammond attacked from the right. The platoons managed to successfully overrun the Japanese forward bunkers and reached the crest just as the unsuspecting Japanese there were emerging from their dugouts. A heavy firefight broke out, but it was the defenders who began fleeing for their lives towards the Coconuts area. As the men consolidated the Old vickers position they found 17 dead Japanese, but also a large amount of abandoned booty. A 70mm gun with 300 shells, 4 light machine guns, 1 medium machine gun and 28 rifles which the Australians gladly grabbed. Hammer expected the Japanese to launch a vicious counterattack so he rapidly ordered the 2/7th battalion to send the fresh A Company of Captain Septimus Cramp over to relieve the exhausted C Company. Meanwhile B Company of the 2/6th were assaulting Sugarcane Ridge being supported by 3 inch mortars and 4 Vickers guns from the 2/6th field regiment along the Tambu Bay coast. Coming from Ambush Knoll, Platoon 10 led by Lt Clive Trethewie made a frontal assault, but machine gun fire from atop Sugarcane Ridge halted them quickly. Platoon 12 led by Sergeant Stan White and Platoon 11 of Lt Ted Exton were hooking around the ridge to attack the enemy’s rear. The Japanese defenders had assumed the ridge was too steep in its rear position and were completely taken by surprise by the attack, seeing Extoons Platoon 11 overrun them. The Japanese were forced to flee for their lives. The Japanese attempted a dusk counterattack to reclaim the ridge, but it failed. On July 28th, with E Company stalled, F company was brought up to help out, taking up a position to E Company’s left. They both tried to assault the ridge together, but gained little ground and were forced to dig in as the Japanese harassed them with counterattacks. The problem really was the Japanese were simply too well dug in. They held a steep narrow crest on the ridge, with the typical camouflaged pillboxes, mutually supporting machine gun nests, an intricate network of underground tunnels, lets call it the “Japanese special” haha, it will be seen quite often going forward into this war. The allied artillery and mortar bombardments could do little to actually hurt the Japanese, but it did cause them to take shelter within their tunnels, then there was the hope the assaulting forces got close enough before the Japanese stormed out again, which feels a lot like battles from WW1. In the meantime Major Roosevelt’s battalion were working to cut off the Japanese supply routes to the ridge. He dispatched multiple patrols to take up positions along junctions and tracks between Scout ridge, Roosevelt Ridge and Mount Tambu. The men ran into skirmishes with Japanese supply efforts, greatly hindering them. But with the lack of progress by Coane’s force concerned certain commanders like General Savige who began to criticize Coane for a lack of control and discipline over the men. Savige ordered him to push on immediately to capture Roosevelt Ridge, but in response Coane protested that he needed more reinforcements to seize the heavily fortified position. Likewise the lack of progress over at Mount Tambu was also annoying commanders. Taylor Force had just relieved the exhausted 2/5th battalion on the 28th. Several companies consisting of around 400 men from the 1st battalion, 162nd regiment coming over from Nassau Bay took up positions around Mount Tambu. Australian mortar crews and stretcher bearers remaining in the line to support their American comrades with one company of the 2/5th staying behind likewise. Moten planned for a new attack, slated for the 30th, to be followed with attacks against Goodview Junction and Orodubi by the 2/5th and 2/6th respectively. To open up the new attack, 8 105mm guns positioned at Buigap Creek Valley alongside 5 25 pounders position at Tambu Bay opened fire in the morning firing around 200 rounds per gun for an hour and a half. The Americans began their assault with Platoons 2 and 3 charging the ridge while Platoon 1 awaited in reserve. For 45 minutes the two leading platoons moved 150 meters across the Japanese front’s right shoulder. They managed to knock out 6 out of 8 bunkers on the shoulder before attempting to advance further, but the defenders second tier line three meters higher up opened fire upon them and numerous grenades came rolling down the slope. The fire was too much, with the defenders using their tunnel and trench system to deadly effect taking up numerous positions to fire down on the Americans. The two platoons were halted dead in their tracks as the third platoon was brought up, but it made no difference. A legendary figure emerged from this action. For those of you from down unda, you probably already know the story, but for those of you who down, Corporal Leslie Bull Allen became a hero this day. Bull Allen was born in 1918, in Ballarant Victoria and when WW2 broke out he volunteered for service with the 2nd Australian imperial force. He served the 2/5th in Palestine where he became a stretcher bearer. He served in Libya and Syria where he received the nickname Bull for getting a reputation to having a cool head under fire. He was a fairly big boy, 5”11, laborer type build and he had a really deep laugh his comrades would remark “you could hear him a mile off! Bull was thus one of the battalion’s most recognisable…and one of its most popular characters”. After facing the Italians, French and Germans, Bull was sent to New Guinea. He had served during the Wau battle where he received a Military medal for carrying out comrades under intense fire, his citation read “Private Allen’s bearing and his untiring efforts in tending the wounded and helping with rations and stores were an inspiration”. On July the 30th when the Americans were storming Mount Tambu and got botched down, Allen was one of the stretcher bearers who came running up and by himself carried 12 American servicemen to safety. There’s a famous photograph of Bull carrying an American soldier over his shoulders who had been knocked unconscious by a mortar, I do recommend googling it. And of course, I am a Sabaton fan and I would be remiss not to mention there is a song dedicated to Bull Allen, worth a listen. I got to sit down with Sabaton at a bar once in Montreal, the first time they came to north america, by the way, just gloating. Bull Allen received the Silver Star for his heroism from the United States. But as much as I’d like to end it there, I would also like to mention the reality of war. Bull put on a straight face and showed no fear as he saved the men, but as early as 1941 he was showing psychological issues. He had been admitted to a hospital in Libya, suffering from anxiety neurosis, again what we call acute combat stress or combat stress reaction. By the time he saved those boys on Mount Tambu his health was being taxed heavily. Towards the end of 1944, Bull would begin lashing out at superior officers and got himself court martialed and demoted to private. His psychological health, alongside a few bouts of malaria took a horrible toll on him creating numerous anxiety ridden episodes seeing him discharged from duty as he was not deemed medically fit. Bull found it difficult in the post war years suffering from post traumatic stress, and during one point he lost the ability to speak for 6 months. He spent his life after the war working as a laborer and then as a theater nurse at the Ballarat Base hospital. Bull became quite a popular fellow around Ballarant and would pass away on May 11th of 1982 from diabetes and other complications. He is a staple on Anzac Day and a famous image of the Australian war effort during the Pacific War. Mount Tambu was not taken that day, though the first line of bunkers were battered. Moten realized frontally attacking such fortifications was suicide, so he elected to cut off Mount Tambu instead. With the Americans failing, the 2/5th and 2/6th planned attacks changed to taking up positions to surround Mount Tambu. Back on the 29th, Major Warfe took his men to attack what was known as the Timbered knoll held by some Japanese. He sent A Platoon led by John Lewin south along its ridge. They were supported by artillery from Tambu Bay. At 4pm the artillery and mortars started blasting away for 15 minutes. The commandos assaulted the knoll from its northern side, but were quickly pinned down by machine gun fire. Around 10 men advanced along the Bench Cut track east of the Timbered Knoll and attacked it from the south, successfully surprising the defenders, forcing them to flee. Following the capture of the Timbered Knoll, Warfe wanted to press onwards to Orodubi, but Brigadier Hammer ordered his commandos to hold their position as he did not want to open up any gaps along the ridge. Also on the 29th, General Herring for the first time informed General Savige of the true offensive going on which was against Lae rather than Salamaua, indicating to him that the role of his 3rd division was to hold the enemy down in the Salamaua area. Likewise Moten had devised a new plan to drive the enemy from Mount Tambu. It turned out a patrol from the 2/6th had discovered a route going from Ambush Knoll to the Buirali Creek which would allow forces to cut off the Komiatum track, thus isolating the Mount Tambu and Goodview junction. The 2/6 sent 4 patrols out searching for how to ford the Buirali Creek going up to the Kiamatum ridge, some of which probed Japanese positions.  To the north, Captain Edwin Griff’s B Company of the 58/59th advanced to Buggert preparing to attack the Coconuts area. On the 30th as they began their attack, they were met with heavy fit around 80 yards south of the South Coconuts. Forced to dig in the Australians spent the night repelling 3 counterattacks with a handful of men receiving some nasty bayonet and knife wounds. By the morning of the 31st Griff was down to 38 effective men and at 7:20am a 4th Japanese counterattack consisting of a hundred or so men overwhelmed his position. Griff was forced to withdraw to a village west of the Old Vickers position. While this was going on, Hammer had sent companies over to cut the Komiatum and Bench tracks using his A company and C Company. Moten reinforced him with A company of the 2/7th in the hopes such actions would press the Japanese to move more units from Lae over the Salamaua area. It was a huge success as by the end of July the Salamaua area counted with more than 8000 troops. However with all of these troops at Salamaua also required the allies to boost up their commitment in the area, thus Brigadier Raymond Monaghan with the 29th brigade were landed at Nassau Bay for the task. They were assigned to reinforce the Coane force which was still struggling against Roosevelt ridge. Over on the Japanese side, General Adachi decided to reinforce Lae’s defenses. He deployed the 2nd battalion, 80th regiment who would be coming over from Finschhafen, however they would never make it to Lae as by the time they were going to depart they were forced to stay put because the Australians were threatening  the region. Adachi also ordered the Shoge detachment of Major General Shoge Ryoichi to depart Wewak. His force consisted of the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 238th regiment and a battalion of the 41st mountain artillery regiment. Elements of the 238th regiment began leaving Wewak traveling in groups of 3 motor landing crafts every two nights. Each MLC had 50 men and their supplies packed in like sardines. Soon small fishing boats were also carrying 20 men, by late July the 2nd battalion, 238th had all moved from Wewak to Alexishafen. From Alexishafen they traveled again by night and by MLC to Finschhafen and from there finally to Lae. However due to increased attacks and losses upon the MLCS countless men would be left at Finschhafen. Some were ordered to march overland to Lae, but it was a nightmare of a trip. On August 1st, the 1st battalion, 80th regiment had taken up positions along the side of the Old Vickers position and began firing upon its defenders. They were covered by mortars as they charged up the steep terrain in an enveloping movements towards Grassy Knoll. Captain Edwin Griff’s B company harassed them from the west, and by the following morning the 2/7th battalion were able to push the Japanese back. To the north in the Coconuts, Pimple Knoll and the Sugarcane Knoll more Japanese attacks were occurring, but the defenders held the former Japanese fortifications giving them a distinct edge. By the afternoon the Japanese were sniping men in the Old Vickers and Sugarcane Knoll, trying to cover their assault units. By August 3rd, the Japanese unleashed another assault against the entire perimeter, seeing the fiercest fighting take place in an area in front of the 8th Platoon led by Corporal Alan Naismith. Alan ended up crawling forward with grenades in hand before tossing them down the steep slopes of Old Vickers killing many Japanese. Seeing the battle going nowhere, the Japanese unleashed a banzai charge at night as a last ditch effort to break through, but were ultimately forced to withdraw. Seeing three full days of frontal assaults fail, the Japanese then elected to advance further south along a ridge and dug in between the Old Vickers and Buggert. This threatened to encircle the 2/7th, so Griff’s B Company were ordered to restore the line of communications to Old Vickers. Griff ordered a concentrated bombardment of 30 mortars before his company stormed the slope the Japanese dug in on. Two platoons quickly broke through towards Sugarcane Knoll and in the process forced the Japanese to withdraw back over to the Coconuts area. Griff then ordered his company to perform mop up operations as some Japanese had stayed in their foxholes. Yet the performance overall for the 58/59th had displeased Hammer who now decided to place them under Major Warfe’s command. They would also be redeployed over to the Gwaibolom area, while the commandos would take over their Old Vickers position. For a few days the 2/7th performed patrols around the Coconuts area to prepare for a final attack against it. Over at Mount Tambu, on August 4th, Captain Cam Bennett’s B Company and Walters A Company of the 2/5th successfully surprise attacked the defenders atop a small knoll known as Hodge’s Knoll. However they were soon met with heavy counterattacks from three sides dislodging them in the late afternoon. The next day, Moten ordered the 2/6th battalion to advance along the Stephens Track, while its D company led by Captain Harold Laver would take an alternate path towards the Komiatum ridge heading north of Goodview. During the afternoon, a forward patrol of Company D found a route through the jungle to Komiatum village, but the route proved very difficult for the full company to traverse. Alongside this discovery, a patrol from Taylor Force found a small ridge north of Komiatum that was unoccupied named Davidson ridge. By August 6th, Moten and Savige concluded their plan to isolate and reduce Mount Tambu. The 2/6th would secure Komiatum ridge to the northwest; Coane Force would hit Roosevelt and Scout ridge; Lt Colonel Charlie Davidsons 42nd battalion would hit a key ridge to the north, Ie: the one that was to be called Davidson; the 2/5th would hit Goodview junction and the 15th brigade would contain assault the Coconuts area containing the enemy at Tambu knoll and Orodubi. General Herring liked the plan and urged General Savige to quote "drive Coane on to the capture of Roosevelt Ridge even if the cost is higher than he cares about". Herring also added that he could take Savige’s requests to the higher authorities and upon stating that Savige immediately requested Coane and Major Roosevelt be relieved of their commands. Again a lot of the interpersonal and command issues were due to MacArthurs tampering with Alamo Force. Brigadier Coane was told by Fuller he was a separate command from MacKechnie and Colonel Roosevelt continuously refused to obey orders from MacKechnie stating he was not under Australian command. It took until July 19th, for Herring to clarify things that the Australians were in charge of operations in the Nassau Bay area. Combine this with the lack of progress and it was no surprise people were gunning to sack another. On August 7th the first units of Davidsons 42nd battalion landed at Nassau bay at 2am and Coane requested that Davidson immediately march north. Davidson refused to do so until his men got a hot meal and some sleep angering Coane. Then when Davidson and his men reach Duali he was informed Major Stephen Hodgman was waiting with orders from Moten that it was he who was taking operational command. Coane was only to have command over supply communications and rations. When Davidson reached Tambu Bay on the 8th he met with Coane who was greatly frustrated that he was unable to use Davidsons units to hit Roosevelt ridge. Coane told him “If I can’t do as I want with you, I don’t consider you under my command at all”. It was quite fortunate as MacArthur soon relieved Coane and Roosevelt of their commands. As General Savige would later write “MacArthur asked me for my views on Coane and Roosevelt and I gave them strongly…I had my bags packed but MacArthur supported me”. Thus MacArthur sides with Herring and Savige and as a result Colonel MacKechnie was given back command over the 162nd regiment which was taken away from the 41st division directly under Savige’s command. So much sneaky maneuvering going on by MacArthur’s team. On August the 9th Savige visited Motens HQ, then Hammers, then the 58/59th battalions and finally the 2/6th. He was making a tour of the front lines trying to raise morale for the Australians. The next day, the 42nd battalion finally got into position at Tambu Bay where they received confirmation of their orders to seize Davidson ridge. By the 11th the men were climbing the ridge, facing no opposition and it was fully occupied by the 12th. Also on the 12th, MacKechnie began his attack against Roosevelt ridge deploying his 2nd battalion on the right flank and the 3rd on the left. The 2nd battalion established a position on the ridge crest rappelling several counterattacks throughout the day. After a 1.5hr artillery barrage of over 2000 rounds the 2nd battalion charged the ridge and successfully breached the Japanese line in three points. Meanwhile the 3rd battalion, 66th regiment were fighting for their lives, but by nightfall two Australian companies were now occupying high knolls around 500 yards apart. The 3rd battalion, 238th regiment had just begun arriving to Salamaua and were quickly redirected to help out the men on Roosevelt ridge. It would all be for naught however as by the 14th, the Australians pushed the Japanese to the eastern end of the ridge. From a Historian who covered the 41st division “At about 13:15 the jungles north, south and west of Roosevelt Ridge shook and shivered to the sustained blast. The mountains and ridges threw the echo back and forth, down and out, and the quiet white-capped sea to the east, ringing the outer third of Roosevelt Ridge, grew dark a s it received the eruption of earth and steel on that stricken shoulder of land. Scores of guns—75-mm howitzers, Aussie 25-pounders, 20-mms, Bofors, light and heavy machine-guns, even small arms—had opened up simultaneously on the enemy-held ridge. A score or more Allied fighters and bombers had swooped low to strafe its dome and tons of bombs released from the B-24s and B-25s fell straight and true, to detonate, shatter, rip and tear and to deliver certain death at that moment on an August afternoon. Those who watched from the beach saw the top fourth of the ridge lift perceptibly into the air and then fall into the waiting sea. In a scant twenty minutes all that remained of the objective was a denuded, redly scarred hill over which infantrymen already were clambering, destroying what remained of a battered and stunned enemy.” By the late afternoon, Roosevelt Ridge was finally firmly in the hands of the allies. MacKechnie could not however advance any further as his lines were already overextended. The Japanese withdrew to the nearby Scout Ridge where the 238th regiment reinforcements also came to defend.  While this was occurring the 2/7th were advancing upon the Coconuts area. Captain Andrew Rooke led the Bena platoon of Company A alongside Platoon 9 to hit the steep eastern approaches of the South coconuts; Captain Fred Barr’s B company advanced upon the North Coconuts from the west. August the 14th began with a heavy airstrike made up of 22 B-24’s and 7 B-17’s. Starting at 9:30am as told to us by Axel Olsen observing from the Old Vickers “with a noise like the rushing of a great wind’, the bombs passed over the heads of the waiting assault troops. ‘Trees, logs and other rubbish flew through the fall [sic] of dust which now cloaked the target.’ The observers at Old Vickers observed, ‘It seemed that nothing could have lived in the midst of devastation loosed by the planes.” At 10:10 artillery began to bombard the area for an hour and half. As the artillery ceased, 3 inch mortars continued to fire covering the approach of the infantry who were using smoke bombs. As Axel Olsen wrote observing from the Old Vickers  “came a terribly fierce raking with Vickers guns firing through the haze from smoke bombs”. The Australian assault battered the north coconuts position which was guarded by two pillboxes connected to weapon pits using crawl trenches. The area had suffered hard from the bombardments easily allowing the Australians to seize it. However the southern defenses of the south Coconuts found defenders resisting hard in their trenches. The center Coconuts position like the north had nearly been obliterated by the bombing allowing B company to make progress, but soon they were pulling back to the north coconuts position. During the night, allied platoons came across a Japanese communication line going over the Salamua-Bobdubi track, so they cut it to prevent reinforcements. For the next two days, patrols and mortar fire were harassing the south coconuts defenders gradually forcing them to evacuate. By August the 17th the Coconuts and northern end towards Bobdubi were firmly in Australian hands. With all of these gains in hand, Moten was finally ready to attack Komiatum. On August the 15th,  Captain Edgar’s A Company, Captain Laver’s D Company of the 2/6th battalion took up a position due west of Laver’s Knoll. Yes the future names of these knolls and ridges really does seem to give away what happens in the stories haha. Laver’s Knoll was a key feature of the Komiatum ridge and taking it would allow the allies to apply more pressure upon the enemy. On the morning of the 16th, the 2/5th battalion performed a diversionary attack against Goodview, while A and B Companies advanced up the Komiatum ridge under a creeping barrage. The men were fortunate as the Japanese were forced to flee during the artillery fire, allowing Laver’s knoll to be seized quite easily. The men dug in immediately allowing Lt Les Johnson’s platoon 17 to capture, you guessed it Johnson’s knoll. During WW2 if you really wanted something named after you, all you had to do was travel to Green Hell. Johnson and his men dug in on the knoll and soon Japanese fire was directed at them. Japanese counterattacks were lobbed from their south and west before nightfall, but they managed to hold on. During the night the 42nd battalion began using Vicker guns and mortars from Davidson ridge to help harass the enemy. Around dawn on the 17th, the Japanese unleashed another counter attack against Johnson knoll, this time the enemy got within just meters of the Australian defenders. After dusk even more counterattacks were made seeing 217 deaths, 380 wounded and 301 sick Japanese after all was said and done. The attacks were tossed back and soon Vickers machine guns were brought up to Laver’s Knoll to add to the Japanese misery. Unable to break the allied push onto the Komiatum ridge, the Japanese began to become more and more desperate. Artillery and aerial bombardment on top of enveloping maneuvers by the Australians were taking a heavy toll. The Japanese had suffered over 900 casualties since July 23rd and with more and more men dying by the minute, General Nakano ordered a withdrawal from Komiatum to be carried out on the night of August 19th. Nakano was still under the illusion Salamaua was the main target. The next day the Taylor Force and 2/5th found Mount Tambu and Goodview suddenly unoccupied and finally seized their objectives. General Savige personally came over to congratulate the men who took Laver’s knoll, but this was to be his last action in command of the 3rd division. Blamey decided to replace  Savige with the commander of the 5th division General Edward Milford. Milford would later find out the reason for Savige’s sacking was because General Herring was greatly annoyed that a supply line to the coast had not been opened, which was desperately needed to relieve supply aircraft for the upcoming attack on Lae. Herring told Milford that Savige had never visited the front line because he was too old, but as I just mentioned this was false, Savage had in fact visited Mubo and Komiatum. Major General Frank Berryman working in Blamey’s HQ, who remained quite close to the man, who often sought out his advice believed General Herring was unjustified in his sacking of Savige. Berryman would point out “ Herring ‘not giving Savige a fair burl… Savige having to fight Herring as well as Japs. Savige had done well and we had misjudged him’.Savige bitterly handed over his command, greatly disappointed he would not get to see the final capture of Salamaua. But he did not depart unrewarded, as he received a Companion of the order of Bath for his services during the campaign with his citation reading; Maj-Gen. Savige had control of the Battle for Salamaua from 30 Jun. 43 till his relief on 26 Aug. 43. The battle was finally won on 11 Sep. 43—the credit for victory must rest with Maj-Gen. Savige during whose period of command, the back of the enemy's defence was broken. The nature of the country rendered great assistance to the defender, and careful planning alone enabled the defences to be overcome. The supplying of our forward troops was also a terrific problem. Maj-Gen. Savige triumphed over all these difficulties, his men were kept supplied, they were encouraged to endure the most dreadful hardships, and to overcome great difficulties of terrain. Maj-Gen. Savige's plans were well conceived and he saw them carried through. The success achieved is of the greatest importance to the Allied cause, and Maj-Gen. Savige by his fine leadership has made a very real contribution to the ultimate success of the United nations. The victories won over the enemy at the battles for Mubo and Komiatum were due to his well conceived plans and energetic execution. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The battle for Salamaua and Lae was drawing ever closer. The boys down unda had seized control over vital positions forcing the Japanese into more and more desperate defensive measures taking horrifying casualties in the process. 

Last time we spoke about the drive to Lae and Salamaua on New Guinea and the mysterious battle of the Pips. The boys on Green Hell were having a hell of a time trying to capture Mount Tambu. The Japanese had made a pillbox nightmare around Mount Tambu and reclaimed Ambush Knoll. Ambush Knoll was once again taken by the allies, by Warfe’s commandos to be exact, but Mount Tambu was proving to be a much tougher nut to crack. Then in the frigid northern waters of the Aluetians, the allies had just successfully retaken Attu, but at a horrifying cost. The heavy cost convinced the allies, Kiska would be a similar bloody affair so they sought some Canadian help for its invasion. Yet before the invasion would occur one of the strangest battle of WW2 happened, the mysterious battle of the pips. The Americans found themselves firing at ghosts. But today we are venturing over to New Georgia. This episode is the Fall of Munda Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  The New Georgia campaign in many ways was akin to Guadalcanal. The Americans had suddenly invaded the island, landing numerous troops before the Japanese could coordinate a way to thwart them. Once the troops were landed, then the Japanese decided to react, and by react I mean tossing troops of their own on the island to dislodge the Americans. But just like with the Guadalcanal campaign, the war of transportation was not one the IJN could seemingly win against the Americans. By 2nd of July US forces led by the US 43rd Division, held an overwhelming advantage of 15,000 troops compared to 9,000 Japanese, who had landed at Zannana with a view to attacking westwards towards Munda Point. It was a battle that took far longer than the Allies had envisaged. Stubborn Japanese resistance and their ability to infiltrate US lines and cut supplies meant an advance at a snail’s pace, despite their control of the air and sea. Yet while the Americans were chipping away, bit by bit at the outskirts of New Georgia, the real defensive position was of course, Munda. Up until this point Major General Minoru Sasaki had done a great job of delaying the Americans while pulling his forces back to make a stand at Munda. Indeed the Americans had a terrible time fighting the Japanese and mother nature, as Sergeant Antony Coulis described one advance thus “We alternatively crawled up and down greasy ridges. We forded numerous jungle streams and swam three of them. The repeated torture of plunging into icy streams; the chopping away of endless underbrush and foliage; the continuous drizzle of rain; the days without hot food or drink; the mosquitoes tormenting us at night. It was sheer physical torture …” Sasaki had constructed a barrage of defensive entrenchments around the airport around Munda to halt the US advance. As Admiral Halsey recalled “Rugged as jungle fighting is by now we should have been within reach of our objective, the airfield. Something was wrong.” The now deceased Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto’s plan to turn the Solomons into a killing machine in order to force the United States to parley for a negotiated peace, seemed to be working. With the battle turning into a stalemate, on 15 July Halsey sent the famously tough Major-General Oscar Griswold, of the 14th Army Corps to New Georgia. Major-General John Hester, who had turned down help from the Marines, was relieved from command of the 43rd Division and replaced by Guadalcanal veteran Major-General John Hodge. A Landing Craft Tank Captain named Jack Johnson  described the operation as a “screw-up. General Hester was army. I had him aboard one time. He was a little fart. He wore these high lace-up boots and carried a riding crop.” However, a lot of the blame would be placed on Rear-Admiral Turner, the commander of the amphibious forces who had insisted that Hester should retain divisional command as well as overall command of the landing operations.It also did not help that the 43rd “National Guard Division” were untested in battle. Griswold would find them in a state of near psychological collapse, prompting him to request reinforcements from the 37th division. The 37th division was led by General Beightler who was manning Reincke Ridge while to the south near the beach were the 43rd division under General Hester's command until the 29th and the 25th division of General Lawton Collins. Additionally Marine tanks of the 10th defense battalion from Rendova were arriving to replace recent losses and they would be critically needed to face the nightmarish Japanese pillboxes the Americans would be facing. In front of the Americans was a complex of camouflaged and mutually supporting pillboxes and fortifications amidst thick jungle. These defenses dominated several high features including Shimizu Hill, Horseshoe Hill, Kelley Hill and Reincke Ridge. They were made out of crushed coral and coconut logs dug several feet into the ground, with just a small portion poking out for their machine gunners and riflemen. It was these types of defenses that had plagued Hesters assaults. Across a frontage of around 3200 yards, Sasaki had established a series of these defenses along a northwestern axis going from the beach to Ilangana. Before the offensive could be kicked off, 161st regiment led by Colonel James Dalton discovered the Japanese held the Bartley ridge due east of Horseshoe hill. Their reconnaissance indicated double-logged pillboxes. Bartley ridge would be the most forward of the defensive positions and thus needed to be seized first.  To meet the enemy Sasaki ordered Colonel Tomonari’s forces to launch a second counterattack against whatever allied forces showed up on the northern flank and he also requested the recently landed Yano battalion to reinforce the northern flank. However Tomonari’s men had suffered tremendous casualties and he was still trying to rally the scattered men along the rugged highlands. Meanwhile Colonel Yano was only able to send his 7th company to take up a position northwest of the 3rd battalion holding Sankaku hill, because his other men were needed to defend Vila. Because of this Sasaki ordered the depleted 1st battalion, 229th regiment to reinforce the Ilangana line. Colonel Hirata placed the 1st battalion along the line between Sato’s 2nd battalion and Kojima’s 3rd, which would turn out to be a key position. The offensive kicked off at first light on July 25th. Commander Arleigh Burke took 7 destroyers through the Blanche Channel and bombarded the Lambete plantation for 43 minutes firing more than 4000 5 inch shells. Nearly at the same time, the new commander of AriSols, Brigadier General Than Twining sent 171 bombers and 100 fighters to hit Munda, the largest air strike thus far in the area. As Burke’s destroyers were firing 5 inch shells, B-24’s and B-17’s led the air attack, followed by B-25’s, Dauntless and Avengers. It was described by many eyewitnesses as “the greatest show on earth”. The Japanese were only able to toss back 57 Zeros at 9:40am who were intercepted quickly by a Rendova patrol of 29 fighters who shot down 6 zeros and lost 4 of their own. But from 6:30-7am, the 254 aircraft managed to drop 500,800 lbs of fragmentation and high explosive bombs over the target area, a roughly 1500 by 250 yard strip. The result was enormous clouds of smoke hanging all over Munda, but Japanese casualties were considerably light. As the bombardment was quieting down, Griswold unleashed the ground forces supported by the 43rd divisions artillery who were firing more than 2150 105mm howitzer shells and 1182 155mm howitzer shells. Colonel Brown's 103rd regiment advanced upon Ilangana point while the 172nd tried to envelop Shimizu Hill, supported by 5 tanks. The 172nd tossed their 2nd and 3rd battalions around the left and right of Shimizu hill, but by 10am, even with the 5 tanks the Japanese pillboxes had halted them in their tracks. 3 of the tanks were disabled because of vapor lock and a ton of time was wasted by infantry trying to extricate them. THe 3rd battalion on the lefthand side, tried to fight through machine gun and mortar fire, but found it impossible. The men tried to move around the pillboxes but found themselves fired upon by other machine gun positions. The 2nd battalion, 103rd regiment attacked in the center of the 43rd divisions zone and managed to progress 300 yards against lighter opposition. bY 10:40am Company E managed to advance 500 yards and by noon reached a beach near Terere. As Company E tried hastily to create a defendable position, the Japanese moved behind them cutting their telephone lines back to the battalion HQ. Seeing the opening, General Hester tossed in some of his reserves in the form of Ramsey’s 3rd battalion, 169th regiment. They were ordered to charge through the same gap made by 3 Company. But as they marched towards the gap they were met with enfilade fire from the southern part of Shimizu hill and from some pillboxes to the south. The 169th were unable to exploit the gap and now E company was forced to pull back lest they be encircled and annihilated. To the north, Beightler kept his 145th and 148th regiments in reserve until Bartley ridge was neutralized. Dalton sent I Company to contain the Japanese pocket by attacking it frontally while the 1st battalion and rest of the 3rd battalion performed a double envelopment. The 1st battalion went around the left while the 3rd took the right, seeing both driving southward and northward for 200 yards. The 1st battalion led by Lt Colonel Slaftcho Katsarky advanced 700 yards with only light opposition, but over on the other side the 3rd battalion of Lt Colonel David Buchanan were halted at the offset by heavy machine gun fire. By the 2nd of the day the 3rd battalion would establish itself in a containing position north,south and east of Bartley ridge. E Company had to be taken out of reserve and sent into the line on some high ground due north of Bartley ridge to secure the right flank of the 161st zone. The 1st battalion advanced a further 400 yards west of Bartley and took up a position on a small rise northeast of Horseshoe hill. With the southern advance stalling somewhat, Colonel Stuart Baxter of the 148th was ordered to help the 161st’s efforts at reducing the pocket on Bartley ridge. He performed a limited advance and his 2nd battalion led by Lt Colonel Herbert Radcliffe gained 600 yards without meeting Japanese resistance. Meeting no resistance, the 1st battalion led by Lt Colonel Vernor Hydaker took up the 2nd battalions position as they advanced further, allowing engineers of the 117th engineer battalion to construct a supply trail behind them.  Despite all of this Griswold was frustrated by the failure of his 43rd division performance. Ultimately Griswold blamed General Hester who he wrote about in his diary that night  “I am afraid Hester is too nice for a battle soldier. He is sick and all done in. Tonight I am requesting his relief from the division.” The next day he ordered the exhausted 172nd to hold their position while the 10rd would advance 800 yards from Ilangana for Terere. To support them the artillery bombarded for over an hour, allowed the 103rd to advance with some tanks in the vanguard. A crucial component of their advance would be the 118th engineer battalion led by 2nd Lt James Olds an acting corps chemical officer, whose men were equipped with flamethrowers who went to work spilling fire over enemy pillboxes. This led to the vegetation over and around them being incarcerated in a matter of seconds and many pillboxes were simply wiped out.  As I had said a few times in this series, the flamethrower would be one of the most devastating weapons in island hopping warfare. The flamethrower was gradually employed by both assault and mop up operations. However useful as it was, it did hold some disadvantages. The equipment as you can imagine was quite large and heavy, required the operator to get very close to the enemy positions and thus extremely vulnerable. For flamethrower personnel to be able to close the distance required rifle team protection. But what if you could alleviate these vulnerabilities by slapping a big flamethrower to a tank? Generals like Griswold and Harmon at this point began mounting flamethrowers to tanks and although it would not see the limelight at Munda, the Firetank as they would become known would become the most devastating weapon against Japanese defenses. By the midafternoon, Browns 10rd regiment managed to reduce around 74 pillboxes along a 600 yard front, successfully occupying Ilangana and continuing the coastal advance until Kia. While it was a great victory for Hester, it failed to change Griswolds mind about relieving him. Back over in the north, Beightler ordered another assault of Bartley’s ridge. 6 light marine tanks of the 10th defense battalion led the charge at 9am. Companies L and K advanced in columns behind the tanks, tossing heavy fire from .30 caliber Browning automatic rifles (known as BAR’s for my Call of Duty world at war veterans) and 2 flamethrowers. Unfortunately for the two guys carrying the flamethrowers, they were not properly protected by their rifle teams and were killed quickly. Very much like the learning of how to perform amphibious landings, it would take time to learn how to effectively use flamethrower units. The man managed to overrun a dozen or so pillboxes, but the terrain soon forced Dalton to frantically order men to extricate stuck tanks. During the morning hours a Japanese soldier burst out of the brush and planted a magnetic mine to one of the stuck tanks disabling it. A second tank was hit in its fuel line by gunfire while the remaining tanks managed to pull back and reorganize by 11am. After 5 hours of combat, Buchanan’s 3rd battalion had lost 29 men and only progressed 200 yards and thus was forced to pull back again.  On the 27th, Beightler committed his 2nd battalion, 145th regiment to reduce the defenders on Horseshoe hill. They managed to occupy a knoll connecting Horseshoe hill called Wing Hill, but heavy fire from Horseshoe hill eventually dislodges them. Meanwhile Colonel Tomonari finally managed to rally his men together for an attack against the 148th northern flank, while Sasaki sent a machine gun detachment, which was actually some anti-aircraft gunners to ambush the 148th engineers causing Colonel Baxter to order Companies A and D to rush over to protect them. Further south, General Hester began tossing some more aggressive actions in combination with artillery and mortar bombardments, gradually pushing the Japanese off high grounds. The 43rd division was slowly advancing yard by yard on the right flank, now reaching within 500 yards of the coast, but the 8 tanks of the 9th defense battalion were demolished in the attacks. On the 29th, the 1st battalion, 169th regiment had to be brought over from Rendova to take up a position between the 103rd and 172nd regiments. Alongside 4 tanks from the 10th defense battalion and some engineers wielding flamethrowers, Hester now had enough hardened forces to push the Japanese. Because of the continuous fighting, all the American regiments were becoming veterans. Pockets of Japanese that would have once held back an entire american battalion, possibly even a regiment were not being reducing quickly and efficiently. The technique for reducing pillboxes, whether it be from isolating them or overwhelming them was becoming mastered. Broken down this process began with a complete non-combative reconnaissance of the Japanese defenses. This was followed up by a reconnaissance in force, usually by a platoon with extra units who would uncover a portion of the Japanese positions. The assault consisted of  parts: preparing an artillery bombardment usually consisting of mortars, firing off the bombardment, then storming in. The bombardments usually got rid of the brush and foliage improving visibility so the enemy could be targeted and damaged. If done efficiently, the Japanese would flee their pillboxes to take refuge. Flamethrowers and tanks made the process a lot easier for the finishing touch part. Soon the Japanese were being pushed to the crest of Shimizu hill. However while Hester was definitely picking things up better with the 43rd division, Griswold was determined to relieve him of command, feeling the man had exhausted himself. Now Major General John Hodge would take over the 43rd. Meanwhile to the north, the Beightlers 161st regiment infiltrated abandoned pillboxes on Bartley ridge near its crest. Over on Horseshoe Hill the Japanese were being hit with heavy bombardments while the 2nd battalion reoccupied Wing Hill and Companies G and F crept their way up the crest of the hill. However once near the crest they began to be pinned down by machine gun fire. The 1st battalion was hitting the hill from the southeast meeting heavy fire as well and they managed to reach 15 yards on top of the crest before being halted. By 5:30pm, the 2nd battalion was forced to withdraw to the foot of the hill, but two companies from the 1st battalion dug in on the crest. The americans lost 24 men died with 40 wounded. On the other side, during the night, Tomonari’s main forces of 400 men arrived ready to attack at dawn. They attempted to move behind the rear of the 148th as Baxter’s troops were advancing to Bibilo Hill. Baxter’s force was spread out quite thinly across 1500 or so yards and they happened to be around 800 yards west of their main regimental ration and ammunition dump. The Japanese from a high ground position began firing down upon them with machine guns, rifles and grenades as forward units stormed the rations and ammunition dump. A ragtag group of service company soldiers rush over to defend the dumb returning fire upon the Japanese. Major Frank Hipp of the 148th took command of the force managing to hold back the Japanese. However as a result of this near catastrophe, Beightler ordered Baxter to withdraw on the 29th. Beightler believed the enemy was coming through a gap between the 148th and 161st greatly worrying him.  Back over at Horseshoe hill, Companies G and F reached the crest while E company was hitting its northern side, supported by machine gun crews from H company. The fighting for the north side resulted in hand to hand combat seeing E company make some progress. But by nightfall the 2nd battalion again was again withdrawing down the hill. The actions ended disastrously, as the men were hit hard as they withdrew down the hill taking enormous casualties and gaining nothing in the process. On the 30th, Bartley Ridge and Shimizu Hill remained in Japanese hands as Beightler and Hodge were reorganizing their exhausted forces. That morning, Baxter finally began his withdrawal, miserably under heavy rain, with Tomonari’s troops harassing them with ambushes. The ambushes caused Baxter to order the men to dig in around the supply dump and that night saw numerous soldiers dying for water begin to use their helmets as rain catchers. The next day the 148th attempted another break through, but Tomonari’s machine gun crews hammered them back towards the supply dump for another night. At this point Sasaki received new orders instructing him to keep the supply lines to Kolombanagara secure. He elected to prepare his men to withdraw to a new defensive line that would be anchored at Kokenggolo Hill to the right, running east of Bibilo hill towards the Munda-Bairoko trail, then it would pass north to Hachiman Hill. Yano and his battalion were ordered to come over from Kolombangara to take up a position at Sankaku hill; Hirata’s 229th regiment would hold Kokenggolo Hill and Tomonari would take up a position at Hachiman Hill. These orders came after the Japanese defenders had suffered tremendous losses over days of fighting. In truth the Japanese defensive line was formidable facing the American 14th corps, and indeed the Americans had been held back for a long time. But the Americans brought terrible power, their naval, artillery and aerial bombing was constant and hammered the Japanese. By late July most of the Japanese emplacements near Munda were in shambles. Rifle companies that were typically 170 men strong had shrunken significantly, some down as low as 20 men. The 229th regiment numbered only 1245 effective men. The hospitals could not hope to care for all the sick and wounded as constant shelling rained hell from above. Aside from the sick and wounded, as a major result of the shelling, many men were suffering nervous disorders, to use the old term shell shock, but today we’d call it  Combat Stress Reaction “CSR”. To compensate for the losses, Colonel Hirata simply ordered his men of the 229th to kill 10 americans for every Japanese and to do so to the death. That’s the kind of, I guess what the Japanese at the time would call fighting spirit, something that made the Japanese armed forces during WW2 unique, perhaps rather tragically.  General Imamura decided to reinforce Vila with the 3rd battalion, 23rd regiment and six companies to buff up the 1th and 229th regiments. This freed up the Yano battalion to take up their new position on the new defensive line. Yet still in the meantime, Japanese were still defending Shimizu and Horseshoe Hill to give the rest of the forces time to withdraw. On the 31st Major Francis Carberry’s 2nd Battalion, 161st charged up Bartley ridge finding no resistance. Then at 4:45pm the 15th field artillery began firing on Horseshoe Hill while the American forces near its crest tried to dislodge the Japanese. Again they were unsuccessful. By the afternoon Japanese were withdrawing from the Ilagana line, covered by fire from Horseshoe hill. During the night Tomonari led his men to withdraw, but a Avenger spotted his force fleeing through a valley overheard and called in an artillery strike. One of the shells hit Tomonari’s HQ killing a lot of his staff and nearly him. Tomonari’s force had to abandon a lot of equipment, but by dawn of August 1st they had managed to assemble at Kokenggolo and Bibilo Hills. His 2nd battalion alongside Hara’s quick fire battalion went into the tunnels of Kokenggolo Hill while the rest of the 1st and 3rd battalions dug in on Bibilo Hill.  Baxter received a message over radio on the 1st of August from General Beightler “time is precious, you must move, get going haste is essential”. The order was to get every man Baxter had and take Shimizu hill. Baxter rallied Companies A, E, B and G into a skirmish line with bayonets fixed and charged at 850am. By 9:30am the exhausted Americans reached Katsarsky’s position where they handed the weary men fresh water and some hot food. Shimizu hill was theres. Meanwhile the 103rd regiment began their own attack. Hodge sent Companies E, F and G to march upon Lambeti which they did, finding no opposition. The rest of the 43rd found no opposition as they marched across Shimizu Hill, by 3pm they advanced 700 yards. Beightlers men captured Horseshoe Hill without firing a shot and as darkness fell on the 1st of august, Griswold ordered a general advance for the next day. Admiral Wilkinson brought a convoy bearing fresh troops of the 27th regiment to aid Beightlers right flank, but it took them until August the 3rd to get into combat assembly. In the meantime August the 1st would bring with it a significant increase in artillery bombardment. The 43rd divisions artillery commander, Brigadier General Harold Barker fired 2000 rounds on the 1st, followed by 2000 more on the 2nd, an incredible 7300 rounds on the 3rd and 3600 on the 4th. The Munda area was turned into an inferno. Yano lost the commander and all platoon leaders of the 8th company; 5 officers died atop Bibilo hill; Hara Masao was killed leaving his 1st battalion to be commanded by Sato on August 2nd; the tunnels of Kokenggolo Hill were one of the few safe planes, but a direct hit collapses an entrance to Sato’s tunnel, burying him along with 60 men, requiring an entire day to dig them out. The Japanese were forced to take refuge wherever they could, preventing Sasaki from stabilizing his new defensive line. Captain Sugiura Kaju brought reinforcements from the 7th and 8th combined SNLF to Erventa where he loaded up the 3rd battalion, 23rd regiment to head for the Vella Gulf under the escort of Admiral Nishimuras cruisers Susuya, Chokai, Kumano, Sendai and destroyer Amagiri. However the naval force was intercepted by PT boats near the Blackett strait. The PT boats fired torpedoes at the Japanese destroyers, but none hit a target. Sugiura was able to land the reinforcements around Webster Cove, but the Amagiri rammed PT 109 just forward of her starboard torpedo tube ripping away the starboard aft side of the boat. Two men were killed, and one John F Kennedy, yes the future president was tossed around the cockpit of PT 109. Kennedy got the rest of the men to abandon ship around 11 in all. A few of them had serious burns and they were forced to swim for an islet 3.5 miles away known as Plum Pudding Island. Kennedy was the first to reach the island and he proceeded to help tow others to the island. The island was unoccupied, but a company of Sasebo 6th SNLF were nearby on another islet called Gizo. Seeing Japanese barges moving around, the Americans would make their way east to an island near Ferguson passage called Leorava island. It would not be until the night of August 7th when the coastwatch Lt Reginald Evans found them and helped them reach PT 157. For his courage and leadership Kennedy received the Navy and Marine Corps Medal alongside a purple heart for injuries he suffered. However the medals would pale in comparisons to the story written about the event by John Hersey for the New Yorker and Reader’s digest which would give Kennedy a strong foundation politically.  Back to the battle, on August 2nd, Griswold’s forces advanced across the entire front and by the late afternoon the 103rd regiment had already reached the outer taxiways of Munda airfield; the 169th were approaching Bibilo Hill; and the 37th division were 700 yards ahead of Horseshoe hill. By the end of the day, the Japanese defensive line was basically Kokenggolo to Bibilo Hill and the Americans were closing in on both. The 103rd and 169th had units around the eastern end of the airfield, many men using wrecked Japanese aircraft as defendable positions. The 145th and 161st were on the eastern ridges of Bibilo hill and the 148th were about to cut the Munda-Bairoko trail. The Yano battalion’s position was taken so quickly, the Americans had failed to notice they had overrun it. Thus Yano withdrew northwards. On August 3rd, the general advance continued and with more open terrain present, mortars became a lot more effective speeding it up. The 169th were advancing up the eastern end of Kokenggolo Hill; to the north, the 145th were advancing up the eastern ridges of Bibilo Hill the 161st were breaking through on the right and the 148th were now along the Munda-Bairoko trail. The situation was desperate that night so Sasaki was forced to order the men to withdraw yet again, now towards Zieta. Hirata’s 229th regiment was to hold their position until sundown to give everyone time, then act as a rearguard until they could withdraw to Kongo Hill. Sasaki likewise moved his HQ to the Kure 6th Farm at Zieta. The next morning brought further misery upon the Japanese in the form of an airstrike. At 7:20am 25 Dauntless, 24 Avengers and 24 B-25’s bombed Gurasai-Kindu Point, which is just due west of Munda airfield were the Japanese had constructed fortifications and emplaced many anti aircraft guns. Griswold did not let up seeing perhaps the final push against Munda before him. Hodge’s 43rd division with marine tanks leading the way attacked Kokenggolo Hill. Beightler’s 25th division were striking against the Japanese northern flank, freeing up the 148th and 161st to advance west towards the beach. The defenders at Kokenggolo Hill offered strong resistance as they withdrew towards Kong Hill before the 161st managed to break through to the sea. The fiercest fighting would be found on Bibilo hill, where the 145th were fighting against the dug in 229th regiment. By the end of the day, both the 148th and 161st broke through to the sea north of Kokenggolo hill and the 145th nearly cleared Bibilo hill as the Japanese fled along a trail going to the Kure 6th farm. With Bibilo Hill reduced, the Japanese began abandoning Kong Hill to continue retreating northwards.  Griswold’s 43rd division tossed mortars, infantry and tanks across Kokenggolo Hill driving away the last of the Japanese from tunnels, bunkers and pillboxes. Their forces soon crossed the western part of the Munda airfield. General Wing grabbed a military telephone and called General Hodge from Bibilo Hill stating “Munda is yours at 2:10 today”. Inturn Griswold radioed the good news over to Admiral Halsey "...Our ground forces today wrested Munda from the Japs and present it to you… as the sole owner…" Halsey then replied with "a custody receipt for Munda… Keep 'em dying." Munda had fallen at long last. The Americans had suffered  4994 casualties since July 2nd, the Japanese had 4683 death with a untold amount of wounded. With Munda captured, Tomonari was ordered to withdraw to Kolombangara to take command of the Vila defenses while Sasaki would move his HQ to Bairoko then move by barge to Vila as well. The 3rd battalion, 23rd regiment was deployed at Baanga island to cover the Japanese withdrawal using mountain guns. Admiral Ota’s SNLF marines were to defend Arundel island. While these forces made their retreat, Admiral Samejima elected to carry out another reinforcement run. He would transport the Mikami battalion and on August the 6th with Admiral Ijuin carrying two other companies of replacements to Buin, Sugiura was once again sailing for Kolombangara. Sugiura had the destroyers Hagikaze, Kawakaze and Arashi while Ijuin had the destroyer Shigure. Meanwhile Admiral Wilkinson received reports from a PBY that sighted Sugiura’s ships passing by the Buka Passage, so he ordered Commander Frederick Moosbrugger to depart Tulagi and sweep the Vella Gulf. Moosbrugger had the destroyers Stack, Sterret, Lang, Dunlap, Craven and Maury. He sailed south of Rendova to enter the Vella Gulf. He took his time going 15 knots to create as little wake as possible so Japanese floatplanes would not spot him and he was northwest of the coast of Kolombanaga by 11:25pm. Moosbrugger’s plan  was to divide his force into two formations; a torpedo division consisting of Dunlap, Craven and Maury, and a Gun division consisting of Lang Sterett and Stack. The torpedo group would attack first once rader contact was made while the Gun group would cut across the bows of the enemy and open fire as the torpedo’s were expected to hit. This was to be the first time in the Solomons campaign that the US navy planned to use torpedo’s as its primary weapon. All 6 of Moosbruggers destroyers held SG radar, but much more importantly at this time an advancement had been made to fix the idiotic mark 14 torpedoes. The defective magnetic exploder was fixed and the settings that made them run too deep was fixed. Admiral King was responsible for the first fix while Moosebrugger on his own accord ordered the torpedoes to be set at a minimum running depth of 5 feet. Sugiura knew fell well he most likely did not hold the element of surprise, but he was prepared to fight as he entered the Vella Gulf with his destroyer Hagikaze in the lead. Moosebruggers force was passing through the Gizo strait before turning southeast towards Blackett strait. Then the Americans turned north up the gulf with the torpedo group leading the way during the dark hours when at 11:33 Dunlaps radar made a contact, bearing 19700 yards away. Moosbrugger immediately changed course to close in and began to line-up his torpedo attacks. For once the Japanese lookouts failed to spot the Americans, most likely due to a lack of moonlight. At 11:41 at a range of around 4500 yards Moosebrugger fired 22 torpedoes and at 11:46 turned his ships 90 degrees as the Gun group made a course to cross Sugiuras T. aT At 11:42 Sugiura’s lookouts spotted the American ships silhouettes and torpedo wakes, but it was too late. At 11:45 7 out of the 22 torpedoes found targets. Two torpedoes hit Hagikaze, 3 hit Arashia and 2 hit Kawakaze. Hagikaze was hit aft her engine room bringing her to a stop; Arashia’s machinery spaces were destroyed and Kawakaze was hit under her bridge detonating her forward magazine sending her ablaze. Shigure would be found later to have been hit by a torpedo which failed to explode. The 3 destroyers were disabled and burning wrecks. The Japanese fired 8 torpedoes in return, none finding a target as they frantically tried to turn northwards to escape. The Gun group opened fire sinking the 3 crippling destroyers in the course of an hour killing 820 of the 940 troops on board. The Japanese would later send 4 large barges to try and rescue survivors with around 310 out of 1520 Japanese sailors and soldiers being rescued including Sugiura. The IJN received a night action defeat which also killed and prevented reinforcements for New Georgia. The American torpedoes would soon strike fear into the IJN. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Munda has fallen at last, though it came at a terrible price. Now with the airfield in American hands, the battle for New Georgia would come to a swifter end. The US Navy finally got the chance to deliver a torpedo blow to the IJN and a devastating one it was.

Last time we spoke about the allied drive to Munda and General Sasaki’s major counter offensive. General Wing began the drive upon Munda Point, but General Sasaki predicted many of the routes the Americans would take and ordered his forces to create tedious roadblocks and defensive positions to foil their advances. The allied progress was brutally slow, despite having the enormous advantage in artillery, naval and aerial bombardment support. The Japanese pillboxes were proving to be devastating to the allied infantry, requiring tanks to be brought over to New Georgia. When things began to halt, suddenly General Sasaki performed a counter offensive seeing a daring attack directed at the headquarters of the 43rd division. The attack nearly broke the lines of communications, but luckily the Fijian commandos outperformed the japanese at their own game of night fighting. Lastly the IJN suffered terrible losses to allied aircraft collapsing their reinforcement efforts. This episode is the Mysterious Battle of the Pips Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  The battles in New Guinea and New Georgia were particularly bloody, in all honesty things had begun to really escalate when you look at it from a numerical point of view. Over on Green Hell, General Savige had just seized Mubo, the Pimple, Green Hill and Observation hill taking them out of Japanese hands. The Japanese had withdrawn to Komiatum while simultaneously trying to defend the Bobdubi ridge area against Brigadier Hammer’s 15th brigade. General Savige, still unaware Salamaua was not the main target and in fact was being used as a deception to cover for Lae, continued his offensive, hoping to drive the enemy north of the Francisco River. Over on the other side, General Nakano’s 1st battalion of the 80th regiment had managed to  push Companies B and A off their ambush position on the Bench Cut Track. They were forced to withdraw towards Gwaibolom by July 10th. Meanwhile to the south Major Warfe launched an attack along Goodview junction. Captain Wally Meares of C platoon marched up Stephens Track while Captain John Winterflood’s B platoon took Walpoles track. Lt Hugh Egan created a blocking position using just 7 men around 800 meters south of Goodview Junction. The platoons went to work advancing down the steep ridges dislodging Japanese from outposts. Captain Meares platoon were continuing along the Stephens track when they suddenly encountered strong resistance from some Japanese who took a position along the Tambu Saddle which is at a junction between Stephens track and the Mule track. After engaging the Japanese, the platoon was forced to bypass them moving along the Mule track towards the Komiatum track where they ran into more Japanese. Meares men killed 13 Japanese on the Mule track before deciding to withdraw back to the Stephens track and dug in. The Japanese had surprised Warfe’s men. The forces they were running into were mainly the 1st and 2nd companies of the 66th battalion along with Araki’s HQ staff who had been on the run from Mubo to Komiatum. The Japanese tried to press on with a counter attack aimed at Winterflood’s B platoon. The Japanese tossed mortar and machine gun fire, but received terrible losses to the commandos, forced to pull back up Walpole track. The next day Warfe ordered Winterflood’s platoon to make a frontal assault, but quickly found themselves pinned down by machine gun fire and during the night received a heavy counter attack that forced them to dig in. The Japanese continued to block the way, covering their withdrawal further east, but all the mayhem prompted General Savige to relieve the commandos by tossing up companies C and B of the 2/5th who adopted the name Bennett force as they were led by Captain Cam Bennett. The rest of the 2/5th marched up the Buigap. Meanwhile General Herring was dealing with a supply issue for the 3rd Australian division. The 3rd division was too far from the coast and thus had been relying on supply via airdrops, which we have seen during this series to not be particularly accurate and quite inadequate. The supply problems mounted more when the decision was made to target Lae as such a campaign required building up reserve dumps. Warfe’s men were critically low on supplies; the 58/59th had nearly used up all the supplies they received, being brought up via the Missim Track and from airdrops. Getting further and further away from the source of supplies and with declining carrier capacity, Warfe’s men were reaching starvation point. Further back, Companies A and C of the 2/6th battalion got drafted the job of moving the supplies from Mubo to Buigap creek. General Herring considered it extremely difficult, but not impossible to maintain further units in the Salamaua area, if they were closer to the coasts. To solve the problem General Herring designated Tambu Bay as a new coastal base for supplies and it would also help as an artillery position. And thus, the 3rd battalion, 162nd regiment of Major Archibald Roosevelt landed at Nassau Bay back on July 12th commencing with their coastal advance. They were accompanied by Brigadier General Ralph Coane’s artillery that had landed prior to them. Yet their advance would begin in an extremely confused and chaotic manner. The question of command was at the core of the issue, General Fuller had decided to separate units such as Archibald Roosevelts from the MacKechnie Force, and thus they were now placed under the command of the Coane Force. General Herring was forced to intervene, placing the Coane Force under General Savige. At the same time, Colonel MacKechnie was relieved of his command because Fuller felt that he had favored the Australians over the Americans. To dig depper into this mess, what occurred was General Savige and Colonel MacKechnie were both unaware that two-thirds of the 162nd regiment had been allocated to the Coane Force when General Herring sent the a confusing message to try and clarify things “all units MACK force are under operational control of 3 Aust Div”. Troubles began at Moten ordered Major Roosevelt to advance north, but Roosevelt had also been told by General Fuller that he was not under Australian command. Thus Roosevelt bluntly replied to Moten “For your information I obey no orders except those from my immediate superior”. Then MacKechnie tried to smooth things over with Moten when he was informed of Fuller’s position. He apologized for Roosevelt’s message, and tried to speak about how great all the Australian/American cooperation was going. Fuller and Herring then tried to clarify the situation by placing the Coane Force under General Savige, but Fuller also decided to dismiss MacKechnie, mostly because he had relinquished command of his men to the Australians and thus had failed to protect American interests. As I say on my personnel channel, often when talking about China’s Warlords in the 1920’s, this is some kindergarten bullshit. Back to the action at hand, the Coane Force was being aided by a Papuan company who were scouting ahead of the Americans. They managed to confirm that Tambu Bay and the Dot Inlet were occupied and fortified by the Japanese. A platoon of the 5th Sasebo SNLF and the 3rd battalion, 66th regiment were holding a position on Tambu Bay while the remnants of the 3rd battalion, 102nd regiment were on a ridge overlooking the bay, which would later be named Roosevelt Ridge. On July 18th, Roosevelt led the troops with Companies L and I taking the lead, guided by two Papuan platoons. L Company with a Papuan company advanced along an inland track while K Company likewise did so along the coast. K Companies’s Papuan guides hit a Japanese outpost south of Boisi on July 18th. On the morning of the 20th, the Papuan platoon managed to kill four Japanese before K Company helped destroy the outpost. By the 20th they seized Boisi and Roosevelt with the others approached the Tambu bay. Roosevelt had Coane’s artillery support, they brought up four 25 pounders of the 2/6th Australian field regiment originally placed at Nassau Bay along with 2 batteries of the 218th American field artillery battalion, 8 75mm guns from north Salus, a battery of the 205th American field artillery battalion and 4 105mm guns. Under the cover the artillery they attacked the enemy, but they were met with heavy mortar fire coming from Roosevelt Ridge. Roosevelt Ridge extended westwards from the sea for nearly 2000 yards, forming kind of bulwark that shielded the northern end of Tambu Bay. Thus Tambu Bay could not be secured unless the ridge was taken first. The Australian broadcasting commission correspondent, Peter Hemery described the ridge like this “a piece of old style razer blade jutting into the sea”. According to some Japanese sources they had this to say of it “The area around Boisi had a lay of land most suitable to the arrest of the enemy advancing northward along the coast” General Nakano had also decided to reinforce the ridge with 250 men of the 1st battalion, 115th regiment, but of course this came at the coast of Salamaua’s defense. By this point the bulk of the 102nd regiment was at the Malolo-buang coastal area and the bulk of the 115th regiment, the 2nd Maizuru SNLF, two companies of the 5th Sasebo SNLF and the 14th field artillery regiment were at Salamaua, around 150 men in total. On the other side, after the fall of Mubo Brigadier Moten had the men advance north. The Bennet Force took over Goodview Junction; Companies A and D of the 2/5th advanced to Mount Tambu. Mount Tambu was the highest feature along the route between Mubo and Salamaua. It consisted of a series of razorback ridges covered in dense jungle, ideal for camouflage pillboxes. Its area was defended by roughly 700 Japanese from the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the 66th regiment led by Lt Colonel Fukuzo Kimura and Major Sakai Sugiyama. On July 16th, Captain Mick Walter led 60 men of Company A up the steep track leading to the south crest of Mount Tambu. Walter led the men to storm the two forward knolls, taking the Japanese by complete surprise. The two knolls were captured, but during the night the Japanese counterattacked in force. The Japanese crawled up the knolls through some heavy undergrowth before they unleashed mortars and mountain gun fire. Walters men however had captured some Japanese pillboxes upon the two knolls and thus the turn tables. 8 counterattacks were tossed at Walters men, each repulsed with heavy losses, around 39 casualties for the Australians and 350 for the Japanese. The following day, D company came up to help the Australian defenders, bringing much needed mortars. They dug in on a knoll around 300 yards back on the track. Alongside D company also came much needed supplies and an additional platoon to reinforce his men who he deployed on his western flank.  On July 18th, Walter ordered an advance going northwest in an attempt to secure the southern portion of Mount Tambu. The advance was spearheaded by Lance Corporal Jackson who alongside his comrades tossed grenades into a Japanese pillbox. Jackson then stormed inside killing 3 Japanese with this Tommy gun. Alongside Jackson, mortar and mountain gun fire aided Walters men to gain 80 additional yards, securing the southern portion of Mount Tambu. They could advance no further however as it became much more difficult from this position as the Japanese basically were encircling them upon razer back ridge to their north. Walter would write later on “we dug in on the new ground and shortened our perimeter to the narrowing plateau”. For this action the Australians paid with 6 lives, 13 wounded while the Japanese lost 82. At this point Walter had D company with one of his platoon holding the western flank; A company held the northern knoll and two platoons from D company held the eastern knolls. The Japanese had been devastated, losing hundreds of men and allied artillery was becoming a nightmare. Captain Newman’s C Company of the 162nd battalion had come to a junction of the Buigap and Bui Eo. From there a reconnaissance patrol found suitable artillery positions northwest of the junction. With the help of native carriers and 80 men of the 2/6th battalion, two guns were hauled over the Buigap track and by July 17th another 4 guns of the American 218th battalion were hauled up from the southern arm of the Bitoi river to Green Hill. From these positions the allies could smash multiple Japanese defensive positions. General Nakano realized Mount Tambu was an essential component of General Muroya’s defensive line so he sent the remainder of the 3rd battalion, 66th regiment to reinforce Colonel Araki’s men. Then during the early hours of July 19th a large earth tremor startled the Australian defenders. It was the prelude to an assault led by Captain Kunizo Hatsugai’s 9th company of the 66th regiment. They had crept up silently managing to get behind the southern knolls then suddenly charged up under the cover of darkness. But the defenders had their guard up and were not taken by surprise. A Bren gunner managed to knock out one of the Japanese raiders machine guns with a lucky hit in the dark. As the Japanese scrambled to try and recover it they were met with fire causing severe casualties. The Japanese surprise attack was a failure, forcing them to withdraw by first light, leaving 21 dead across the knoll. While this raid was occuring, Walters men were also repelling a series of attacks against the Northern Knoll. During these attacks, Walter was injured. Luckily for Walter and his company, they were relieved on the 19th by D Company. Another American unit, C Company of the 1st battalion, 162nd regiment led by Captain Delmar Newman also arrived to take up a position on the southern knolls. Until july 23rd, the Australians limited their actions to patrols. On the 20th, Bennet led a patrol making contact with a strong Japanese position on the Walpole track; Another company led by Morse found a Japanese position in the Goodview area dug within 100 yards of their own. Meanwhile the Japanese also limited their actions to a few patrols proding Mount Tambu for weaknesses.   On July 23rd Moten ordered the 2/5th battalion to attack the remaining Japanese positions on the Tambu Knoll, but it was the most heavily fortified yet. Basically it was like a castle keep, complete with a ravine for a moat, near vertical walls and deep tunnels going through the knoll. Mount Tambu’s peak held  10 log reinforce bunkers connected by the tunnels which could shelter half a battalion or so. They also had a chain of weapon pits set up on lower ledges. Later on when investigating the entire system, the allies found weapon pits to be around 4 logs thick, interconnected by crawl trenches. Many of these weapon puts had been carefully sited within the roots of large trees, making them impervious to allied artillery fire. The tunnel entrances were dug into the side of the peak directly behind the defensive positions, allowing the defenders to storm out from their shelters underground within seconds. It was these kind of ingenious defensive works that would be built upon later on in the war to create absolute nightmares for the allies.   Moten had not carried out a thorough reconnaissance of the Japanese positions prior to ordering the attack and thus many of his subordinates elected to make a frontal assault instead of encircling them. D company took the center for the frontal attack while to the left were the 16th platoon led by Sergeant Alvin ‘Hungry’ Williams and the 18th platoon led by Lt Bernard Leonads; and A company advanced along a Caffins track heading for the western flank of Mount Tambu to try and cut off the main Japanese supply route going back to Komiatum. 15 minutes before they charged, Australian and American artillery and mortars fired upon Mount Tambu. Two Australian mountain guns fired 90 rounds while the 4 75mm American guns fired 60 per gun from Green hill. D company began their attack around midday, trying to drive a wedge between two lines of pillboxes. Corporal John Smith laid cover fire as Captain Lin Cameron crept forward, getting within 15 yards of the pill boxes on the left side of the track. Cameron counted around 7 pill boxes in two lines of defense going across both sides of the track. The steep slopes on both sides gave little venues of approach, allowing around just a platoon at a time. There was also sharpened bamboo pickets on the left flank, leading Cameron to believe that an attack was expected there.   The Japanese knowingly let two platoons reach their line of forward pillboxes before unleashing hell upon them. The casualties were terrible. As Cameron recounted, “we were within 20 meters of the enemy bunkers before all hell let loose”. One of the men in the forward sections was killed outright, Cameron was wounded, his right elbow was shattered by a machine gun bullet. As he saw his men hesitate, he screamed out “forward! Get stuck into them!” With his right arm now useless and his eyesight dimming, Cameron handed command over to Lt Martin. Despite the horror, the Australians pressed on. Corporal Carey led his depleted platoon forward in a great dash and swept the outer ring of the Japanese pillboxes. On his left were Leonards men who stormed two pillboxes before heavy enfilade fire pinned them down. Then the 17th platoon led by Corporal John Smith charged up Mount Tambu from behind with their bayonets fixed. Smith screamed out “follow me!” as he charged. 3 other men out of the 11 managed to keep up with Smith, but soon Japanese grenades began to rain down on them. The grenades caught them just as they passed a third line of pillboxes. Smith was hit, but he kept charging and when he reached the peak of Mount Tambu with his back to the enemy he screamed “come on boys! come on boys!”. Without additional support and with no indication A company were making progress over on the left flank, the 4 men on the peak were forced to withdraw. The gallant Smith had to be dragged down and would die from severe wounds two days later. Smith was decorated for bravery in Syria in 1941, when he cleared out 3 machine gun nests at a roadblock and despite being wounded during the battle of Wau he still had gas left in the tank for some more.   Scouts had made their way towards the Tambu saddle track and spotted Japanese soldiers, around 125 of them a full company or so. The scouts quickly realized they were outnumbered, thus when the artillery began to open up and Walter’s company moved in for the attack across the saddle, no sooner then they started the enemy halted them in their tracks. Walter had no choice but to withdraw around 500 yards south east as the Japanese were too strong. Walter’s inability to make progress in the west ultimately ruined the entire attack. Despite the defeat, Companies A and D had done very well against such a heavily fortified position.   Meanwhile, Warfe and his men were marching when they discovered Ambush Knoll had come back under the hands of some Japanese from the 2nd battalion, 66th regiment. On July 15th, Warfes commandos launched an attack, with C Platoon performing a frontal assault along the narrow ridge top track. There were 16 men in the attack and they found themselves face to face with well dug in Japanese. The Japanese were behind a bamboo barricade with some pillboxes scattered about. The platoon got within 50 feet of the main barricade, but the Japanese fire was too much and casualties were mounting quickly. Meanwhile B Platoon was maneuvering around the Japanese eastern flank. At 5:30 B Platoon began attacking the eastern side of the knoll. The men got behind an enemy pillbox covering the track from Orodubi, but the Japanese quickly saw the Australians and began tossing grenades at them. Despite the resistance, B Platoon managed cut off the Japanese supply line to Ambush Knoll. With their supply lines cut the Japanese were forced to withdraw   With Ambush Knoll back under allied control, Brigadier Hammer ordered A company of the 58/59th battalion to depart Gwaibolom and attack Orodubi from its southern flank. Even with the help of the 58/59th company, the commando’s yet again failed to dislodge the Japanese. On the night of July 19th, fresh troops of the 1st company, 80th battalion used the light of the full moon to come up the ridge. This became a staging point for them to attack Ambush Knoll, seeing artillery fire beginning in the morning to support their attack. Warfe’s commandos were manning the trenches on Ambush Knoll, turning the tables on the Japanese and inflicting heavy casualties upon them. The Japanese were forced to retreat. The next day Warfe reinforced Ambush Knoll with two Vickers guns, which gave the Japanese a nasty surprise when they attacked again. On the 20th, the Japanese opened fire with mortars and artillery before charging the ridge. They managed to get as far as to cut the Australian lines of communication, but were ultimately repealed once again. Over 14 consecutive attacks would be made on the 20th, and even more on the 21st, but it all came to nothing, Warfe’s commandos held their ground. Facing such pressure from the Japanese, Hammer still felt the greater weight of their attention was directed at Bobdubi and not towards Tambu, believing it to all be a consequence of Moton’s lack of progress. General Savige decided to order Motens 2/6th battalion to take responsibility over Bobdubi ridge. The 2/6th then came across the Japanese rear near the slopes of Ambush Knoll and began harassing them. On the 22nd the Japanese tried yet again to attack Ambush Knoll, but were beaten back firmly, forcing them to finally withdraw to Sugarcane Ridge. By July 23rd, Warfes’ exhausted commandos earned a relief by the 2/6th and were sent to relieve A company at Gwaibolom, while A company advanced north. The 2/6th likewise would advance north. But now we are moving away from the troubles of New Guinea and heading back up north to the frigid Aleutians. After the successful seizure of Attu, now Admiral Kinkaid and General Buckner needed to plan the invasion of Kiska. Kiska was the last Japanese bulwark in the Aleutians and held an incredible underground city. There were miles of tunnels, buried ammunition dumps, barracks,  3 hospitals, dental clinics, mess halls, machine shops, warehouses, photo labs, telephone rooms, all shoved and shored with wood. Ventilation pipes connected the maze of caves and tunnels, with Japanese troops wearing great fur lined coats busy at work. The Americans had experienced hell, on Attu, over 2872 Japanese had been killed or committed suicide, just 28 men were captured and it cost 549 american lives, 1148 wounded and nearly another 2000 ill or battered by harsh climate. The American leadership expected Kiska to be another hellscape and did not want to come at it lightly. The 7th division led by Brigadier General Archibald Arnolrd, Buckner’s 4th regiment, the 87th Mountain infantry regiment, the 13th Canadian Brigade, consisting of the 6th Canadian division led by Major General George Pearkes, the Canadian Fusiliers regiment, the 1st battalion of Winnipeg grenadiers, the Rocky Mountain rangers regiment and e Regiment de Hull along with the 1st Special Service Force led by Colonel Robert Frederick were to be part of the invasion of Kiska, codenamed Operation Cottage. Unfortunately, the actual invasion will not be happening in this episode, you will actually have to wait  weeks for that one, but I just so happened to have recently done a podcast with a Canadian Military Historian named Brad St.Croix from the Youtube channel OTD Military History, the same gentleman who I interviewed for this series about the battle of Hong Kong. The podcast we recently did was on the Canadian experience of the Pacific War and the battle of Kiska is 1/3rd of it, so if you are, impatient and want to learn some neat stuff about how Canadians had to change their entire military organization and use American equipment for the battle of Kiska, check out my Youtube channel, the Pacific War channel for the full episode.  Now the last time we spoke about Kiska, the Japanese were forced to perform a bit of a miracle to evacuate their boys. After Attu had fallen, Rear Admiral Akiyama Monzo alongside 6000 men were ordered to evacuate Kiska. To try and do this, the Japanese began by sending 13 I-class submarines of the 1st submarine squadron of Rear Admiral Kouda Takeo. Despite these Type C submarines being enormous in size, they could only carry around 150 men per trip, thus it would have took 40 successful journey’s to evacuate the entire Kiska garrison. With the US Navy fully decked out with sonar, this was not going to be a walk in the park. The efforts had begun on May 27th and by July, the submarines had managed to get 800 men safely back to Japan, but lost 300 due to american attacks.  Meanwhile Admiral Giffen had a considerable armada to work with consisting of a trio of older battleships; the Mississippi, Idaho and New Mexico, a quintet of cruisers; Louisville, Portland, San Francisco, Santa Fe and Wichita and 9 destroyers. He was ordered to bombard Kiska who already had been smashed with aerial attacks all throughout June and early July. On July 6th, Giffen steamed towards Kiska with 4 cruisers and 4 destroyers and bombarded the island for 22nd minutes causing a handful of casualties. It was not all that impressive, but it convinced Admiral Kawase that the Americans were about to invade Kiska at any moment.Admiral Kawase Shiro realized the futility of the submarine effort and was forced to come up with a new plan. Kawase came up with a bold plan, he was going to wait for a night when a thick fog was occurring and would take a surface fleet to sneak over into the Aleutians to assault enemy warships and evacuate all the remaining men on Kiska in a single go. To be blunt, it was a dumb idea. The American warships were equipped with radar that would pick up any surface ship with ease despite any type of fog, but what was about to occur can only be described as spectacular and bizarre.  Rear Admiral Kimura, the victor of the battle of the bismarck sea, would lead the force and he had at his disposal Destroyer Squadron 1: consisting of Yugumo, Kazagumo, Asagumo, Akigumo, Usugumo, Hibiki (one of my favorite whiskeys), Shimakaze, Samidare, Naganami, Wakaba, Hatsushimo and light cruisers Abukuma and Kiso. In close support of these there was also a covering force consisting of heavy cruisers Nachi, Maya, light cruiser Tama and destroyers Nokaze and Namikaze. The large convoy force departed from Paramushiro on July 7th with Takeo’s 1st submarine squadron performing reconnaissance. The covering force departed Paramushiro on July 10th and by July 12th the fleet was around 500 miles south of Kiska. When they took up this assembly position, the sailors were in despair to see the fog was quite low. While it did not matter for warships with radar, Kimura knew full well what allied aircraft could do to his forces if they were not better concealed. Thus he elected to wait until the fog reappaered to cover his force. But the weather did not change, the skies remained clear forcing him to head back on July 15th. Meanwhile on Kiska, Rear Admiral Monzo was frantically ordering his troops to lay out a road from the underground base to the harbor piers to help facilitate the impending evacuation. All of the Japanese on Kiska felt an impending doom placed upon them. If the Americans landed first, it was all but over for them. Luckily, Japanese weather stations reported a dense fog would emerge over Kiska by July 25th, and unlike here in Montreal Canada, I guess these weather reporters are accurate. Kimura once again departed Paramushiro on July 22nd, accompanied by Admiral Kawase aboard cruiser Tama. Yet a few days prior, on July 19th, Admiral Kinkaid had ordered Admiral Giffen to bombard Kiska again. This time Giffen took a two pronged naval attack force consisting of battleships Mississippi and Idaho, cruisers Portland, Wichita, San Francisco, Louisville, Santa Fe and destroyers Abner Read, Farragut, Monaghan, Perry, Aylwin, Bache, Hughes, Morris and Mustin. Giffen’s force reached Kiska on July 22nd and his ships smashed the island with 424000 lbs of high explosive shells. Just an hour later, a PBY suddenly detached with her radar 7 radar pips southwest of Attu. The PBY maintained contact for around 6 hours before low fuel forced her to return to base. These radar pips alarmed Admiral Kinkaid which was being reported in conjunction with a massive increase in Japanese radio activity on Kiska. Kinkaid believed a major Japanese fleet had just entered Aleutian waters, most likely a reinforcement convoy. Kinkaid immediately ordered Rear Admirals Giffen and Griffin to intercept the suspected enemy. However, by doing this he had also done something extremely favorable for the Japanese, he had left Kiska Harbor open and unguarded. Kinkaid dispatched a quartet of PT boats to try and provide a makeshift blockade, but the terrible weather forced the smaller vessels to return to port as trying to dash over to Kiska would probably see them all sunk. While this was occurring, Kimura’s ships were traveling through the dense fog separately. The fog prevented the Americans from intercepting them initially, and having failed to make contact with the enemy, Kinkaid became nervous the Japanese might escape the blockade and ordered the force to return to Kiska at maximum speed on July 25th. The American ships dutifully turned back while Kinkaid sent the Oiler Pecos out to meet them for refueling. By dusk of the 25th, the American ships were around 90 miles from Kiska, when the fog had all but disappeared showing a cloudless sky. Kimura’s vessels seeing their fog betray them, all reunited as a single force, now bearing 400 miles south of the American warships. At precisely 12:43am on July 26th the American warships picked up 7 strong radar pips around 15 miles northeast. It was Mississippi’s SG radar that first picked them up, the American destroyers were actually unable to detect any pips on their radar due to the curvature of the ocean's surface at such a distance. The New Mexico, Portland, San Francisco and Wichita began picking up the same radar pips. The radar pips zigzagged across the sea surface, changing direction in much the same way ships attempting to evade detection might. The ships were being detected all at different angles, verifying to the Americans there were physical presences of some kind occupying definite points in space. On top of this, the immobile radar signature of Kiska’s volcano at a range of 78 miles appeared clearly the entire time, verifying the validity of the pips moving with a fixed landmark. The radar pips converged 22,000 yards ahead of the Americans forcing them to spring into action. Admiral Giffen called for the entire fleet to turn left to intercept the pips on their southerly heading and in the hopes of foiling a possible torpedo attack. All of the American ships turned their guns to fire salvo’s into the night. Great flame lances stabbed into the darkness as destroyers launched volleys of torpedoes and radar plotters frantically calculated salvo corrections. For 67 minutes the Americans tracked the 7 radar pips firing wildly at them. At 1:30am the Mississippi’s log recorded zig-zags and a 20 degree course change, but not a single sailor saw an enemy ship. Cruisers San Francisco and Santa Fe registered shell splashes, but never an enemy target.  75 miles over on Kiska, the Japanese were watching a spectacle. From their point of view it was like a night-time light show over the horizon. By 2:22am the radar pips thinned, faded and vanished completely. During the morning surface ships and aircraft fanned out looking for wreckage, ships, floating papers, oil slick, anything to indicate something was even out there! The American warships reported no return fire, it was as if they faced ghosts. With a lack of fuel and ammunition, the US ships began refueling on the 28th and resumed their blockade of Kiska. What famously has become known as the battle of the Pips left the US Navy with a mystery that remains unsolved to this very day. The radar equipment was operating at times where there was a cloudless night with no fog, zero reasons for false radar echoes. An Aleutian crab fishing captain named Captain George Fulton may have solved the mystery in 1991 when he managed to duplicate the radar signatures observed during the battle by using his radar on a natural phenomenon common to the area. He presented his findings to the Alaska War Symposium in 1993 in a letter “I […] duplicated the Battle of the Pips using color radar. Sure enough there were blips on the tube and their density changed from red to orange to yellow and finally to black, providing an exact replication of the Battle of the Pips. What you described fits exactly the […] pattern of dense flocks of mutton birds or dusky shearwaters […] As mutton birds fly they veer left and right. This accounts for the zigzagging that was reported on the radar logs” Captain Fulton further went on to say how these huge flocks continue until they see large schools of fish, such as pollack. When the birds see them they begin landing on the sea surface then dive for their prey. This maneuver causes them to vanish from radar screens entirely. In the 1990s Aleutian fishing crews use this trait to locate large concentration of pollack, identifying the blips by their zigzagging motion and cast their nets accordingly. Were the Japanese saved by shearwater birds? Another answer came from the US Navy who officially stated that atmospheric echoes, a sort of phenomena caused the radar pips, that explanation has been highly contested. Its also been speculated that the American radar pips were 7 IJN submarines running reconnaissance. What we do know is Kimura made it to Kiska on the 28th undetected and unharmed while the US warships were enroute miles back. No American ships were anywhere near Kiska on the 28th. Admiral Kimura pulled the ships into Kiska anchorage and evacuated the entire remaining forces on the island, all 5183 men onto 8 vessels all within 55 minutes. The Japanese soldiers made sure to spend their last moments on the island setting up a plethora of booby traps. Four days later Kimura and Kawase were back in Paramushiro, successfully evacuating Kiska without firing a single shot. The Americans had no idea the evacuation occurred. In the words of one disgruntled American Colonel after the Kiska ordeal ““How I hate those bastards but I've got to give them credit for the most masterly evacuation by any army at any time and I'm not forgetting Dunkirk” I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The drive to Lae and Salamaua rages on New Guinea as the American Navy in the frigid northern seas fought perhaps a ghost ship army. Or perhaps some pesky birds looking for tasty pollock saved the entire Japanese garrison on the island of Kiska. 

Last time we spoke about the allied offensive against Mubo and the naval battle of Kolombangara. The Australians and Americans were continuing the drive towards Salamaua and Lae, but in their way was the once heavily fortified area of Mubo. Because of intricate diversionary attacks in multiple places, the Japanese gradually lifting their defensive positions in Mubo, until the time was ripe for the allies to seize it. The Pimple, Green Hill and Observation hill, places that caused suffering and hardship were finally seized, Mubo was secured. Over in the Solomons, the New Georgia campaign was continuing, forcing the Japanese to make another daring Tokyo Express run like they did at the battle of Kula Gulf. Yet again Admiral Ainsworth went out to face the enemy, completely ignorant of their torpedo capabilities and he paid for it dearly. Today we are going to continue these stories. This episode is the Drive on Munda Point Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Today we are starting with the main drive towards Munda. We are picking up from last time where General Wing had finally begun his main advance on Munda on July 9th. Now the landings had occurred on July 2nd, from then on the Americans were busy making another landings such as at Rice Anchorage, getting forces to assembly points and trying to hinder any efforts by the Japanese to reinforce Munda. If you were looking down upon a map it would basically look like multiple forces taking up positions that cut off trails and ports that extend towards Munda. Everyone had a unique task and a time table, but as we all know not everything goes according to plan. When General Wing ordered the main advance, two infantry regiments were greatly delayed, those being the 172nd who moved a grand total of 1100 yards and the 169th who made zero ground at all. The war planners had not considered how difficult it would be for ground forces to travel the single narrow tracks, dense jungles, mangroves, creeks, ridges and ravines. The men found navigation difficult and whenever the terrain seemed to narrow they found Japanese defenses. The 172nd were ordered by Major Genera Hester to carry out flanking maneuvers against a roadblock set up by the 9th company, 3rd battalion, 229th regiment while the 169th attacked them frontally. They were supported by heavy artillery, naval bombardment and aerial bombing. But General Sasaki correctly predicted the American commanders intentions and responded to them rather quickly with his own counter flanking maneuvers. His forward area was held by Japanese snipers, well concealed in baskets in trees whom employed rifles that gave little to no muzzle flashes, something that was turning into a real trait of the Japanese.  The 172nd progressed a few hundreds yards with its 1st battalion leading the way, the 2nd behind them and the 3rd following from a distance. They were assaulting a point where the Munda trail intersected another trail running southwest to a beach and southwest of this were the native villages of Ilangana and Laiana. The Japanese managed to keep them 1500 yards away with this defenses. The Artillery was not working to dislodge the Japanese from their roadblock and during the night the Japanese were reinforced with some units of the 11th company who took up some high ground later called Reincke Ridge. This made things ever worse for the inexperienced and pretty brutally shaken 169th who had the unfortunate job of meeting them in a front assault. Things were becoming even worse for General Wing. Despite the slow progress, the American forces had actually overstretched their logistics by July 10th. The 118th engineer battalion had been making some good progress building a jeep trail going from Zanana to the Barike River. They relied on information provided by native scouts, and the engineers built the trail over high dry ground, averaging around half a mile or so per day. But the 5 foot deep fast running stream east of the Barike caused a ton of soft mud, not  very engineer friendly. To get the ground firm enough for footbridges and such they were forces to swing the road northward parallel to the river for over 2 miles. This gap between the end and front of the road meant near half of the combat troops were forced to carry forward ammunition, food, water and other supplies and let us not forget everyone who gets sick or wounded needed to be carried back on the same roadways. Again, logistics are not as sexy as the combat and don’t usually get much time of day, but its important for any war effort, hell look at Russia today. To solve his logistical headache, General Hester decided to divert the 172nd infantry regiment south towards Laiana, while the 169th would continue their miserable advance up the Munda trail. Now Laiana was just 500 yards east of the main Japanese defensive line at Ilangana, currently held by the 2nd and 3rd battalion of the 229th regiment and 2nd independent Quick-fire battalion all under the command of Colonel Hirata Genjiro. The 172nd would have the support of the 3rd battalion, 103rd regiment and 8 M3 Stuart tanks of the 9th defense battalion who were expected to land at Laiana by July 13th. On the morning of the 11th, the 172nd began turning south wading through knee deep mud and having the Japanese fire mortars upon them. By midway they had advanced 450 yards when they came across some Japanese bill boxes. While this was going on the 169th were pushing against the Japanese upon the high ground leading to a stalemate. Because of this Colonel Temple Holland replaced Colonel Eason as commander of the 169th and Colonel Frederick Reincke took command of its 3rd battalion which was being led by Major William Stebbins. On July 12th the Colonel Holland began a plan calling for the 1st battalion to attack frontally while the 2nd battalion enveloped the Japanese left flank. The 3rd battalion who were in reserve were released to engage the enemy, but the entire thing bogged down immediately as units became intermingled with the 172nd who were on their way to Laiana. Meanwhile Rear Admiral Aaron Merrill with task force 36 was ordered to depart Ironbottom Sounds and provide naval bombardment from the Blanche Channel in coordination with heavy artillery in Rendova and aerial bombing from AirSols. Merrill took 4 light cruisers Columbia, Cleveland, Denver and Montpelier into the narrow channel while his two destroyers Farenholt and Buchanen took up a position near the Munda Bar to shell the Kokenggolo Hill Area. Merrills force fired 8600 shells for 40 minutes, which did clear the jungle in front of the advancing troops, but ultimately did little else as they were forced to fire a mile in front of the American positions, but within that mile were the said Japanese defenses. As you can imagine, the boys on the ground were all too excited to now advance, only to find the same unhampered enemy facing them. The 1st battalion, 169th regiment managed to gain about 300 yards; the 2nd battalion received enfilading fire from a ridge to the north, unable to progress and the 3rd battalion assaulted the southern ridge for several hours enjoying some artillery and aerial support. To the south the 172nd were stuck in front of the pill boxes. These pill boxes were not made out of concrete, but instead coconut logs and coral, pretty ingenious stuff. They ranged from 10-12 feet square, with 3-4 layers of logs banked with 6-8 feet of weathered coral. Their ceilings were usually around 10 feet from the floor, dug into the earth so that 2-4 feet of the pill box projected above the ground. Each had several firing slits for riflemen or machine guns. Outside the pill boxes were foxholes, and trenches connected all positions. All of this was well camouflage using earth, grass, vines, palm fronds and such, leading Americans to stumble onto a pill box without even noticing it. One remark made by the 43rd division after coming across them was that they had an easier time smelling them than seeing them. So if you ever watched classic Pacific War films or the Pacific Series and wondered how some of these pill boxes were made, there you go.  On the morning of the 13th Colonel Holland requested some aerial support and he got some at 10am. 12 Dauntless dropped 1000 pound daisy cutters upon some smoke markers laid out by the 169th. The dive bombers manage to hit the target perfectly before Holland ordered the men to charge. The 2nd battalion went through the center, while the 1st battalion took the right and the 3rd battalion took the left. They hit the north and south ridges trying to envelop the Japanese. E and F companies of the 2nd battalion ran into heavy machine gun fire, causing a halt. The 1st battalion tried to climb the north ridge but were obstructed by a ton of felled trees and craters due to the bombing. The Japanese who survived the bombardments opened fire from their pillboxes keeping the Americans in check. The charging Americans now without artillery or mortar support tried to push forward with rifle and bayonet, seeing many killed upon the crest or wounded. Company B would lose 3 of its 4 officers alone. The 3rd battalion now led by Colonel Reincke fought for some hours managing to progress 500 yards into the Japanese lines securing the south ridge. They fought pillbox through pillbox, it was a terribly bloody affair, resulting in 100 casualties. When they took the ridge they held the position, beating back several counterattacks during the night, to which the men named the ridge Reincke. Soon the 1st and 2nd battalions took up positions on the 3rds flanks securing Reincke ridge, while the Japanese concentrated on the northern ridge and to the west they held a higher ground called Horseshoe hill. Meanwhile the 172nd had their lines of communication cut off in their rear by the Japanese forcing them to quicken up the pace as they were running low on food. They made it to Laiana beach in the late afternoon successfully securing the beach and organizing defensive positions. The following morning General Hester landed the 3rd battalion, 103rd regiment and the tanks to back them up at Laiana. This came also with some much needed supplies for the worn out men. Having supplied the men to the southern beach, now the men in the northern front required resupply. Reinckes men were tossing back more counterattacks. One morning Japanese artillery fired upon the ridge bursting a tree that killed 4 men and wounded 23. Alongside this 5 men were reported to have a case of shell shock, 7 others war neurosis. Machine gun fire claimed 2 men, wounded another 5. At 8pm artillery began again killing another 8 men and wounding 26. There were no medical officers with the battalion, leaving medics to do what they could. Despite the hardship the 3rd battalion held their ground, and gradually the Japanese evacuated the northern ridge which the 2nd battalion quickly seized. By July 15th, the 4rd divisions engineers had managed to complete the jeep trail from Laiana to the 169th area. Telephone lines crews began to lay underwater cables between Zanana, Laiana and General Barkers artillery teams. Engineers also finished a bridge over the Barike on the 12th and on the 14th had extended the trail within 500 yards of the 169th front lines. Supply lines were finally being secured, and more importantly the wounded would be able to be safely transported. By July 17th, the 43rd division had 90 deaths, 636 wounded in actions and over 1000 cases of sickness ranging from the ever present friend malaria, but also diarrhea, dysentery and such. As mentioned, cases of psychological problems were also very apparent. Half of the 43rd division were suffering war neurosis, which we call today Combat Stress Reaction “CSR”. This is an acute reaction from the stress of war that causes the combatant to feel fatigued, have slower reactions, be indecisive, and can become disconnected from one's surroundings. It’s classic psychological trauma, kind of similar to what I assume many of you listeners would think of as PTSD, but it is not the same thing, PTSD can see durations lasting months if not even years, while CSR has a short duration. Small tidbit of info since my first degree is in neuroscience, a fairly recent study in the later 2000’s was done to look at the issue of CSR, shellshock and such from a neurological point of view. The idea was to figure out if specific physical damage was being done to parts of the brain during blast trauma that caused combat stress reactions. The reason the study was done was because the symptoms from such maladies often overlap with things you see in traumatic brain injuries, anyways was interesting reading back in my uni days. As pointed out by historian Samuel Eliot Morison, it seemed General Hester’s choice of sending the 172nd infantry regiment south, had greatly exposed the inexperienced 169th. In his words “This was perhaps the worst blunder in the most unintelligently waged land campaign of the Pacific war (with the possible exception of Okinawa). Laiana should have been chosen as the initial beachhead; if it was now required, the 172nd should have been withdrawn from Zanana and landed at Laiana under naval gunfire and air support. Or Hester might have made the landing with his reserves then waiting at Rendova. As it was, General Sasaki interpreted the move correctly and by nightfall had brought both advances to a standstill.” In order to break the deadlock that was occurring, some of the command structure would be reorganized. This coincided with half of the 4rd division being knocked out of commission, prompting General Hester to request reinforcements for the drive against Munda. General Harmon performed a inspection of the situation and reported back to Admiral Halsey on Guadalcanal. He advised sending forward General Oscar Griswold of the 14th corps with a forward echelon of staff so he could begin building up the administrative, supply and planning for the future New Georgia occupation force. Once Munda had fallen, this would allow General Hester to carry on against Vila. Harmon justified this by stating Hesters force was too small to do it, but there was another rationale. By doing this it would relegate Admiral Turner to a supporting role, whom the army and marines were resenting because of what they deemed to be his meddling of ground operations. Admiral Turner opposed the idea, and Halsey replied to Harmon he could simply increase Hester’s staff. This prompted Harmon to fly back to COMSOPAC HQ on Noumea to personally talk to Halsey and force the issue. Griswold showed up at midnight on the 15th assuming command of the occupational force, leaving Hester to focus on the actions of his 43rd divisions offensive. Griswold began his new task by directing Major General Robert Beightler to the rest of the 37th division to New Georgia alongsideColonel Collins 161st regiment of his 25th division. Over at Zanana, the 1st battalion of the 145th regiment arrived at 5pm, which Colonel Holland tossed up to help reinforce the 169th.Now that Admiral Turner was relieved as commander of the South Pacific Amphibious force, his new orders were to take command of the central pacific offensives, replacing Admiral Wilkinson. Now General Hester was preparing for a corps level offensive, but it would take over 10 days to build up and in the meantime the Japanese began to prepare a major counter offensive. On July 16 and 17 some small attacks were performed against the Ilangana line, supported now by the newly arrived tanks, but a lack of coordination between the 172nd regiments infantry and tanks led to only a bit of gain. Nonetheless the tanks did help against the pillboxes. The tanks took up a wedge formation and used their 37mm guns with high explosive shells to dislodge the panicking Japanese trying to fight back with their machine guns from many of the forward pillboxes. However the Japanese were only phased by the arrival of the tanks for about a day as on July 18th they started to employ anti tank strategies to great effect. The Japanese defenders began tossing a mixture of mines, molotov cocktails and flame-throwers, forcing Griswold to withdraw the remaining tanks and ordered the transportation of the 10th defense battalions tanks to reinforce them.  Meanwhile the 169th regiment were advancing southwest towards Kelley Hill located 400 yards southwest of Reincke Ridge. They faced little opposition, but would soon see wave after wave of Japanese counterattacks to dislodge them. On the other side, the 1st and 3rd battalions of Colonel Tomonari’s 13th regiment had arrived at the scene and managed to bypass Colonel Liversedge’s roadblock. General Sasaki planned to toss Tomonari around the American’s right flank near the east bridge over the Barike river. From there they could advance upon Zanana Beach. By July 14th, the 1th regiment were marching to the upper Barike, but the men lacked maps and were hacking their own trail. Tomonari said of this  “If we had to go round and round in circles in the jungle, not having been able to find the enemy, nor having been able to help the 229th Regiment and let them die, it would really hurt the reputation the 13th Infantry Regiment had had for a long time, since the Sino- and Russo-Japan War. That was why most soldiers were feeling the pressure. Finally meeting the enemy at that point was like meeting Buddha in hell.” It would take them  days to march through the thick jungle. On the night of July 17th, Tomonari and the men found a jeep trail heading towards General Hesters HQ on Zanana Beach. He ordered his men to attack the area which at this time was being guarded by a platoon of the 4rd reconnaissance troops and 70 Fijian commandos led by Captain David Williams. General Hester was not at the HQ at this time he was at Laiana, but Generals Wing and Barker were. The Japanese launched simultaneous raids against the engineer and medical bivouacs and 43rd divisional command post. At the same time Captain Kojima of the 229th regiment launched an attack against Kelley Hill on the 18th. At 10am Japanese machine guns north of Kelley opened fire as riflement charged the its western slope. The 1st battalion fired upon the charging Japanese as the 3rd battalion fired upon the machine gunners to the north. The Japanese assault was threatening to break the line. Many of the Japanese managed to crawl within grenade tossing distance of the northern line of the 1st battalion, but mortar fire forced them back. It was an extremely bloody attack and the 1st battalion reported finding 102 dead Japanse upon the slopes at daybreak. Another predawn attack was launched by the 2nd battalion 229th infantry against the 3rd battalion, 103rd infantry but they repulsed it. The attacks were done to prevent the American troops there from helping the Zanana defenders. If all went well, Sasaki could destroy the 43rd divisions rear installations cutting off major lines of communications to the surrounding front line forces. Tomonari’s raids however were chaotic and disorderly. Rather than a organized assault, it fell into a series of separate smaller raids allowing the few reconnaissance and Fijian commandos to fend off the invaders. The reconnaissance forces repelled the attacks upon the engineer and medical bivouacs while the Fijian commandos manned a perimeter alongside Headquarters personnel such as drivers, medical orderlies, clerks, everyone grabbed a rifle despite many not even using one since basic training. The Fijians had better eyesight at night than anyone else and showcased their abilities to the Japanese who were certainly not used to being contested in this field of expertise. Tafa a Tongan, was firing from his foxhole when a Japanese officer wielding a katana and a grenade in the other hand charged at him. Tafa used his Owen gun to mow the man down killing him. The Japanese officer was found later to be carrying documents showcasing the full strength of the Japanese force and details of their mission. The Japanese were screaming as they charged from all directions as the close quarters melee raged on. The Japanese managed to infiltrate the perimeter multiple times, destroying communications equipment, but they could not reach the most important part of the area, General Barkers artillery. Barker unleashed a tight box barrage from extremely close range to devastating effect. The Japanese had no other option than to flee up the jeep trail they came from. Tomonari had his surviving forces erect some road blocks for the next 3 days, but Sasaki’s hopes of knocking out the 43rd divisions HQ were thwarted. Having survived the major counter offensive, the 148th regiment was quickly landed at Zanana on the 18th and were soon sent over to Reincke Ridge to relieve the poor 169th regiment. Colonel Stuart Baxter of the 148th regiment was surprised by the roadblocks as Griswold never warned him about them. His advance parties were ambushed leading to 2 deaths and some wounded. During the night the Japanese were found drunk off looted whiskey they had taken from a rations dump near the bridge on the Barike. There was a clash where a platoon from the 169th were bringing wounded men down. The drunken Japanese managed to kill many of the wounded men being carried on litters alongside 2 medics. The bridge henceforth was called “Butchers bridge”. The next morning at 8am, Baxter sent his 1st battalion and his HQ up the jeep road to fight the Japanese, but as they went up it seemed the Japanese had withdrawn. Baxters men crossed the east bridge without incident, but as they went further up the road suddenly Japanese machine guns opened up on them. A company lost over a dozen men to this ambush and soon the Japanese were attacking his flanks forcing Baxter to dig in. By July 21st the Japanese would finally depart the area allowing the 148th regiment to relieve the 169th. As for the 169th, they were sent over to Rendova and General Beightler took command of the 37th division whom he reshuffled for an offensive. A 1300 yard line was formed north of Ilangana with Hester’s 43rd division to the south and Beightler’s 37th division to the north. By this point Hester moved his 43rd divisional command post from Zanana to Laiana where many trails were created to help with the supply lines. Griswold now planned to start an offensive on July 25th, opening up with a naval, artillery and aerial bombardment, before the infantry and tanks performed a frontal assault upon the Japanese line. The 43rd division would hit from the left to take Lambete plantation and its airfield while the 37th division would hit from the right against Bibilo Hill, thus enveloping the Japanese north of the airfield. Meanwhile, Colonel Currin’s 4th Raiders had secured the Enogai inlet, allowing Liversedge to launch his attack against Bairoko. For the attack on Bairoko, Liversedge planned to use the 1st and 4th Raiders along the ENogai-Bairoko trail to hit the Japanese frontally, while the 3rd battalion, 148th regiment would take the Triri-Bairoko trail to hit their southern flank. Liversedge appeared to have expected aerial bombing support, but did not request or failed to request the air support in time. On the morning of the 20th, the forces began their advance. At 10:00am, Colonel Griffiths 1st Raiders ran into some Japanese outposts manned by just a handful of Japanese. They fired upon them sending them fleeing, as they continued their advance they soon came across a larger force. Eventually they were forced to a halt as they came upon the Japanese main defensive line at around Noon. Commander Okumura Saburo had created 4 successive lines of mutually supporting pillboxes on low parallel ridges running north to south. Meanwhile the 4th raiders advanced within 300 yards short of the shore of Bairoko harbor meeting the Japanese lines of defense. At 2:30pm, Griffiths D company managed to break into the first line of defense, but an hour later, Okumura ordered heavy mortar fire from the ridges pushing the Americans back and turning the area into a killing field. The 1st raiders were unable to move forward, now resting their hopes on the 4th raiders making a breakthrough in the south. The 4th raiders ran into the Japanese main line during the midday and were not making any progress. Liversedge called the forces at the front and consequently ordered the two raider battalions to take up defensive positions further east on some high ground. The raiders had suffered 200 casualties before they retired to the south shores of Leland Lagoon. The next day, reinforcements came over from Enogai along with air support. At 9:50am 24 Dauntless, 25 Avengers and 8 B-25’s swooped in to bomb Bairoko. This was followed up at noon by 37 Avengers, 6 B-25s, then at 4pm 48 Dauntless and 25 Avengers. 130 tons of bombs his Bairoko alongside an estimated 24,000 rounds of machine gun bullets. Liversedge ordered the men to sit tight and hold their positions for now along a line stretching from Enogai, Triri and Rice Anchorage.  Meanwhile, after the victory during the battle of Kolombangara, Admiral Samejima formed a new Night battle unit, consisting of  Heavy cruisers Kumano, Suzuya and Chokai; light cruiser Sendai; and destroyers Yugure, Kiyonami, Yukikaze and Hamakaze, led by Admiral Nishimura. Their unit was given the task of harassing American transportation efforts. Rear Admiral Ijuin Matsuji was now commanding the reinforcement unit who were going to make a run on the 17th, but this was greatly hampered by an American air strike against Buin. On the 17th, 7 B-24s, 32 P-38’s and P-40’s, 37 Dauntless, 36 Avengers and 64 Wildcats and Corsairs hit Buin. 48 Zeros began to take off from Kahili, but they could not scramble fast enough as the Americans bombed the shipping, setting a cargo ship on fire, before the Hatsuyuki took a direct hit to her forward magazine sinking her and 3 other destroyers were damaged. 13 Zeros were shot down while the Americans lost 6 aircraft. Many of Ijuins transports received some minor damage delaying his departure. On July 19th, Nishimura attempted a reinforcement run to New Georgia, but his force was intercepted northwest of Kolombangara by a pack of Avengers. Nishimura’s ships scattered at high speed upon seeing the enemy aircraft, but Yugure was successfully torpedoed and sank as a result. The Kiyonami stuck behind to grab survivors. Meanwhile cruisers Chokai and Kumano were also heavily damaged. The Kiyonami was later attacked by 8 B-25’s who bombed her at masthead level, leaving her dead in the water. The B-25’s also attacked the transports doing some minor damage to the Matsuzuki and Minazuki. 582 men, 102 tons of supplies and 60 drums of fuel were successfully delivered, but the terrible losses led to the newly formed Night Battle unit to be canned. On the 22nd another reinforcement convoy consisting of Seaplane tender Nishin and destroyers Arashi, Isokaze and Hagikaze made a run to Bougainville led by Rear Admiral Osugi Morkazu. They were carrying 630 men of the South Seas 4th guard unit, 22 tanks and 8 artillery pieces. They were intercepted by a huge force consisting of 12 B-24’s, 16 Dauntless, 18 Avengers, escorted by 134 fighters flown by US army, Marine and New Zealanders. The Nisshin was devastated by bombs, torpedoes and strafing attacks leading her to sink within 14 minutes from the start of the interception. Of her 633 crewmen and 630 troops onboard, only 178 would be rescued later on by destroyers who faced considerable attacks from aircraft doing so. Despite the rather insane levels of allied aircraft attacks, General Imamura continued to commit more forces to the defense of the Central Solomons now assigning the elite 2nd battalion, 230th regiment “Yano Battalion” led by Lt COlonel Yano Keiji to reinforce Vila. They were sent aboard the destroyers Yukikaze, Mikazuki and Hamakaze on the night of the 23rd. Instead of sailing through the slot, they used the Wilson straight which was very fortunate as Admiral Merrill was coming up the slot with a large task force to supply Liversedge at Enogai. At Least the poor Japanese transports dodge one bullet. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The American drive upon Munda was seeing significant delays as the Japanese proved themselves very capable at defense, especially in pillboxes. However the battles to reinforce New Georgia were costing the Japanese defeats or pyrrhic victories. 

Last time we spoke about the amphibious assaults in New Georgia, New Guinea and the naval battle of Kula Gulf. The boys on New Guinea were edging ever closer to their objective of Lae while drawing the Japanese attention elsewhere. In the Solomons, Admiral Kusaka tossed as many aircraft as he could to thwart the multiple allied landings, but it was to no avail. Having depleted his airpower, now he turned to the navy to see if they could reinforce New Georgia before another Guadalcanal situation occurred. Rear Admiral Teruo Akiyama was given the task of launching a Tokyo Express to New Georgia while also trying to give some fight to the enemy. Aboard his flagship the Niizuka, Akiyama did indeed give a fight to the Americans, showcasing a brand new type of radar and the ever trusty type 93 long lance torpedoes. The Japanese landed a few of their boys and now the real fight for New Georgia would begin.  This episode is the Fall of Mubo & battle of Kolombangara  Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  So the past few weeks we have been chaotically juggling multiple events across the Solomons and New Guinea and this week it shall be no different. So let's first jump into New Guinea. General MacArthur’s forces managed to pull off the Nassau Bay landing, getting General Savige some much needed reinforcements on his eastern flank and a new supply route. Now the landing at Nassau Bay was part of an ongoing operation codenamed Doublet, aimed at dislodging the Japanese from Bobdubi and Mubo. Taking these were necessary for the future push against Lae and Salamaua. Mubo held an airfield and its capture would greatly facilitate troop movements towards Salamaua. The movement in the interior towards Mubo was complicated by rough terrain. There were a series of ridges that could be defended sternly by the Japanese. As we have seen for weeks, Roosevelt ridge, the pimple, Green Hill, Observation hill, Lababia ridge and Bitoi ridge proved to be very heavily defended. For the Japanese headquarters, all of the allied offensives were confusing as to where exactly the main target was to be. General Nakano remained confident, Salamaua was the main target and he acted accordingly by beefing up the defense there. He ordered Major General Chuichi Muroya, the commander of the 51st infantry division to fortify and defend Salamaua. As part of this, he also ordered Muroya to dispatch around 1000 men to halt American forces trying to move up the coast towards Lake Salus. Now by July 2nd Brigadier Moten’s plan was for the 2/6th and 2/5th battalions to take Mubo and Observation hill. While the new Taylor Force would capture Bitoi ridge and then the ridge between Bui Alang and Bui Kumbul Creeks. After this the forces would link up and the Japanese lines of communications along the Buigap Creek would be severed. While this was going on the 15th brigade who was working in conjunction with the newly landed troops, were performing an offensive directed at reducing the Japanese presence around Lae and Salamaua. Part of this offensive involved the inexperienced 58th/59th battalion who had a hell of a time facing the Japanese at Bobdubi ridge. The 58th/59th battalion were two previous militia battalions from Victoria. Initially they were a defensive force in Australia, not meant to go to places like New Guinea, but as they say times were tough. They got a taste of hand to hand combat in late june and while they did not make much progress, they still impacted the campaign, forcing General Muroya to request reinforcements so he could maintain a firm defense for the approaches to Salamaua. Nakano made it clear Bobdubi was of grave importance stating “this location is the last key point in the defense of Salamaua”. Muroya received Major Otoichi Jinno’s 1st and 3rd companies of the 80th battalion. They marched through the Coconuts area to Bobdubi bringing with them 2 mountain guns of the 26th field artillery regiment. Meanwhile Colonel Araki his 1st battalion over to the Old Vickers position. By early July Muroya now held 5 infantry companies, around 500 men strong in all. But with all the activity hitting the north, Araki became worried and ultimately decided to move his regimental HQ and 1st battalion to Komiatum, leaving only his 2nd battalion to hold Mubo.  On July 4th, Brigadier Heathcote Hammer took command of the 15th brigade. He was a veteran of the second battle of El Alamein, one of the most iconic battles of WW2, yours truly actually wrote quite a large episode for Kings and Generals on that one, and I think by the time this podcast comes out it should as well. Anyways Hammer had taken a German bullet right through both of his cheeks, but he did not lose a single tooth in the process, I guess lucky on that count. He earned a distinguished service order for his time in the middle east and in june of 1943 was promoted to Brigadier and given command of the 15th brigade. He was considered one of the most original and magnetic leaders of the Australian Infantry. “Hard as Nails” was said to be his motto, and “as you train, so you fight” his creed. When the 58/59th battalion stalled, he was tossed into the thick of it. Now do remember he was coming directly off the victory at Alamein, so he was I guess you can call it “desert minded” when he was tossed into the unforgivable jungles of New Guinea. He would have to deal with completely different terrain, different types of troops and a different enemy than the Italians and Germans. Another result of the delays at Bobdubi saw General Saviege dispatched Major Warfe’s commands over to stop the Japanese from escaping Mubo. On July the 5th, General Savige ordered Hammer to send the company towards Tambu Saddle and Goodview Junction where they could cut off the Komiatum Track, thus preventing the Japanese from escaping Mubo to the north. Meanwhile B Company were on the Bench Cut Track carrying out ambush attacks. The two mountain guns brought up to the old vickers position were sporadically hitting Australian positions to their misery. C Company was performing a diversionary attack, while D Company was trying to capture the Coconuts and were successful at taking its northern region by nightfall on July 6th. The next day, the 80th regiment were pushing the 58/59th battalion back as air attacks from 6 Bostens hit the Old vickers allowing C Company to charge in with further support from D Company’s mortars. The men charged up the steep ridge into Japanese machine gun nets and pillboxes. Likewise the 1st company of the 80th regiment with support of the 1st battalion, 66th regiment were launching counterattacks out of Komiatum. The Japanese managed to ambush some Australian supply lines inflicting casualties. On July 9th, the Australians tried to charge again into the Old Vickers, through a Sugarcane Knoll, but it went the exact same as last time, the machine gun nests and pillboxes were simply too much. Bobdubi ridge proved a tough nut to crack, but all of the activity was causing more and more Japanese units to move away from Mubo. By this point Mubo was being defended by 950 men and of those 770 were front line soldiers of the 66th regiment and the 14th field artillery regiment. And so the time was ripe to hit Mubo. Moten tossed Companies A and B from the 2/6th and C Company from the 2/5th towards Buiapal Creek; C Company of the 2/6th at Lababia ridge; D company of the 2/6th at the Saddle and the remainder of the 2/5th battalion into reserve. Warfe’s commands went to work cutting off the escape route along the Komiatum track at Goodview Junction, but his forward units were spotted by Japanese patrols. As the commandos approached the area the Japanese came down from Orodubi ambushing them at Ambush Knoll…because of course its named that, silly Aussies, and this resulted in some lost supplies. Hammer was determined not to be thwarted by any delays so he ordered Warfe to launch a counterattack immediately. The Commandos were able to push the enemy back and reclaim their lost supplies, some of which were mortars and machine guns. On the night of the 6th, Warfe was ordered to leave a force to secure Wells junction while the rest of his men would proceed to cut off the escape route. During the morning of July 7ty, Moten’s leading companies were wading through waste deep water in the Buiapal Creek due south of Observation Hill. The allied assault against Mubo was set to begin at 9:30am on the 7th, with Mitchell bombers coming in to strafe Kitchen Creek, Woody Island and Observation Hill. After this some Botsons and liberators would likewise bomb and strafe the same targets. The view from the ground was quite the spectacle for Moten’s men. It looked like the entirety of the Mubo valley was being enveloped in thick black smoke and flames as the bombers dropped their payloads. Over 159 bombers and fighters dropped 109 tons of bombs over the Mubo area. Even if the bombs did not directly cause casualties among the Japanese in the area, it still caused chaos. Once the air attacks dissipated, the ground forces opened up their artillery and charged. A company of the 2/5th advanced without encountered any opposition, successfully climbing the northern slopes of Observation Hill. The southern slopes proved much more difficult with the Japanese putting up a fight against B company. B Company were forced to take a defensive position in a Kunai patch southwest of the slopes of Observation Hill. During this time, the Artillery over at the beaches of Nassau Bay were being moved further inland and would arrive at Napier by July 8th. This allowed Taylor Force to have the guns necessary to launch an assault of Bitoi ridge. Taylors men managed to get to the southern slopes of the ridge by 3pm while A Company touching its forward crest. B Company likewise broke through to the north and got to a point between Kitchen and Bui Savella Creek. A Company attempted another assault against Observation Hill but was repelled again, prompting Captain Dexter’s D company to be sent to reinforce them. July 9th saw numerous patrol clashes as the Australians prodded deeper and deeper into the area. In the afternoon the Japanese sent a strong counterattack against the 2/5th companies seeing fierce fighting. As noted by Arthur Pearson of D company “In most cases we were firing blind, but sometimes we were abl to pick up the smoke from their rifles”. Pearson  at one point jumped into a weapon pit, trying to draw the Japanese fire his way. A bullet came at him, piercing the stock butt of his rifle, before slamming into one of the soldiers beside him killing the man. Pearson had no idea where the bullet had come from and frantically fired into the jungle hoping to hit the Japanese sniper. The next day saw a lot of the same, more patrol clashed. On the 10th, B Company engaged the enemy around Kitchen Creek. Meanwhile US infantry had cut the main track north of Bui Alang Creek on the 9th. The Americans began advancing down to Buigap Creek, then south to the Komiatum Track by July 10th, before hitting Buigap where they drove off a bunch of Japanese. The Americans now guessed the Japanese on Mubo were using a route north east along the Buikumbul to withdraw to Mount Tambu. With the Australian and now Americans infiltrating the sector, General Nakano ordered the Mubo garrison to pull out on the 11th, back over to Komiatum. To mask their withdrawal the Japanese planned to begin moving after sundown. By July 13th, they made their way along the Saddle to Mount Tambu, but the Americans had spotted them and gave them hell using artillery. The Japanese got out, but suffered many casualties doing so. On July the 12th, with the Japanese leaving the area, the Australians seized the Pimple, Green Hill and Observation hill with little opposition. Thus the allies had finally driven the Japanese out of their positions near Mubo, but they had also allowed them to escape. It turned out to be quite the fiasco with General Savige and Herring both believing they controlled the US troops of the 162nd, but in truth General Fuller refused to relinquish command to either. This confusion helped the Japanese squeeze out, though they did suffer 313 deaths and 981 casualties. The Australians received around 300 casualties. Mubo had fallen, its airfield was captured, mop up operations would go on for sometime, but most of the Japanese outposts were cleared. The path to Salamaua and Lae was ever closer. But now we are heading east over to the Solomons. General Wing’s 172nd and 169th regiments were assembling at Zanana by July 6th. Their task now was to advance along the Barike River towards Munda. Meanwhile on the northern coast of New Georgia Colonel Liversedge’s men successfully landed at Rice Anchorage by July 5th. His force was the 1st Marine Raider battalion, the 3rd battalion, 148th infantry and Companies K and L from the 145th infantry. His men began their advance south towards what is known as the Dragons peninsula. At the same time, as a result of the battle of Kula Gulf, the Japanese were able to land some men of the 13th regiment over at Vila. Defending Vila were forces led by Colonel Tomonari Satoshi. With more men on hand, General Sasaki intended to move the troops via barge through Bairoko so they could reinforce Munda. Sasaki had already brought his 3rd battalion, 229th regiment from Vila using barges. He was lucky the first time but now he felt the Americans would try to attack the airfield directly, perhaps by setting up artillery on the nearby Hopei island. Roviana island likewise could be used as a staging area for amphibious tanks to charge over. Thus Sasaki brought over some 8cm dual purpose guns and 13mm anti aircraft machine guns to try and defend the beaches. He also ordered Major Sato’s 2nd battalion of the 229th regiment to dig some anti-tank ditches along the beach with the intent to smash any enemy tanks at the waters edge. He received word of the landings made at Zanana on July 3rd, prompting him to quickly reinforce his eastern line that ran north from Ilangana point. By July 6th, he had the 3rd battalion, 229th regiment and Sato’s 2nd battalion holding positions along the the Ilangana line with a roadblock position held by a company who were using felled trees and barbed wire in front of Barike. Sasaki also had at his disposal a company of the Kure 6th SNLF led by Commander Okumura Saburo at Bairoko with a small detachment of the 2nd battalion, 13th infantry led by Major Obashi Takeo.  Meanwhile General Wing managed to get most of his 172nd regiment to the mouth of the Barike, but the 2nd battalion of the 169th remained on Rendova and the 1st and 3rd battalions were moving inland towards the Japanese roadblock. Unfortunately for the 3rd battalion, they had not found the roadblock by the night of july 6th and dug in just a bit east of it. They did not establish a good perimeter for their fox holes, there were no trip wires or barbed wires anywhere. Thus when the darkness came, so did the Japanese from the roadblock. The Japanese performed their classic infiltration tactics. The men in the foxholes began to hear random screaming, the odd firing of rifles all around them. The Japanese began to infiltrate their perimeter with one soldier reported that Japanese troops were approaching while calling out company code names in English. It was a brutal night to be sure. The shaken men of the 3rd battalion advanced with I company leading the way. They found themselves running into Japanese machine gun positions by 10:55pm around the Munda trail. They retaliated with mortars and machine guns, but could not properly see where the enemy was. Luckily B company from the 172nd showed up attacking the roadblock from the rear. In the carnage 3 platoon leaders were wounded, K Companies commander was killed, no progress was being made. Firing lanes were drawn out, the Americans were trying to find the enemy but their muzzle blasts were tiny. Some of the Americans tossed grenades, but they could not get close enough to effectively do it. By 3:30 the 3rd battalion withdrew from what they called “blood hill” to dig in for the night, but the Japanese continued to harass them. According to the 169th infantry “it was a sleepless night spend under continued harassment from enemy patrols speaking English, making horror noises, firing weapons, throwing hand grenades, swinging machetes and jumping into foxholes with knives”  On the 8th, the roadblock was overrun costing the 3rd battalion, 169th regiment and B company of the 172nd 6 deaths and 13 wounded. The next day the 169th finally got to their assembly point at the Barike line, while Colonel Liversedge and his men were crossing the Tamaku river. Colonel Liversedge planned to send Colonel Griffiths 1st Raiders with 2 companies of the 145th regiment to swing around the west shore of the Enogai Inlet prior to assaulting Bairoko while the 3rd battalion, 148th regiment would advance over to the Munda-Bairoko trail to cut off Munda from reinforcements. Liversedge estimated taking the Enogai Inlet and cutting off the trail would be done by July 8th, and it was critical it was done speedily as his men only had 3 days rations on hand. In the late afternoon of the 7th, the 148th managed to reach the trail and created a roadblock the following day. Griffiths team and secured the villages of Triri and Maranusa, clashing with a few Japanese patrols along the way. After capturing the villages the men came across some Japanese documents showcasing the defense plan for Enogai. On the 8th, the Raiders moved out of Triri enroute to Enogai only to run into an impassable mangrove swamp. Meanwhile Major Obashi launched a counterattack against Triri which would be eventually repelled. Griffith got the men to resume the advance using another trail west of the swamp and found themselves around Leland Lagoon where they clashed with some Japanese.  The morning of the 9th, saw General Wings main advance began. At 5am General Barkers 3 battalions of artillery positioned on both shores of the Honiavasa passage and some 155mms on Rendova opened fire on Munda. The artillery put several thousand rounds of 105mm and 155mm high explosives upon Munda. This was followed up by a naval bombardment by the USS Farenholt, Buchanan, McCalla and Ralph Talbot who were firing from the Blanche Channel, showering Munda with over 2000 5 inch shells. Then on top of all that 107 Dauntless and Avengers dropped 79 tons of bombs over Munda, Enogai and Bairoko harbor beginning at 8:30am. The Japanese recorded that the area was lit up as if it were daytime. The 172nd regiment forded the Barike, the 169th was unable to move because of the battle against the Japanese roadblock. On the night of July 6th, Admiral Samejima sent the rest of the troops that were supposed to be transported during the battle of Kula Gulf, the 2nd battalion of the 13th regiment, some 1200 men. They were aboard 4 destroyers, the Matsukaze, Yunagi, Mikazuki and Satsuki escorted by the cruisers Sendai and Chokai and 4 other destroyers the Yukikaze, Hamakaze, Tanikaze and Yugure. They only saw some harassment from a small strike force consisting of 5 PBY’s as they made their way to Vila and safely returned. Admiral Kusaka requested some naval reinforcements from the Combined Fleet, so Admiral Kogo send Admiral Nishimura’s Cruiser division 7, arriving on the 11th. Alongside this, Rear Admiral Izaki Shunji came over with light cruiser Jintsu and destroyer Kiyonami, taking command of the reinforcement unit. Back on land, the Kure 6th’s batteries were firing upon Rice Anchorage prompting Griffith to begin the assault of the Enogai Inlet. Supported by mortars, B Company stormed the village of Baekineru. The Japanese began withdrawing from Enogai allowing the Americans to seize it by the 11th. This came just in time as the Raiders had run out of food and water. The raiders had paid heavily, suffering 47 deaths, 80 wounded and 4 men missing. The Kure 6th SNLF would report 81 deaths and a platoon of 50 men lost. The heavy losses forced Liversedge to request the 4th raiders be landed for the capture of Bairoko, but they would only arrive on the 18th. Meanwhile Colonel Tomonari brought forward his 1st and 3rd battalion to Bairoko to help reinforce Munda. At around 4pm, the 3rd battalion led by Colonel Takabayashi attacked the American roadblock, nearly dislodging them. By nightfall the Japanese took up a position on a ridge to the 148th’s northern flank. There was a series of counterattacks until the next day saw a bit of a stalemate, then the morning after that the Japanese backed off. The 148th regiment would hold onto the roadblock for more than a week, but would quickly run low on food. It mattered not however as the Japanese just advanced along another trail further west, prompting Liversedge to order the roadblock abandoned on July 17th. Now Admiral Kusaka wanted to reinforce the important volcanic island of Kolombangara. Kolombangara was a perfectly round stratovolcanic cone soaring out of the sea to an altitude of 5800 feet. The Japanese had a garrison at Vila airfield on the islands southern shore. The island was often to put men and supplies upon barges that would make nighttime transits across the straits to Munda point. Kusaka sought to toss another 1200 troops, Major Yamada Tadaichi’s 2nd battalion, 45th regiment and the 8th battery, 6th field artillery. Transporting them would be Matsukaze, Yunagi, Minazuki and Satsuki coming from Buin, escorted by Admiral Izaki’s aboard the Jintsu alongside 5 destroyers Mikazuki, Yukikaze, Hamakaze, Kiyonami and Yugure coming from Rubaul. Unfortunately for the IJN, allied coastwatchers saw reported their movement and Admiral Halsey responded by ordered Admiral Ainsworth and task force 18 to intercept them. Ainsworth had light cruisers USS Honolulu, St Louis, the Royal New Zealand light cruisers HMNZS Leander; destroyers USS Nicholas, O’Bannon, Taylor, Jenkins, Radford, Ralph Talbot, Buchanan, Maury, Woodworth and Gwin. Half of Ainsworth’s forces came from Captain Ryan’s Destroyer squadron 12 who were quite inexperienced. Ainsworths set up his force making his vanguard the Nicholas followed by O’Bannon, Taylor, Jenkins and Radford. Honolulu, Leander and St Louis followed in the center. Ainsworth specifically placed Leander in the middle because she held inferior radar, he preferred St Louis to take the lead out of the Cruisers. Ryan’s destroyers would take up the rear with Ralph Talbot, followed by Buchanen, Maury, Woodworth and Gwin. By 5pm task force 18 was sailing once again for the Kula Gulf. Task Force 18 had left Tulagi at 5pm on July 12th under clear skies and calm seas. As they passed Savo Island, Ainsworth took a course along the west coast of Santa Isabel island hoping to use it to hide his force from Japan reconnaissance aircraft. At 12:35am a PBY reported the course and composition of Izaki’s force, and Ainsworth heading in for the intercept. As the two forces were converging, Izaki dispatched his Destroyer transport through Vella Gulf to unload the troops but at 1am he was alerted of the approaching enemy. It was actually the Americans who established radar content first, but the Japanese gained visual contact by 1:08am As the two forces converged, Izaki sent his destroyer transports through Vella Gulf; yet by 01:00, the Americans detected his force. However it was actually the Japanese who detected the Americans first for almost 2 hours or so because of the electromagnetic impulses the American radar systems emitted. The Japanese crews had managed to gain a fairly accurate picture of Ainsworths disposition. At 1:08 the Japanese made visual contact and were the first to attack, launching 29 torpedoes by 1:14am. Ainsworth’s vanguard increased speed to engage the Japanese with their torpedoes while the cruisers turned to deploy their main batters and engage to starboard. Ainsworth yet again ignorant of the type 93 long lance capabilities had no idea the fish were already in the water coming towards his force as they watched the Japanese destroyers turn away. The American destroyers tossed 19 Mark 15 torpedoes, but the Japanese were over 10,000 yards away and turning north thus completely wasted the volley. When the Japanese were 10,000 yards or so Ainsworth cruisers began opening fire, concentrating on the Jintsu. When the Japanese column closed to 10,000 yards at 01:12, Ainsworth ordered his cruisers to open fire, concentrating on the Jintsu which was leading. Honolulu and St Louis fired an incredible amount of shells for 18 minutes at 1100 and 1360 6 inch rounds joined by 350 5in rounds. The Leander fired 160 6 inch rounds. The Jintsu was hit first to her rudder, then her bridge killing Izaki, followed by 10 or more shells to her engineering spaces. She was a doomed burning ship, that came to a dead drift quickly. The Americans then launched another volley of torpedoes, 21 in all, but they would all fail to hit a mark. By this time, the Japanese torpedoes were finally arriving. Leander was hit at 1:22 forcing Ainsworth to detach Radford and Jenkins to help her limp away. The rest of Ainsworth forces managed to avoid the torpedoes. While this was occurring the destroyer transports had successfully unloaded the 1200 troops and were moving north to withdraw with Izaki’s other destroyers. The Japanese were not running away however, they were getting to a safe position to reload torpedoes and re-engage. After finishing off the Jintsu at 1:45, Ainsworth ordered the force to pursue the enemy going northwest. They made radar contact again at 1:56, but Ainsworth doubted the blips to be the enemy, but rather his vanguard ships. Instead of opening fire, Ainsworth attempted making contact with the vanguard force and began firing starshells, this would prove to be a fatal error. The Japanese launched another volley of 31 torpedoes. At 2:08 the first to be hit was St Louis, it opened her bow, next Gwin was hit near her No 2 engine room; Honolulu was third receiving a hit to her starboard bow at 2:11, with another hitting her stern without exploding. Honolulu’s rudder jammed and she nearly smashed into Gwin coming within 50 yards of her. That effectively ended the battle as Ainsworth ordered the task force to withdraw back to Tulagi. The Gwin had lost 61 men and was forced to be scuttled, Leander lost 28, the Jintsu 482 and another Japanese Admiral was dead. 21 survivors of the Jintsu were rescued later on by the I-180, a few others were picked up by American ships. The Japanese had won a tactical victory and demonstrated yet again their superior night fighting techniques. But it was a pyrrhic victory in many ways as well, the Americans could afford to lose ships, the Japanese could not.   After the defeat, Admiral Nimitz decided to change tactics and not confine anymore cruisers to the Solomons as they could not hope to chase the IJN destroyers and their troublesome torpedoes were a major threat. Nimitz wrote a letter to Halsey suggesting that a well trained squadron of 2100 ton Fletcher class destroyers would be better suited to such waters rather than cruises. Halsey argued despite the Japanese having superior torpedoes, he believed Ainsworth’s night battle plan A, that had employed SG radar with radar directed gunnery were still superior to anything the IJN had. He thought the solution “appears to be the greatest volume and weight of gunfire that can be incorporated into a highly maneuverable unit–and a unit that is certainly not appreciably weaker than the enemy unit.” Regardless Halsey went to work designating two squadrons of 2100 ton destroyers to take over New Georgia operations and would not risk anymore of his cruisers going up the Slot on any more missions. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The New Guinea and New Georgia campaigns were seeing gradual progress for the allies, but the naval battles were much less to be desired. While the Japanese were earning some victories, they were rather pyrrhic in nature as American production was winning the day.

Last time we spoke about the amphibious assaults for Operations Chronicle and Toenails. General Douglas MacArthur finally performed his landings at Nassau Bay, Woodlark and Kiriwina islands. Woodlark and Kiriwina proved to be cake walks, while Nassau Bay proved a tougher nut to crack. Then over in the Solomons, Admiral Halsey unleashed his landings at Wickham Anchorage, Segi Point, Viru Harbor and Rendova. Now the Japanese were more alert to the invasions and offered some resistance, although ultimately Sasaki would order many forces to simply withdraw from the invaders. Admiral Kusaka tossed a ton of airpower at the incoming allies only to lose a disastrous quarter of his air fleet, forcing him to ask his Army colleague Immamura for additional support. However with all of these landings came a large amount of allied warships to bring them, and such actions could only bring about one conclusion, another naval battle for the pacific war. This episode is the Battle of Kula Gulf  Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    Before we jump into the naval battle of Kula Gulf a lot was occurring in New Guinea and the Solomons. Over in the Bobdubi front, the Australian 15th brigade under the temporary command of Colonel Guinn were preparing for the main offensive, hoping to trap the Japanese defending Mubo. To support the Nassau Bay landing, Colonel Guinn ordered the untested 58/59th battalion to advance upon the Japanese high ground position at the Old Vicker’s, Coconuts and Bobdubi area. They would be marching from Orodubi to the Coconuts while Major Warfe’s commandos would raid Malolo and Kela. Company A and C of the 58/59th would make the initial attack seeing A attacking Gwaibolom and C the Old Vicker’s position. Following close behind them was B company who were to advance across the ridge to gain control over the Bench Cut Track. D Company were to be held in reserve at the Kunda-vine. On June 26th, A company set off from Missim heading towards their forming up point at Namling. On the 28th, the other remaining companies made departed Meares Camp heading for the New Bobdubi kunda bridge. The next day 17 of Warfe’s commandos were ambushed by 30 Japanese. They managed to escape, but were forced to abandon a Bren gun. By the night of June 29th, the 58th/59th crossed the Francisco River and began preparations for the launch of the main attack which would occur the next morning. The next morning saw lackluster allied air strikes against Gwaibolom, Salamua, Old Vickers and the Coconut area. Companies B and C left their start up point of Uliap Creek, seeing C attack Buggert village, just a bit south of the Old Vickers position being held at this time by a company of the 115th regiment led by Lt Ogawa Takeshi. They successfully outlanked the Japanese and captured the village, suffering only 2 casualties for their efforts. From there the Australians assaulted the Old Vickers position, but the Japanese defenders repealed them right back to Buggert village. The Japanese defenders had well established positions, hiding in dugouts 40 feet down from the top. The failure to seize the Old Vickers position, prevented B Company from reaching their objective, the Bench Cut Track and now they were being met with Mortar fire as they crossed the ridge. Meanwhile A Company began their assault on Orodubi, but anticipating booby-traps the men had left on the Bench Cut Track around 70 yards south of Orodubi, they chose to climb a 40 foot kunai slope to join the main track just 10 yards within the enemy. Around 80 men of Company 10 led by Lt Gunji Toshio saw the Australians doing this and promptly began tossing grenades at close range and fired down upon them. The Australians were forced to flee back to Namling as a result. The next day it was decided they would use a platoon to contain Orodubi while the others bypassed it to go onwards and capture Gwaibolom and Erskine Creek, which they managed to do by July 2nd. While this was occurring, B Company was trying to find another way across the ridge, but were failing to do so. So on July 2nd, they were ordered to move across the ridge via the newly established positions at Gwaibolom and Erskine Creek, and would reach the Komiatum Track / bench track junction where they would prepare an ambush by the 3rd. At around 5pm on the 3rd, B company managed to ambush a party of 20 Japanese trying to move towards Old Vickers and this quickly fell into hand to hand combat killing half the Japanese and one of their officers. Meanwhile Colonel MacKechnie’s men were fighting to keep their beachhead alive at Nassau Bay. AA and C Companies had fought through the night against Japanese until their 300 yard perimeter was secured. At dawn on June 30th, C company began advancing south to find the Papuan infantry battalion who were around Cape Dinga. C Company made their way to a place just due west of Cape Dinga, following the Tabali River, while A Company was patrolling north and south of an arm of the Bitoi river where they ran into the 3rd battalion, 102nd regiment. A Company backed by some other units attempted to hit the Japanese western flank, but they were overwhelmed and forced to turn back. It would actually be Amphibian engineers who would save the day, who came in at the last minute to help A company out just as the Japanese tossed a banzai charge at them. Upon receiving word of the Japanese attacks, C company rushed over to join A by 3pm. Yet unbeknownst to them, the Japanese were not actually trying to break through, they were trying to withdraw by crossing the Tabali river. General Nakano had ordered them to withdraw to a new position at Lake Salus when he heard word over 1000 men had landed at Nassau Bay. Nakano also had ordered the 3rd battalion of the 66th regiment to send 150 men to march south from Salamua to help out in the Nassau Bay area. These men were tasked with carrying out only limited attacks against the allied forces around Nassau Bay, such as delaying actions to help the Nassau Bay garrison withdraw towards Lake Salus. Nakano was also coordinating with Colonel Araki who was now operating out of an HQ in Mubo, he had likewise brought forces over to Mubo from Salamua.  As for the Papuan infantry, they were marching north and they ran into the 3rd battalion, 102nd regiment around Cape Dinga as well. They managed to attack their rear killing at least 26 Japanese who were holding out in a bunker. After this they continued their march to the Nassau Bay beachhead. At around 4:30pm C company began sending reports that they were seeing some Japanese crossing over the Tabali River just south of their position. They were ordered to return to the beachhead perimeter to take the southern flank, but before they were able the Japanese attacked their rear taking 5 men and a platoon commander. Around the beachhead a hastily prepared defensive line was established by an ad hoc force of Engineers, Australian infantry and Headquarters personnel. As the night fell on, C company reached the southern part of the perimeter, quickly taking up positions. The Japanese began a series of attacks throughout the entire night from all sides using machine guns, grenades, mortar and rifle fire. Smaller parties of Japanese were trying to infiltrate positions. It was a terrifying experience for the defenders who would dub it “guy fawkes night”. Many of the men had itchy fingers which led to tragic accidental casualties throughout the night. It was a pitch black night and the noises of the jungle and Japanese screaming stuff in english unnerved the allied forces. The Japanese had tossed a ton of stuff into the perimeter trying to get the allies to use up their own munitions in response. As a result the allied forces had 18 deaths and 27 wounded several of which were the result of friendly fire. The Japanese it seems to have around 50 deaths during the night. Back over in the north, on June 30th, Captain Dexter was leading forward a number of patrols in preparation for an assault upon Duali. However as they advanced they ran into a Japanese ambush along the Bitoi track, thus canceling their planned assault. The next day, Brigadier Moten ordered Dexter’s exhausted men to move forward regardless. With some support of Beaufighters strafing the Japanese positions, the Australians charged straight through the enemy positions, and to their shock they found them abandoned. As Dexter recalled ‘We advanced through the Japanese position with fixed bayonets and searched the scrub on each side. Everywhere was evidence of a hasty evacuation, dropped equipment and personal rice bags, and evidence of extensive bomb damage. But of the Japs, no sign.’ Thus Dexter and his men captured the mouth of the Bitoi by early afternoon. Shortly after the capture, Dexter made contact with MacKechnie who was busy expanding his perimeter northwards. By nightfall, PT boats led by Lt Commander Barry Atkins covered the landing of 11 landing craft full of reinforcements. The PT boats staffed nearby villages to cause a lot of ruckus, hoping to dissuade nearby Japanese from firing on the vulnerable landing craft. The reinforcements were mostly from B company who had failed to land during the third wave. On July 2nd, Moten began to pressure MacKechnie, stating he had to get his troops moving inland at once. Thus MacKechnie decided to leave C company to defend the perimeter while Lt Colonel Harold Taylor would lead the rest of the men towards Napier. Luckily for the men, 4 75mm pack howitzer m1 artillery guns had been unloaded that night with the reinforcements giving them ample firepower. The gun were positioned on the beach and immediately went to work shelling targets at the mouth of the Tabali River, Cape Dinga and the area between Duali and the Bito River’s southern arm. On July the 3rd, the men now designated the Taylor Force accompanied by Dexter’s company were marching for Napier, but their march was a slow one as the jungles were thick and they were carrying heavy equipment. While this was occurring the 3rd battalions of the 102nd and 66th regiments were consolidating around Lake Salus looking to create a defensive position. The coastal area however proved to be too difficult to fortify, so they moved over the Tambu where they joined a SNLF platoon of the 5th Sasebo to make a position there. At this point General Savige decided to send the Papuans north along the coast to keep pressuring the enemy’s retreat. By the 4th, Taylor Force had taken a position at Napier and were now under the direct command of Moten’s 17th brigade. Back over on the beaches at Nassau Bay a total of 1477 troops had been landed, thus securing the beachhead. Dexters company marched back over to Guadagasal taking a coastal route, getting themselves ready for a future assault against Mubo slated for July 7th. MacKechnie believed the loss of some of his landing craft had greatly delayed the entire operation, perhaps up to 3 weeks. He did not think he would be able to move artillery or large quantities of supplies further inland. He also did not think it was tactically sound to leave his base, as the Japanese proved to be quite a nuisance in the area. Orders from the top were demanding a artillery road be built, but his troops at the assembly area would probably run out of rations in a day or two and he had no native carriers on hand. In his words "To be very frank we have been in a very precarious position down here for several days and my sending the rifle troops inland was contrary to my own best judgment. Troops had gone inland stripped to the bone. Without heavy weapons and mortar and machine-gun ammunition. "Therefore, these troops who are up there now are in no position to embark upon an offensive mission until we are able to get food, ammunition and additional weapons up to them." In response to the situation, on July 6th, Moten ordered 1000 rations and 100 boy loads of ammunition…god you have to love the australians, boy-loads haha. Anyways this was to be dropped over Napier. Moving over to the Solomons, Admiral Halsey had successfully occupied Rendova, Segi point, Viru Harbor and Wickham anchorage forcing the smaller number of Japanese to withdraw to their main base at Munda. Admiral Kusaka tossed a series of air strikes against the invaders, suffering horrible losses whereupon he had to request General Immamura reinforce him with the 21st air flotilla at Saipan and from the 6th air division. For the battle of Munda, Admiral Halsey had assembled the largest air force ever assembled in the Solomon islands campaign. It was a force that was needed as the Japanese in Rabaul tossed every bomber that was available to try and thwart the US amphibious invasion. The June air battles had greatly depleted the Japanese air power, but they were not done. On July 1st the Japanese hit Kahili using 6 Vals and 34 Zeros. They were trying to knock out the 3rd battalion, 103rd infantry who were unloading at Poko plantation on the west coast of Rendova. However they were met by 20 P-40’s and F4Fs that ripped them to pieces taking down 3 Vals, 5 Zeros and losing 5 P-40’s in the process. Although the allies were scoring massively high success against the Japanese in ratios, by this point it reached 7 to 1, they were still unable to sustain round the clock 32 fighter or more CAP. To do this required a total of 96 operational aircraft and after 10 days of fighting in the skies over New Georgia the pilots were also becoming increasingly exhausted. Colonel Merrill Twining requested more P-38 Lightnings, the aircraft that had become the most comfortable fighter to those in the south pacific by this point. But Hap’s Arnold over in Washington was heavily committing forces for General Patton and Montgomery’s invasion of Sicily at the time so he had to deny this request. As Arnold stated back “every trained unit must be thrown against the German until he is beaten”.  Regardless, with Rendova secured, General Hester was landing the bulk of his forces for the final push against Munda. The unloading process had been heavily hampered by poor planning and a failure to allocate adequate personnel for beach control and unloading duties however. To clear the new beachhead and distribute the combat stores, infantrymen were detailed to carry out the work. When transports carrying the next echelon arrived, many of the boats grounded offshore and had to be unloaded manually by troops wading ashore. On July 2nd, Admiral Kusaka coordinating with General Itahana formed a combined strike led by Major Endo Misao consisting of 18 Ki-21 bombers, 23 Ki-43’s and Ki-61s with 29 Zero escort. Unfortunately for the allies, Admiral Mitscher had recalled the Rendova patrol due to bad weather, so a total of 18 Ki-21 bombers came to the scene unmolested and hit the congested area around the harbor. The strike caused 200 or so casualties, mostly upon the 2nd battalion, 172nd, the 24th seabees, the 9th defense battalion and staff officers of various headquarters. The strike also knocked out a lot of equipment and supplies. With the failure of the June air battles to hold back the allied invasion, Admiral Koga turned to the Navy for the task of providing new supplies to the defenders at Munda Point. The Tokyo Express was back in business, a convoy of 10 destroyers were sent to New Gerogia led by Rear Teruo Akiyama aboard his flagship Niizuki. His force was ordered to attack Rendova and he had with him the old Yubari, Yunagi, Mikazuki who would operate south of the Treasuries as a diversion, while Niizuki, Amagiri, Hatsuyuki, Nagatsuki, Satsuki, Mikazuki and Mochizuki would hit the allied shipping and shell the harbor. The Japanese destroyers were spotted right away, but bad weather prevented 3 American strike forces consisting of PBY’s and B-25’s from hitting the incoming enemy. In the meantime, Akiyama closed in on the southern tip of Rendova. She circled the island and opened fire on a point due west of the harbor. The bombardment was quite ineffective, but some allied PT boats rushed in to attack her which caused a wild 10 minute mini battle seeing 2 of them running aground. On the ground, General Hester ordered the 1st battalion, 172nd regiment and A company of the 169th regiment now designated Southern Landing Group to land at Zanana beach. Led by General Wing on the afternoon of the 2nd they made a crossing over Blanche Channel using 16 landing crafts. With the support of Brigadier General Harold Barkers artillery they successfully formed a perimeter. Now the Japanese air and naval attacks were worrying Halsey. He expected the Japanese to launch a major counterlanding with substantial forces perhaps on the 3rd. Therefore he ordered Admiral Ainsworth to lay in wait off the west coast of Rendova for the enemy. However July the 3rd would not bring an enemy, this was because General Imamura and Admiral Kusaka agreed with the lack of air and naval forces on hand at this time they could not perform such a feat, to the disgust of General Sasaki who had assumed command over the defense for Munda on the 2nd. Sasaki was so adamant about landing reinforcements at around midnight on July 3rd he proposed violating orders to simply make a counter landing using the 13th regiment and Ota’s barges. He had a crazy idea to simply bring the vessels in and mix them with the American landing craft who were making rountrips to the mainland through the Honiavasa passage. He thought even if half his forces perished, the attack would be worth it. Ota objected to this on the grounds the barges would be needed for other transports scheduled for July 4th and 5th, apparently this made Sasaki visibly upset, who adjourned the meeting and left the room. Ota pushed Sasaki to write his plans down and submit them to Rabaul, which he did, and Rabaul squashed it immediately.  On July 3rd the Japanese performed an unsuccessful fighter sweep over Rendova and the next day reconnaissance reported the island was secured by the Americans who had heavily reinforced it with anti aircraft guns and radar. They also reported landings on Zanana and that it looked like Rice Anchorage would be next, thus cutting off Japanese reinforcements from coming down the Munda trail from Bairoko. Imamura and Kusaka had to wait for an accumulation of forces to bring reinforcements to New Georgia; they had no intention of losing it like Guadalcanal. 4000 soldiers of the 13th and 45th regiments were earmarked for departure. Kusaka ordered Itahana to launch another combined strike, this time aimed at Roviana island. However the Japanese were intercepted by 32 F4F’s causing the loss of 6 Ki-21s, 3 Ki-43’s and a zero without a single loss for the Americans. This would be the fateful end of the joint air operations as Itahana needed to take his forces to help the Salamaua area. Luckily for Kusaka he received reinforcements in the form of the 201st Kokutai from the 25th flotilla which would allow him to gradually rebuild his air strength by mid july. Meanwhile Admiral Turner had assigned 7 destroyer transports, 2 fast minesweepers and 4 Destroyers to carry the 1st raider battalion, the 3rd battalion, 145th infantry regiment and the 3rd battalion, 148th infantry regiment of the 37th division led by Colonel Liversedge into the Kula Gulf. Their escort cover was Ainsworth task group 36.1 consisting of the Cruisers Honolulu, St Louis, Helena and destroyers Nicholas, O’Bannon, Strong and Chevalier. They were also tasked with bombarding Vila and Bairoko. On July 4th, Ainsworth led the group up the slot while the Rear Admiral Teruo Akiyama’s Tokyo Express were on their way to Vila carrying 1300 troops of the 13th regiment towards Vila. At around midnight Ainsworth entered Kula Gulf carefully avoiding the mindfield laid back in May. His force proceeded to shell Vila, but they failed to detect the Japanese who were heading south. The Japanese detected the Americans at 12:15 thanks to their brand new radar system; the 1-shiki 2-go radar which was outfitted on the Niizuki. The IJN were eager to test out the radar so they fastened it to the flagship of Destroyer squadron 3. Oh how the turn tables as they say. The radar indicated they were heavily outnumbered, so Akiyama decided to abort the mission, but before doing so he ordered 14 torpedoes to be launched at a range of 10 miles. The type 93 long lance torpedo remained the best weapons of the kind in the Pacific theater and one his destroyer Strong at 12:43 practically cutting her in two. Can’t stress it enough what an immense advantage Japan had over the Americans in terms of torpedo power during the first half of the war, hell if any of you play World of Warships, you know Japanese DD is base as hell.  When the torpedo hit, the Japanese were already heading back up the Slot and Ainsworth thought he was being attacked by IJN submarines. Thus while Liversedge’s men were landing on the southside of the Pundokono River, Ainsworth dispatched destroyers O’Bannon and Chevalier to rescue the survivors of Strong. The Strong was settling fast off the Enogai inlet. When Chevalier and O’Bannon came to the scene picking up survivors a gun duel emerged between them and some batteries on Enogai. By 1:22am Chevalier had 239 men come aboard before her commander said it was time to go. His ship was getting battered by the batteries and he unfortunately was forced to ram the Strong to keep it from capsizing which ripped a 10 foot fash in Chevaliers bow. A near miss from one of Enogai’s guns had opened her seams aft and another shell knocked out her NO 3 gun mount. When Chevalier was pulling away from the Strong, breaking her in two in the process, 3 of Strong’s depth charges went off under Chevalier lifted the entire boat out of the water causing her to flood in forward sections, talk about bad luck. Over in Rice Anchorage, despite the terrible stormy weather and some gunfire from Enogai, Turner ordered the transport group to clear the Gulf by 7am so they could quickly unload their cargo. 300 men of the 148th regiment landed further north at Kobukobu inlet because of the terrible weather. It would take them until July 7th to meet up with the main body. Though the USS Strong had been sunk, the Tokyo Express failed her run, thus Akiyama elected to bring the bulk of his shipment to Vila the following night, but this time he brought 10 destroyers; Niizuki, Suzukaze, Tanikaze, Mocizuki, Mikazuki, Hamakaze, Amagiri, Hacujuki, Nagacuki and Sacuki. Halsey got advance word of this and ordered Ainsworth to return to Kula Gulf to wait for the Japanese to show up. Halsey also reinforced him with destroyers Jenkins and Radford. Ainsworth went into this with a simple but ultimately flawed plan. He overestimated the capabilities of radar guided 6 inch guns against fast moving targets. On top of that he seemed to be totally ignorant of the IJN’s Type 93 Long Lance torpedo’s capabilities. His plan was to wait passively until radar detected the enemy than he would toss his cruisers at the enemy using their 6 inch guns, hoping to fire over 8,000 yards or so. He believed that was the effective Japanese torpedo range, why he believed this I do not know. For his destroyers, they would launch torpedoes at the enemy.   Akiyama’s Tokyo Express departed Buin after sundown divided into a covering force of 3 destroyers in the front and the main bulk behind them. Around midnight on July 6th, Ainsworth’s force were just northwest off New Georgia, entering the mouth of the Kula Gulf. The Japanese were also arriving to the Kula Gulf whereupon they detached the first transport unit to land 1600 troops. By 1:06am, Niizuki’s radar detected Ainsworth’s force, but this time Akiyama was prepared for a fight. Akiyama detached his second transport unit at 1:43am and 7 minutes later American radar picked up the Japanese. Ainsworth took his force in closer until the enemy was 7000 yards away. Then at 1:56am at around a range of 6800 yards the Americans Cruisers began to open fire. Akiyama quickly recalled the second transport unit before he engaged the enemy. Unluckily for Akiyama the Americans concentrated their fire upon the Niizuki which was pulverized quickly. She became a burning wreck before she was sunk by 6 inch shell fire taking Rear Admiral Akiyama’s life alongside 300 sailors. Within 20 minutes the Americans would fire 612 shells, 6 of which smashed the Niizuki.   Despite the loss of of their commander, the well drilled torpedo crews pulled off a salvo of 16 torpedoes at the American gun flashes. Ainsworth ignorant of the long lance range could do little to avoid it. The light cruiser USS Helena was the first to be struck, her bow was blown off virtually up to the number 2 turret, nearly cracking her in two as she sank taking 190 of her 1177 crew with her. St Louis was hit by a torpedo that fortunately did not detonate and another nearly missed Honolulu. The Japanese fled as fast as they could for Buin as Ainsworth directed his two remaining cruisers to shell the second transport unit. Of the four destroyers in this group, Amagiri escaped with minor damage, while Hatsuyuki was hit by 2 6inch shells, but luckily for her they were duds and she limped away. Nagatsuki was hit by a single 6 inch shell to her rear ship which would force her to run aground near Bambari Harbor. The next morning she would be destroyed by American aircraft. At 3:30am, Ainsworth ordered his forces to return to Tulagi as he dispatched the Radford and O’Bannon to pick up survivors while Nicholas chased the fleeing Japanese. The Japanese dispatched Amagiri to pick up their survivors and she would be intercepted by Nicholas taking 4 hits before she made her retreat. While this was going on the First transport unit completed unloading its 1600 troops and bolted through the Blackett Strait and Kula Gulf. The Japanese had managed to land their reinforcements and sunk the USS Strong and Helena, so they considered it a tactical victory, though the loss of the Niizuki and her commander was terrible. The battle for New Georgia was nowhere near done. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The landings and early offensives were well on their way on New Georgia and the drive upon Lae was closing in. The Battle of Kula Gulf gave the Americans a bloody nose and now the Japanese had more forces at their disposal to try and dislodge the Americans from New Georgia.

Last time we spoke about the extensive plans involved in Operation Cartwheel. The allies were crossing their T’s and dotting their I’s. MacArthur was getting closer to unleashing Operation Chronicle, the invasion of Woodlark and Kiriwina islands. MacArthur’s Navy, that being the 7th amphibious fleet are now prime and ready to go. Over in the Solomons, Admiral Halsey’s Operation Toenails likewise had finalized their plans for a full scale invasion of New Georgia. The invasion would consist of multiple amphibious assaults done by countless units all with important missions. It was to be a extraordinary complex operation that would showcase to the Japanese how far American production had come and just how doomed the empire of the rising sun was. In the words of a great wizard “The board is set, the pieces are moving. We come to it at last, the great battle of our time” This episode is the Invasion of New Georgia Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    I do want to just start off with a bit of an apology. I am well aware the past few episodes have been extremely heavy on the planning rather than the doing as they say. Again this is the reality of the week by week schedule and this podcast as I hope all of you know follows the Youtube series almost to a T, well almost, I do like to wander off now and then. But today I assure you we are diving into the fray of battle. Ever since the conclusion of operation KE and the allied victory at the Bismarck Sea, the war in the South Pacific had gotten a bit more quiet, but certainly tense. Both sides were looking at another, expecting a major offensive to kick off at any moment. But it would be the allies who would kick off everything by unleashing the start of Operation Cartwheel. The opening shots of Cartwheel would begin with the invasion of Woodlark and Kiriwana islands just off the southeast coast of New Guinea and due south of New Britain. Colonel MacKechnie’s 162nd regiment continued to prepare their Nassau bay landings just 11 miles south of Salamaua. Ever since April of that year their 1st battalion had been carrying intensive amphibious training at Morobe Harbor. They were being reinforced with the 532nd engineer shore regiment, 542nd engineer amphibian regiment, the 592nd engineer boat regiment under Brigadier William Heavey and with a Papuan infantry battalion who had marched to Buso by mid june. Under orders not to proceed any further north, the spent their time carrying out long-range patrols, gaining valuable intelligence on the enemy. From their intelligence, MacKechnie believed there were about 75 Japanese near the mouth of the Bitoi river, an outpost or two along the beach at Nassau Bay and about 300 Japanese on Cape Dinga which also held an outpost. MacKechnie decided to use Mageri point as a staging base, which held an excellent beach 12 miles north of Morobe with good cover for their landing crafts.They had with them 2 LCMS, 2 captured Japanese barges and 29 Higgens boats. To further augment them, 4 PT boats were assigned to help transport the men, around 150 of them from Morobe. In the meantime, Brigadier Moten planned to send Captain Dexter’s D company who had just achieved an incredible victory at Lababia ridge where they repelled a Japanese force 10 times their size to march to the Bitoi rivers mouth to divert Japanese attention away from Nassau bay. On top of this one of their platoon’s led by Lt Dave Burke would guide the Americans to the landing beach. Now operation Chronicle was expected to go unopposed, though Krueger did not tell his men that. The Woodlark group consisted of Colonel Cunningham’s 112th cavalry regiment while Kiriwina would receive Colonel Herndon’s 158th regiment. Admiral Barbey’s 7th Amphibious force with the support of Admiral Carpender’s 7th fleet would transport them. On June the 20th, Krueger set up the 6th Army HQ at Milne Bay. The 6th Army was codenamed the Alamo Force as it assumed control of the majority of US Army units involved in operation Cartwheel. General Kruegers command was actually a bit awkward. Instead of operations being conducted directly by the 6th army, the Alamo force, which was purely an operational entity, basically administration, was in charge…and it was directly under the control of Douglas MacArthur. So as you can imagine for Krueger …well it was like having two of the same hat kind of? In his own words "the inherent difficulties faced by my dual headquarters in planning and administration were aggravated by the command setup, which was a novel one to say the least." Thus Alamo force was on New Guinea while the main body of the 6th Army HQ, the real one was in Brisbane until February 1944, when upon they were merged together. Yes this was a sneaky maneuver by MacArthur to seize control. Ever since the Buna campaign, MacArthur was increasingly unhappy with having to depend primarily on Australian troops. Although on the surface he look to be in a great harmonious relationship with Blamey, in truth MacArthur was extremely critical of the man and the Australians in general. Alamo Force was his way of wedging himself into the chief role for planning and conducting the later stages of the war, thus bypassing Blamey as the allied ground force commander.  To kick off the operation, Krueger sent advance parties of the regiment groups to secure beachheads in the two islands. At 4pm on June 22nd an advance party of the 112th cavalry regiment led by Major McMains left Milne Bay aboard the destroyer transports Humphreys and Brooks bound for Woodlark. They arrived in the dead of night at Guasopa and unloaded 200 men using 6 Landing crafts. The destroyer transport departed by 4am for Milne Bay. It turned out a Australian coastwatcher, not having been informed of the landing nearly attacked the force with his locally recruited guerrillas. But upon hearing the accents of the troops he quickly realized them to be friend and not foe. The advance party went to work performing reconnaissance, establishing defenses and facilities for the incoming invasion force and clearly marked the beaches for them to land. The next day the 158th infantry regiments advance party led by Lt COlonel FLoyd Powell departed Milne Bay at 6:10 aboard the two destroyer transports. They were accompanied by a detachment of the 59th combat engineer company. They arrived to Kiriwina around midnight, taking their landing craft through a small channel that passed through a reef to the beach at Losuia, code named Red Beach. Their unloading was quite slow due to lack of experience, bringing them the threat of aerial attack by the enemy. Thus the ships were forced to depart partially loaded.  On June 25th Operation Chronicle officially began. 2600 troops of Colonel Cunninham’s Woodlark force departed Townsville Australia aboard 6 Landing ships, a subchaser and the destroyers Bagley and Henley. As the Woodlark Force slowly and stealthily made its way, 2250 troops of Colonel Herndon’s Kiriwina Force departed Milne Bay aboard 12 Landing crafts, 2 coastal transports and were escorted by Admiral Brabeys destroyers. They successfully landed at Losuia beach at dawn on June 30th completely unopposed and the unloaded process was quite slow. Around the same time, Colonel Cunninghams force landed at Woodlark, also unopposed, but their unloading went much faster. The problem for the team at Kiriwina was an extremely spiny necklace of coral. The landing craft had grounded several hundred yards short of the beach, with only a single one passing over the sandbar to land offshore. Heavy rain and a low tide were hampering the vehicles and thus making it a nightmare. It was the complete opposite story over at woodlark. Their supplies were already loaded onto trucks which drove straight off the landing crafts allowing for an efficient unloading process so the vessels could depart before enemy air attacks might occur. Meanwhile, B-25’s of the US 5th air force bombed Japanese strong points along the Bitoi river as A-20 Bostons hit supply dumps on the southern side of Nassau Bay on June 29th. The amphibious landing force known as MacKechnie Force departed Mort Bay at dusk on the 29th. PT boats of the 7th fleet took around 210 men of Lt Colonel Harold Taylors 1st battalion, 162nd infantry regiment while 29 of the captured Japanese barges took the 770 men of 2nd Engineer special brigade and two mechanized landing craft took the 532nd engineer boat and shore regiment to Mageri point. They landed in 3 waves and just like woodlark and Kiriwina, it went unopposed seeing all 770 safely landed at Nassau bay. The Japanese defending the immediate area were just 6 guys at an observation post, and offered only a few shouts in defiance before they fled into the jungle.  On June 30th the men went to work clearing up the beach to create a defensive perimeter, while some units of C company marched south to link up with the incoming papuan infantry battalion. Some other patrols ran into Japanese and were turned away near the bitcoin river. Upon receiving news of the landing, General Nakano ordered the 3rd regiment of the 66th battalion to march south from Salamaua. However the Australians were also applying pressure near Bobdubi so the 3rd regiment could only carry out limited attacks on the allied forces around Nassau bay, before they would perform delaying actions to allow the Nassau garrison to withdraw towards lake salus. The Papuan battalion began attacking the rear of the Japanese 3rd regiment of the 102nd battalion around Cape Dinga causing some casualties when they stormed a Japanese bunker. Nassau Bay would see some minor Japanese air attacks but for the most part things were going smoothly, allowing the seabees to work on the new facilities and airstrips for Woodlark and Kiriwina. Now thats it for MacArthurs half, time to go over to the Solomons. As you will remember, Admiral Haley’s plan for New Georgia consisted of 5 different landings scattered about the island. Four of these landings were to occur on June 30th. These landings were 1) Wickham Anchorage on the southeast coast of Vangunu 2) Segi Point on the southeastern tip of New Georgia 3) Viru harbor on the southwest coast of New Georgia just a few miles up from Segi and 4) Rendova Harbor on Rendova island just across the Blanche channel from Munda. As a preliminary, Halsey sought to land some reconnaissance teams. The first one to arrive was at Segi point on June 14th consisting of units from the 47th seabees tossed over by PBY’s. They began constructing landing sites for heavy equipment to come over. The next saw units go over to Viru Harbor, then Oloana Bay on Vangunu just a bit west of Wickham Anchorage, another at Rendava harbor and a last one at Rice anchorage. These teams all prepared the way for the future landing teams. However all did not go smoothly, for on June 16th over at Segi Point a dozen scouts being led by the New Zealand coastwatcher Donald Kennedy unsuccessfully ambushed a Japanese patrol. Kennedy had established a defense zone around the village of Segi used local native forces who were using scavenged weapons and they often tried to ambush and kill small Japanese patrols. This patrol they had stumbled upon was a platoon from the 4th company, 229th regiment operating around Viru harbor. They didnt manage to kill any of the Japanese, but instead alerted Colonel Sasaki of allied activity near Segi point and Viru harbor. Sasaki responded by ordered Major Hara Masao the new commander of the 1st battalion with his 3rd company and a machine gun platoon over to Viru harbor the following night. His orders read “settle things”. Luckily Hara had no idea where exactly Kennedy and his guys were so they would have difficulty finding them, but this did mean Japanese activity in the area increased. On June 20th Kennedy made an inaccurate report indicating the Japanese had landed troops in Nono Lagoon prompting Admiral Turner to react. That night Turner sent Companies O and P of Colonel Currins 4th raiders to occupy Segi Point with companies A and D of the 103rd regiment following them the next day. This meant Kennedy and his men were saved, but it also alerted the Japanese of the incoming offensive as allied destroyer transports were spotted around Wickham. This prompted Admiral Kusaka to put the Southeast Fleet on high alert, but further reconnaissance failed to find anything, thus by the 27th the IJN relaxed. This was also partly due to the fact that the IJN believed no invasions would come until late July or August. It would only be Lt General Sasaki who believed the allies might invade as early as late June, so he had set to work preparing New Georgia’s defenses. Sasaki did not have much time, nor much capable labor as there was a large case of malaria going around. Added to this materials and equipment were hard to come by as supply missions were failing to arrive on time. The terrain on the island was quite an obstacle also. The Japanese dug into coral on the south side of their airfield and establishing communication lines towards the east. In the northern sector Sasaki placed 4 Kure 6th 14cm guns at Enogai point, but Bairoko had basically nothing. East of the airfield practically no defense existed. Sasaki managed at the last minute to construct some gun emplacements at Bairoko ingeniously using blocks of coral, something that the Japanese would really build up in later island warfare. To establish a main line east of the airfield he had the men build extremely strong bunkers to face frontal assaults across the Munda Bar. Communications would be a major issue as all they had to work with was a motor vehicle road that ran along the beach to Lambete and 1000 meters of completed road between the southeast Detachment HQ and 229th infantry HQ. Other than that there were no roads, just some trails which Sasaki described “that turned into slush ponds after rain”. To keep in contact with the troops spread everywhere, Sasaki requested they use an underground cable, but it seems he never got it. Sasaki was forced to spread his men in multiple places seeing company sized units in exposed locations at Wickham Anchorage, Viru harbor and Rendova harbor. These units would have been better used at places like ENogai, Bairoko and Ilangana. To help with the landings, General Kenney ordered the 5th air force  to launch a heavy raid against Rabaul while Admiral Merrill’s cruisers escorted minelayers up to the Shortland islands to mine the southern entrance to Buin. Merrill’s cruisers also took the time to bombard Faisi, Ballale and the Poporang islands while he dispatched some destroyers to hit Vila. Early on june the 30th B-24’s and B-17s from AirSols hit Kahili and further raids would be made against Munda and Vila throughout the day.  The night of June 29th was a very stormy one hindering the AirSols and 5th air forces abilities and even Merrill’s ships had difficulty carrying out their tasks. Admirals Turner and Fort departed from Guadalcanal, Tulagi and the Russels to land the forces. Two groups of infantry units code named“barracudas”; 2 companies of the 172nd regiment enroute for Rendova and Companies A and B of the 169th regiment and 1st Commando Fiji Guerillas enroute for Honiavasa went ahead of Turner aboard the faster transports Ward, Lang, Talbot and Zane. They were going to seize Rendova Harbor’s beaches and the Honiavasa passage. The convoys continued their voyage to New Georgia in the early hours of the 30th facing no difficulties and would reach their jump off points in the early morning. The Barracuda groups arrived at 2:25an, successfully landing the first infantry group at Baraulu, Honiavasa and the Sasevele islands securing their staging base. The Rendova group however got a bit lost, leading to a bit of disorder, but they landed nonetheless.  By 6am the 43rd division begun its landing which was described by the US Marine corps official history as “hurried and having the appearance of a regatta rather than a coordinated landing, it was chaotic in the extreme”. Troops from the 103rd field artillery battalion, Marines from the 9th defense battalion and Seabees from the 24th naval construction battalion secured the beach even though Japanese sniper of the 1st rifle company, Kure 6th and 7th company, 229th regiment were making pot shots at them. There was also the appearance of Japanese Betty’s overhead who circled the landing zone, but did not attack. The Japanese reported back to their commanders “that due to the tenacious interference by enemy fighter planes, a decisive blow could not be struck against the enemy landing convoy. And that the landings were an absolutely miraculous and speedy disembarkation of the enemy”. I believe this showcases another major disparity between the allies and the Japanese, that of amphibious assaults. The allies and Japanese were on par at the beginning of the conflict, neither side understood the science per say, but particularly the American began to really study how it to do it, designing and employing multiple different vehicles to help in its efforts. Meanwhile the Japanese would do little to improve their methodology, thus from their perspective to see how the allies were doing it in mid to late 1943 probably looked like magic. General Hesters 2nd battalion, 172nd regiment quickly established a defensive perimeter around the beachhead. His men had a rough time of digging in due to the ground being heavily waterlogged, nothing like a wet foxhole eh? Outnumbered and taken by surprise, the Japanese were gradually pushed into the interior suffering heavy casualties in the process. They initially assembled in a coconut plantation behind the initial landing beach known as the Levers plantation. They took up a position hoping to launch a counter attack on the American perimeter. However a week of heavy rain left them fighting miserably in knee deep water and eventually they could not bare it any longer so they withdrew further into the hinterland. Troops of the 172nd regiment pursued many of them shooting down several snipers and machine gun positions as they advanced towards the Pengui river. Near the river the Japanese tried to remain firm meeting the Americans with all they had, but the US mortars rained hell upon them eventually forcing them into a rout. The Japanese would scatter, many aboard makeshift rafts trying to head for the mainland. These efforts would be in vain however as American patrol vessels caught many of them. Over on Baanga island and around Munda Japanese artillery began opening up on 4 US destroyers sailing through the Blanche channel. The USS Gwin was hit, killing 3 and wounded 7 before the USS Farenholt and Buchanan began to return fire upon the batteries neutralizing them. Just before noon a force of 27 Zeros of the 11th air fleet performed a fighter sweep over the beachhead, but it resulted in nothing more than a few delays and the loss of 4 Zeros to allied fighters. 6000 Americans were soon landed on Rendova. It was grueling work to create the beach head, in the words of the Seabees leader, Commander Roy Whittaker about the conditions his men had to work in “They ceased to look like men; they looked like slimy frogs working in some prehistoric ooze. As they sank to their knees they discarded their clothes. They slung water out of their eyes, cussed their mud-slickened hands, and somehow kept the stuff rolling ashore.” Indeed it was a hell of a time. Tons of bulky B rations, hundreds of barrels of petroleum, thousands of barrack bags filled with personnel items were piled all over the beach. People don’t often ever think about the logistics of war, its usually seen as the unsexy stuff, but it was of critical importance as we have seen countless times in this series. The Seabees were missing heavy bulldozers, army engineers, adequate medical personnel, military police, because yes boys will be boys and a lot of men were stealing stuff. It turned out the reason for a lot of the lack was because Turner loaded the operation for an unopposed landing rather than an offensive one. As reported by Lt COlonel McNenny “equipment and stores carried in the New Georgia operation were excessive. It appears the forward base must be considered as an assembly area for launching the assault.” Colonel George W. McHenry wrote in his notes, “Believe too much gear for initial landing. Stress what [is] necessary to fight and eat. Bring other up after secure.” By 3pm, most of Turners stuff was unloaded and his vessels were preparing their withdrawal. Admiral Kusaka and General Imamura had already been alarmed by the landings at Nassau Bay, and were shocked to find out at 6:50 Rendova was seeing landings. In response they unleashed an air strike at around 3:45pm. Led by Lt Commander Nakamura Genzo, 26 Betty’s and 24 Zeros came in to attack the departing convoy. they were intercepted by 48 allied aircraft made up of F4U Corsairs and F6F Hellcats and were met with heavy anti aircraft fire. The Japanese lost a 10 Zeros and 19th Bettys in the mayhem. However a single Betty was able to release a torpedo which struck Turners flagship McCawley, killing 15 sailors and wounding 8 others. Turner luckily survived the hit and transferred his flag to Farenholt. Rear Admiral Theodore Wilkinson remained aboard the McCawley as she began being towed by the cargo ship Libra. Later in the afternoon, another Japanese wave of 21 Zeros, 9 Vals and 13 F1M Floatplanes showed up attacking the convoy. The McCawley was strafed, but managed to fight back with their anti aircraft guns shooting 3 planes down. By 6:60pm it seemed the McCawley was going to sink so Admiral Wilkinson ordered her abandoned. Later on at 8:22 a PT boat would actually misidentify the doomed McCawley as an enemy ship and torpedoed her twice, sinking her. The poor fleet tug Pawnee who was tugging her at the time narrowly was hit as well. At 5:20, 21 Zeros and 9 Vals would launch their last attack, but it was extremely disorderly and amounted to nothing. By the end of the day, AirSols had destroyed nearly a quarter of Kusaka’s air strength while only losing 17 fighters in the process. The losses were so grave, Kusaka was forced to ask Imamura to commit the 6th air division to help out in the future. When the IJN is asking the IJA for help, you know the shit has really hit the fan. Now over to the east, Admiral Fort was performing his 3 simultaneous landings. At Wickham Anchorage, Fort was going to land Companies N and Q of the 4th raiders along with Lt Colonel Lester Browns 2nd battalion, 103rd regiment. They would touch down on a 500 yard strip of beach at Olona Bay. The 4th raiders would lead the charge heading their in the first destroyer transports, but mother nature was cruel that day leading to 6 Higgins boats getting wrecked and seeing Raiders scattered all over the area. One platoon got stranded on a reef 7 miles west of the landing point, not fun at all. Brown’s landing craft infantry meanwhile had no difficulty in landing on the marked beach. After reuniting with the scattered Raiders, Brown learnt there were enemy bases at Kearuku Village and Vuru. In response to this he sent Company E of the Raiders to hit Vuru while the bulk of his forces would capture Kearuku. The advance was slowed by rain, allowing Colonel Sasaki to send word to his men over at Wickham to withdraw to the northern coast of New Georgia as they were outnumbered and outgunned. However there was no way for them to do this as their barges were scattered in the Marovo Lagoon. Thus the Japanese found themselves under fire from the north side of the Kairuku river and by nightfall were being pushed towards Segi Point where their artillery was set up. The men defending Vuru had it worse and were easily scattered by E Company. The next day the Japanese began unleashing their artillery, prompting Brown to request air and naval support to allow his men to hit Segi. However the support would only be able to come on July 3rd and by that time the Japanese had managed to escape. When July 3rd came, some US destroyers and 18 Dauntless dive bombers bombed Segi point. When Browns troops went in they killed 7 dazed Japanese and captured one. Because of the preemptive capture of Segi, the plans had to change in regards to Viru harbor. On the morning of june 28th, Colonel Curren ordered a single company to use rubber boats and go up the Choi river all the way to the western end of Nono Lagoon. From there the Raiders would march overland to hit the Japanese bivouacs at Tombe and Tetemara, hoping to link up with B company of the 103rd regiment. But now with Segi point taken, Currin instead left with his two companies to land at a village just a bit west of Nono Lagoon. However along the Choi river they would run into Japanese patrols, delaying them heavily. By june 30th, some of Forts destroyers would enter Viru Harbor expecting to find Currins Raiders, only to be met with 3 inch field gun fire from the Japanese at Tetemara. The destroyers left in haste and landed a company at Segi point to help the Raiders out. Currin that morning split his forces, sending P company to attack Tombe while the rest would circle west of the harbor, cross the mango river and attack Tetemara. After marching through endless swamps, by July 1st Currin and his men were prepared to attack, but Sasaki had also decided to order the withdrawal of forces at Viru who were now marching overland towards Munda. At 8:45 the Raiders stormed Tombe, overwhelming the few defenders there. 15 minutes later, 17 Dauntless began bombing Tetemara disrupting Japanese artillery crews. An hour later the Japanese artillery opened fire against the raiders, but they fought through the rain of shells and machine gun bullets. Taking the Japanese machine gun nests caused heavy casualties. At 4pm Currin ordered a final push, seeing Tetemara taken after 30 minutes. Major Hara alongside 160 Japanese would manage to escape into the jungle, heading for Munda. Though the eastern landings saw some heavy resistance, all of the objectives were met.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The allies' successful amphibious assaults proved how far they had come and the Japanese could only look on in wonder at the marvel it was. Now the allies would keep pressing further and further north, one island at a time until the Solomons and New Guinea were liberated. 

Last time we spoke about operation Cartwheel, developments in Green hell and some new adventures in Burma. General Douglas MacArthur had his work cut out for him as he developed his original Elkton plan into what would become Operation Cartwheel. Alongside the US Navy, MacArthur set out the blueprints for seizing parts of New Guinea and the Solomons before taking the ultimate prize that was Rabaul. The Japanese meanwhile extended their efforts to hammer allied airbases in the south pacific with lackluster results. Over on New Guinea the allied forces were drawing closer to seizing Lau, by using Salamaua as a distraction. Over in the Burma front, the disastrous Arakan campaign had resulted in some shuffling of leadership and now the Auk was working with General Slim to see if they could prepare the Indian Army for another go at the Japanese. And today we are going to be venturing back into all of these stories.  This episode is Battle of Lababia Ridge Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    Last time we were speaking about Operation Cartwheel and part of phase one for Admiral Halsey in the Solomons was to move north from Guadalcanal to hit New Georgia code named Operation Toenails. Halsey planned to perform four simultaneous landings. One was directed at Wickham Anchorage by the 2nd battalion, 103rd regiment plus two companies from the 4th raider battalion to be led by Lt Colonel Lester Brown. Wickham would become a new landing craft layover base. A second landing would be made at Segi Point by Companies O and P of the 4th Raider battalion and Companies A and D of the 103rd regiment would garrison Segi point and its airfield afterwards. Another landing would be made at Viru Harbor by Company B of the 103rd regiment for its small craft base. And a final landing would be made at Rendova Harbor by the 172nd regiment and 24th naval construction battalion Seabees which would become a stage for further troops coming over to New Georgia before an assault on Munda was made. The 43rd infantry division led by Major General John Hester were going to take the lead against Munda. The 43rd were actually a national guard division from Connecticut, Maine, Rhode island and Vermont who were mobilized and reorganized as a “triangular” division. This meant they were going to be 3 regiments rather than 4. They would be brought up to strength, but in reality the only real experience they by this point was some unopposed landings on the Russell islands early in 1943. They had several months to prepare for the campaign. Hester got the men to construct pill boxes modeled after the Japanese one’s found on Guadalcanal for training exercises. However the terrain found on Guadalcanal or on the Russell Islands did not really bear much resemblance to that of New Georgia. In April 1943, the 14th corps arranged for the 147th regiment, veterans of the Guadalcanal campaign who had chased the Japanese west during Operation KE to conduct several training exercises with the 43rd division. However as noted by many of the men in the regiment the terrain was not very similar to what was expected on New Georgia hampering the training. By mid june the 103rd infantry and the 169th infantry also began training exercises on Guadalcanal using landing craft. Now you probably noticed in my listening there was mention of the 4th raiders. Two new Raider battalions were entering the fray; the 3rd Raiders led by Lt Colonel Harry Liversedge were coming over fresh from Samoa; and the 4th Raiders led by Lt Colonel James Roosevelt from Camp Pendleton of California. And yes you are probably wondering, James Roosevelt II was the eldest son of FDR. Since 1936 he had been serving as his fathers military aide, under the commission of a captain in the Marine Corps Reserve. When the war broke out in 1939 he entered active duty and starting in April of 1941 FDR sent him on a secret mission. James traveled around the world on a diplomatic mission to assure other governments that the US would soon join the war despite the official neutrality stance. He met with Chiang Kai-shek in China, King Farouk of Egypt, King George of Greece, Sir Winston CHurchill of Britain and such. After the attack on Pearl Harbor he sat right beside his father as he gave the legendary Day of Infamy speech, and soon he requested an active combat assignment. He was transferred to the Marine Raiders by January of 1942 and became the 2nd in command of the 2nd Raiders under Carlson. He took part in the Makin Island Raid in August of 1942 where he earned a Navy Cross. He had some health issues, such as flat feet, and got the special privilege of being allowed to wear sneakers while the other Marines wore boots. On March 15th the 4 Raider battalions were reorganized as the 1st Raider regiment, stationed at Espiritu Santo with Liversedge as their commander and Carlson executive officer. Carlson infused his fire team and squad models into the raiders, while Edson molded them into a highly trained, lightly equipped force who could accomplish special missions or fill a line battalion on the fly. The 1st Raider Regiment was no guerilla outfit, though it felt like that initially. For Operation Toenails, Halsey assigned both the 1st Raiders led by Colonel Griffith and the 4th Raiders led by Lt Colonel Michael Currin, supported by the 9th defense battalion which was carrying a 155mm gun units and light tank platoon. The Navy was also sending the legendary Seabees; Acorn 7, the 24th and a single section of the 20th naval construction battalions. It can’t be said enough how much the Seabee’s brought to the table in the Pacific. During the war theSeabee's would receive 5 Navy Crosses, 33 Silver Stars and over 2000 Purple Hearts alongside numerous citations and commendations. They performed legendary deeds in the Atlantic and Pacific creating over 400 advanced bases along the 5 figurative roads to victory.   Lastly and quite interesting to note, the Americans would have a unique commando units of 130 Fijians known as the 1st Commando Fiji Guerillas. When the Pacific War broke out, Japan had seized numerous territory going as far south as the Solomon islands getting just 8 hours flight time away from places like Fiji. At this time Britain was too preoccupied with the Atlantic and America was scrambling to recover from Pearl Harbor. Fiji was in a critical position and for several months while the US was organizing her forces so was Fiji. Fiji possessed 2 good harbors and 2 airfields and her position on earth put her smack dab on the way between America and Australia / New Zealand. The allies knew the Japanese would love to take such a territory and thus she needed defense. Small numbers of troops were garrisoning Fiji, many from New Zealand, but she had little to spare as she became heavily committed to Africa and the Middle East. Thus the Americans came to Fiji to relieve the New Zealanders and they helped expand Fiji’s forces. The result were commando units who proved themselves uniquely equipped for combat on pacific islands like the solomons. For New Georgia the Fiji guerillas were tasked with locating enemy soldiers scattered about the island. The eastern landing force consisted of the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 103rd regiment alongside the 4 raider battalion to be led by Colonel Daniel Hundley. Their job was to secure the lines of communication to Rendova directly across from Munda. The Western Landing Force consisted of the 172nd and 169th Regiments; 3rd Battalion, 103rd Regiment; 9th Marine Defense Battalion; 24th Naval Construction Battalion (Seabees) and 1st Commando Fiji Guerrillas, to be led by General Hester. They had the initial mission of securing the island of Rendova and afterwards the 3 islets in the Blanche Channel opposite of Munda. For the islets it would be the job of Companies A and B, 169th Regiment; and 1st Commando Fiji Guerillas. Once all of that was done, the 172nd and 169th regiments led by Brigadier General Leonard Wing would advance to Zanana through the Honiavasa passage, then take a overland route over the Barike River for the final drive upon Munda supported by destroyer bombardment. Hester also planned to use the 3rd battalion, 103rd regiment to hook around Munda’s from the west coast. For all of these amphibious landings, Admiral Turner was in charge with his task force 31. He divided his forces into two groups; the Western Force under his personal command which would make the Rendova landings; and the Eastern Force led by Rear Admiral George Fort would perform the landings at Wickham, Segi Point and Viru Harbor. For the Rendova harbor landing, Turner employed 4 Attack transports and 2 Aka’s; during WW2 Aka’s referred to merchant ships that were modified for combat use. These took the 172nd regiment and 24th seabees over on June 30th, while Turners larger landing craft, LST’s (landing ship tank), LCT’s (Landing craft tank) and LCI’s (landing craft infantry) would move Hesters initial units over the next few days. The Amphibious forces would be covered by Halsey’s Task Force 36 constituting of forces that had previously been under the command of Admirals Ainsworth and Merrill, destroyers, cruisers, some battleships and a few carriers. Merrill would help the landings by performing a bombardment of the Shortland islands as minelayers created minefields across the southern entrance to Bougainville, and a smaller detachment of destroyers hit Vila as a diversion. Ainsworth would get himself into position in the seas around Rendova while Admiral Fitch would grant the operation a total of 1182 aircraft, including 626 from Admiral Mitschers Airsols as cover. To gain air supremacy, 17 air missions were assigned such as PBY crews for rescue operations and last minute supply drops over New Georgia. AirSols aircraft would be assigned to New Georgia missions with a few SBDS set aside for Russell operations. Fitch also went ahead and created the New Georgia Air force commanded by General Mulcahy who would direct missions from the ground. Closing in on Operation Toenails, Halsey and Turner also decided to add a last minute landing directed at Rice Anchorage on the Kula Gulf. Designated Northern Landing Group, the landing was to be performed by the 3rd battalions, of the 145th and 148th regiments alongside the 1st raider battalion led by Colonel Harry Liversedge. This would occur on July the 4th to create a base from which the allies could launch an attack against the Enogai inlet and Bairoko harbor. By seizing these the allies could interdict Japanese supply lines and prevent reinforcement efforts for Munda. Now that is all for the plans for the Solomons, but Operation Cartwheel had other plans over on New Guinea being handled by General Douglas MacArthur and Kreuger, code named Operation Chronicle, the invasion of the Woodlark and Kiriwina islands. The two Trobriand islands held airfields and were only 125 miles from New Britain and 200 miles from Bougainville. Capturing them would allow the allies to launch bombers with fighter escort to hit Rabaul, Kavieng and the northern solomons. It was also a great opportunity to test what was colloquially known as “MacArthur’s Navy”, officially known as the 7th amphibious force. Now Lt General Krueger had sent reconnaissance missions to the islands which indicated there were no Japanese present on them in May. Nonetheless he instructed the men to prepare for a fight and at the least to expect aerial attacks when they approached them. Kruegers plan of attack was simplistic, Colonel Julian Cunningham would lead the Woodlark force. This consisted of the 112th Cavalry Regiment; 134th Field Artillery Battalion; and 12th Defense Battalion. Also, the 20th and 60th Naval Construction Battalions and ARGUS 1. They would depart Townsville Australia on June 25th and land on Woodlark by June 30th. The Kiriwina Force would be led by Colonel Prugh Herndon consisting of the  158th Regiment; and 148th Field Artillery Battalion. They would depart from Milne Bay on June 30th and quickly land at Kiriwina that same day. To get them to the beaches, Admiral Barbey would have 4 destroyer transports, the Gilmber, Sands, Humphrey and Brooks alongside 6 LSTS, a subchaser 7 mechanized landing craft, 2 small coastal transports and a survey ship, a real hodge podge. Escorting them would be Barbey’s task force 76 consisting of the destroyers Mugford, Bagley, Conyngham, Henley and helm along with Carpenders task force 74 consisting of cruisers Australia and Jobart with destroyers Arunta and Warramunga. For aerial support they had multiple squadrons from Australian Wing 73 operating off Goodenough island. Now on the grounds of New Guinea in mid June, Generals Savige, Herring, Berryman and Colonels Archibald MacKechnie met with Brigadier Moten to hear about his plans for the 17th brigade’s salamaua offensive. Moten laid out a 5 phase plan, phase 1 consisted of the 1st Battalion, 162nd Regiment creating a beach head at Nassau Bay, with the support of a company from the 2/6th battalion. Phase 2 would see the 2/6th reinforced by a company of the 2/5th who would capture Observation Hill and a ridge between Bui Savella and Kitchen Creeks. From there they would be able to move through Mubo Valley to Archway while American forces captured Bitoi ridge. Phase 3 would see the capture of Green Hill and the Pimple by American forces and some of the 2/6th. From there they could advance towards Komaitum and Lokanu. Phase 4 would see the 2/5th advance from Mubo through the 2/6th position to occupy Mount Tambu, linking up with the 15th brigade at Komiatum. Lastly Phase 5 would see the capture of Lokanu and Boisi, clearing the enemy away from the Francisco river area. The plan looked good to all present. But nothing was mentioned about the capture of Lae, nor the critical fact, that Salamaua needed to fall prior to Lae, lest they all lose the element of surprise for Operation Postern. This was done for security reasons, it all had to be held under wraps, but despite this General Savige remained convinced he had to capture Salamaua as soon as possible. His subordinate, Brigadier Moten was aware of the grand plan created by Blamey. Yet while all of these allied commanders were planning, a war was still afoot and the Japanese tossed a counter offensive on the night of June 20th. The Japanese commanders had determined in late May that they needed to dislodge the Australians from Lababia Ridge. General Nakano had brought forward the 1500 men of 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 66th regiment. He concealed their movements by ordered heavy airstrikes and ordered the men to make no fires. This also allowed the exhausted 102nd infantry regiment to rotate back a bit as they had been fighting the Australians ever since the battle of Wau. On the 20th, Nakano began sending patrols made up of the 66th with a few guides from the 102nd who probed the Australian position on Lababia ridge, at that time being held by just 80 men. The Japanese patrols defused many booby traps the Australians laid out for them, made up of piano wire attached to hand grenades. However the Japanese were not too familiar with the Australian hand grenade, so instead of pocketing them to use against the enemy they simply left them. Some sporadic skirmishes occurred that day alongside some bombing missions aimed at Guadagasal, Mat Mat and the Mubo Valley. 83 Japanese aircraft caused some casualties and damage against the 2/6th and spooked a ton of native carriers. The next day the Australians would be searching for native carriers who fled, losing around 578 of them for over 3 days. This greatly delayed the movement of rations, ammunition and other supplies. On the morning of June 21st, the 1st battalion of Araki, guided by some men of the 102nd regiment, began advancing around the eastern flank of the Australian position on Lababia, getting into position for a dawn attack set for the following day. Behind them was the 2nd battalion who were doing a similar maneuver but on the Australians left flank. The Japanese were extremely careful as they advanced having learnt bitter lessons throughout the war about how much the Australians liked to hang grenades attached to piano wire just about anywhere one would think to walk. Oh and it was not limited to fragment grenades, they hooked up thermite grenades, cans of petrol and other goodies. Now they were going to be attacking 80 men as I said, which were being led by Captain Walter Dexter’s D company. He had two platoons in a forward position on the Jap track and two others to the back guarding his HQ. Further north he set up listening posts to watch for enemy activity around the Pimple. Dexter figured he was holding a decent enough position going on to say ”if you’ve got to fight them you’ve got to see them’. Around noon Australian patrols began to notice signs of Japanese activity along the track towards the observation post just a bit due east along the ridge. At 7:30 the telephone line to that observation post was suddenly cut and the Japanese could be seen approaching. The Australians went to work setting off booby traps that had been rigged up as early warning devices and a small firefight emerged. Then at 2pm the Japanese launched an assault from the north and north east of the Australian position, firing off mortars. The Japanese were repelled, but they came right back later in the afternoon screaming into a bayonet charge. Over the course of the afternoon 3 major attacks were made to the sound of Japanese bugles. This was a classic Japanese strategy to intimidate the enemy, but it actually aided the Australians as it warned them of the incoming attack each time. The attacks were turned back and during the night the Australians were reinforced by another platoon,  70 men of C company led by Corporal Keith Mew. As the night wore on, the Australians sent out some patrols to try and make contact with their forward positions only to find out they had been wiped out in the attacks. Meanwhile under heavy rain, the Japanese were recovering their wounded and trying to get rid of more pesky booby traps in front of the Australian positions.    The next morning came screams and charging Japanese setting off booby traps all morning long. Dexter responded by ordered the men to shoot mortars and rifle grenades at anything that looked like a Japanese position. At 2pm on the 21st, the Japanese began a heavy attack on one of the forward positions held by Sergeant John Hedderman lying between the Jap track and Lababia track. The attack spread to Roach’s and Lt Edward Exton’s front sending a rain of automatic and mortar fire into the two forward platoons. A bayonet charge along the Jap track was halted within just 10 yards of the forward positions and another one to the right flank got within 20 yards before being stopped. The Australians tossed lead in all forms into the banzai charges, but no matter how much mortar, bullets and grenades were tossed, the Japanese were closing in. Sensing a breakthrough, Moten ordered forward more men from the 2/5th battalion allowing Dexter to reinforce his left flank using a small reserve he had at his HQ. They arrived at the flank just in time to repel another banzai charge. By the late afternoon the Australians had 12 dead men and 10 wounded, they were down to just 55 abled bodies, but the brunt of the Japanese attack was done. The arrival of C company allowed Dexter to reinforce his forward positions, now bolstered to 150 men.    The Japanese did not give up however and continued their attack during the late afternoon. Suffering so many casualties, it looked like the Japanese might break through Exton’s position. Exton and Corporal Martine charged forward to rally their men, getting them through the brunt of another assault. By dusk the attacks began to decrease until the gradually stopped. The night saw a ton of rain, making it miserable for the Japanese who were dragging their wounded and dead comrades through booby trapped jungle. On the morning of the 22nd, Araki sent some patrols to probe Dexter’s left flank who were met by Australian sniper fire. An attack was launched against Dexter’s rear, held by Smiths platoon who overwhelmed the Japanese causing them to give up after 5 minutes. Frustrated by the lack of progress, Araki ordered his two mountain guns from the 14th artillery regiment to start shelling Lababia. However the foliage was too much and only two shells actually landed within Dexters perimeter. Thus when the Japanese recommenced their attacks they were met by the full brunt of the defenders. By night, Araki was forced to toss in the towel and he ordered the men to begin a withdrawal. To cover the retreat, Araki ordered his men to fire heavy automatic guns and motors into Dexter’s position on the morning of the 23rd. The Australians responded the same way, but then Dexter unleashed a nasty surprise. He ordered his units to mark the forward lines with smoke. Soon the RAAF send Bristol Beaufighters in who strafed the Japanese up and down the Jap Track.  It was an incredible defense, the defenders had been outnumbered 10-1. The Japanese had received 42 dead, 131 wounded while killing 11 and wounded 12 Australians. As Moten would go on to say ‘the engagement is noteworthy and is a classic example of how well-dug-in determined troops can resist heavy attacks from a numerically superior enemy”. Dexter had been pretty much left to his own to defend Lababia and for his excellent leadership he was later awarded the Distinguished service order while some of his platoon commanders; Lt edward Exton, Laurence and Roach received Military crosses and Sergeant John Hedderman received a military medal. Dexter was praised by Moten for “taking every trick during the battle” and one of his colleagues, Captain Jo Gullet described him as“he was too exacting to be popular, although he was a thorough soldier, a good trainer of men and a painstaking tactician”. Lababia was secured, and in the next week major operations were about to begin. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Operation Cartwheel was getting its ducks all in order for a major push set on June 30th. The boys down unda fought like lions to protect Lababia ridge. Outnumbered 10-1 they proved, well dug-in positions sometimes made all the difference. 

Last time we spoke about the aftermath of the battle for Attu. The American victory over Attu meant the end of the Aleutian campaign for the Japanese, Tokyo decided to pull everyone out. Over 6000 Japanese needed evacuation from Kiska and it would be very tricky for the Japanese to get past Admiral Kinkaids blockade. Then we finished up the West Hubei offensive, with a part of it being known colloquially as the Rice Bowl Campaign. The Japanese had brutalized the Chinese, but we’re stopped short of invading Chongqing or Sichuan. Thus for the Chinese it was a victory, but at the same time the Japanese had secured exactly what they wanted, stealing vast amounts of property, notably rice. Vessels left Yichang and sailed further west through the riverways acquiring large sums of goods to help the China war cause. Today we are diving back into the south Pacific. This episode is Operation Cartwheel starts rolling Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  So honestly for awhile now we have been hitting the North Pacific and China theaters, which certainly was a change of pace, but as you can imagine these events do not simply move along in a vacuum. Yes a lot was going on in the other theaters and this episode is going to be tackling a lot of different events so buckle up buckos. First we are going to talk about Operation Cartwheel. The ULTRA intelligence that brought Yamamoto’s death was not the only information the Americans received in April. A lifeboat bearing a list of the names of 40,000 active Japanese officers washed ashore after the battle of the Bismarck Sea. Using this Cryptographers were able to match each name to radio signals from Japanese army units, ensuring General MacArthurs intelligence remained as operationally up to date as it could be. At the same time William Bull Hasley showed to on April 15th to Brisbane to meet with MacArthur and the two hit it off. Halsey would later write this about their first encounter. “Five minutes after I reported, I felt as if we were lifelong friends. I have seldom seen a man who makes a quicker, stronger, more favorable impression. He was then sixty-three, but he could have passed as fifty. His hair was jet black; his eyes were clear; his carriage erect….My mental picture poses him against the background of these discussions; he is pacing his office, almost wearing a groove between his large, bare desk and the portrait of George Washington that faced it; his corncob pipe is in his hand (I rarely saw him smoke it): and he is making his points in a diction I have never heard surpassed. “ Both men would hammer out a plan on April 26th, it was a revision to MacArthur’s Elkton plan, this one would be known as Elkton III, but it was soon to be coded as Operation Cartwheel.  The plan consisted of 13 amphibious landings in just 6 months with MacArthur and Halsey providing maximum support to each others efforts. The first phase of the plan would see MacArthur seizing Woodlark and the Kirwina islands while Hasley invaded New Georgia. Phase 2 would commence 2 months after the start of the offensive where MacArthur would capture Lae, Salamaua and Finschhafen. Phase 3 would be the seizure of the Shortland islands and Bougainville in the south pacific. In December MacArthur would seize Cape Gloucester in Western New Britain and shortly after that they would seize Rabaul. Halsey’s forces would knock out Japanese air bases on Buka, allowing MacArthurs men to clear the northwestern half of New Guinea. By January of 1944, MacArthur and Halsey figured they would be ready for the final assault on Rabaul which was their ultimate objective for victory. MacArthur resisted sending details of their joint plan to Washington, probably fearing the Europe first obsessed chiefs of staff would veto their ambitious thrust. He told them only that he anticipated that the first move toward Woodlark and Kirwina would start in June. However this was too slow for Admiral King. King wanted his protege Admiral Nimitz to begin a thrust into the central pacific, heading through the Marshalls in November and proposed shifting the Marine 1st and 2nd divisions, the ones that fell under MacArthurs and Halsey’s command to help with the Marshalls offensive, this alongside two bomber groups promised to General Kenney. MacArthur was very pissed off and he sent a distressed message to George Marshall damning the entire central Pacific strategy as a quote “unnecessary and even wasteful diversion from what should be the main pacific strategy”,  that being MacArthur’s own.”. He added in “from a broad strategic viewpoint, I am convinced that the best course of offensive action in the Pacific is a movement from Australia through New Guinea to Mindanao. Air supremacy is essential to success, for the southwestern strategy where large numbers of land-based aircraft are utterly essential and will immediately cut the enemy lines from japan to his conquered territory to the southward. Pulling any additional heavy bombers groups would in my opinion, collapse the offensive effort in the southwest pacific area…in my judgment the offensive against Rabaul should be considered the main effort, and it should not be nullified or weakened ”. But King was adamant. There would indeed be a thrust through the central pacific led by the navy with its main axis passing through the Marshalls and Marianas towards Japan,which might I remind you listening, bypasses the Philippines. It of course was a strategy completely at odds with MacArthurs. Marshall supported King, as did the other Joint Chiefs. But in the end MacArthurs whining forced King to relent on the transfer of the two marine divisions and the bomber groups, thus MacArthur revealed his timetable for operation Cartwheel. He told them he planned to take Kiriwna and Woodlark in the Trobriand Island around June 30th. The advance on New Georgia would start on the same date, and in September the First Cavalry and 3 Australian divisions would begin operations against the Madang-Salamaua area. Meanwhile MacArthur's 43rd division would invade southern Bougainville on October 15th, while the 1st Marines and 32nd division would invade Cape Gloucester on December 1st.  For all of these amphibious landings, there were no serious problems when it came to shipping and landing craft….that is for Nimitz designated areas. However at the beginning of 1943, MacArthur had practically no amphibious equipment nor experts in these types of operations. The only units available to him were the Army’s engineering special boat brigade which had very few small craft. The man who would be responsible for the amphibious assaults during much of the coming campaigns was to be Rear Admiral Daniel Barbey. On January 10th, 1943 he took command of the forces that would later be designated the 7th Amphibious force. Barbey from the offset established good relations with MacArthur…because well anyone who worked with MacArthur had to. He had nearly nothing to work with in the beginning, but started with establishing bases at Toobul Bay, near the mouth of the Brisbane river and Point Stephens. MacArthur had requested more small craft and transports as early as mid 1942, but because of the European and central pacific being a priority, little had come his way. Before the equipment came, MacArthur was receiving American and Australian troops, so he got Barbey’s team to improvise. They began training the troops in debarking from larger ships down cargo nets to smaller landing craft. However Barbey had no attack transports (APA), which was the key to this kind of operation. To solve this they rigged nets from cliffs, boy that must have been fun. The first Landing ship tanks LSTs and Landing craft tanks LCTs would not arrive until mid january, and on Easter Sunday 13 Landing craft infantry’s LCI’s were delivered, giving them very little time before the first operations were to begin to train the crews on how to use them.  Now on the other side Halsey had his own three phase operation. Part 1 saw the invasion of New Georgia, part 2 was the seizure of Buin and Rekata Bay if possible and last 3 was the seizure of Kieta and the neutralization of Buka. Phase 1 was codenamed Operation Toenails. Halsey described the operation to Nimitz as “a infiltration and staging operation”. The operation would see simultaneous landings at Wickham Anchorage to hit its landing craft base; Segi point for its airfield site; Viru Harbor for its small craft base and Rendova Harbor which would serve as a new base to stage troops for a future attack upon Munda. This would all occur on June 30th. The main force assigned to Operation Toenails was General Hester’s 43rd division. Admiral Turner and his Task Force 31 were in charge of the amphibious landings while Admiral Fitch would toss 1182 aircraft to give them aircower and Admiral’s Ainsworth and Merrill’s Task force 36 would provide further naval support. On the other side, interservice coordination between the Japanese Generals and Admirals remained intermittent and largely ad hoc, when it was not hostile. General Imamura’s 8th area army HQ at Rabaul stood above Hyakutake’s 17th Army, comprising 3 divisions spread over the SOlomons and New Britain, and General Hatazo Adachi’s 8th Army had 3 divisions on New Guinea. Troop reinforcements were arriving in Rabaul bolstering the garrison at one point to 90,000 men. Vice Admiral Jinichi Kusaka remained in command of navy forces at Rabaul and held responsibility for the defense of the central solomons. Admiral Mineichi Koga had succeeded the slain Yamamoto as commander in chief of the combined fleet, based at Truk. Nowhere in the theater was there a blended command, the army and navy had to coordinate their operations through a meticulous process of “nemawashi / digging around the roots” for a consensus. The Japanese moved new air units into the theater, including more of the elite carrier aircrews that had trained and honed their skills prior to the war, but the loss ratios in air combat was ruining them.  As a result of the devastating loss during the battle of the Bismarck Sea, the Japanese were forced to change plans. USAAF and RAAF aircraft based at Port Moresby and Milne Bay had slaughtered an entire convoy of Japanese transports attempting to land troops in the Lae-Slaamaua area using a new technique called “skip bombing”. Imperial General HQ set up a joint Army/Navy investigation board to study the disaster, seeing the IJA accused the IJN of being too focused on the Solomons rather than on New Guinea. The Army argued New Guinea was vital for the national defenses and proposed that if a retreat became necessary, it would be as a direct result of the navy’s lack of support. If this were to happen they would have to pull back and create a defensive line from northwest New Guinea to Timor. The Navy’s representatives argued that the Huon Peninsula must be held or its loss would swing open the western gate to Rabaul, forcing the combined fleet to withdraw from Truk. Well the fighting eventually resulted in an ultimatum with both sides agreeing the army/navy operations should focus on eastern New Guinea. It was decided that both the army and navy would literally operate as one unit, because that would go well. The Central solomons were still under the overall responsibility of the 8th fleet, now commanded by Vice Admiral Baron Samejima Tomoshige with some IJA units placed under naval command according to agreements made between General Imamura and Admiral Kusaka. It seems the Japanese could get along once and awhile, as just like Halsey and MacArthur, Imamura and Kusaka developed a deep friendship. Both of their staffs ate lunch together once or twice a week, where southeast area affairs were discussed informally and their respective staffs got to know another personally. Kusaka went on the record to say Imamura was a very great person. Many army units would be sent to reinforce the New Georgia defenses and by late May the bulk of the 229th regiment arrived to Munda, and the 13th regiment went to Vila by late June. Imamura placed both regiments under the command of Major General Sasaki Noboru’s southeast detachment who responded directly to Samejima. Samejima’s first orders were to arrange the responsibilities between General Sasaki’s southeast detachment and Admiral Ota’s 8th combined SNLF, seeing Sasaki in charge of Munda and Ota in charge of the Enogai and Bairoko area’s. If the situation arose, command would be unified under the senior officer on New Georgia, General Sasaki. Ota would also have responsibility for coastal artillery defense, radio communications, and barge operations. Admiral Koga in his new role as commander of the combined fleet, preemptively sent move of his forces back to the home islands in preparation to reinforce Attu. But as the fate of the Aleutians became sealed by late May, Koga decided to concentrate the combined Fleet at Truk, so it would be primed and ready for a decisive naval battle with the Americans. Without the aid of Koga’s carriers, Kusaka had launched another air counteroffensive after I-Go, this one taking place in June. The aim was yet again to prevent the Americans from invading the central solomons . Kusaka began tossing waves of Bety’s against American shipping east of San Cristobal and night raids over guadalcanal. Simultaneously he also unleashed Operation SO; a major offensive to smash allied air power in the Solomon islands; and operation SE: which targeted airfields and shipping. He sent 105 Zeros to sweep and bomb the enemy airfields with a new type of gasoline bomb. Operation SE began with 25 Val dive bombers attacking US shipping in the Guadalcanal-Tulagi area and Operation SO began on June 7th with 81 Zeros led by Lt Commander Shindo Saburo assaulting the Russels. However the Russel group ran right into 104 allied fighters who shot down 9 Zeros. A follow up attack was made on the 12th with 74 Zeros led by Lt Miyano Zenjiro, this time the Japanese lost 7 fighters but took down 6 American. As usual the Japanese pilots made wild claims, stating the first attack saw 41 American fights shot down and the second attack 24.  Kusaka launched the main attack of Operation SE on June 16th led by Lt commander Saburo consisting of 24 Vals and 70 Zero escorts who swung south of the Russells, turning at Beaufort Bay. Yet again they were intercepted, this time by 74 allied fighters over BEaufort Bay and the ensuing ari battle rolled over the mountainous spine of guadalcanal. This time the Japanese lost 15 Zeros and 13 Vals while only shooting down 6 allied fighters. The Japanese lost first rate pilots such as Lt Miyano who had scored a total of 16 kills during the war. Again Japanese veteran pilots were being bled dry severely affecting the nation's airpower. Despite their waves being intercepted nearly every time, the Vals were able to press through with their attacks and managed to hit the cargo ships Caleno and LST-340. But such results were hardly worth the cost, so Kusaka began to urgently request reinforcements. The carrier Ryhuo would lend her bombers to replace the lost ones, arriving on the 2nd of July. The losses taught the Japanese pilots some bitter lessons and never again would the fly over guadalcanal during daylight as the American CAP was far to powerful. Over in New Guinea, General Blamey was laying out his plan for the capture of Lae, codenamed Operation Postern which was approved by MacArthurs headquarters. Before the allies would invade Woodlark and Kiriwana, MacArthur proscribed the seizure of Lae and the Markham and Ramu valley. The Markham operations were to be based on Port Moresby while the north coast operations would be staged from Buna and Milne Bay. The invasion of Woodlark and Kiriwana islands codenamed Operation Chronicle would be entrusted to Lt General Walter Kruegers 6th army. The islands northeast of the Papuan coast would allow the allies to have air bases closer to Japanese targets in the Solomons and around Rabaul, thus Blamey had devised his plan to secure the northeastern part of New Guinea. The first phase of his plan was Lae and the Markham and Ramu Valleys; the 2nd phase was to seize a shore base within 60 miles of Lae, he chose Nassau Bay. Nassau Bay would help with the supply problems in the Wau-Mubo-Bobdubi area, as all the supplies were being flown in from Port Moresby. The mountains were serious obstacles for transport aircraft, not to mention the Japanese fighters that could spring out of nearby Lae. Taking Nassau Bay would greatly shorting supply lines for allied troops fighting in the Salamaua region and also allow a junction to be made with General Saviges forces operating at Mubo The 162nd American Regiment led by Colonel Archibald MacKechnie would help hit Nassau Bay, they would be known as the MacKechnie force. They would seize the high ground around Goodiew Junction and Mount Tambu and the ridges running down therefrom to the sea, allowing the Australians to link up with the 15th brigade at Bobdubi and the American landing force at Nassau. D-day for the Nassau Landing was set for June 30th and it was all going to act as a feint, hoping to lure Japanese forces from Lae to Salamaua.  Now the last time we left off in New Guinea, General Savige had launched a limited offensive against the Japanese at Mubo and Bobdubi ridge. General Nakano was certain Salamaua was the main allied target and this prompting him on the 29th to order Major General Chuichi Muroya to lead the 51st division to fortify it. In the process Muroya’s men expelled Warfe’s commandos from the northern ridge. To the east of Mubo, Brigadier Moten was trying to take the Pimple, but his 17th brigade would be performing more patrolling than actual attacks throughout the later half of May. Eventually Savige would relieve the exhausted 2/7th battalion with the 2/6th battalion led by Lt Colonel Frederick Wood who would begin an advance on May the 27th. Meanwhile Nakano had brought more reinforcements to defend Mubo and launched a strong counterattack in early May, nearly breaking through towards the main Australian camp at Lababia ridge. On May 23rd Nakano received two battalions of the 66th regiment and began to work out a plan for assembling supplies and ammunition in the Mubo area to prepare for an offensive. Men would move at night in a single file along the narrow jungle trails carrying the materials by hand, through mud and rain. The main train was a slope on Komiatum ridge known to the Japanese as Regret Hill as the hard working soldiers became more exhausted with each passing day marching along it. The Japanese sought to clear out Lababia ridge as far as Guadagasal, thus securing Mubo. On June 3rd, allied patrols discovered Nakano had reoccupied Markham point which forced Savige to keep the bulk of the 24th away from the action at Bobdubi and Mubo. From their camp at the bank of the Markham Savige ordered patrols to investigate the Nadzab area. On June 14th, a 3 man patrol came across friendly natives at the village of Gabsonkek who informed them of the Japanese activity in the area. They said "that the Japs come to the village every day between 10:00 and 12:00 hours taking everything in sight—pigs, fowls, fruit, etc., without paying; they take native girls back to Lae if they can catch them. The guides would not proceed farther to Ngasawapum because Japan man come up Big Road, cut us off", and they would not go to Narakapor because they claimed there were too many Japs and two big guns". The patrol went back to camp by the 18th informing command. A second patrol was made, led by Lt Dave Burke who forded the Tabali River to get to Nassau Bay. Their report indicated the area was suitable for landing and road construction. To further prepare for the American landings, the Australians began building a footbridge over the Bitoi River and blazed a track up to Bitoi Ridge. On Lababia Ridge the main defensive position withdrew to a junction on the Jap Tracks where it would be easier to counter enemy encirclement attempts. Reports came in from forward platoons that there was considerable enemy activity along the Komiatum-Mubo track. This was Nakano’s 66th regiment carrying the food and ammunition in preparation for the upcoming offensive. In response to this, Savige ordered Brigadier Frank Hosking of the 15th brigade to assume command of the Bobdubi ridge area and to begin harassing the Japanese supply route. Meanwhile the 58th/59th battalion relieved the 2/3rd independent company at Hote and a party of Warfe’s commando’s were sent to attack the Komiatum-Mubo track. However disaster struck as the Australians ran into their own booby-traps on June 16th suffering a number of casualties. By June 20th, the commando’s established ambush positions along a ridge near the junction of Stephens Track and the Komiatum Track. They successfully ambushed some Japanese later that day, killing a few men and capturing valuable documents about the arrival of Nakano’s 66th regiment. However by this point Nakano’s units were already assembling in front of Lababia ridge and the offensive was about to begin. Now we gotta finish up the episode talking about some developments in India. After the disastrous first Arakan Campaign, Marshal Wavell was to receive a promotion, and by promotion I mean he was kicked upstairs as they say, succeeded Lord Linlithgow as the new Viceroy of India. But until then he began looking into training his forces in jungle warfare as the bitter lessons learned at Arakan proved the men were very unprepared. Wavell also wanted to investigate what the hell had happened during the disaster, so he sent Major General Roland Richardson in late May to head a infantry committee at New Delhi for the task. The committee’s report about the Arakan campaign found the troops fighting spirit was fundamentally sound, but the major problems that affected their combat performance were more about the over expansion of the army in India. The army mobilization had been rushed, they barely met basic training and the supplying of their sheer numbers was a catastrophe. There were also issues regarding their low status, inferior pay for the infantry, which further deprived them of skilled and well educated recruits.  Yet above all else the Infantry committee found their lack of jungle training to be the most egregious issue. As observed “This is the most urgent problem facing us, and one which requires prompt and energetic action if results are to be produced in time for the winter campaigning season.” The lack of jungle training severely undermined their ability to fight efficiently and ultimately led to the breakdown of infantry battalions in the Arakan. And of course there was the ever present unseen enemy, that of malaria, alongside an assortment of other ailments that were wreaking havoc on the men. But many of these problems could not be tackled until June 20th, when General Claude Auchinleck was officially appointed as the new Commander in Chief in India. For General Slim this was excellent news and certainly worked in his favor alongside the sacking of Irwin. The “Auk” as he was called, had always been a Slim supporter and was the one who recommended him to Wavell for advancement when Wavell was Commander in Chief of the middle east back in 1941. The Auk had wanted to retain Slim in the middle east and fought hard to dissuade Wavell from taking him over to Burma. Churchill never held Wavell ever in high regard and was tired of his quasi-academic effusions and preferred a “fighting general” in Burma. Alongside the Auk, Irwin was replaced with General George Giffard, and Slim had this to say of the replacement.  “The new Army Commander had a great effect on me. A tall, goodlooking man in the late fifties, who had obviously kept himself physically and mentally in first-class condition, there was nothing dramatic about him in either appearance or speech. He abhorred the theatrical, and was one of the very few generals, indeed men in any position, I have known who really disliked publicity . . . But there was much more to General Giffard than good taste, good manners and unselfishness. He understood the fundamentals of war – that soldiers must be trained before they can fight, fed before they can march, and relieved before they are worn out. He understood that front-line commanders should be spared responsibilities in the rear, and that soundness of organization and administration is worth more than specious short-cuts to victory” Auckinleck went to work from the offset of his new command by improving the welfare, health and feeding of the Indian army to foster improved morale. General Giffard as the new commander of the Eastern Army had Major General Temple Gurdon to oversee some reforms for training and the development of new doctrines. A lot of effort was made to conduct intensive collective training under jungle conditions. The men would train near Nasik, Ranchi, Dehradun and in the Jhansi-Nowgong-lalitpur region. Commanders low to high were given a chance at handling units to improve standards of staff work, practice combined army tactics and build team spirit. Auchinleck also initiated a policy of active patrolling at Assam and Arakan to gather intelligence and maintain touch with the Japanese as to destroy the feeling that they were super soldiers.    I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. A lot of chess pieces were moved around the board this week. Bitter lessons had been learnt in multiple theaters of the war and now it came time to reorganize and try new things to ultimately bring the war against Japan to a closer end. 

  /Last time we spoke about the fall of Attu. The Americans had to fight both the Japanese and a very cruel mother nature to claim the frigid island of Attu. The Americans gradually seized every hill, ridge and razer edge crest as the pushed the Japanese into Chichagof Harbor. Once the Japanese had their backs to the sea and nowhere left to withdraw, Colonel Yamasaki decided they would go out in ablaze of glory. Nearly 1000 screaming Japanese performed a suicidal Banzai charge towards the American artillery positions, hoping to unleash the enemies guns upon them. Yamasaki received an M1 Garand Bullet as the rest of his men killed themselves en masse clutching grenades to their chests. It was a horrifying conclusion fit to make the last Samurai Saigo Takamori proud. Now the Americans turned their gaze back east upon the isolated Kiska.  This episode is the Rice Bowl Campaign Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  We left off with the fall of Attu to the Americans. Colonel Yamasaki’s doomed garrison made one last banzai charge into oblivion, leaving piles of their dead over the island. The Americans had suffered substantial casualties, making the battle of Attu the costliest ground battle as of now fought in the Pacific. In the words of General Bucker “[The Japanese proved to be a] tough fighter, with great physical endurance and fortitude. He was not afraid to die.”  A number of lessons were learnt from the battle, including new landing techniques, and the necessity for rubberized, thoroughly waterproofed boots. The men on Attu had been given expensive, thick and insulated leather hunting boots, but these became absolutely useless once soaked in water. After Attu, improved winter kits emerged, and cases of hypothermia, frostbite or trench foot would become very rare among American soldiers even during bitterly cold campaigns in Italy and France. The Americans also learnt how masterful the Japanese were at creating concealed defensive works and at infiltration tactics. The American forces got to see first hand how weather and terrain could pose the greatest threat to success. The Hourglass Division, owing to its initial desert training, was not prepared for Attu conditions, which demanded cold weather and mountain warfare expertise, clothing and equipment. In addition to being inadequately clothed, they failed to take care of themselves on the battlefield. The 7th Provisional Scout Battalion was only able to muster 40 men to walk after five days of action. In contrast, the 30-man detachment of Alaska Scouts, recruited because of their outdoors skills and experienced in Alaska conditions, lost one man killed in action, two wounded and one man with a slight case of trench foot. These type of lessons would prove very useful in future operations, to point out two, the future Italian and France campaigns which held some cold territories.  As the battle of Attu was coming to a close, Tokyo issued a directive on May 21st for the evacuation of Kiska’s 6000 man garrison led by Rear-Admiral Akiyama Monzo. The evacuation was going to be done using 13 I-class submarines from the1st submarine squadron of Rear-Admiral Kouda Takeo. But by early June Takeo would already realize the danger of using his force for such a task as one of his submarines would be sunk at Attu. There was a call to use surface ships if the weather permitted it and continuous calls to rush over to evacuate the Attu garrison, but the American naval blockade put an end to that idea and worse now it seemed the Northern Kuriles were in danger. Now Tokyo sought the deployment of fighters and anti-aircraft units to provide air defense and shore batteries to thwart an amphibious invasion of the Kuriles. The Japanese had a daunting task laid before to them. In contrast to the relatively weak American naval forces deployed at the battle of the Komondorski islands, Admiral Kinkaids blockade and bombardment forces included the a trio of older battleships; the Mississippi, Idaho and New Mexico, a quintet of cruisers; Louisville, Portland, San Francisco, Santa Fe and Wichita and 9 destroyers. This powerful fleet showed up on July 19th under the joint command of Rear Admirals Robert C Giffen and Robert M Griffen, very close names there lol. Other destroyers and submarine chasers were operating in separate smaller commands within the region. Admiral Kawase Shiro took over IJN operations in the Aleutians and North Pacific following Hosogaya’s removal from command and thus found himself stuck with rescuing Kiska’s garrison from the teeth of a very powerful American blockade. Lacking the fleet strength to punch a hole in the blockade, thus Kawase had turned to submarines. The 12 submarines under Takeo were Type C’s, heavily armed with torpedoes, deck guns and measured 358 feet long. Kawase’s first plan was to try and slip submarines through the blockade, but despite being large, the submarines could barely carry 150 men each, thus it would require 40 successful journeys to remove the entire garrison. With most American warships now equipped with sonar, this represented a hell of a risk, forcing Kawase to look towards other options. While the submarines would make runs as soon as possible, Kawase had to plan a surface evacuation. The Japanese submarine evacuation of Kiska began on May 27th with the first submarine, the I-7 arriving at Kiska with food, ammunition and a radio beacon. She could only carry 60 passengers, which was reserved for the sick and wounded alongside 28 boxes of ashes for those who had died on the island and 4 tons of spent shell cartridges. A few more submarines managed to make the trek and evacuated a few hundred men from Kiska, but then the Japanese luck changed for the worse. The I-24 captained by Hanabusa Hiroshi, entered Kiska harbor in early June taking aboard 150 soldiers. On the night of the 10th, she was trying to slip away but as she was passing 40 miles north of Shemya Island, American sonar aboard the USS Larchmont, A pc-461 Class Submarine chaser pinged. Lt Wallace Cornell ordered is crew to depth charge the enemy submarine tossing 5 of them into the water. The Americans blasted the I-24 to the surface. Then Cornell ordered the Larchmont to put the pedal to the metal flooring the 450 ton sub chaser to ram the 2554 ton I-24. Larchmont rode up and over the submarine splashing into the sea on the far side. Upon seeing they failed to ram her, Cornell’s men began pounding the vulnerable I-24 with shells, before turning around to try ramming her again. This time the Larchmouth smashing into the I-24’s conning tower, fatally damaging the submarine. She sank stern-first into the black, frigid sea killing her 104 man crew and the 150 soldiers she was bearing. Three days later, the destroyer USS Frazier sank the I-31 taking down her entire crew and the 150 soldiers she was evacuating. Out of 800 total men the submarine forces got off the island, 300 of them died to American attacks. As the summer would continue, combat and operational losses would see the destruction of 8 out of the original 13 submarines, leaving Takeo with 5. Kawase recognized the futility of the submarine operation and was forced to turn to his surface plan which would unfold in late july. While all of this was going on, the Americans invaded the islands of Shemya and Agattu. Brigadier General John Copeland led elements of General Buckner’s 4th regiment and Colonel Talley’s 18th Engineers to land on Shemya during a tough storm. The Americans quickly surveyed the island to see if they could construct an airfield to accommodate a brand new experimental aircraft, the most iconic one of the Pacific War, the B-29 Superfortress heavy bomber. She had been in the works since 1938 and her objective would soon be long range bombing missions against the Japanese home islands. With their usual blinding speed, the American Engineers made the Attu air station operational by June 8th, then Shemya’s two weeks later. Alongside this the 11th air force would be reinforced with squadrons of the new PV-1 Ventura bomber, equipped with the latest airborne radar, which was capable of giving a clear picture of topographical contours that would be extremely useful while flying through the arctic weather and at night. Admiral Kinkaid would likewise shuffle his ships around to improve the blockade and General Butler’s airforce would spend most of June smashing Kiska with bombs. They would fly a total of 407 bombing sorties, though the Japanese arsenal of 70 anti-air batteries would give them a hell of a time doing so. Completely uncontested the Americans would make unopposed landings on Semisopochmoi and the Rat Islands, covered only by PT boats. With these newly acquired airfields such as Attu and Shemya and the new aircraft on hand, the Americans were in sufficient range to bomb Paramushiro, Japan’s Gibraltar-like base guarded its northern approach. The first raid against Paramushiro would occur on July 10, with 6 B-24’s launching from Attu, but suddenly getting redirected to hit 4 Japanese wooden transports trying to breakthrough the naval blockade for Kiska. Although the American pilots successfully sunk 2 of them, they would not have enough fuel to continue on to hit Paramushiro. Another attempt would be made on Jul 18th seeing 6 B-24’s inflicting minimal damage upon Paramushiro, but it showed the Japanese their home soil was no longer safe from American bombers. Tokyo was forced to reinforce the Kuriles and Hokkaido taking up valuable resources in men, guns, ships, aircraft and such from other places they were needed like the Solomons. Because of their large success, Buckner and Kinkaid saw significant budget increases and now the Joint Chiefs were seriously thinking about invading the Japanese home islands from the Aleutians. They went as far as to create plans with 1945 designated as the year they would invade Japan. Now we are shifting away from the north pacific to dive back into the situation of the second sino-japanese war. The last time we were in China, the battle of West Hubei was raging on, with the 11th army of General Yokoyama invading south of the Yangtze River. Now Yokoyama would press on against the southwest portion of Yichang where the Chinese 11th division was defending Shipai Fortress; the 18th division was at Changyang and the 24th and 36th independent engineer battalions were at Yuyangkuan. The Chinese 11th division was led by General Hu Lien who held a considerably well defended fortress at Shipai, but also its approach which was the dangerous Xiling gorge. All combined, these defended the approach to Chongqing and Sichuan. Because of its vital importance, Commander Chen Cheng ordered Hu Lien to defend Shipai fortress to the death. By May 18th, the second phase of the IJA operation came to its conclusion, thus Yokoyama decided to concentrate his 13th division near Quanshuiwan, and his 3rd division backed by the Nozoe detachment near Shuangjingsi. This was in preparation for the third phase of the operation, a final drive against the Chinese defenses between Yichang and Yidu. The IJA 13th Division began to move north while the 3rd and Nozoe detachment advanced south of Yichang to cross the Qingjiang river. The Japanese found many Chinese defensive positions along the way, but by this point the Chinese had been so brutally battered over the past month, they were still dazed and confused, thus easily brushed aside. The 18th army would manage to hinder the Japanese advance, forcing Yokoyama to redirect 3 battalions of the 39th division to join the offensive. By May 22nd, the 39th forded the Yangtze and joined up with the 3rd and Nozoe detachment to assault Changyang. As the Japanese forces approached Shipai Fortress from three directions, Commander Chen Cheng and General Sun Lianzhong tossed the 94th and 32nd armies to try and stop the Japanese advance at Yuyangkuan. Chen Cheng’s plan was to box in Yokoyama’s forward units at Yuyuangkuan, but instead the Japanese began dispersing and clashing with the Chinese 18th army at Changyang alongside Yuyangkuan by May 23rd. The defenders still jarred from the offensives were routing left right and center. Fortunately the Chinese would manage to pull themselves together to reorganize a new defensive position to the right of the Shipai Fortress. Their last line of defense was to be at Muchiaochi, in front of Congqing and Sichuan, held by the 34th division. The Japanese were relentless as they continued their advance and by the end of May 26th they reached the defensive line. At this point Yokoyama had achieved his objectives as the vessels at Yichang could now advance towards Yueyang without facing resistance. He quickly ordered 53 steamers to navigate the river on the 27th, but then they were met with an expected enemy, the Major General Chennault's Flying Tigers. During May of 1943, as we have seen, the Japanese launched a ground offensive targeting areas like DongDongting Lake and the Yangtze River region. The objectives were clear to the allies, the Japanese were seizing the colloquially called “rice bowl” region, right during harvest season. As the ground fighting intensified it became clear that the CHinese land forces desperately needed aerial support. To counter the Japanese, the recently created 14th airforce as of march 10th 1943 led by Chennault and the Chinese 4th air group tossed P-40E’s and P-43’s to try and support the Chinese ground forces. On MAy 14th, Japanese reconnaissance covered Kweilin and Lingling, estimating the US order of battle was 24 P-40s, 8 B-24’s, 3 B-25’s, 1 P-38 and 1 P-43. It was also noted that the Chinese had advanced to Liangshan where their 4th air group was located.  The 4th air group went into action by May 19th with 8 P-40E’s, 4 P-43’s, alongside some A-29 Hudson bombers. The Chinese bombed the Japanese ground forces meeting some intense anti-aircraft gunfire back. Deputy group commander Xu Baoyun, flying a P-40E was shot down by Japanese anti-aircraft gunfire in the process. The next morning the Japanese bombed Liangshan by surprise giving the 4th air group no chance to retaliate. From May 19th-June 6th, the Chinese Air Forces would fly 336 fighter and 88 bomber sorties over the battle zone claiming to have shot down 31 Japanese aircraft. The 4th air group missing their chance to confront the Japanese on May 29th, when they fly from Liangshan to cover Chongqing due to a false alarm. While they were absent, 10 Japanese fighters strafed the field followed an hour later by 9 Japanese bombers with fighter escorts. On May 31st, 9 P-43’s escorted 5 A-29s to attack the ferry crossing between Yichang and Yidu, but in doing so they would miss the most intense action of the campaign. On the same day Lt Colonel John Alison, an American ace alongside 2 USAAF wingmen led 7 P-40s from the 4th air group to escort 9 B-24 bombers over to Yichang. It was Alison’s last mission in China and the ace hoped to add to his record of kills. The allied airforce bombed and strafed Japanese ground forces but also got into dogfights with Japanese air forces. Alison’s aircraft was badly shot up by Captain Ohtsubo Yasuto the leader of the 1st Chutai squadron of the 33rd. Lt Tsang Hsu-Lan nicknamed “Bulldog” took his No.2304 P-40 to swing behind Ohtsubo as he was firing upon Alison and managed to shot his aircraft down, saving Alison’s life. Tsang was awarded a American Silver Star and the highest medals China could offer. On June 6th the 14 K-43’s and 8 light bombers attacked Liangshan. 13 Chinese P-40’s led by COlonel Li Hsiang-Yang were returning from a mission to Liangshan and were landing as the Japanese approached. Captain Chow Chin-kai, commander of the 23rd squadron and a veteran of many years of combat, directed the ground crews to take defensive measures and then apparently climbed into a P-66 Vanguard. Without time to adjust his parachute, check his fuel nor even buckle his seatbelt he gunned the engine. While the Japanese strafed the field, Chow went directly for the bombers, claiming 3 destroyed. Chow received the Blue Sky White Sun award personally from Chiang Kai-shek for this action. Yet despite his heroism, 12 P-40’s and a fleet trainer were destroyed on the grounds of Liangshan. What became known as the Rice Bowl Campaign took a heavy toll on the CAF. In addition to their loses in combat and on the ground suffered most by P-40’s, many other aircraft suffered from operational damage. After the campaign the operational CAF aircrafts would number 6 out of 7 A -29s, 5 out of 10 SB-3s, 3 out of 5 P-40E’s, 6 out of 9 P-43s and 39 out of 46 P-66’s. The 14th airforce played a small role overall in the Rice Bowl campaign and thus their losses were quite minimal. Meanwhile at the Shipai Fortress, Hu Lien faced direct attacks from the IJA 68th regiment on May 28th. Told to fight to the death, the defenders managed to repel each enemy assault inflicting significant casualties upon the invaders. Hu Lien would personally led the troops at all times in their efforts to dig in and build fortifications. To the right flank the 3rd and 39th divisions charged against new positions manned by exhausted soldiers of the 18th army, who resisted as much as they could. However they were simply no match for the full might of two Japanese divisions and soon two Chinese companies were annihilated as the rest pulled back. General Luo Guangwen of the 18th Chinese division boldly decided to counterattack, launching a rain of grenade and mortar fire over the 3rd and 39ht divisions halting their advance. Although aided by artillery and aerial bombardment, the Japanese were still pressing hard against the defenders. The Chinese 94th and 32nd armies then arrived to the scene, and the 94th army went to work successfully blocking the advance of the 13th division near Dayanxiang. This forced the Japanese to cross the dangerous Tianzhu Mountain which would claim much of their equipment. Further down the road, the 13th division was also ambushed by concealed forces of the 32nd army, managing to inflict hundreds of casualties upon them. Because of the increased losses, Yokoyama ordered the Noji detachment at Yichang to cross the Yangtze to assault Shipai Fortress frontally in a last ditch effort to break Hu Lien’s lines. On the 29th, the Noji detachment launched its attack, breaking through Hu Lien’s line at Qiuqianping, inflicting sever casualties upon the 11th division which was forced to retreat towards the bay. By the end of the 29th, the 18th Army’s other units were also withdrawing, leaving Hu Lien alone to face the brunt of the enemies advance. But by the point the Japanese had suffered tremendous losses and the steamers at Yichang had already arrived to Shishou, thus Yokoyama feared he was overstretched and that his forces might get trapped by Chinese units moving to Changyang. Thus not wanting to see things fall apart, Yokoyama ordered an end to the operation on the 29th and preparing his forces for a withdrawal. But the next day the 13th division decided to press an attack upon Muchiaochi, not knowing the 32nd Army had set up another ambush for them there. The Chinese unleashed artillery on the Japanese inflicting more casualties on the already battered division. Meanwhile the isolated 11th division was repealed the combined attacks of the 3rd and 39th divisions, repelling 10 consecutive attacks throughout the day, leaving the bay area full of dead Japanese. on the 31th the Japanese began their withdrawal as more and more Chinese reinforcements were arriving for a massive counterattack. While the 3rd and 39th divisions managed to avoid battles as they crossed the Yangtze at Yichang, the battered 13th division was heading towards Yidu and was trapped by the 32nd army at Changyang by June 3rd. The 13th division would manage to break free and flee towards Gongan, but the division which was earmarked to depart for the Pacific, lost so many men they would be forced to remain in China. Yokoyama was forced to send the 17th independent mixed brigade who had already managed to withdraw to Shishou to rescue the 13th division. They arrived to Gongan on June 5th, and fight a long series of battles to help the remnants of the 13th division to limp back to Shishou by June 8th. With the Japanese operation concluded, Commander Chen Cheng and General Sun Lianzhong would successfully recapture most of the lost territory and begin rebuilding defensive lines as they did. The Japanese claimed to have suffered 3500 casualties with 771 dead and 2746 wounded, though it should be noted other sources claim their losses were considerably higher, as the 13th division was practically destroyed, the 17th mixed brigade, 3rd and 39th divisions were also severely damaged indicating losses possibly in the tens of thousands. The losses were so grave, the Japanese would not be able to start another offensive in China until the end of the year. Thus the gateway to Chongqing and Sichuan were held, paraded as a grand victory by the Chinese. As I indicated in a previous episode however,  Historians such as Barbara W. Tuchman suggest "the Japanese withdrew without pursuit from what appeared to have been a training and foraging offensive to collect rice and river shipping." In other words, the Rice Bowl campaign as it became known, basically saw the Japanese stealing the bowl of rice for 1943.  Now we are not done just yet, there is some action going on in the Solomons. The Japanese had just conducted Operation I-Go and despite their pilots extremely overexaggerated claims, it truly was a lackluster offensive. Alongside this the legendary Admiral, Isoroku Yamamoto had been assassinated on April 18th, shattering Japanese morale. Nonetheless the show had to go on as they say and now Admiral Kusaka would need to reorganize, repair and reinforce his air forces in preparation for the next expected American offensive in the Solomons. Kusaka was reinforced with the 12th Air Fleet; consisting of the 24th and 27th Air Flotillas. The 11th Air Fleet meanwhile, would be reinforced with the 25th Air Flotilla  holding 60 Zeros, 10 J1N1s and 50 G4Ms. Kusaka’s 26th Air Flotilla, who should have been relieved, would be forced to fight on for the duration of the campaign against Rabaul; but the 21st Air Flotilla would be sent to Saipan for rehabilitation. Now since the evacuation of Guadalcanal, the Japanese had created a new defensive line with Rekata bay being the hub for the Santa Isabel defense line and Munda the hub for New Georgia with its forward post at Wickham anchorage. This meant forward bases needed to be reinforced, so Santa Isabel received the 7th Combined Special Naval Landing Force of Rear-Admiral Katsuno Minoru, consisting of the Kure 7th SNLF and the 3rd Battalion, 23rd Regiment. New Georgia received the 2nd battalion, 229th regiment of Captain Iwabuchi Sanji, the 41st antiaircraft battalion, the 4th, 10th and 22nd construction units who went to Munda, the 1st battalion, 229th regiment and 1st machine-gun company who would go to Wickham anchorage. Kusaka envisioned the main defense force to be Rear Admiral Ota Minoru’s 8th combined SNLF. This consisted of the Kure 6th and Yokosuka 7th who had recently been converted into heavy artillery units originally set to for hitting the Americans on Guadalcanal. Other support, rifle companies and heavy weapons compies made up the rest of the SNLF force. By late January Ota’s force began its movement to New Georgia, arrived to Munda by the end of the month, though a large air strike rocked them on January 29th sinking 75 barge loads of valuable cargo. The Japanese sent various forces to occupy Vila and Rekata Bay in January where bases would be developed.  On February 27, Choiseul coast watchers spotted Kirikawa Maru carrying two 14cm guns, four 8cm dual-purpose guns, 600 tons of ammunition and supplies, and SNLF personnel as the ship and its two escorts cleared the Shortlands. A PBY and the coast watchers reported their course, and a COMAIRSOLS strike force of fourteen SBDs, with an escort of twenty-four fighters, caught them three miles off the northeast tip of Vella Lavella. The escort took on the thirteen Zeros and two F1Ms flying cover, and in the fight that followed each side lost two aircraft. The SBDs went about their business with deadly effect; a surviving Japanese medical officer later wrote that the bombs were exploding in the ship like a fireworks exhibition at Ryōgoku Bridge in Tokyo. This would force the Japanese to yet again rely on the good ol Tokyo express much to their dismay. Alongside that the battle of Blackett strait on March 6th forced the Japanese to avoid the Kula gulf and instead op for the Fergusson passage. Through march to May the Japanese would suffer only one loss, the sea truck Gisho Maru, thus the new route seemed to be successful. However with all of the shuffling by both sides it seemed evident, a new bloody campaign was about to be unleashed in the Solomons.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Japanese struck hard into the heart of China’s Rice Bowl Region. Both the Chinese and Japanese lost significant amounts of men to the bloody campaign, Chongqing and Sichuan were safe, but in the end the Japanese had secured their objectives.  

Last time we spoke about the battle of Attu. The American forces were gradually taking the high grounds from the Japanese. The stalemate at Jarmin’s pass had caused severe casualties upon the Americans, but they managed to get the Japanese to withdraw from the Pass by May 17th. Jarmin’s Pass would receive its name after Captain John Jarmin and his platoon died fighting atop it on May 14th. We also spoke about the silent service and how the Mark 14 torpedo was gradually fixed so the submariners would be better equipped to strangle Japan of her lifeblood, her merchant fleet. Lastly we spoke about the horrifying Changjiao Massacre that occurred during the West Hubei Offensive and the plight of the common Chinese people during the brutal second sino-japanese war. But today we are going to finish up the story of the battle for Attu.  This episode is the Fall of Attu Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  So we left off in the Frigid Northern island of Attu on May 16th, with General Brown being relieved of command of the 7th division by the Aleutian veteran Brigadier General Eugene Landrum. Given the evidence on hand today, it seems Brown had really irritated Admiral Kinkaid and his other military superiors, coupled with miscommunication or better said lack of. The misunderstandings that arose saw Brown kicked out, but before he departed he had the chance to speak to Landrum. Landrum was shocked when he saw the situation for what it really was and sympathized with Brown. He ordered all of Brown's plans to continue as they were.  Now back on Attu, the Northern Force of Colonel Culin was making a major breakthrough by cutting off Lt’s Goto and Honna and their forces in Jarmin Pass. They were forced to abandon their positions during the night of the 16th, slipping away and successfully eluding all the American forces as they joined Colonel Yamasaki’s main body at Chichagof. The following morning the Americans failed to realize off the bat that they were no longer facing any Japanese atop Jarmin Pass, as a result of the thick fog. Eventually the lack of bullets coming down upon them brought the realization that the brutal massacre valley struggled which had to this point claimed 1100 American casualties had ended. Over in the south Colonel Wayne Zimmerman walked atop the crest of Jarmin pass where he stumbled upon the corpse of Captain John Jarmin and the bodies of his comrades surrounded by mangled bodies of dead Japanese. The pass which was called Massacre-Holtz pass was renamed after Jarmin who died on the 14th. The pass would receive a renaming There was an eerie silence over the pass that day. On May 18th the various Americans forces finally established contact through Jarmin Pass and now looked towards Chichagof where the Japanese were looking to make a stand. Despite successfully dislodging them, the Japanese had managed to withdraw in order, establishing yet again well-prepared defenses on the jagged heights of Chichagof Valley.  Landrum decided to give the men another day to recuperate and plan out their attack and as he noted later “I know this country and my heart bled for the boys. I had to send them up there. I know how cold and bitter it was on the mountains. But I knew death was bitterer.”.On May 18th the American officers got together to formulate a plan to assault the Japanese. Colonel Culin would lead one Pincer and Colonel Zimmerman the other, this was part of Major General Browns original plan. Zimmerman's 2nd battalions, of the 17th and 32nd infantry with the 3rd battalion of the 17th infantry in reserve would seize Clevesy pass. Once that was taken, the Southern force would then advance down Jim Fish Valley to seize Sarana Nose on the right side and Buffalo Ridge on the left thus securing the approaches to Chichagof harbor. Culin’s Northern Force and the 1st battalion of the 4th regiment would capture the northern slopes of Prendergast ridge in preparation for the final assault against Chichagof. Culin and Zimmerman shuffled their more exhausted units into reserve, allowing fresher troops to take the lead. Meanwhile in his Kingfisher Colonel Eareckson flew reconnaissance missions almost constantly, scouting, coordinating and occasionally dropping messages to isolated units he could find. Eareckson relayed targets back to the bomber units so they could try to hit the enemy who had been alluding them heavily for days because of the deep fog. Colonel Talley’s Engineers were also at work, building a road towards Engineer hill to help move the artillery piece further inland. Admiral Rockwell also sent a force of PT boats to carry further supplies ashore, hoping to reduce the enormous traffic jam of supplies along the beaches. During the night of May 18th, Zimmerman and Culin sent scouts to probe the enemy defenses at Clevesy Pass. On the morning of the 19th, the offensive began, with Zimmerman sending his 2nd battalion 17th regiment to hit Clevesy pass supported by an artillery barrage and Culin sent his two battalions against the Chichagof heights. By noon, the 2nd battalion, 32nd regiment joined the southern attack. Culins advance finds out the Japanese position at the Chichagof heights are quite formidable. Lt Honna has taken a position at a place called Point Able, a mountain blocking the Southern forces advance. Lt Honna who spoke perfect english notably would be spending the fighting at Point Able lobbing elaborate insults and taunts at the American invaders. For Zimmerman’s men, they had the support of a ton of artillery and some aerial bombardments to soften up Clevesy Pass allowing the men to capture a toehold on the high grounds. However Zimmerman’s men quickly found themselves embroiled in a major battle, as Dr. Paul Tatsuguchi tells us via his diary “The hard fighting of our 303rd Battalion in Massacre Bay is fierce and it is to our advantage. Have captured enemy weapons and used that to fight enemy closing under fog.” Lt Honna and his 303rd independent battalion fought like madmen to hold Point Able. The next day, Zimmerman sent some companies to perform an early morning attack to seize Cold Mountain while the Japanese reigned machinegun fire upon them. By noon the American attacks had reduced the Japanese to a force of 50 men upon Nees Point who were tossing back continuous american attacks. Meanwhile Culins men were fighting their way inch by inch over bloodstained hills. By the end of the 20th, they gained a few hundreds yards. Also on the 20th, the 1st battalion, 4th regiment entered the fray, hitting Clevesy pass and beginning their ascension to Prendergast ridge. General Buckner’s men were able to reach the top of the ridges the following night before turning their advance towards Sarana-Holtz Pass. The USS Nassau launched its final mission of the day, sending some Wildcats to bomb and strafe the Japanese positions in the Chichagof Harbor in the afternoon. Again we hear from Dr. Tatsuguchi’s diary “Was strafed when noon, amputating a patient’s arm. It is the first time since moving over to Chichagof Harbor that I went in an air raid shelter… Nervousness of our CO is severe and he has said his last word to his officers and NCOs-that he will die tomorrow – gave all his articles away. Hasty chap this fellow. The officers on the front are doing a fine job. Everyone who heard this became desperate and things became disorderly.” After hitting the Japanese the USS Nassau left for Adak having lost 5 pilots and 8 aircraft to the bitter frigid weather. The next day, General Buckner came over to Attu to support his 4th regiment and had Colonel Eareckson fly him up Massacre Valley to look around Point Able. Buckner apparently even manned the aircrafts machine gun strafing the Japanese trenches. That day Eareckson’s bombers managed to destroy every building in Chichagof village. Eareckson himself would later that day walk over to the frontlines, borrow a rifle from an infantry man and proceeded to shoot at Point Able. For this he was rewarded with an enemy bullet that wounded him. Buckner would get him a Purple Heart to pin to his chest and a firm kick in his ass upon saying “for being where you had no business being”. I think in Eareckson's defense, a General manning a machine gun on an aircraft was just as hilariously improper.  Zimmermans men continued to push up the mountains against the Japanese, and during the nightfall Company E of the 32nd regiment made a daring charge up the slopes of Point Able ferociously wiping out Honna company down to the last man. Honna would die from a gunshot wound having fought to the bitter end. To the north, Culins man successfully captured Hill 4, leading towards Prendergast ridge, when General Landrum suddenly ordered them to instead support the Southern Forces advance upon Fish Hook ridge. Fish Hook Ridge overlooked Chichagof harbor still held by Colonel Yamasaki who was suffering daily artillery and aerial bombardments. Yamasaki’s men were ordered to hold the beach at all cost. To the left was Jim Fish Valley and Sarana Nose to the right. The defenses on both sides of the entrance to the harbor rendered a direct approach upon Chichagof harbor quite difficult.   Sailed from the west, Admiral Kawase was performing reconnaissance around the Komadorski islands and reported back that the size of the American fleet at Attu was enormous. It seems this report finally sunk in with Tokyo HQ, because they made their decision to evacuate the aleutian garrisons via submarine, thus ending anymore reinforcing. The following day, 19 G4M bombers launched from Paramushiro, and through the fog found a patch of clear sky over Holtz Bay where they dropped packages over Chichagof Harbor before they attacked the American vessels. They lost two Betty’s for their efforts inflicting basically no damage upon the American warships. On the morning of May 22nd, Zimmermans forces ran into the remnants of the 303rd battalions, the 4th company and a few survivors of the 2nd company on Sarana Nose. Zimmerman ordered his reserve 3rd battalion, 17th regiment to hit the peak after the big guns got to smash it for 30 minutes. The big guns referred to 32 heavy machineguns, 14 37 mm anti-tank guns, 23 81mm mortars, a section of 75mm pack howitzers and 4 batteries of 105mm howitzers, a lot of shock and aye. THe bombardment devastated the entrenched Japanese allowing the men to take Sarana Nose with relative ease, annihilating the handful of Japanese. Meanwhile on the left flank, the 4th regiment advanced upon Prendergast Ridge supported by artillery. To the north, Culin attacks stalled due to heavy resistance, so Landrum ordered him to hold his position. Despite Landrums recent broken leg he assumed personally command of the southern force.  May 22nd’s aerial photos showed that leading a direct assault up the valley floor would bring the southern force into an inferno of lead from the surrounding ridges that overlooked the valley. So instead they would secure Fish Hook Ridge first. Fish Hook ridge was a rugged semicircular snow covered, knife edge ridge which bent like a fish hook around 2 miles towards Chichagof Harbor. The Japanese had made a defensive line of snow trenches, rifle pits and machine gun nests connected by snow tunnels along the slopes of Washburn and Newman Peaks. These extended further south to the slopes of Brewer Peak, Buffalo ridge and to the floor of Jim Fish Valley. The entire defensive line blocked the Holtz-Sarana and Holtz-Chichagof passes and the entrance to Jim Fish Valley. Zimmerman sent his 2nd battalion, 32nd regiment to seize a high plateau to the left side of Jim fish valley. Again, before his men charged up the plateau, artillery made sure to pound the area, and again the Americans would find mangled survivors. At this point the Japanese situation was dire. They were desperately low on food, isolated and fighting a battle of attrition against an enemy enjoying every advantage. Yamasaki and his men were trapped behind their innermost defensive perimeter, but his delaying action left him in possession of a defensive firepower more concentrated than before. Despite the hundreds of casualties they had suffered, Yamasaki now counted with more soldiers to defend each yard of ground. May 23rd began with a heavy fog and very snowy weather, preventing Zimmermans men from launching their main attack. He was only able to send the  2nd Battalion, 17th Regiment and 2nd Battalion, 32nd Regiment to relieve the exhausted 4th Regiment. Company A of the 4th infantry had a horrible experience when 9 Japanese machine gun nests with attached riflemen pinned them down. Then an unexpected event occurred as told to us by Lt Winfield Mapes “quite suddenly a lone figure jumped up and ran across the open snow towards the nearest Jap hole. He had an M1 and bunch of hand grenades. He threw a grenade into the first hole and began firing. He moved right on into the circle of Jap holes around the machine gun. Deliberately, he walked up the edge of the holes one by one, […] then […] tossed a grenade. Nine times he did this […] [Private Fred M.] Barnett is just a guy […] who said, “Hell, I just got all fed-up and disgusted; and decided I'd get the damn thing over with,” and voiced the words of a nation” When Barnett reappeared he walked calmly downhill signaled the two companies to advance. Barnett had charged nine successive Japanese emplacements, wiping them all out without taking a scratch. Private Barnett received the distinguished service cross for his actions.  Other smaller units probed the ridge, but all were stopped by Japanese resistance on Buffalo Ridge. To the west, Culins men were pressing towards a junction beneath Fish Hook ridge, finally linking up again with the southern force, planning to coordinate an offensive the next morning. That day, General Butler’s P-38 Lightnings intercepted a wave of 16 Betty’s managing to shot down 9 of them while losing 2 Lightnings in the process. Because of these large losses, the Japanese would not commit anymore airforces from Paramushiro. On the morning of May 24th, a coordinated assault against the ridge began. The 2nd Battalion, 17th Infantry of the Southern Force moved over the southern slopes of Prendergast Ridge, while the 3rd Battalion, 32nd Infantry, plus two companies from the 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry, advanced along the northern slopes. Heavy Japanese machine-gun fire, repelled both forces back to their lines of departure on Prendergast Ridge as they attempted to negotiate their way across the “Bahai Bowl.” The 2nd Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment and 3rd Battalion, 17th Infantry Regiment advanced up Jim Fish Valley where Japanese fire from Buffalo Ridge halted them near the southern end of Lake Cories. The Americans were fighting for every inch of snow and ice covered muskeg they advanced upon and the casualties were mounting heavily. Dr.Tatsuguchi’s diary tells us“Naval gun firing, aerial bombardment, trench warfare, the worst is yet to come. The enemy is constructing a position. Bn. Commander died at Umanose [Fish Hook Ridge]. They cannot accommodate their patients. It has been said that at Massacre Bay district, the road coming through sector unit headquarters is isolated. Am suffering from diarrhea and feel dizzy.” Aerial and artillery bombardment was carried out the entire day, unfortunately a bit too much so, as some friendly fire occurred, yet again the fog a constant enemy. Eventually Landrum was forced to order the 4th regiment to reinforce the southern advance because of the intense resistance. By the end of the day two companies of Culins 3rd battalion, 32nd regiment managed to get into the Holtz-Sarana Pass.  Meanwhile the American Engineers had built up the road to Engineer Hill allowing Landrum to order every artillery piece available to be brought along it up to Massacre Valley. On the 25th, artillery and aerial bombardments soften up the approaches for the 3rd battalion, 32nd infantry on the left and the 2nd battalion, 17th regiment on the right against the pass. While this assault began, the 2nd battalion, 32nd infantry and the 3rd battalion, 17th infantry resumed their assault but were met with intense resistance from the Japanese along Buffalo ridge. The defenders as usual enjoyed extremely good concealment, utilizing fresh snow to their advantage making them practically invisible. The 2nd Battalion, 17th Infantry supported by the 1st Battalion, 4th Battalion charged through snow and bullets, seizing Newman Peak, which overlooked the pass. By nightfall, Zimmerman controlled the base of the ridge with some isolated slopes in the hands of scattered companies. It was at this point the logistics for the Americans took a turn for the worse. They were not much further from their beach landings areas and the supplies were trickling up slower and slower. This was an indication that time was of the essence, the longer the battle went on, the more the chances were that logistical issues would strangle them. When May 26th rolled around, with it came some clear weather giving the American airforces a chance to bomb the defensive lines with rare precision. Again from Dr. Tatsuguchi’s diary we receive this “Hit by naval gun firing, it felt like the Missumi barracks blew up and things lit up tremendously. Consciousness becomes vague. One tent burn down by a hit from incendiary bombs. Strafing planes hit the next room, two hits from a 50 caliber shell, one stopped in the ceiling and the other penetrated. My room is an awful mess from sand and pebbles that have come from the roof. First Lt. from medical corps is wounded. There was a ceremony to grant the Imperial Edict. The last line of Umanose [Fish Hook Ridge] was broken through. No hope for reinforcements. Will die for the cause of Imperial Edict.” Culin sent forces to secure the Holtz-Sarana Pass gradually pushing back the concealed defenders, foxhole by foxhole. Company K advance up a 2500 foot crest of Washburn Peak and found themselves face to face with Japanese trenches. Private Joe Martinez with his rifle in hand decided to walk into the enemy fire as he tossed grenades killing 5 Japanese. He managed to reach the crest of the ridge before collapsing from a mortal gunshot wound he received over 50 yards further down the hill. He was posthumously awarded with the medal of honor, the only one earned on Attu. The Northern force eventually overwhelmed the Japanese snow trenches and seized the northwestern portion of Fish Hook. The only remaining obstacle now in the war were the trapped Japanese upon Buffalo ridge. The 4th regiment advanced along Fish Hook ridge, pushing the Japanese all the way to the summit of West Peak by the end of May 26th. The next day the weather turned around on them, with frigid slush like weather and the typical foggy concealment aiding the Japanese. Yamasaki took the advantage by dispatching reinforcements. Zimmerman’s reinforced the advance against Buffalo ridge, tossing the 2nd battalion, 32nd infantry and companies C & D from the regiments 1st battalion alongside a lot of artillery support. But yet again the Japanese held firm, successfully halting the American advance just 200 yards from the ridges crest. On the 28th, another assault was launched against Buffalo Ridge supported by artillery. This time, the 2nd battalion, 32nd regiment managed to reach the top of the ridge facing significantly less resistance. Yard by yard the Americans seized most of Buffalo ridge by the end of the day. While that was going on, the forces advancing along Jim Fish Valley reached the southern portion of Lake Cories where they established a defensive position to hold up for the night. Landrum expected the 29th to be the final offensive to take Chichagof. The Americans now dominated the high grounds. The 1st battalion, 17th infantry held the Holtz Bay area; the 3rd battalion, 32nd infantry were atop Fish Hook Ridge; 1st battalion 4th infantry held positions along the Holtz Bay-Sarana Pass and atop West Peak; the 2nd battalion, 17th infantry and 1st/2nd battalions of the 32nd occupied Buffalo Ridge; and the 3rd battalion, 17th infantry held Jim Fish Valley. 4 75mm mountain guns and a battery of 105mm howitzers were placed on Hogback ridge while 60 artilleryman took up spotting positions on Engineer hill to direct the bombardments. Everything was in place for a final battle. The Japanese had their backs to the sea, crammed into a crowded area of low flat ground counting only 800 soldiers left. Two Japanese soldiers had been captured a day earlier and they confessed the remaining strength of their garrison. This prompted Landrum to order leaflets dropped over the Japanese positions. The leaflets carried a message from General Landrum to Colonel Yamasaki informing him of his hopeless situation and asking for his unconditional surrender. Landrum also added in “that the Japanese soldierly conduct thus far had been worthy of the highest military tradition”. Landrum asked Yamasaki to send a delegation to the American lines under a white flag. Landrum was trying to avoid the senseless slaughter, hoping Yamasaki might prove himself to be different from the countless other Japanese commanders who chose to resist to the last man. Landrum also was trying to prod the common Japanese soldiers to see if they would surrender in the face of the inevitable. Yamasaki ordered all paper burnt and personally oversaw all his wounded men given a fatal dose of morphine and their comrades showered the dying men with grenades. The Japanese, knowing full well the submarines originally set to come rescue them were no longer coming, the American destroyer picket line was preventing this. There was nowhere to pull back to, but the Japanese did not surrender, no Yamasaki chose to go out in a blaze of glory, fit to make the late Saigo Takamori proud. Yamasaki took his ancestral katana, while his men fixed bayonets. They were going to banzai charge at the weakest point in the American lines during the night, the Jim Fish Valley floor. They hoped this suicidal thrust might see a breakthrough upon which they could charge towards the American position at Engineer hill, hoping to capture their artillery to bear down upon them and to destroy their supplies. If they could manage to destroy the american supplies, they could theoretically then flee into the southern mountains where they might delay the americans enough to be rescued. The slim hope of victory depended on lightning speed, defeat would see their complete annihilation. By nightfall Yamasaki got his men ready, the 1st company and remnant of the other 2 companies of the 303rd independent battalion took the left flank, Yamasaki, his HQ and non-combat forces too a rear position and the remnants of the 83rd independent battalion took the right flank. In the early morning of May 29th, nearly a thousand screaming Japanese charged, as described by Nisei interpreter Peter Nakao later on “ It was pitch black when the enemy began the banzai attack. […] All of a sudden, the enemy was upon us. We could not see anything in the darkness except for tracer bullets flying in every direction. […] Leaving bayonetted dead and wounded behind them, the Japanese went past us and continued to the medic unit station to our rear. Then they headed for the ammunition dump behind the medics” The Japanese had smashed into the reserve Company B, 32nd regiment. The inexperienced men of that company had set up camp dead-center in Chichagof Valley, and had also withdrawn to the rear during the night to make breakfast, so their deserted positions where quickly overwhelmed and they fled for their lives to Buffalo ridge. Yamasaki let them flee and took his men in the direction of Engineer Hill. Yamasaki’s timing was brilliant, he had taken the Americans by surprise and his forces were sweeping up the base of Engineer hill easily getting past the enfilading fire from the ridges by daybreak. The Japanese savagely swarmed a field hospital, exterminating all the sick and wounded men inside along with its chaplain. 12 Americans in a tent outside survived the horror by pretending to be dead, though they were severely trampled upon twice by charging Japanese. At this point the American initial shock and panic had worn off and General Archibald Arnold rallied the men. He set to work organizing artillerymen, engineers and service troops to establish hidden defensive positions. They lacked automatic weapons, but the ragtag force consisting mostly of the 50th engineers met the charging Japanese with grenades and M1 Garand bullets. Eventually the 4th regiment came forward with automatic weapons successfully slowing down the Japanese banzai charge. The Engineers then fixed their bayonets and engaged the Japanese in hand to hand combat forcing them to fall back. Yamasaki was gunned down by an M1 Garand bullet and his men were unable to maintain the momentum. Nearly half of the Japanese, now isolated and surrounded began pulling the pins of their grenades as they held them to their chests, 500 men committed suicide en masse. Several Americans witnessed the Japanese squatting in a thick shadowy cluster in the first weak gray light of morning  seeping through the fog, with one man standing and appearing to speak to the others. The thumps of their detonating grenades and agonized cries of dying men created a crescendo, that died away leaving the grounds littered with disemboweled bodies. American reporter Robert Sherroid described the scene as such “The explosive charge blasted away their vital organs. Probably one in four held a grenade against his head. There were many headless Jap bodies between Massacre [Bay] and Chichagof. Sometimes the grenade split the head in half, leaving the right face on one shoulder, the left face on the other. […] Two bodies were burned to crisps, one atop the other, fused into one charred hump” After the battle was over, the Americans erected a wooden interpretive sign at the foot of Clevesy Pass honoring Yamasaki, a rare gesture considering the intensity of the war at the time.  The battle of Attu was done. The Americans found and interred 2351 corpses, but guessed hundreds more Japanese bodies were buried all over the place. They took 28 prisoners in all, mostly men knocked unconscious by shell explosions or too badly wounded to kill themselves. Scouring the landscape over the following days, a few dozen more Japanese were found hiding in foxholes, often in small groups. The US soldiers called upon them to surrender, but these men usually killed themselves with grenades or opened fire to receive a bullet back. Two Japanese gave themselves up willing however. One was from San Francisco, the other, a short, fat and good humored man dubbed “the Japanese 8-ball”, by the GI’s was treated kindly and even allowed to eat in the mess tents. PFC Howard Sparrs described the 8-Balls capture as such “ [Private Emerson] Burgett pulled out a Jap battle flag which he held up in front of the little fellow. The Jap shook his head violently in the negative and gestured so not a doubt remained – “Take it away!” The inner pockets of his coat revealed an assorted, and incidentally excellent, collection of […] pornography […] on silk handkerchiefs. The little Jap smiled innocently as Burgett gazed appraisingly over the collection (which, by the way, he pocketed)”  The Japanese lost approximately 2850 men dead, the Americans had 549 deaths, 1148 wounded and around 2100 evacuated due to frostbite, trench foot, hypothermia and other ailments. A number of lessons were learnt from the battle, including new landing techniques, and the necessity for rubberized, thoroughly waterproofed boots. Can’t express the importance of that last one enough, I once got a black toe in my stupid youth drinking outdoors with some friends in like -35 degree weather in bad boots, does not end well. The men on Attu had been given expensive, thick and insulated leather hunting boots, but these become absolutely useless once soaked in water. After Attu, improved winter kits emerged, and cases of hypothermia, frostbite or trench foot would become very rare among American soldiers even during bitterly cold campaigns in Italy and France.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The bitter and bloody and cold campaign for Attu was now finally over. Colonel Yamasaki decided to go out in a blaze of glory with his men, in a fashion that would make the last samurai Saigo Takamori proud. 

Last time we spoke about the battle for Attu. The allied commanders responsible for the frigid northern pacific theater finally unleashed a major campaign to kick the Japanese off American controlled soil. However the battle of Attu was to be by no means a cake walk, far from it. The men of the 7th and 35th divisions were about to receive a baptism under ice. As they stormed multiple beaches on Attu all was eerily quiet, there was no enemy to be seen. However upon marched a bit up the rugged hills and ridges they found extremely well concealed and well defended positions of the enemy. The Japanese rained pure hell upon the Americans causing a bloodbath. Despite the incredible numerical superiority, the Americans struggled to claim each hill, slope and ridge against a tenacious enemy. Today we are going to finish that story and jump back over to China for another bloody conflict. This episode is the West Hubei Offensive & Changjiao Massacre Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  We left off at Attu with Colonel Zimmerman taking command after Colonel Earle was killed by a Japanese sniper. The Southern force was pinned down at Massacre Valley just in front of Jarmin Pass. Colonel Culin’s Northern force and Willoughby’s Scouts were making gradual progress over in the Holtz Bay area, preparing to launch an all out offensive in 35 hours. The weather was terrible for the allies. The misty fog was concealing the Japanese positions upon the peaks, while the Japanese could fully see the allies down below. To make matters worse, casualties were mounting as a result of the brutality of mother nature. The clothing issued in San Francisco was  not nearly warm enough for fighting in Attu trenches. More than 100 Americans suffered death, injury, cripping frostbite and trench foot by May 14th alone, and the casualties were continuing to pile. The allied artillery were stuck in mud along the beaches. Supplies on the beaches sprawled in great clogged heaps which the men were forced to carry on their backs, causing them to sink further into the snow and mud. The transport ship Perida which was carrying vital supplies and beached herself after hitting a pinnacle rock. Landing crafts were running double time carrying supplies to the beaches and wounded men from them through crashing frigid waves. The air force were grounded because of the terrible weather, already 4 Wildcats had been smashed into mountainsides because of gusts of wind. Continuous radio pleas for supply drops were heard with men demanding sleeping bags and food.  General Brown decided to prod the enemy defenses with another assault on May 14th, tossing Zimmerman’s 3rd battalion against the Jarmin Pass, this time with some support from the USS Nassau. Yet as usual the weather was brutal and 3 Wildcats would get caught in a williwaw in the early morning crashing them. The troops assault likewise was just as disastrous. 4 company commanders were put out of action, two killed and two wounded. The casualties were high and the battalion was forced to run right back to their trenches. Zimmerman was forced to relieve the battered unit by bringing up the 2nd battalion of the 32nd regiment. Further south, the newly arrived 1st battalion, 32nd regiment were clambering onto a very overcrowded beach. The transports were having a difficult time unloading unlike their counterparts at Beach Red who were managing to move the flow of supplies more smoothly to the front. General Brown was anxious to make progress and reluctantly requested that General Buckner’s 4th regiment be brought over from Adak.  His message included this “Evidence of greater enemy strength than anticipated. Indication of lack of sufficient force to accomplish mission… Recent captured enemy documents show enemy strength considerably above than anticipated.” But Admirals Rockwell and Kinkaid had to refuse the request because the southern beach was congested, Kinkaid sent back this message,“Every effort must be made to expedite clearing of beach and unloading of transports in order that they may be withdrawn as soon as possible. Reinforcement by 4th Regiment not possible until completion of above.” Well that response certainly did not sit well with the Brown and the Army lads. Brown reacted bitterly, telling his staff officer he didn't believe the Navy cared at all about the Army’s needs. As Major General Archibald Arnold put it  “Attu was the first Army-Navy operation for almost all of us. We had little understanding of successful cooperation. The Navy had no conception of the effect of terrain and weather on the combat efficiency of the troops on Attu. It had no conception of how ground troops fought, and therefore Admiral Kinkaid could not evaluate the prospects for the outcome.” To make matters worse, Rockwell’s three old battleships had exhausted their bombardment ammunition, they needed to head back to Adak for more, leaving Brown and his men without that critical bombardment support. Admiral Kinkaid was really unhappy with the lack of progress on part of the Army and demanded Brown write a report of the situation. Unfortunately the PBY Catalina carrying that report accidentally dropped it into Massacre Bay. Admirals Kinkaid and Rockwell were not at all happy with what appeared to be utter silence from Brown. Meanwhile Culin’s Northern force were firing from their trenches and withstanding Japanese mortar and artillery barrages. Both sides were causing significant casualties upon another. One of the Japanese Doctors at the scene, Dr. Paul Tatsuguchi wrote this in his diary  “Continuous flow of wounded in the field hospital. Took refuge in the trenches during daytime and took care of the patients during the bombardment. Enemy strength must be a division. Our desperate defense is holding up well.” Over in the mountains Willoughby’s scouts had been fighting nonstop from May 14th to the 16th. Constant firefights and shootout with entrenched Japanese was taking a toll on them. The Japanese continuously were heard screaming “Damn American dogs, we massacre you!”. After the series of grim firefights in intense cold, the men went to their foxholes hungry as they had no rations. By the evenings nearly half his men were casualties. Willoughby would later describe his constant struggle to save his men, as many as possible from frostbite and gangrene. "The ones who suffered were the ones who didn't keep moving. I tried to keep everyone on the move, but I didn't catch some of them. They stayed in their holes with wet feet. They didn't rub their feet or change socks when they needed to". Willoughby had no choice but to push the men forward. They had no food and their boats had been casualties of friendly fire, their only salvation was to link up with the northern force, but to do so they would have to break through the enemy lines. On the 16th, Colonel Yamasaki decided to withdraw his forces to the Moore Ridge on the far side of Holtz Valley, it would be a miracle to Willoughby’s men. Yamasaki’s men had left behind large stores of ammunition and food. The rationale for the withdrawal was to thwart getting caught between the Northern FOrce and the Scout battalion. The Japanese had actually believed the Scout battalion to be a much larger force than it was because of the intensity of their fighting. Willoughby’s battered men finally linked up with Culins force at Holtz Bay. Only 11 of Willoughbys scouts were dead, but out of his 420 men, now only 165 were effective. They had been crushed by wounds, frostbite, gangrene and other ailments.80 scouts were left to hold key positions in the mountains as the other 320 scouts would join the northern force’s plight against the Jarmin Pass. Something had to be done to break the stalemate at Jarmin Pass which was causing unbelievable losses upon the allies. Culin ordered his battalions to march east during the night, hoping to push the Japanese off Moore ridge to the Chichagof Valley which would effectively cut off the Jarmin Pass defenders. Further south, Zimmerman led another front assault against Jarmins pass, but like the other times it failed. That noon, Rockwell decided to pull his warships out of Attu’s waters within the next 24 hours as they had become sitting ducks. During this period, Brown was forced to physically come aboard Rockwell’s Flagship to meet with the Admiral as communications had all but broken down. Brown had come to argue about transporting the 4th regiment, while Rockwell wanted to know what the hell was going on. Brown was able to convince Rockwell to send word to Kinkaid that they both wanted the 4th regiment to come over to Attu. Additionally they requested road-equipment to help the engineers build some roads to clear up the supply nightmare on the beach. Kinkaids response to Brown was made in haste with some poor choice of words “What did you expect to build there with such tremendous supplies—a stadium, or a city? You asked for supplies that you couldn’t have used over a period of months.” Kinkaid basically read Brown’s requests and came to the conclusion the General was expecting a battle to last 60 days, while the original battle plan was expecting 3 days. At this point when they were messaging another it had been 5 days of battle. Thus Kinkaid deduced Brown had shifted to a defensive stance rather than offensive. He was really pissed off by this and immediately met with General’s Buckner and DeWitt. Buckner and DeWitt were not fans of Brown and would fan the flames blame upon him. As a result of terrible bad communications and some service rivalry, General Brown was relieved of his command. General Landrum was to relieve him and take command of the 7th division. Before Brown’s  On may 16th, both Rockwell and Brown were relayed the message to their shock. Landrum was on his way, and in the meantime Brown retained command. Thus Brown ordered Zimmerman to launch an attack again against the Jarmin Pass and once again it failed. They had incurred so many losses from that attack the 2nd battalion of the 32nd regiment had to be relieved by the 3rd battalion of the 17th regiment. Do remember the 2nd battalion had been sent to relieve the previous one. To the north, Culins battalions had crossed the Holtz valley under the cover of night, applying pressure to the defenders on Moore Ridge. The allies were pinned to the valley floor while they rained hell upon Moore Ridge. Again we have a diary entry from Dr. Paul Tatsuguchi displaying the lengths the Japanese would go to, to hold their position. “If Shitigati Dai [Moore Ridge] is taken by the enemy the fate of East Arm is decided, so orders was given to destroy all the wounded soldiers by giving them shots in the arm and die painless. At the last minute there was an order from Headquarters Sector Unit to proceed to Chichagof Harbor by way of Umanose [Fish Hook Ridge].” Culin then sent some platoons out along the beach to his left to climb the seaside ends of the ridges. The men climbed from hump to hump and were forced to charge into several hand to hand fighting with the defenders, but they gradually earned a foothold upon the ridge by nightfall. Culin had thus managed to capture Holtz valley, finally a significant piece of good news. He sent word by radio to Brown. It was to be the only bit of good news Brown would hear as he responded “well done” to Culin. A few minutes later Brown heard General Landrum had just arrived at the harbor. Brown and Landrum met awkwardly. Brown gave a full report to Landrum who expressed astonishment. Landrum then made it clear he found no fault with Browns command and ordered his plans to continue exactly how they were. He judged Kinkaid’s condemnation of Brown without even meeting with him in person to be a grave error. Brown took one last look at Attu, before he made his departure to the States. Without Browns knowledge, General DeWitt went on the record writing up a efficiency report of him, adding passages like this “Personality and temperament not conducive to command joint operations. Impulsive.” These sly remarks would block Brown’s promotional chances later in his career.  Back at Moore Ridge, the Japanese defenders were down to a single meal a day, usually a single ball of cold rice. Many of them broke under the strain of cold and hunger. The psychological effect of waiting for ones death was too much for many. Many of the men would simply go off on their lonesome to attack the American positions in order to be shot and put out of their misery. Again Dr Paul Tatsuguchi wrote in his diary of the defenders plight “At night about 11:30 o’clock under cover of darkness I left the cave. Walked over muddy roads and steep hills of no-man’s land. No matter how far or how much we went we did not get over the pass. Was rather irritated in the fog by the thought of getting lost. Sat down after 30-40 steps, would sleep, dream and wake up, same thing over again. We had few wounded and had to carry them on stretchers. They got frost-bitten feet, did not move after all the effort.”    Colonel Yamasaki decided to abandon Moore Ridge and the Holtz Bay area, withdrawing into the Prendergast and Fish Hook ridge during the night of May 16th. This left the Jarmin Pass defenders in an impossible position, so the 303rd independent battalion was likewise order to pull back and take up a position at the Clevesy pass. The Americans failed to realize this because of the thick fog, however with the lull in firing they gradually came to realize the brutal battle for the Massacre Valley which had caused 1100 casualties up to this point had ended. On may 17th, Culin launched a night attack to seize the rest of Moore ridge and the men anxious advanced for hours expecting carnage at any moment only to find out the Japanese had withdrawn. On Moore ridge they found large stocks of supplies, including artillery guns. While all of this was a great relief to the men, a few Nassau Wildcats coming in for a bombing-strafing run upon their position was not so great. Many of Culin’s men were wounded by the aerial strike prompting word to be brought over to Kinkaid. Kinkaid sent Colonel Eareckson to Attu to better coordinate the air strikes with the ground operations. Meanwhile Willoughby sent out some patrols to link up with the Southern forces at Jarmin Pass to spread the good news. Prior to receiving that news, the fog had prevented Zimmerman's men from noticing the enemy had withdrawn. Zimmerman sent some patrols to the pass which found out the news for themselves and Zimmerman would begin occupying the pass by the end of the day. Zimmerman walked the crest of the pass and found the corpse of one Captain John Jarmin alongside the bodies of his platoon and the small clumps of dead Japanese horribly mangled by artillery shells. The pass, then named Massacre-Holtz Pass, was renamed after Jarmin who died on May 14th. Now we are going to take a leave of the frigid north pacific to talk about some American naval developments and a bloody offensive about to begin in China.  On February 7th of 1943, the submarine USS Wahoo entered Pearl Harbor carrying 8 rising sun flags on her signal halyards and a broom lashed to her periscope shears signifying a “clean sweep”. She had just come back from a long submarine cruise and one of the most remarkable ones for the war. She was hailed by a crowd of officers, personnel and even news reports. News reporters coming to see a submarine was indeed a rarity, thus adding to the nickname “the silent service”. The American submarines never promoted themselves and received basically no press coverage. But one person in the Pacific Fleet did decided to publicize the submarine war and much of the Wahoo’s reports were given to him for public release. The captain of the Wahoo, Commander Dudley Walker Morton was nicknamed “a one-man wolfpack” and the submarine got an article published in Hawaii’s Hawaiian Advertiser  titled “Wahoo running japs A’gunning”. Wahoo had sunk 5 ships totalling 32,000 tons on her third cruise. But what is more significant than the damage done was Morton’s tactics. He had turned a new page and many submarine commanders would begin to study him. As Morton’s executive officer, Richard O’Kane would say “cast aside unproven prewar concepts and bugaboos”. Morton was extremely aggressive and employed daring tactics like surfacing beside enemy ships to induce panic and deck gunning vulnerable ships. This often led to convoys scattering causing logistical nightmare for the Japanese.  However as triumphant as the Wahoo’s ventures were, it could not sweep away the lingering frustration and disenchantment for the Pacific submarine force. Submarines had sunk 180 enemy ships totaling 725,000 tons in 1942, more aggregate tonnage than Japan could build that year, but it was felt the fleet was not reaching its full potential. Too many submarine crews clung to pre-war tactics. There was overwhelming evidence that the Mark 14 torpedo was a complete lemon, but the Navy’s bureau of ordnance unanimously rallied against any critics and refused any suggestion that things needed reevaluation. In the later half of 1942, Admiral English had sent over 61 war patrols out of Pearl Harbor and 27 returned empty handed. Patrols off Truk had been far less productive than patrols within Japanese home waters. Glory hunting, ie: chasing capital ships was not producing results. The Japanese freighters and oil tankers, much slower and easier targets were a better investment. In the Atlantic Nazi Germany’s Wolf packs were demonstrating how a relatively small number of Uboats could menace a vital economic and military lifeline. Japan like Britain was extremely vulnerable to a war of commerce and it was evident to all this was not being pursued heavily enough. But the Submarine leadership, admirals English, Fife, Lockwood and Withers were allowing their vessels to perform marginally important reconnaissance services or support various other campings in ill-conceived roles, ie pre-war doctrine stuff.  The active duty submarine officers were becoming increasingly resentful to their leadership and extremely annoyed at watching countless torpedoes explode prematurely, not explode at all or run in circles rather than speed towards a target. To these criticisms, Admiral English retorted “ SUBPAC has never had a premature explosion”. The Bureau of Ordnance instead of investigating, began to blame the sub crews for failures. According to Clay Blair a scholar of the Pacific submarine Campaign “The torpedo scandal of the U.S. submarine force in World War II was one of the worst in the history of any kind of warfare.” Ned Beach, a submarine commander who later became a historian and novelist remarked about the torpedo’s “performed so poorly that had they been the subject of deliberate sabotage they hardly could have been worse”. It might have honestly been better if the torpedoes 100% all failed, because perhaps an investigation would have come sooner. The torpedo problem was gradually fixed over the period of two years, while the bureaucrats resisted bitterly and the submariner crews risked their lives carrying faulty weapons. The first problem to be solved was the Mark 14’s tendency to run 10 feet deeper than set. Charlie Lockwood in Freemantle, Australia ran a series of tests and demonstrated the problem to the bureau of ordnance and got Admiral King involved who championed his cause. It was easily fixed by changing the depth setting. Next in August of 1942, while the torpedoes were certainly not going too deep anymore, the explosion rates were not improving. The magnetic influence exploder was faulty and causing premature explosions and through a lot of bickering amongst numerous commanders it was decided to deactivate it. This seemed to cure the mark 14’s of premature explosions, but still more was wrong. So many submariner crews reporters dud hits, and when the magnetic influence exploder was deactivated the duds became even more apparent. It seemed the contact pistol was faulty. To solve this engineers adopted a ball switch and electric detonator rather than using a firing pin mechanism. Now the depth issue was solved, the premature explosion issue was solved and the dud issue was solved, but the torpedoes still tending to go in circles or simply ran erratically. Turned out to be an easy fix, they attached collars to the mark 14, which mark 15’s had and this caused them to steer straight. To give an idea of how these minor engineer fixes changes the war lets go through some figures. By the start of the war, the Japanese had 6,384,000 tons of shipping. During the first year of the war, they lost 1,147,400 tons of shipping, but they also added 706,000 tons of shipping, for a total net loss of 441,400 tons, which left them with 5,942,600 tons of shipping by the start of 1943. It’s important to mention that the Japanese leadership believed they needed to retain 3 million tons of shipping in order to meet the industrial and civilian needs of the economy, although this estimate was probably too low, as Japan's industrial capacity was proportional to her ability to import the needed material.  In 1943 Japan would lose 1.5 million tons of shipping, in 1944 this became 2.7 million. The Pacific Submariners were strangling the island nation to death. Now as a result of the increased american submarine attacks upon shipping, alongside Japan's increased demand for shipping to be used to transport men, supplies and raw materials for the war effort, well as you can imagine all of this required the homefront to produce more. As a result the shipping available for secondary theaters like the north pacific and even that of China forced Japan to seek out alternative means to secure the resources they needed.  For example at Yichang there was approximately 20000 tons of steamer tonnage for inland river navigation which could alleviate supply issues for the China theater. But Chinese control over the southern bank of the Yangtze river prevented the Japanese from moving the ships forward to Wuhan. Going all the way back to 1938, Chiang Kai-shek in absolute desperation to stop the Japanese advance had opened the levees that held back the Yellow River at Huayuankou in Henan province. This move had cost an estimated 500,000 Chinese lives. The fertile plains of Henan province were destroyed and its people drowned or starved. The Japanese army gradually moved south seizing the strategic city of Wuhan on the Yangtze river. The Nationalists still held control over unoccupied Henan provinces as the Japanese held around 1.5 million soldiers within China at the time and did not have the resource to push deeper. For most of the Pacific War, the Japanese were content simply controlling the Yangtze river from Wuhan, extending along the rich fertile delta that passed through Nanjing and Shanghai before exiting into the east china sea. A further 466 miles upstream to the west of Wuhan behind multiple barricades of mountains lay Chiang kai-shek's wartime capital of Chongqing.  In effect there began a stalemate between 3 sides in the conflict; the Japanese, the Nationalists and the CCP. Mao had brokered a secret deal with the Japanese not to fight another for awhile, some units of the NRA had similar pacts with the Japanese. This resulted in trade between both sides, and it might surprise you to hear, this even resulted in some lend lease materials that came over the hump being traded down the Yangtze river to the Japanese in Wuhan. Chiang Kai-shek did not have the resources to train and army even his core divisions let alone the local NRA forces led by provincial commanders. FDR promised Chiang kai-shek in 1943 to arm and modernize the NRA’s core of 90 divisions, out of a theoretical 360, but in practice the hump could only provide enough materials to modernize 30 divisions, the X force and Y force. Stilwell was in charge of training these divisions which would in turn retake Burma to open up the land supply routes to CHongqing along the Ledo-Burma Road. Without resources to equip his armies on the eastern front, Chiang Kai-shek knew any head-on engagement with the Japanese would most likely end with defeat and destruction. This led the 2nd sino-japanese war conflict from 1942-1944 to see the majority of fighting limited at a local level, with struggles in agrarian regions ,village by village and between the NRA and CCP.  Now back to the offensive at hand, the Japanese sought to occupy the area between Yichang and Yueyang to increased their control over the Yangtze River and crush the Chinese fighting strength in the region. Now a bit further back in time there had been an offensive launched between february and march north of the Yangtze, performed by the 11th army of General Yokoyama. They managed to occupy the area between Jingzhou and Yueyang, thus acting as a preliminary for what would be called the west hubei offensive. Within the region was the 6th war area army under the command of General Sun Lianzhong, but overall command in the hands of the leader of the Chinese expeditionary force in the Burma theater, though at this point was still in Hubei, General Chen Cheng. The Chinese expeditionary force had 40,000 men that held defensive positions all over the region. General Yokoyama commenced the operation by ordering his 40th division to advance upon Shishou, then Huarong. The 40th division successfully captured the line running east and west of the towns by mid april. By early May, the 40th division sent its Koshiba detachment further west to prepare an assault upon the town of Nan while the 3rd division and 17t independent mixed brigade deployed at Shishou to prepare and assault upon the well defended base at Anxiang. Alongside this the 34th divisions Harigaya detachment performed a wide flanking maneuver to hit Nan and Anxiang from the south. This all consisted of the first phase of the operation, if it was successful, then the 3rd division would continue west to attack Zhijiang and Gongan, supported by the 58th divisions Nozoe detachment and the bulk of the 13th division. On May 5th, the west hubei offensive officially began with the 3rd division and 17th brigade crossing the Yangtze and smashing the NRA’s 26th army defensive lines. Meanwhile the 40th division began to advance south and east securing the Yueyang area with the Toda detachment rapidly attacking NRA defensive lines around Yushanzhen. To the east, the Harigaya detachment crossed Dongdongting lake and defeated NRA forces around Hengling Hu, supported by the 44th air regiment. The Japanese advances were so powerful and quick, the defenders had no ability to stall them and rapidly began withdrawing south and west. By may the 8th, the 3rd division had defeated the NRA forces trying to escape towards Anxiang, successfully intercepting their escape route as the 17th brigade began occupying Anxiang. Further east, Nan was captured by the Koshiba detachment while NRA positions south of it were annihilated by the combined assaults performed by the Toda and Harigaya detachments. And it is at this point, one of the most horrible events unfolded during the 2nd sino-japanese war.  Most of you listeners and honestly many people in the world are aware of what is termed “the rape of Nanking”, but most of you in the west I imagine have never heard of the Changjiao Massacre. The town of Changjiao is around Dongdongting lake surrounded by water on three sides. As such the civilians were easily trapped within the town when the Japanese troops began to enter. The Japanese forces seized the waters ways and land routes coming out of the town quickly before anyone could escape. The Harigaya and Toda detachment alongside the 17th independent mixed brigade encircled Changjiao from all four sides while preparing for a river crossing to Changde’s coastal area. The 73rd NRA army alongsides tens of thousands of civilians were besieged as a result.  In the early hours of May 9th, hundreds of Japanese forces landed in the Yonggu embankment in the central part of Changjiao. This was an area considered safe, thus thousands of local residents and refugees had gathered there. As the IJA forces landed they began massacring the civilian indiscriminately, forcing many to kneel down or be ties up in groups to be killed with knives and bayonet. On may 11th, the IJA forces forced hundreds of civilians to the Yongguyuan ditch port to salvage bullets dropped by NRA forces. Due to the cold weather and deep water in the port, the people were unwilling to cooperate. The IJA officers ordered machine gun crews to open fire upon them forcing countless into the waters. At this ditch port, more than 1000 people were stabbed to death by bayonet, gunned down, or even stoned to death. The survivors dug a bit to bury the victims and it is called “the thousands peoples pit” by locals.  In Changjiao is the Anhe river which is something like a deep mota blocking the east-west traffic, it was the only passage from Nanxian country to Hanshou and Changde county. On may 10th, the IJA indiscriminately massacred more than 6000 NRA POW’s of the 73rd army and local civilians trapped there. In the early morning of the 10th the Japanese first bombed the area with aircraft, then the ground forces opened fire upon them. It is said the smell of decomposing corpses could be smelt miles away and was called “bloodwater river” by locals. In the Valienne dike, the Japanese performed 5 sweeps along the embankment killing more than 3000 people. In the Yucheng embankment of the factory cellar, the Japanese hacked to death 30 people with knives; within Quancheng village, 200 people were killed within 3 days by IJA forces. The Japanese forced 200 civilian to kneel on the ground before being gunned down by machine guns. Very few escaped the carnage. In many other local places pockets of civilians were killed in similar fashions. Sometimes the IJA would tie civilians to the back of motorboats and would drive at full speed to kill them.  It is estimated the Japanese raped more than 2000 women, from the young to the old, no one was spared. 3000 houses were burnt down alongside 2500 ships. The Japanese looted gold, silver, copper, iron and grain on a large scale.  The massacre was part of “the three alls policy, kill all, burn all, loot all”. In just 4 days, the Changjiao Massacre claimed the lives of 30,000 people. It was conducted under the command of Field Marshal Shunroku Hata ad the testimony of one Japanese Kempeitai officer named Uno Shintaro who participated in the event gives a chilling account. “I personally severed more than forty heads. Today, I no longer remember each of them well. It might sound extreme, but I can almost say that if more than two weeks went by without my taking a head, I didn’t feel right. Physically, I needed to be refreshed.” A chinese civilian in Changjiao who survived named Guolu Ping give us this account. "Japanese soldiers slammed their feet into the pregnant bellies of women, laughing as they bloodily miscarried." Guolu Ping was bayoneted alongside his father and brothers: "The first blade barely pierced my thick coat... they stabbed me again in the back & abdomen."  After the horror, the first phase of the operation was a success. The 3rd division then advanced the Songzi river and assembled around Tuochuanbu while the 17th brigade moved towards Lixian and the 13th division advanced upon Zhijiang. On the 12th, the second phase kicked off, with the 13th division crossing the Yangtze to attack Zhijiang while the 3rd division trapped 50000 NRA forces of the 87th army at Gongan. The NRA were completely unprepared and utterly defeated as they fled towards Songzi. By the 18th the Songzi position collapsed and the defenders proceeded to flee further south suffering terrible casualties. Its important to note while this all looked like a large scale operation to annihilate and conquer, Historian Barbara Tuchman has this to say about the operation  "The Japanese withdrew without pursuit from what appeared to have been a training and foraging offensive to collect rice and river shipping." Forage for materials they did so at large scale, but also they annihilated large armies of NRA and performed unspeakable atrocities upon civilians. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The battle for Attu was a bloody affair, but soon the allies would seize the frigid north island and end Japan's toehold in the Americas. The Changjiao massacre is yet again another taste of the absolute horror that Japan unleashed upon the Chinese people. 

Last time we spoke about the drive towards Salamaua. New Guinea was about to see a large scale offensive launched at Salamaua, but in order for it to be pulled off, the allied high command decided to produce many feints to distract the Japanese. Codenamed Operation Postern, General Blamey directed his subordinate to launch offensives around Salamaua, but not to attack kit directly. Battles began to break out over the Pimple, Green Hill, observation hill and bobdubi ridge. It was costly warfare for both sides, but the strategy was working as the Japanese were beginning to believe the allies were targeting Salamaua, rather than the actual target which was Lae. We also talked about the tragic tale of the fate of the surviving doolittle POW’s and the sinking of the hospital ship Centaur. The Japanese would perform many more war crimes during this war. But today we are venturing back to the frigid north pacific. This episode is the battle of Attu Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  It is May of 1943, almost a year has passed since the battle of Midway. The battle of Midway, though as you have heard me say probably a hundreds times by now, not the turning point of the pacific war, nonetheless has captivated people since it occurred. There is something about Midway that just makes it a great story, its full of everything, deception, foreshadowing, underdog victory, its on the level of Herodotus to be brutally honest with you. But while thats all good and fun it really overshadows other events in the Pacific War. One thing that gets really overshadowed is the Aleutian campaign, which ironically was born from the battle of Midway. As we have seen throughout this series, the Japanese invasion of the islands of Attu and Kiska were incredibly important aspects of the war, hell it was the first time American territory had been seized since the war of 1812, a war in which my nation of Canada defeated America, haha jokes jokes, trust me I know quite a lot about the war of 1812 and its by no means as simple as that and is honestly one of the most misunderstood wars in history. The invasions of Attu and Kiska were a large shock for the American public and their liberation was demanded from the offset.  Now to backtrack only a tiny bit for coherency’s sake, last time we talked about Admiral Kinkaid’s plan to attack Kiska. The plan became a major item debated at the Casablanca conference. The allied commanders liked the plan and sent it over the the Joint chiefs of staff to try and hammer out the details to form it into a real operation that got the codename Operation landcrab. When it was presented to General John DeWitt, he recommended using the 35th infantry division, but the War department decided to use the 7th motorized division instead. They had of course been trained for desert warfare in north africa, but General Rommel had just been defeated and thus the division’s expertise in that area was no longer needed.  Vice Admiral Francis Rockwell received overall command of Operation Landcrab and when he looked over the plan, he quickly pointed out some major problems. Number one, they simply did not have enough naval assets to pull it off. Going back to the drawing board, Kinkaid suggested they switch their target for Attu, believing the island only held a garrison of around 500 Japanese. Attu would turn out to have closer to 3000 men. Regardless, Kinkaid argued bypassing Kiska for Attu might result in the Japanese abandoning Kiska.  The idea was approved and the 10,000 strong 7th division commanded by Major General Albert Brown would receive a crash course in amphibious landings and tundra warfare. The initial lands were set for May 7th, but the finer details of the plan were only finalized on April 1st at the San Diego military conference. As mentioned before, shipping was the most crippling issue facing the North Pacific as they really only received hand me downs so to say. Thus Operation Landcrab would be forced to use five terribly-overcrowded transports: the Harris, Heywood, Zeilin, Perida and Kane escorted by Task Force 51’s Destroyers Dewey, Dale, Monaghan, Aylwin; minelayers Sicard, Pruitt and the Minesweeper group Perry, Elliot, Chandler and Long. They were to depart on April 24th.  Now to preserve secrecy for the operation, the 7th division who were training in California were told they were going to deploy in the Solomon Islands. Kind of a nasty surprise when you think about it, your training for a tropical climate only to be shipped off to one of the coldest and most miserable places in the world haha. A key element in the plan consisted of the provisional scout battalion, commanded by Captain William Willoughby. This unit was made up of the physically toughest men out of the 7th division and would prove to be the finest American fighting forces on Attu. Captain Willoughby would have 410 men who were given very little time to train. Willoughby secured massive firepower for his men, getting rid of half their rifles and all their submachine guns and replacing them with automatic rifles, machine guns and exchanging their soft lead ammunition for armor piercing rounds, which was a big necessity so they did not ricochet on the ice. He also filled his mens packs with grenades to the brim. The men left San Francisco on april 24th at 1pm, completely ignorant of their true destination. In the meantime the Americans wanted to keep their actual target a mystery from the Japanese and began a bombardment campaign against Kiska and Attu, tossing most of the bombs at Kiska. The bombardment campaign was heavily hampered by tremendous storms for the first half of april, seeing winds up to 115 mph and gusts over 127 mph. The Americans managed to better Kiska with 1175 sorties during April second half, then on May 1st they switched focus to Attu where their bombers hammered it with over 200,000 pounds of bombs. The pilots unfortunately were bombing blind as Attu was covered in a thick fog, thus there was no way to know the effectiveness of their campaign.  Of the entire invasion force, only Willoughby’s provisional scout battalion would get training ashore in the Aleutians prior to deployment. While the rest of the 7th division came ashore at Cold Bay, they would be forced to stay aboard their ships as there were no accommodations ashore, a shivering and crammed mess to be sure. Only Captain Willoughby’s men would carry on over to Dutch Harbor where they embarked on a week's last minute training in snow and muskeg. While the 7th division boys were shivering their asses off in Cold Bay, General Butler signaled the bombardment campaign to lay down the hammer of Attu, tossing Admiral McMorris force into the mix. McMorris led the Light cruisers Richmond, Detroit and Santa Fe; and destroyers Coghlan, Bancroft, Caldwell, Edwards, Frazier and Gansevoort to bombard Attu with naval gunfire. Over in Attu, Colonel Yamasaki Yasuyo who had been appointed to command the 2nd district force of the North Seas Garrison had arrived to the island in April and was given orders to hold Attu without any additional help until at least May. In May he was to receive reinforcements. Until then he had the 83rd and 103rd infantry battalion; the Aota battalion which was a provisional anti-aircraft battalion;  the 302nd Independent Engineer Company and 2nd Company of the 6th Ship Engineer Regiment; and  the 6th Independent Mountain Artillery Company. In all 2630 men, with just a few coastal guns, some flak guns and small arms to defend themselves. Yamasaki decided to keep the garrison at Chichagof Harbor, while at Holtz and Massacre Valleys he had the men abandon the low ground to instead dig pits, trenches and bunkers of the high, rugged ground overlooking the valleys. Rockwell and Brown spent May the 1st and 2nd discussing the landing plans against Attu. Characteristically the Aleutian weather was to be bleak, furious storms raged thus postponing the operation. D-day had to be pushed from may 7th to the 11th. Rockwell called for landing the entire 7th division at Sarana Bay as he didn't believe he could maintain full-scale supply of 2 different landing points. But Brown favored making 3 landings. One at Holtz bay by Colonel Frank Cuilin’s northern force; the 1st battalion of the 17th regiment; another in Massacre Bay by Colonel Edward Earle’s southern force consisting of the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the 17th regiment and the 2nd battalion of the 32nd regiment; and Captain Willoughby’s  Scout battalion was to land at Beach Scarlet; lastly a reserve force consisting of the 1st and 3rd battalions of the 32nd regiment and the 1st battalion of the 4th regiment  ready to depart at any moment from Adak. The key to the plan was to have all three forces join up in the mountain pass  called Jarmin Pass which lay between Holtz and Massacre Valleys. Converging there would basically trap the Japanese at Chichagof Valley, leaving them open to naval bombardments and aerial bombing as the 7th division’s advanced upon the high ground. Willoughby’s scouts would have an extremely dangerous task having to land from two large submarines at night, the USS Narwhal and Nautilus. They would have to creep up in complete silence to achieve the element of surprise. This was easier said than done however. When jumping into their rubber boats, their equipment would clank and some of their heavy weapons would rip holes in the fragile boats. Thus Willoughby instead planned to come topside, inflate the rubber boats on the afterdecks and try to quietly crowed the boats while they were still high and dry. The submarines would submerge under them, so the boats would float without a ripple. Pretty smart stuff and very innovative for the day. Once a beachhead was established, the destroyer USS Kane would bring the remaining 165 men to Attu.  Admiral Kinkaids Task Force 16 would provide the naval support, consisting of two groups:  the Southern Covering Force of Admiral McMorris consisting of Light cruisers Richmond, Detroit and Santa Fe; and destroyers Coghlan, Bancroft, Caldwell, Frazier and Gansevoort; and the Northern Covering Force of Admiral Giffen  consisting of Heavy cruisers Louisville, San Francisco and Wichita; and destroyers Balch, Hughes, Morris and Mustin. They would have the task of naval bombarding the enemy positions and would receive the support from Admiral Rockwell’s Task Force 51 consisting of the escort carrier Nassau, 3 old battleships the Nevada, Idaho and Pennsylvania; and destroyers Edwards, Meade, Ammen, Phelps, Hull, MacDonough, Aylwin and Monaghan, a Transport Group covered by three destroyers Dale, Dewey and Farragut and a Minesweeper Group of two minesweepers Chandler and Long.They were to be the largest American naval force assembled since the invasion of Guadalcanal and their guns would hammer the enemy on Attu to support the ground forces. On the 3rd of May, the assault force finally departed Cold Bay en route to Attu, despite the fact their intelligence indicated the Japanese knew they were coming. The convoy cut across the Chain at Amukta pass making a wide circle north of Kiska to avoid detection. By the 6th, they had reached their launch point, 100 miles north of Attu, but a storm began to smash them during the evening. The surf became too dangerous for landings, forcing Rockwell to postpone yet again. Rockwell took his transports and had them perform circles while his battleships headed west incase the Japanese tried to send reinforcements from the Kuriles. By the 11th, the storm had ended, leaving a soupy fog over the ocean. Because of the fog the destroyer USS Macdonough accidentally cut across the destroyer USS Sicard’s course causing a collision. No one was injured, but the collision breached Macdonough’s hull, forcing Sicard to tow her back to Adak. Sicard was one of the control ships for the landings, thus the landings would now be more difficult. Meanwhile, Colonel Yamasaki received warning of the incoming American invasion by May 4th and set to work ordering his men into combat alert positions. He kept the men on edge for a week, but by the 10th he had exhausted them and it looked like perhaps the weather and stopped the invasion from coming. Thus Yamasaki decided to leave the beaches unguarded, as his small force could not possibly guard every inch of them. His force was made up of, what we call the b-teamers, older men and raw recruits, primarily drawn from Hokkaido. The only advantage they enjoyed was the fact they were used to colder climates and knew the terrain and weather. Giving up the beaches to occupy the high ground was the only sensible defensive posture Yamasaki could hope for. Thus a major component of the defensive strategy would be to draw the enemy further in towards the mountains and away from their supplies on the shore. Yamasaki organized his forces into two sectors; the Chichagof harbor sector and the  Holtz Bay sector. Lt COlonel Yonegawa Isamu defended the Holtz Bay sector with his Yonegawa force of 420 men, 526 men of the Aota provisional anti-aircraft battalion led by Major Aota Seiji, 270 men of the 6th independent month artillery led by Captain Ono CHinozo, 270 men of the 6th ship engineers led by Captain Kobayashi and 183 men of the field hospital unit.  Chichagof Harbor sector was defended by Major Watanabe Tokuji who had 664 men of the 303rd independent infantry battalion. Willoughby and his scouts moved ashore first at 1am on May 11th, marking the start of a struggle that would carry on for 19 days. It was not going to be the 3 day adventures Admiral Kinkaid had promised them. Willoughby and 244 of his scouts clambered out of the large submarines Narwhal and Nautilus into their inflatable boats and made their way 3 miles to the western shore of Attu. They successfully landed on Beach Scarlet after two hours and immediately headed for an icy little creek that climbed up a ravine towards some ridges, there was no sign of the Japanese anywhere. Disaster struck immediately when some naval Wildcats swept in low over Scarlet Bay and began strafing their boats, narrowing missing 3 guards left behind with the boats. The Wildcats had come from the USS Nassau, there to support them, not destroy their escape vehicles. The friendly fire was certainly a bad omen to start their mission. With 36 hours worth of rations in their packs and no ability to retreat the scouts made their way climbing a snow covered mountain ridge. Willoughby and his soldiers spent the first night at the bitterly cold summit. A B-24 would be sent to drop additional ammunition and rations to them, but the powerful snow filled winds hurled the parachute supply crates deep in some crevasses. Over in the south, the old battleships delivered a bombardment of Chichagof harbor. After this the largest of the three assault bodies had arrived aboard their transports to Massacre Bay in the early morning. However the fog was so intense the allied aircraft couldn't see a glimpse of the ground from their altitude of 20,000 feet. In fact both the Japanese and allies bombers would be spending the majority of the battle grounded because of weather. The americans yet again had to postpone, this time until the afternoon. General Brown had had enough and ordered the southern force of Colonel Edward Earle to make the landings regardless. At 3:30 the first wave began to hit the Massacre beach unopposed. An hour later the second wave landed at 5pm. The soldiers came ashore to a eerily silent beach, greeted allegedly by a solitary raven, whose croaking echoed eerily off the foggy ridges until the bird flew away. Meanwhile the Northern force led by Colonel Frank Culin landed on Beach Red, meeting no immediate Japanese resistance as they formed their beachhead. Beach Red proved to be a narrow strip only a hundred yards long or so, surrounded by 250 feet heights. It was a highly unlikely landing area and thus the Japanese had never set up defenses there. Instead the Japanese set up positions, intending to hit the allies at Moore ridge using two 75mm mountain guns. By midafternoon, Culin had 1500 men ashore and climbing with no sign of the enemy. During this period however Culin succumbed to hypothermia forcing Lt Colonel Albert Hartl to take command. Hartl began his command by tossing out a screen of Aleut scouts, some who originally came from Attu, over the ravines and mountain ridges. By 6pm a US patrol encountered 4 Japanese, they killed one man, wounded and captured a second, but the other 2 managed to escape and raised the alarm. The Japanese began digging in on the high ground overlooking Holtz Valley. The days deep silence unnerved the men more than an outpouring of gunfire.  Lt H.D Long described the eerie silence followed by a sparrow that quote “ He sat on a bump above the beach and sang his lungs out, and an explosive gasp shushed out of hundreds of throats. The spell was broken, the world hadn't died around us. The first DSC from Attu should go to that bird. He saved lives that day. His song changed us from a tight, tense, hypnotized, unrelated group of human beings to a relaxed, laughing, cohesive fighting force” Back over in Massacre Valley, Colonel Early decided to toss one battalion up the valley floor and another up a parallel ridge. The two-pronged maneuver was slow going because of the muck of snow, mud and muskeg. They would soon come upon a chain of Japanese machine gun nests and mortar positions held by men of the 303rd infantry battalion. They were led by Lt Goto and Honna who told the men to wait silently for the enemy. Their position lay in some thick fog, but they could see the Americans clearly below them, struggling forward up the valley through a wet layer of snow and sucking mud. They had orders from the Northern Imperial Army headquarters at Paramushiro  “Destroy the enemy. We pray and hope for your successful battle.”   However the first shots of the battle would be fired at around 6pm by Brigadier General Archibald Arnolds 3 105mm field artillery. The pieces of artillery had been brought ashore with the southern force, but immediately got stuck in mud. A scouting force led by Lt James west had found a Japanese mortar positions and called its location down to the artillery men at the beach. Their first shell missed, but the Japanese mortar crew walked right into the next two shells which destroyed their guns and blasted the crews to pieces. They were the first casualties of the battle of Attu.   While those shells were being lobbed at the ridge-lines, Japanese snipers opened up fire taking long range shots at the US troops struggling up the valley throughout the day. By 7pm Earle led hundreds of men forward in an attack on the pass at Massacre Valley’s inland end, soon to be dubbed Jarmin Pass. Japanese machine gun fire and mortar explosions caught the Americans on open ground. The men fell back, rallied, tried to again and were driven back once more.   The Japanese had prepared their battlefield expertly, choosing defensive positions that provided cover and concealment. Their snipers were positioned at right angles to cover the approaches from the enemy upon their machine gun nests. The grenade launchers covered depression where the Americans might take cover. A system of tunnels and trenches allowed them quick and easy movement. Telephone wires strung along the ground provided them communication. Caches of food and supplies were easily moved around throughout the combat. Low hanging fog along the ridges and mountain sides concealed their positions while also providing them good observation of the Americans huddling in their water filed foxholes down below. While the Japanese watched their enemy, the enemy could only see mist above them.   Earle tossed countless assaults, each bloodily repulsed. Sergeant Louis Adami of G company, 32nd infantry described one of the failed assaults. “The attack pushed off early in the morning at about 0630 and immediately the Japs opened up. The first casualties were being hit in the back by guns high on the mountain to our left. It was demoralizing because we couldn't spot them. […] They had machine guns all over the place, and knee mortars were systematically blasting holes in our advancing lines”. At nightfall, Earle would thus be forced to regroup behind a defensive perimeter, digging foxholes in the cold snow.    Further north, battleship Nevada was hammering the Japanese positions with her 14 inch guns as the Americans watching severed arms, legs and entire Japanese corpses pop out of their trenches, flopping grotesquely down the steep slopes after each salvo. The salvo’s were chewing great chunks of mountain and inflicting heavy casualties. The Northern force meanwhile had reached high ground when the Japanese artillery had opened up on them, pounding Beach Red. By 10pm the americans were two miles inland and less than a mile from their first objective, designated Hill X. Hill X was a hilltop dominating Holtz Valley. The Americans would have to stop for the night as they could not see where they were going, unfortunately this gave the Japanese ample time to build up defensive positions on Hill X. At 4am, Willoughby got his half frozen men off their feet and they marched over the final ridges of Attu’s western mountains and emerged to the rear of the Japanese positions on the high ground overlooking Holtz Bay and the Northern force. The scouts quickly took up positions sliding on their back down long snow slopes. The Japanese saw them and launched a preemptive attack. Willoughbys men, exhibiting professionalism, took cover and demolish the attack with machine gun and mortars. The scouts doctor, Captain David Kelin went to work setting up aid stations with extreme speed that would save the lives of 15 badly wounded men on the 12th and 13th. On the 13th the Americans pushed within 2 miles of the Jarmin Pass, fighting every step they took. Willoughby and his elite scouts fought so furiously, the Japanese defenders estimated their strength to be a full division worth instead of 410. On the 14th a trio of F4F wildcats tried to support them courageously fighting the bad weather, but incredible wind gusts smashed them against a mountainside killing all of the pilots. Willoughbys men carried on their costly struggle that was necessary to stop the enemy from turning their full might down upon the Northern force. At 9am, as the fog lifted, Colonel Earle ordered his 3rd battalion to assault the Jarmin pass, but yet again it failed. His men only made it a few yards before they were crawling back under heavy fire. Earle himself was visiting the front lines early that afternoon and was a victim of sniper fire. His death was a grave loss, prompting General Brown to send his chief of staff Colonel Wayne Zimmerman to take command of the southern force.  At the same time Colonel Culin’s men were attacking the right flank of the Japanese defenders at Jarmin Pass, being met with machine gun fire, rifle fire and mortars. Pinned down one of Culin’s companies would be unable to move forward or back and had to be rescued. After beach artillery, Phelps naval guns and Nassaus Wildcats made a bombardment, the Northern force was able to push forward and link with the isolated company. By the late afternoon, Hill X was captured by Culins men who had to overrun Japanese positions to do so. The Japanese soon regrouped and counterattacked causing heavy casualties, but did not manage to dislodge the Americans. At this point, casualties were shockingly high, General Brown pressed Rockwell to land two reserve battalions, but unbeknownst to him the Perida had suffered an accident. As she was edging towards Massacre Beach to land her reinforcements and supplies, the transport ran into a pinnacle rock. Water gushed into her forward hull destroying radio equipment needed ashore. Perida backed off, listing and staggered until she beached at the mouth of the bay and now was undergoing repairs. Rockwell only had 4 more vessels for shipping. On May 13th, Zimmerman picked up where Earle had left off tossing men at Jarmin Pass. The soldiers struggled uphill through snow and Japanese lead, managing to get within 200 yards of the summit before triple crossfire tossed them back. After this defeat, Brown pressed again for reinforcements and was told two battalions would arrive early in the afternoon. By midafternoon, the 1st battalion of the 32nd regiment successfully landed and immediately marched up hill to fill the front lines. The 3rd battalion of the 32nd regiment however were prevented by steady Japanese anti-aircraft guns from landing.  Brown asked Rockwell to get Nevada to fire upon the Holtz Bay area. As Nevada steamed back and forth firing her 14 inch guns against the Japanese anti-aircraft positions in Holtz Bay, suddenly an officer on the bridge alerted everyone an enemy submarine was in the area. Rockwell snapped “Screw the torpedoes, slow speed ahead”. The IJN submarine I-31 lined herself up with the Neveda and fired a torpedo, but the old battleship managed to dodge it narrowly and her destroyer escorts Edwards and Farragut began firing upon the submarine, managing to trap her and sinking her with naval gunfire. Nevada silenced the Japanese flak guns giving the boys on the ground a fighting chance. Willoughbys scouts who had not eaten for 2 days drove the Japanese from the high ground, securing the summit and settling in for the night. To the east of them, Culins 1st battalion managed to drive the Japanese from a hilltop with the assistance of Nassau’s wildcats. Culin called up for reinforcements as his men dug in. For in 36 hours a full scale assault towards the mountain pass and enemy camp in Holtz Bay was going to begin.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The fighting for Attu was turning into carnage. The frigid weather combined with flying lead in all forms would take a horrifying toll on the poor souls who had the unfortunate job of dying in a remote part of the world, few people ever venture.

Last time we spoke about actions in New Guinea and the Japanese counteroffensive in Arakan. The good ol boys down unda were getting ready to launch a major offensive aimed to seize Lae and Salamaua. The Australian and American forces gradually built up enough strength to commence the offensive and high command decided to launch some feints, such as at Mubo to distract the Japanese from their real intentions. Over in Arakan, Irwins disaster was still paying dividends to the Japanese as General Koga launched a massive counterattack. Things were continuing to get worse for the British in Burma, though General Slim was beginning to make improvements. Lastly the British began a propaganda campaign to boost morale in the far east using the mad onion man Wingates recent adventure with the Chindits. Things were looking rough in the CBI theater.  This episode is the Operation Postern, the drive to Salamaua Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    I just want to say before we begin, this episode will feel a bit like one of those old tv episodes that rehashes what happened during that season. You’ve heard me say it a few times, but because we do this series in the week by week format sometimes we get into these messy weeks where either not much occurs or too much occurs. Regardless this episode is about multiple ongoing operations that culminate into the drive upon Salamaua and for the sake of coherency I am going to have to summarize a lot of what occurred in the south west pacific area for early 1943.  General Blamey devised a plan to capture Lae, codenamed Operation Postern. General MacArthur approved of the plan, which was quite complex and reflected the growing power of the allied forces in the southwest pacific. Blamey moved to New Guinea to take overall charge, reverting Herring to commander of the 1st corps, responsible for tactical operations. The key to quick success lay in convincing General Adachi, that Salamaua was the primary target for any major offensive. To accomplish this, it was necessary for the Australian and American forces to press upon the Japanese around the Salamaua area, but not Salamaua.  Operation Postern was preceded by three simultaneous operations occurring in the South west pacific area and the south pacific area. Together the three operations helped set up the conditions necessary to allow for an amphibious landing at Lae, by tying up the Japanese ground, naval and airpower in the region alongside creating important feints. The invasion of New Georgia was the first of these operations carried out by Admiral Bull Halsey and the 1st raider battalion. That offensive codenamed operation Toenails took up a lot of the Japanese ground, sea and air forces and would gradually see the allies capturing Munda. The 2nd was operation Chronicle, the seizure of Kiriwina and Woodlark islands located just northeast of Milne Bay. With their seizure, the allies were able to create new forward airfields from which to launch air strikes against Rabaul and provide air cover for multiple other operations in the region. Lastly the third operation was to be an assault on Nassau Bay, which we will talk about a bit later. Now back to the ground forces.   The 8th Area Army at Rabaul sent General Adachi and the 18th army to secure important areas west of Lae and Salamaua and to do so an offensive was launched against Wau. This prompted the Australian high command to send Brigadier Moten and the 17th brigade over to defend Wau in January of 1943. The battle to defend was tough, but the allies were able to prolong the Japanese advance long enough to transport enough troops to save Wau. The Japanese were sent retreating over to the Mubo area, but instead of pursuing the enemy, Moten limited his men's actions to patrols. The New Guinea force wished to pursue the Japanese, but was prevented by logistical difficulties. As the Australians gathered more strength, the Japanese prepared a second attempt to capture Way. This time the Japanese planned to approach Wau from the north, building a road from Markham point into the snake river valley. From there the Japanese advance would hit Wau. The 51st division was earmarked for the task, but the battle of the Bismarck sea had caused devastating losses to the convoy bringing them over in March of 1943.  The battle of the Bismarck sea had pressed upon the Japanese high command the increasing allied airpower, leading them to reformulate their plans. The Japanese began to construct a road to compensate for their inability to transport men and materials to New Guinea via the sea. As the Japanese did this, on the other side, the allies now felt very secure at Wau and were willing to perform some offensives. General Savige’s 3rd division was given command of the Wau-Bulolo area. For this task he had the 17th brigade, the 2/3rd, 25th and 2/7th independent companies. It was believed the Japanese had around 5500 men around Lae and Salamaua with around 6-8 thousand at Madang and 9- 11 thousand at Wewak. Savige was ordered not to attack Salamaua directly, so he decided to establish firm bases as far forward as possible to harass the Japanese, basically you can see this as forward offensive patrol actions. Now the Japanese had dug in some defensive positions in places called the Pimple, Green Hill and Observation Hill which were along the main track from Wau to Mubo. On April 24th, the 2/7th independent company were given a new mission; to clear the Japanese from the vicinity of Mubo. Moten approved a plan for the seizure of the Pimple and Green Hill, ordering Major Warfe and his 2/3rd company to harass the Japanese logistical routes in Mubo as a distraction as the 2/7th hit the Pimple. The Japanese had made the Pimple a nightmare for the allied forces. They had taken defensive positions on commanding ground allowing for concealed ambushes. They cleared firing lanes to enable their machine guns to gundown anyone who took a forward approach. By holding the high grounds they also thwarted the allies from utilizing grenades effectively.   On the morning of April 24, after 20 minutes of air attacks by Boston aircraft against Green Hill, Stony Creek, Observation Hill and Kitchen Creek, the offensive kicked off with a two pronged attack. The 2/7th would start from the Vicker’s ridge track, moving in two columns: one going along the Jap track towards the Pimple; the other would move north along the Laws track, a very difficult and quite unknown trail to try an encircle the Pimple from the west. When the two columns got within 100 yards of the pimple, they were met with light machine gun fire and snipers. The Australians attempted an all out assault in the late afternoon, but were unable to gain any ground. The next morning 3 Bostons came roaring in to strafe and bomb Green Hill while allied artillery began to bombard the Pimple. Despite the increased firepower the Australians still were unable to dislodge the enemy with their proceeding assaults. It turns out the Australians had greatly underestimate the defensive capabilities of the Pimple position. Reconnaissance had failed to pinpoint the enemy positions prior to the offensive. A major lack of communication between the two columns because they had no telephone lines or wireless communications led to a lack of coordination, neither allied column knew the plight of the other. Runners were used, but they were too slow and extremely vulnerable to Japanese snipers. The offensive was quickly falling apart as the Japanese continued to reinforce their lines. Meanwhile Warfe’s men conducted a number of raids and ambushes in the Missim area, Komiatum Hill and Bobdubi Ridge. Warfe then sent a patrol from Namling along the Bench Cut track to ambush the Japanese at the junction between the Francisco river and the Buirali Creek. The ambush was a large success leading to the deaths of 18 Japanese. Warfe tried to perform an identical operation on April 28th, but this time his men were ambushed by the Japanese at Goodview junctions suffering considerable casualties. As a result of the forward patrolling of Warfe’s men, the allies had learned the Dobdubi ridge area was defended quite lightly. Having learnt this, Ware decided to order a second platoon to capture the northern part of the ridge on April 27th. By the end of the month Warfe had two platoons spread over the Bobdubi ridge area, with a 3rd platoon held in reserve at Missim.  Over in his headquarters, Moten now realized the offensive against the Pimple was far too costly and he decided the men should simply bypass it. However the commander in the field, General Savige continued to launch attacks. The reason why Savige pressed on was because on April 28th, one of his reconnaissance patrols found a position on Pimple unoccupied and kicked seized it before the Japanese could return to man it. Colonel Guinn on the ground there deduced the Japanese must have been expecting an airstrike and momentarily left their positions. He therefore elected to order another company led by Captain Leslie Tatterson brought forward to assault the pimple. This time however, the allies used deception. Instead of launching an airstrike and artillery against the Pimple they passed over it and bombarded Green Hill. The deception did not work as planned and Saviges men yet again were unable to make any ground against the pimple. By early May the 2/7th battalion had lost 12 men dead with 25 wounded against the pimple with no end in sight. Meanwhile on May 3rd, an offensive was launched against the northern part of the Bobdubi ridge. The Australians were able to  fight their way close to the mouth of the Francisco river, prompting the Japanese to pull up reinforcements in the form of 70 SNLF marines from Salamua. A battle was fought in a place called the South Coconuts on May 5th. The Australians performed encircling maneuvers, managing to surround large pockets of the Japanese whom they smashed with artillery. The Australians were met with 3 major counter attacks but held their ground successfully occupying another place called the Center Coconuts by May 7th. However the Japanese then performed another counterattack, utilizing mortars to great effect, pushing the Australians back. The Japanese further reinforced the area with 60 additional men coming up from Salamaua, but they were ambushed by the Australians at the North Coconuts location suffering 20 casualties.     On May 9th, Captain Tattersons men were struck a lethal blow when they ran into a Japanese booby trap along the Jap Track. The Japanese opened fire upon the Australians on the track and began to encircle them. Colonel Guinn led a small force along the track to break the encirclement while Tatterson’s men resisted tenaciously against the Japanese. Tatterson’s force had been completely surrounded by the afternoon of May 9th and were in a state of desperation. The Australians utilized booby-traps, fire control and mass grenade attacks to force the Japanese to give them breathing room. The next day the Japanese launched a fierce attack against Tatterson’s rear. The Australians could hear Japanese officers screaming orders as their riflemen poured lead upon them. As the Japanese pressed upon them they were receiving 500 additional reinforcements from the 102nd and 115th regiments. Meanwhile the 3rd battalion of the 102nd regiment in Nassau bay received orders “to capture the high area on the right bank of the Buyawim River fork” to be done in coordination with the May 9th attacks. This action would have endangered the allied positions at Lababia camp, but luckily the Japanese commander decided instead to hold a defensive positions at the bank of the Bitoi mouth. This allowed Colonel Guinn to concentrate some of his forces at Lababia camp. By May 11th, a company of 60 men managed to break the Japanese encirclement of Tatterson’s men. According to Tatterson, by 7am on the 11th, the Japanese had continued to fire heavily upon his force, but made no further attempts to advance. It seemed to him the Japanese were actually withdrawing and the increased rifle fire and mortars was a cover. Tattersons men had been battered, he himself was wounded. His force received 12 casualties and estimated they had inflicted 100 casualties upon the enemy with possibly 50 deaths. Having saved Tatterson, Guinn reorganized his forward units and began to dig in along the Jap track and Lababia camp. From May 15th onwards the 17th brigade focused on aggressive patrolling in all sectors. Aggressive patrols each day harassed the Japanese around the Pimple and Observation Hill. The Australians set up booby-traps, practically paralyzing the Japanese troop movements outside their trenches. General Okabe received some much needed reinforcements over the course of the week and began to launch some limited attacks against the south, central and north Coconut areas. Okabe’s forces were repelled on the 12th and 13th, but things would greatly change on the 14th.  The 14th saw a heavy shelling of the Bobdubi ridge area before Okabe launched a full scale attack that overwhelmed the Australian defenders forcing them to make a fighting withdrawal from the north and central area further down in the south coconut area. General Nakano was displeased with his troops and issued an address of instruction of May 17th, it is as follows  "In the attack at Bobdubi, although a certain group was advancing on a height on the enemy's flank, instead of really carrying out the attack in such a way as to prepare the way for an assault by our main force, they went no further than a vain firing at the enemy with their weapons. The spiritual and physical strength which was worn down in the Wau campaign is at the present time still lower, but I believe it can easily be restored if the officers will take the initiative, set an example and command as leaders of their men." Despite Nakano’s criticism, his men would take a lot of ground forcing the Australians further south, dangerously close to Warfe’s headquarters. Warfe realized maintaining the position would lead to heavy casualties, so he pulled his force out and took up a position at Namling.  It was quite fortunate as the day after he made this decision, 20 Japanese dive bombers strafed and bombed the village of Bobdubi. This was part of a Japanese heavy air raid that began on May 15th, culminating in over 100 Japanese aircraft hitting multiple Australian positions over the course of a few days. Three heavy raids were performed, but these air attacks focused general far into the Australian rear, leaving the forward positions rather untouched. On may 17th and 18th large formations of Japanese aircraft performed a raid against Wau’s airfield. Although the Australians ultimately were forced to withdraw from many forward positions, such as Warfe’s units, they managed the ultimate objective of operation Postern, to take Japanese resources away from Mubo and Lae. They had inflicted numerous casualties upon the Japanese including against Major General Okabe who had stepped on a booby trap that put a bullet through his right foot. Okabe had to be evacuated on the night of may 16th as a result, flown back over to Rabaul. Command was handed over to Major General Muroya Chuichi of the 51st division. The battle for Dobdubi was nowhere near done. General Nakano sent 170 soldiers of the 115th regiment on May 17th to attack Hote via the Malolo track. Nakano estimated the Australians had around 50 men defending Hote. The Japanese force ran into 25 Australians at Cissembob along the way and the defenders inflicted 50 casualties upon the Japanese before withdrawing towards Ohibe. One Australian commander at Cissembob had this to say about the engagement  "During this running fight, all men were under very heavy fire, but once again it was brought out what rotten shots the Japanese were. Not one of our boys were hit, and believe me things were hot." The Australians would return to the Hote area on the 22nd to find it completely deserted, so they simply reoccupied their lost positions. That is it for the New Guinea campaign, but other significant events unfolded for the Pacific War during this time period. On April 21st, with a heavy heart President Roosevelt announced to the American people the Japanese had executed several airmen from the famous Doolittle raid. To refresh your memories, 8 of the Doolittle pilots had been captured in Jiangsu province and put on military trial within China and sentenced to death “because of their act against humanity”. They were then transported to Tokyo where the Army ministry reviewed their case. Hideki Tojo initially opposed the death sentences for fearing the Americans would retaliate against Japanese living in America, he would be right about this. Sugiyama and the rest of the Army general staff however insisted on executing all 8 of the pilots who had contributed to the deaths of around 50 civilians and thwart possible future air raids against Japan. The executions would be authorized by an ex post facto military regulation specifically drafted by the army ministry. What is interesting to note, is Emperor Hirohito chose to intervene and commuted the punishment of 5 out of the 8 pilots. Why he allowed the other 3 to die in violation of international law is unknown as the Japanese destroyed nearly all documentation pertaining to prisoners of war by the end of the war. Some historians theorize Hirohito wished to demonstrate his benevolence. Yet again, this is one of those moments that showcases Hirohito was a very active participant, despite the claims made for decades after the war that he was merely a powerless hostage. The 3 men were executed via firing squad at a cemetery outside Shanghai in China on October 14th of 1942. It was not until april of 1943 that the Doolittle Raid operation was fully disclosed to the American public. The US war department said the chief reason for not explaining the full details of the Doolittle raid sooner was the need to bring the Doolittle pilots safely home and to prevent reprisals against their Chinese allies who aided the pilots. In April of 1943 the 5 surviving pilots were moved to Nanjing and in December of 1943 Pilot Robert Meder died of beri beri. He had been starving for months and rejected medical assistance. His death would result in improvements of conditions for the remaining 4 pilots. A truly tragic part of this war and to add to this I would like to read a short piece written by one of the pilots who survived the captivity and became a Christian missionary in Japan after the war.   I Was a Prisoner of Japan   By Jacob DeShazer   I was a prisoner of war for 40 long months, 34 of them in solitary confinement.   When I flew as a member of a bombing squadron on a raid over enemy territory on April 18, 1942, my heart was filled with bitter hatred for the people of that nation. When our plane ran out of petrol and the members of the crew of my plane had to parachute down into enemy-held territory and were captured by the enemy, the bitterness of my heart against my captors seemed more than I could bear.   Taken to prison with the survivors of another of our planes, we were imprisoned and beaten, half-starved, terribly tortured, and denied by solitary confinement even the comfort of association with one another. Three of my buddies were executed by a firing squad about six months after our capture and 14 months later, another one of them died of slow starvation. My hatred for the enemy nearly drove me crazy.   It was soon after the latter's death that I began to ponder the cause of such hatred between members of the human race. I wondered what it was that made one people hate another people and what made me hate them.   My thoughts turned toward what I heard about Christianity changing hatred between human beings into real brotherly love and I was gripped with a strange longing to examine the Christian's Bible to see if I could find the secret.   I begged my captors to get a Bible for me. At last, in the month of May, 1944, a guard brought me the book, but told me I could have it only for three weeks.   I eagerly began to read its pages. Chapter after chapter gripped my heart. In due time I came to the books of the prophets and found that their every writing seemed focused on a divine Redeemer from sin, One who was to be sent from heaven to be born in the form of a human babe. Their writings so fascinated me that I read them again and again until I had earnestly studied them through six times. Then I went on into the New Testament and there read of the birth of Jesus Christ, the One who actually fulfilled the very prophecies of Isaiah, Jeremiah, Micah, and the other Old Testament writers.   My heart rejoiced as I found confirmed in Acts 10:43, "To Him give all the prophets witness, that through His Name, whosoever believeth on Him shall receive remission of sins." After I carefully read this book of the Acts, I continued on into the study of the epistle Paul wrote to the Christians at Rome.   On June 8, 1944 the words in Romans 10:9 stood out boldly before my eyes: "If thou shalt confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus and shalt believe in thine heart that God hath raised Him from the dead, thou shalt be saved."   That very moment, God gave me grace to confess my sins to Him and He forgave me all my sins and saved me for Jesus' sake. I later found that His Word again promises this so clearly in 1 John 1:9, "If we confess our sins, He is faithful and just to forgive us our sins and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness."   How my heart rejoiced in my newness of spiritual life, even though my body was suffering so terribly from the physical beatings and lack of food! But suddenly I discovered that God had given me new spiritual eyes and that when I looked at the enemy officers and guards who had starved and beaten my companions and me so cruelly, I found my bitter hatred for them changed to loving pity.   I realized that these people did not know anything about my Savior and that if Christ is not in a heart, it is natural to be cruel. I read in my Bible that while those who crucified Jesus had beaten Him and spit upon Him before He was nailed to the cross, on the cross He tenderly prayed in His moment of excruciating suffering, "Father, forgive them for they know not what they do."   And now, from the depths of my heart, I too prayed for God to forgive my torturers, and I determined by the aid of Christ to do my best to acquaint these people with the message of salvation that they might become as other believing Christians.   With His love controlling my heart, the 13th chapter of 1 Corinthians took on a living meaning: "Love suffereth long, and is kind; love envieth not; love vaunteth not itself, is not puffed up, doth not behave itself unseemly, seeketh not her own, is not easily provoked, thinketh no evil, rejoiceth not in iniquity but rejoiceth in truth; beareth all things, believeth all things. Love never faileth."   A year passed by and during that year the memories of the weeks I had been permitted to spend with my Bible grew sweeter and sweeter day by day. Then, one day as I was sitting in my solitary confinement cell I became very sick. My heart was paining me, even as my fellow prisoner had told me his was paining him just before he died of starvation.   I slid down onto my knees and began to pray. The guards rushed in and began to punish me, but I kept right on praying. Finally they let me alone. God, in that hour, revealed unto me how to endure suffering.   At last freedom came. On August 20, 1945 parachutists dropped onto the prison grounds and released us from our cells. We were flown back to our own country and placed in hospitals where we slowly regained our physical strength.   I have completed my training in a Christian college, God having clearly commanded me: "Go, teach those people who held you prisoner, the way of salvation through the blood of Jesus Christ," and am now back in that land as a missionary, with one single purpose--to make Christ known.   I am sending this testimony to people everywhere, with the earnest prayer that a great host of people may confess Jesus Christ as their personal Savior.   Alongside the unfortunate news for the Americans on May 14th a major tragedy occurred for the Australians. At 4:10am on the 14th, the Australian Hospital Ship Centaur was on a run from Sydney to Port Moresby when she was torpedoed by a Japanese submarine. The torpedo struck her portside oil fuel tank below the waterline, creating a 10 meter hole, igniting fuel and setting the ship ablaze. The ship was luckily not carrying patients, but held her normal crew staff, around 332 personnel on board. Many of those on board were killed instantly from the concussion blast, others from the blazing inferno. Centaur quickly took on water from her breach, rolled to port and sank bow-first, submerging within 3 minutes. Her rapid sinking prevented the deployment of lifeboats, though two would break off as she went down. According to Centaurs second officer Gordon Rippon, she was hit 44km northeast of Point Lookout. Of the 332 people onboard, only 64 would survive, most of the crew had been asleep when she was hit, giving barely a chance to react. It is estimated that 200 people may have been alive inside Centaur as she sank. Several who escaped the ship would die of shrapnel wounds or drown having found nothing to support them in the water. The survivors spent 36 hours in the water clinging to barrels, wreckage and two damaged lifeboats. The survivors drifted around 36 kms in the water going further north east. On the morning of May 15th, the destroyer USS Mugford departed Brisbane, escorted the New Zealand freighter Sussex when she saw some of the shipwrecked survivors. Sailors aboard the Mugford took up positions with rifles fending off sharks from the survivors. It took an hour and 20 minutes to rescue all 64 people. One of the survivors was sister Ellen Savage, the only surviving nurse from 12 aboard the Centaur. In 1944 Ellen Savage was presented the George Medal for providing medical care, boosting morale and displaying courage during the time they waited for rescue. The identity of the attacker was suspected to be a Japanese submarine. At the time of the attack three KD7 Kaidai class submarines were operating off Australians east coast; The I-177 commanded by Hajime Nakagawa, the I-178 commanded by Hidejiro Utsuki and the I-180 commanded by Toshio Kusaka. None of these submarines survived the Pacific War; the I-177 was sunk by the USS Samual S Miles on october 3rd of 1944; the I-178 was sunk by the USS Patterson on august 25th of 1943 and the i-180 was sunk by the USS Gilmore on april 26th of 1944. In December of 1943 following protests, the Japanese government issued an official statement denying any responsibility for the sinking of the Centaur. The sinking of a hospital ship was a war crime, and investigations were conducted between 1944-1948. The conclusion of the investigate suspected the I-177 of Nakagawa to be the most likely culprit, but there was not enough evidence, thus the case was closed on december 14th of 1948. Nakagawa survived the war and until his death in 1991 refused to speak about the suspected attack on the Centaur. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Australian and American forces in New Guinea were fighting tooth and nail towards their ultimate goal of Salamaua, trying to deceive the Japanese the whole while. Soon battles for Lae and Salamaua will be fought to rid New Guinea of the Japanese menace. 

Last time we spoke about Operation Vengeance, the assassination of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto. When the decrypted intelligence hit Admiral Nimitz desk about the vulnerability of his Japanese rival, he wondered what he should do. Was it moral? Would it even benefit the allies, Yamamoto was arguably losing the war on his own? In the end he ordered the hit and sent the job over to Admiral Halsey who enthusiastically took the bull by the horns. A special squadron of P-38 Lightnings were sent over to perform an extremely precise interception of Yamamoto’s G4M Betty aircraft enroute to Ballale airfield on Bougainville. Yamamoto’s aircraft was shot down killing him and all those aboard it. The death of the admiral was hidden from the Japanese public for an entire month and upon learning of it the Japanese people all mourned. It was a terrible moment for the Japanese, one of the greatest had fallen, how would the rest of the war play out?  This episode is the Japanese counteroffensive in Arakan Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    Before we jump back into the CBI theater some action was heating up in New Guinea. The Okabe detachment was defeated during the battle of Wau seeing the Australians controlling the area from Waipali to Buibaining and much of the Mubo Valley. However the Japanese remained resilient and would not give up Mubo without a fight. Vigorous patrolling and ambushes were all the Australians could perform, because they did not have the necessary numbers to launch a major offensive. In early March General MacKay sent word to Blamey, advising him he believed the Japanese might try another shot to seize Wau. He believed even with the projected arrival of the 4th and 15th brigades they would still be outnumbered by the Japanese. MacKay estimated the Japanese had roughly 7500 men in the Lae-Salamaua area and were maintaining a formidable defense in the Mubo region. Therefore he wanted to continue to restrict their activity to patrols to prevent the Japanese from surprising Wau again and allowing vital time to build up the defenses. The attack on Mubo in January had not accomplished its objectives, but it did show the Japanese at Lae and Salamaua how much of a hornet’s nest they had stirred up by attacking Wau. The Japanese were not done however and hoped to launch a counteroffensive. They planned to bring the 51st division in a large convoy across the Bismarck Sea. But as we saw in a previous episode this was met with catastrophe during the battle of the bismarck sea, denying the reinforcements, equipment and supplies the Japanese at Mubo desperately needed. 800 units, mostly from the 102 regiment held various positions at Mubo and they could not hope to launch a counteroffensive.  The supply situation in New Guinea remained a nightmare for both sides. In January Blamey authorized the construction of a new jeep trail going from Bulldog to Wau and it would take months to complete the 68 mile path. By April the Australians improved their situation in the Mubo area by occupying the heights called Saddle and Vicker’s ridge. They began placing artillery on the heights and on the 20th began to bombard the Japanese position on Green Hill. On the 23rd, Major General Stanley Savige of the 3rd division established his Headquarters at Bulolo. Kanga force had been officially dissolved, thus henceforth the 3rd division was responsible for offensives in the Wau-Lae-Markham area. For months the focus had been on reinforcing Wau, expecting a major Japanese offensive. But the Australians had also maintained a small force 11 miles from Salamaua guarding the entrance to the Markham valley. The 2/3rd independent company was occupying in the vicinity of Missim village along the Francisco river between the Powerhouse and Salamaua. In early april they began performing reconnaissance of the area. On the 21st the ambushed a column of 60 Japanese managing to kill over 20 of them and wounding 15. Soon after their commander was notified by Moten that they were going to launch an offensive against Mubo finally set for the 24th. The offensive against Mubo was actually part of something grander. General Blamey planned to capture Lae forming a plan codenamed Operation postern which was quickly approved by General MacArthur. For the plan to work, the allies needed to trick General Adachi that Salamaua was the primary target for a major offensive. Thus to accomplish this, the Australians had the ⅔ independent company operate just a few miles from Salamaua. General Stanley Savige would not even be aware of these grander planes until June of 1943. Postern called for a large pincer movement, involving an amphibious assault east of Lae and an airborne assault near Nadzab 50 kms to the west of Lae. Planning for Postern had begun in May, with Generals Blamey and Herring proposing to seize Nadzab as soon as possible with Brigadier Eather’s 25th Brigade and a parachute battalion, while the 9th Australian Division, now under the command of Major-General George Wooten, was to take Lae in early August. Nadzab was an obvious target, undefended and of immense value, not only for the Lae operation but also for extending the range of Allied air power. In the meantime Blamey had various forces drive the Japanese from key areas, but not to attack Salamaua directly. The Japanese were going to be in for a major surprise. But now we are turning over to the CBI theater. Last time we were speaking about General Irwins Arakan disaster and the mad onion man Wingate’s operation Longcloth. Irwins blunders had cost countless lives and provided General Koga’s 55th division ample time to regroup. By March 20th, Wavell, Irwin and Lloyd were accepting they would have to withdraw the forces to the Maungdaw-Buthidaung line. Wavell was incredibly pissed off and decided to make Lloyd a scapegoat. Lloyd was dismissed and replaced by Major General Lomax who was ordered to simply carry on doing what Lloyd had been doing. Lomax came just in time to meet General Koga’s counteroffensive which practically annihilated the 47th brigade. Irwin looking to blame anyone and anything but himself, shifted the blame to the brigade itself rather than his tactical blunders and tried again to bring Slim into his mess. The British forces were forced to flee east of the Mayu river and this severely beat India morale which was already horrible to begin with.   Now how bad was morale? By early April morale had plummeted to an all time new low. This was because of the series of terrible defeats, terrible casualties and growing more from malaria. The 6th brigade wsa evacuating 50 men due to malaria a day. Despite using mepacrine as a suppressive treatment alongside anti-moquito nets, cream and wearing long clothes at night, in 8 weeks the 6th brigade lost half its total strength. Desertions were on the rise from many units, causing the British commanders a lot of anxiety over their loyalty.  General’s Slim and Lomax met at Chittagong as Koga was sweeping everything before him. Both generals scoured over the maps and agreed, Koga’s next logical step was an assault on the Maungdaw-Buthidaung line. To meet this attack, Slim and Lomax devised a stratagem for catching Koga in a box along the Mayu peninsula. The box was to involve 6 battalions, two on the ridges of the Mayu hills, two along the mayu river and two in the hills south of the Maungdaw-Buthidaung road. The idea was to let the Japanese advance through the most likely location, some tunnels on a disused railway track. Once the Japanese were along the tunnels, they would close the lid on the box using a force of brigade level strength. The hope was to achieve a perfect encirclement, chasing the legendary glory of Hannibal’s victory at the battle of Cannae. To do this they had exhausted and unbelievably demoralized men and would have to achieve a scheme of geometric perfection.  The troops Lomax came to command were shaken badly, malaria riden battalions, departing the disastrous Arakan campaign at the point of exhaustion. There were no trained formations available in India to replace them, thus they would have to be retained in combat. By early April, Lomax had skillfully managed to stabilize the front at the Maungdaw-Buthidaung. On April 14th Marshall Wavell had appointed General Slim’s 15th corps to lead the British-Indian forces retreat. The Japanese sensing weakness amongst the allied forces continued their advance. On April 24th, the Japanese reached the British defenses at Buthidaung and Maungdaw. The 55th indian Brigade held the first attack at Kanthe while carefully preparing their entrapment box strategy, pushing the Japanese advance along the spine of the Mayu mountains; however it all went to shit. Two demoralized battalions gave way to Japanese pressure, breaking the box. This forced everything to come undone and soon the British-Indian forces were yet again performing a fighting withdrawal going north.  It was reported that the fighting efficiency was so low by April 28th, the men of the 8/13th frontier force regiment had literally fired off all their ammunition at an imaginary opponent, and when they actually were attacked the next day they had no option but to retreat. The withdrawal culminated with the capture of Buthidaung on May 9th. The 55th brigade narrowly escaped annihilation by abandoning their vehicles and heavy equipment while limping by foot over some jungle covered hills to safety. Five days later the port of Maungdaw was evacuated and the British-Indian defenders began to take up defensive positions in the open rice-field country near Cox’s Bazar. As General Slim noted “Our only hope of stabilizing the front, if the Japanese really pushed us, was to hold the rice-field country. Our men were still untrained for the jungle; they feared it more than they did the enemy. We had to select areas where we could give our troops reasonable fields of fire and open maneuver.‘It was too much like 1942 over again, with the added bitterness that this time we had been defeated by forces smaller than our own.” Slim was very better about the entire ordeal. To make matters worse, the men only pulled out after Slim’s incessant pressure applied to Lomax, because Irwin was counter arguing they should toss the kitchen sink for a siege strategy. All the way over in London Sir Winston Churchill had this to say “‘This campaign goes from bad to worse, and we are being completely outfought and outmanoeuvred by the Japanese. Luckily the small scale of the operations and the attraction of other events has prevented public opinion being directed upon this lamentable scene.” Churchill was writing at a time, after the Anglo-American victory in North Africa and the crushing soviet victory at Stalingrad. It was obvious to Churchill and the other allied leadership, Europe was won. Churchill was furious with Wavell, a man he never really liked. The Americans likewise were not happy with Wavell. Meanwhile Irwin kept blaming everyone except himself, even sending reports of how cowardly his troops were. Irwins last absurdity was to signal a recommendation that General Slim by removed from commanding the 15th corps. But Wavell, under severe criticism of himself by this point was determined that Irwin would be canned. Slim was ordered to report to Irwin’s HQ. Slim told his colleagues around him he was about to be dismissed as he made his way. When he got to Irwin he was met with this ‘You’re not sacked. I am.’ Upon hearing this, Slim remarked: ‘I think this calls for the opening of a bottle of port or something if we have one.’   The British-Indians forces had  916 dead, 2889 wounded and 1252 missing; the Indian high command had suffered another heavy blow, with the myth of Japanese superiority, excellence and skill as a jungle fighter being strongly reinforced in the minds of British and Indian troops, something that gravely affected their morale General Slim held a rather remarkable ability, mental toughness with some extraordinary resistance to stress. The frustrations of all the defeats and the constant shuffling between HQs and the front was a lot to bear. Slim actually found something positive about the Arakan disaster. The British battle casualties were high, but they could have been a hell of a lot higher, given Irwins insistance to perform endless frontal attacks. The British had learnt valuable lessons about the Japanese and the lack of their own training in specific areas. There had been over 7500 cases of malaria and they were only truly learning on the spot how to deal with the pesky disease. Troops heanceforth would be routinely issued with mosquito nets, repellents and by autumn of 1943 a wonder drug was developed, Mepacrine which significantly helped with the symptoms of malaria.  But by far and large the most significant long term development in 1942-1943 was the gradual reasseration of allied air superiorirty. By the end of 1942, 150 new airfields were constructed, RAF pilots and aircraft began to arrive to them in large numbers and the Americans had sent 10,000 air force personnel to serve in the CBI theater. Heavy B-24 Liberator bombers began to appear at the battlefront for the first time and in November of 1942 some made the spectacular 2760 mile return trip after bombing Bangkok. The Japanese quickly realized their proposed Burma-Siam railway was very vulnerable. When the war in the middle east came to a close in early 1943, the US army airforce transferred a ton of their heavy bombers to the far east. Bombing raids on Bangkok, Rangoon and Mandalay were increased significantly by Christmas of 1942. The Japanese were gradually losing their air superiorirty and this was deeply troubling for them.  During the Arakan campaign a Japanese colonel issued the following orders ‘There must be no fear of aircraft. As long as you are not discovered you must seek to remain so. If once our position is revealed, the enemy planes must be shot down. It is not permissible to suppose that our soldiers are no match for aircraft.’ The Japanese were forced to yield the skies over Arakan even though they had taken its ground. The RAG would conduct search and destroy missions over Thaitkido, Buthidaung, Sinho and Akyab island in June. 6 Hurricanes would escort some Blenheim bombers on a long range raid against Ramree island, even though they were not safe. Allied air superiority would eventually become the crucial factor to win the struggle over Burma. Now we cant talk about Burma without talking a bit more about the mad onion man Wingate. While the Arakan campaign was coming to its disastrous conclusion, Operation Longcloth had reached its own. The last remaining columns made their way back to allied territory. 2182 returned out of the original 3000 men that entered Burma; an estimated 818 men had been killed, taken prisoner or died of disease. There was a ton of criticism tossed at the operation and the effectiveness of the Chindits, but the operation was moderately successful. To be brutally honest, the Burma campaign had basically no success stories except for the Chindits, thus it got inflated quite heavily. Wavell was very pleased with the performance of Wingate’s forces, so much so he put in an order to form the new Long Range Penetration group, the 111th Indian Brigade. Wavell handpicked their commander, Brigadier William Lentaigne who would come to hate Wingate and Wingate hated him haha. The success of the Chindits would be tossed in all the major headlines of every newspaper from England to India. The British had to do something to raise morale and the Chindits kind of just fell into it. Now one last major event that occurred during all of this was a major conference. Wavell had been flown to Washington to partake in the Trident Conference which was carried from May 12-25th. The main focus of the conference was on the European theater, in fact there was an obsession over the Mediterranean cross channel invasion plans. When it came to theaters like Burma there was little interest. In fact Churchill would often only talk about Singapore when the east was brought up, showcasing full and well he only sought to revitalize the prestige of the British empire over other things. Churchill was quite in favor of bypassing Burma which he viewed as only being beneficial to China, a subject he could not understand why FDR obsessed over. It seemed the Churchill FDR regarded China as the emerging dominant power in the far east, while he only regarded CHina as a pacific power, ignoring China’s claims over Tibet, Mongolia and northeastern Burma, and of course Churchill would completely ignore any mention of Hong Kong. FDR was seen to be extremely Pro-Chiang Kai-shek, almost maniac by British accounts. The British began to adopt a machiavellian stance of supporting Chiang Kai-shek and Chennault's airpower idea, thinking it would surely fail, which served Britain just fine.  Meanwhile, Vinegar Joseph Stilwell also at the Trident conference, kept trying to persuade his president that Chiang Kai-Shek was cunning and quite evil. He stressed the danger of American becoming a solitary atlas bearing the burden of the world because the British were outplaying them. He underlined Chiang Kai-sheks ambitions to get rid of him and replace him with a “yes man”, so he could acquire lendlease material for his own ends without any pushbacks. Stilwell recommended sending US troops to the CBI theater; to get Chiang Kai-shek to make specific commitments and stop wiggling around issues and above all to stop Chiang Kai-sheks stab-in-the-back secret diplomacy antics. Stilwell would find the British at Trident very unimpressed with him and his opinions. Stilwell also chose to bitterly argue with Field Marshal Alanbrooke, the chief of the imperial staff and a rampant Americanphobe. It got so bad, George Marshall told Stimson ‘Stilwell shut up like a clam and made an unfavourable impression.’  During the conference FDR did ask Stilwell in private what he thought of Chiang Kai-shek to which Stilwell said ‘He’s a vacillating, tricky, undependable old scoundrel who never keeps his word.’ By contrast Chennault, when asked a similar question, replied: ‘Sir, I think the generalissimo is one of the two or three greatest military and political leaders in the world today. He has never broken a commitment or promise made to me.’ Meanwhile Chiang Kai-sheks representatives including his wife were threatening to pull out of Burma and to make a separate peace with Japan, unless the British finally took action to seize Rangoon. Instead it was agreed, more supplies would be tossed over the Hump and for the future operation Anakim to be shelved, to which Stilwell argued that if the allies waited another year before launching a land-based campaign, China would collapse.  Trident was chaotic as hell. Admiral King slammed the table with his fists many times violently supporting Marshall and Stilwell. King and Marshall wanted the land route to China open, but the British kept tossing their support for the Hump operations. Stilwell was not having a good time, but then he had a surprising victory. Stilwell met with Churchill privately, complaining about the abysmal situation in Burma, and Churchill 100% agreed with his criticisms. Churchill acknowledged the high command in India was terrible and that he was going to replace Wavell. As Stilwell wrote after the experience.   “With Wavell in command, failure was inevitable; he had nothing to offer at any meeting except protestations that the thing was impossible, hopeless, impractical. Churchill even spoke of it as silly. The Limeys all wanted to wait another year. After the Akyab fiasco, the four Japanese divisions in Burma have been scared to death. The inevitable conclusion was that Churchill has Roosevelt in his pocket. That they are looking for an easy way, a short cut for England, and that no attention must be diverted from the Continent at any cost. The Limeys are not interested in the war in the Pacific, and with the President hypnotised they are sitting pretty. Roosevelt wouldn’t let me speak my piece. I interrupted twice but Churchill kept pulling away from the subject and it was impossible.’ Thus Wavell was as they say “kicked up stairs”, promoted to viceroy of India and replaced as commander in India with Sir Claude Auchinleck. Stilwell returned to China and participated on a celebrity tour arranged by George Marshall to heighten his profile. Once that was done, Stilwell fell into a depression writing this  “‘Back to find Chiang same as ever – a grasping, bigoted, ungrateful little rattlesnake.Any Jap threat will put the Peanut in an uproar, and if they are wise they will repeat their attempt, for this if for no other reason. And if they seriously want to gain the game, they can attack Kunming or Chungking, or both, with five divisions on either line and finish the matter. If we sting them badly enough in the air, they are almost sure to try it . . . The Peanut’s promise of picked men for India is so much wind; last year 68% of the men sent were rejected for trachoma or skin disease . . . This is going beyond all bounds. This insect, this stink in the nostrils, superciliously inquires what we will do, who are breaking our backs to help him, supplying everything – troops, equipment, planes, medical, signal, motor services, setting up his goddam SOS, training his lousy troops, backing his dastardly chief of staff, and general staff, and he the Jovian dictator, who starves his troops and is the world’s worst ignoramus, picks flaws in our preparations and hems and haws about the Navy, God save us.” Stilwell’s frustration was a bit understandable as Chiang Kai-shek had still not replied to FDR about if or when he could commit forces into Burma again. Stilwell was baffled by his nations continued support of what he saw as a fascist regime in China, while simultaneously fighting the fascist regimes in Europe. What Stilwell really wanted was to be made field commander in China, and if he ever got that position, the first thing he would do was cancel the lendlease. Things were not going so well for the married couple of Vinegar Joe and Peanut. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Things were not going well in Burma to say the least. Well except for the Chindits minor success, but that simply could not overcome the incredible low morale of the far east allied forces in the face of what seemed an unstoppable Japanese goliath. 

Last time we spoke about the situation in the north pacific and the grand conclusion of the Chindits Operation Longcloth. The battle of the Komandorski islands had basically put a nail in the coffin that was the Aleutian islands campaign for japan. They could not hope to resupply Attu and Kiska properly, therefore America had a free hand to build up to invade them. Also the crazed Onion man Wingate had taken his boys in the fray of Burma and they paid heavily for it. Yes despite all the glory and fame that the propaganda perpetuated the operation had done, in reality, Wingate had sacrifice many lives for little gain. His erratic behavior led to dangerous decision making which took a toll on the men. In the end what can be said of the operation was it atleast provided something positive to boost morale for the British in the far east. But today we are going to speak about the falling of a major giant of the pacific war. This episode is Operation Vengeance  Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Now two weeks ago I covered Operation I-Go and you may have noticed I sprinkled a bit of foreshadowing information here and there. But to catch you back up to speed so to say let me just summarize those events and the dire circumstances what person would find himself in.  It can easily be deduced by early 1943, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto knew Japan was staggering towards a catastrophic defeat. Rather ironically, he was one of those figures in Japan that tossed as much as his political influence could against the decision to go to war with america. He warned his high ranking colleagues of the great industrial might America held and that it would inevitably overwhelm Japan. His obsession over a decisive naval victory was driven mostly because he knew the only possible way for Japan to come out of WW2 positively was to bring America to the negotiating table as early as possible. But how does one do that exactly? Well Japan held a significant advantage over America in 1941, their Pacific Fleet was by far larger, vastly better trained and held considerable technological advantages. Thus like a game of Axis & Allies, a game I have been playing since I was a teenager and hope to livestream now and then for audiences like yourself, well like a good old game of Axis & Allies if you are the Axis you typically toss the kitchen sink at the offset of the war hoping to break the allies before their productive advantage gradually wins them the board. Yamamoto engineered the raid on Pearl Harbor to smash the US Pacific fleet enough to thwart them of any offensives for 6 months at minimum, though he definitely hoped for a year. After that his plan had always been to force america into a naval surface battle in the hopes of taking out their fleet and forcing them to negotiate. If they did not negotiate after that, well he hoped to buy Japan enough time to build a complex defensive perimeter which perhaps could be used to bleed Americans dry and thus gradually get them to come to terms. Well his obsession for the grand naval battle led him into a trap. Yes, a critical thing the Japanese overlooked during most of the Pacific War was code breaking. The Cryptanalysts at Station Hypo did miracles breaking the JN-25 code, leading them to deduce Admiral Yamamoto’s operation MI was directed at Midway atoll. They had knowledge of the locations, the units and the timetables and they used this intelligence to set up a major trap for the combined fleet. The June 1942 disaster at Midway had been a major gambit aimed at forcing the war to an early conclusion, a gambit which fell apart. The losses at Midway meant the war was not to be a prolonged one, though it might surprise many of you to know, the chance of another decisive naval battle was not all but lost, it would just be harder to configure. Regardless the overall viewpoint after the failure at Midway now meant Japan had to fight a war of attrition, something Japan could not hope to win.  Yamamoto had obsessed himself and countless other high ranking figures that Midway was to be the decisive battle, but in reality it fell upon Guadalcanal. Yes the battle for Guadalcanal emerged the decisive battle they had all sought, but the Japanese high command were late to this conclusion. The Americans basically snuck onto the island in an extremely bold manner, forcing what became a horrifying bloody war. In the end the Americans won the battle for Guadalcanal and because of Japan’s lackluster planning, this simultaneously led to the major loss of the Buna-Gona-Sanananda front as well. New Guinea and the Solomons were intertwined and Japan kept fumbling back and forth between them which inevitably was leading to them losing both. After the loss at Guadalcanal, Japan had lost the initiative for the Pacific War, now America was in the drivers seat. The battle of the Bismarck Sea proved to the Japanese high command, their sealanes were no longer safe. America was dominating Japan’s ability to move men and supplies across the ocean through a war of attrition using airpower and submarines. The Japanese planners understood the allies were going to advance in two prongs; one through New Guinea and the other up the central and northern solomons. For the allies to advance, they required the construction of airfields along the way to provide air superiority to cover their surface fleets and transports of men and supplies. Japan had been massively depleted of ships, aircraft, trained men, resources in general, but one thing they still had an advantage over the allies was their airfields scattered about the Pacific.  On March 15th Japanese high command in Tokyo demanded plans be made to build a new defensive strategy in the central Pacific. The main idea was to build a stronger defensive perimeter emanating from Rabaul. Thus on the morning of April 3rd of 1943, Admirals Yamamoto and Ugaki, accompanied by more than a dozen officers of the combined Fleet staff boarded two Kawanishi flying boats and headed for Rabaul. Yamamoto and the high ranking figures scoured their maps and came up with what was needed to be done to meet this new demand. They needed to hinder the American airpowers advance up the Solomons and New Guinea, this meant hitting allied forward airfields. Four locations were chosen: Guadalcanal, Oro Bay, Port Moresby and Milne Bay. It was to be called Operation I-GO Sakusen and would be the responsibility of the IJN. Admirals Yamamoto and Jinichi Kusaka established temporary headquarters on Rabaul and began planning. The planning led to an incredible concentration of Japanese airpower. The 11th airfleet and 4 aircraft carriers of the 3rd fleet: Zuikaku, Zuiho, Junyo and Hiyo would amass a force of 224 aircraft. The airpower was going to be used to smash the 4 targets and then they would be dispersed to several airfields to mount a new defensive perimeter. They would be sent to places like Buka and Kahili on Bougainville and Ballale in the Shortland Islands. Admiral Yamamoto would personally supervise Operation I-GO as he took up quarters on a cottage high on a hill behind the town of Rabaul. He spent weeks inspecting airfields and other military installations, meeting with local army and navy commanders at various headquarters scattered about New Britain. As was his typical behavior, he bid farewell to departing air squadrons waving his hat to them. For 10 consecutive days, Japanese bombers and fighters hit their designated targets. More than 200 aircraft attacked Guadalcanal on April 7th, a raid larger than any attempted during the 5 month battle over the island. The Japanese pilots came back with extremely exaggerated claims of success. They claimed to have destroyed dozens of ships and hundreds of aircraft. In reality operation I-Go amounted to the destruction of 25 aircraft, 1 destroyer, 1 corvette, 1 oil tanker and 2 transports. The Japanese had lost around 40 aircraft for this.  The Japanese high command including Yamamoto and even Emperor Hirohito bought the success stories. Hirohito send word stating “Please convey my satisfaction to the Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet, and tell him to enlarge the war result more than ever.” On the other side of the conflict, General Kenney had a more damning critique of the way Yamamoto used his air forces during Operation I-Go, “… the way he [Yamamoto] had failed to take advantage of his superiority in numbers and position since the first couple of months of the war was a disgrace to the airman’s profession.” The reality was, the aircrews were not the same types that raided Pearl Harbor in 1941, no these men in 1943 were forgive me to say, kind of the bottom of the barrel types. Sure there remained some veterans and experiences men, but far and too few to trained what should have been a brand new generation of Japanese airpower. Japan had squandered their veterans and now she was paying a heavy price for it. On October 25th of 1942, Rear-Admiral Ugaki had written this in his diary “every time it rained heavily, about ten planes were damaged due to skidding.” The Japanese airfields were no match for the American Seabees who were performing miracles across the pacific building superior fields for their airpower. By contrast the Japanese could not hope to match this, they lacked resources and trained personnel. Operation I-GO in the end costed the allies advance 10 days. Yamamoto had his spirits lifted somewhat by Operation I-GO believing it to be a triumph. He announced he would conduct a one-day tour of forward bases at Buin, Ballale and Shortland Island set for April the 18th and this is where our story truly begins. Yamamoto’s tour was sent over the radio waves using the JN-25D naval cypher to the 11th air flotilla and the 26th air flotilla. Admiral Yamamoto’s operations officer Commander Yasuji Watanabe would go on the record complaining that the information about Yamamoto’s visit to the Ballalae Airfield should had been done by courier and not by radio, but the communications officer replied “this code only went into effect on april 1st and cannot be broken”. The message was picked up by three stations of the “Magic” apparatus, the United States cryptanalysis project. One of the three stations ironically was the same team responsible for breaking the codes that led to Midway, station Hypo at Pearl Harbor. Major Alva B. Lasswell, a duty officer at Joseph Rochefort's Combat Intelligence Unit Station HYPO deciphered it and pronounced it to be a "jackpot". The message contained highly detailed information and it was easy to deduce the message was about Yamamoto. It contained his departure time: April 18, 06:00 Japanese Standard Time, 08:00 Guadalcanal Time set for Ballale, 08:00 Japanese Standard Time, 10:00 Guadalcanal Time.; his aircraft which was a G4M Betty and the number of his escorts, 6 Zeros; as well as the entire itinerary for his tour. Admiral Yamamoto’s plane was going to be heading over the southern end of Bougainville on the morning of the 18th, a location that happened to be just within the fighter range of Henderson Field. Alva Bryan Lasswell and intelligence officer Jasper Holmes took the decrypted message to CINCPAC headquarters and handed it to the fleet intelligence officer Ed Layton who tossed it upon Admiral Nimitz desk a few minutes after 8 on April 14.  Nimitz scrutinized the chart on his wall and confirmed himself that Yamamoto’s plane would enter airspace that could be reached by american fighters from Henderson. “He asked Layton “Do we try to get him?”. The question honestly was a tough one. Was it wrong to target the combined fleet chief based on some sort of convention upon military chivalry? Like most naval officers, Nimitz had interacted socially with Japanese officers during the interwar years. Nimitz was not a particularly vengeful nor bloody-minded man. In era’s past, an American flag or general officer would certainly refuse to have his rival commander assassinated. For you American listeners, can you conceive George Washington ordering a hit on William Howe? How about Robert E Lee ordering a hit on Ulysses Grant? However war in the 20th century was not like the previous centuries. Hell even by the standards of the war in europe, the Pacific War was unbelievably more brutal. Honestly if you wanted a good book on the subject of how brutal the Pacific war was, try John D Dowers “War without Mercy: Race & Power in the Pacific War”.  Now during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, cough cough if you want to hear about that one check out my Youtube channel, the IJA and IJN had strictly adhered to the rules of war. Russian prisoners were housed well, fed well, provided good medical care, given cigarettes and alcohol, the 2nd one very important to russians as we know haha. Those who died within captivity were even buried with military honors. During WW1 the Japanese took German prisoners after the siege of Tsingtau and treated them extremely well in Japan, let them parade the country with a band and such. In fact the treatment of the German POW’s had a small hand to play in how Japan got into bed with Germany later, and honestly to this very day Japan and Germany have this special relationship. However, Japan certainly did not bring this type of chivalrous etiquette into the Pacific War.  Nimitz may have hesitated to give the order, but he knew full well of the Japanese actions in China, the Philippines, Malaya, Hong Kong, the East Indies, the Solomons. I guess you can say barbarity dishes out barbarity. Yet aside from the morality question, was it wise to kill Yamamoto? This was after all the man who planned and executed the disastrous Midway offensive losing 4 aircraft carriers with nearly all their aircraft. Yamamoto had also mismanaged the guadalcanal campaign by deploying air and troop reinforcements in piecemeals. He arguably was doing a good job losing the war. Layton knew Yamamoto personally and argued that he was the best-respected military leader in Japan and that his death “He’s unique among their people… Aside from the Emperor, probably no man in Japan is so important to civilian morale. [His absence] would demoralize the fighting navy. You know Japanese psychology; it would stun the nation.”. Layton said to Nimitz “You know, Admiral Nimitz, it would be just as if they shot you down. There isn’t anybody to replace you”. To this Nimitz smiled amusingly and replied “it’s down in Halsey’s bailiwick, if there’s a way, he’ll find it. All right, we’ll try it”. Thus sealed the fate of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto. Thus Admiral Nimitz sent a “your eyes only” message to Admiral Halsey, alerting him to the situation and ordering a fighter interception with the concluding remarks “best of luck and good hunting”. Codenamed Operation Vengeance approved on the 14th, the assassination of Admiral Yamamoto was done under utmost secrecy to protect the cryptanalysis teams. It just so happened Halsey had already been informed of the operation in a chance encounter in Melbourne Australia. He was inspecting naval facilities in the city and dropped by the communications intelligence office where a yeoman named Kenneth Boulier was working on one of the draft decrypts. Halsey came to his desk and asked “what are you working on son?”. And when Boulier explained, Halsey raised his voice and addressed the entire unit “Goddamit, you people knock off this Yamamoto business! I’m going to get that sonofabitch myself!”. I guess one can say he was enthusiastic about the job. Halsey informed his subordinate air commanders, Admirals Aubrey Fitch and Marc Mitscher about the details of Operation vengeance. Southern Bougainville was roughly 400 miles away from Henderson field and the aircraft would need to take a roundabout route to evade detection. Thus the mission would require 1000 miles or so of flying, a range that would test the capabilities of even the longest legged American fighters. AirSols commander Mitscher called for a secret meeting of his staff on April 16th to figure out the logistics of the operation. It was determined that to intercept Yamamoto’s flight, they should use Lockheed P-38 Lightnings which held a comparable range to that of the Zero fighter, though it would not alone be enough. They would need to use a lean fuel mixture and drop tanks to barely make the long flight. It was going to be quite tight, thus the timing had to be precise, or else the aircraft would burn their fuel while waiting for the enemy to make their appearance. Major John Mitchell of the 339th fighter squadron was assigned the commander of 18 P-38’s piloted by handpicked airmen. 4 P-38’s would be designated as “killers”, ie: the guys who would target Yamamoto’s G4M Betty, while the other pilots would cover them against the Zero escorts. The killers were to be Captain Thomas Lanphier, Lieutenants Rex Barber, Joseph Moore and James McLanahan. They were going to intercept Yamamoto in the air just south of Empress August Bay.  Now the direct flight to Bougainville meant crossing over or very close to Japanese held islands which held observers. This meant they would need to veer far out to sea to avoid any visual contact made by Japanese coastwatchers. Likewise they would skim the ocean at wave-top height to avoid detection by Japanese radar. Mitchell plotted their missions course to remain at least 50 miles offshore. This also meant they would have no landmarks to use as checkpoints: it would have to be dead reckoning the entire way, flying by airspeed, clock and compass under strict radio silence for over 2 hours, until they saw the Bougainville coast. The strike force would depart guadalcanl at 7:20. Even after all the precision and planning, the lightning force would only have around 15 minutes to shoot down Yamamoto, this was a extremely tight one. Mitchell gave the odds of the operation succeeded about a thousand to one. Back over in Rabaul commanders like Admirals Ozawa and Jojima were trying to change Yamamotos mind about making the tour to the forward airbases thinking he was taking a large risk. Adamiral Ozawa argued with Captain Kameto Kuroshima, a senior member of Yamamoto’s staff “If he insists on going, six fighters are nothing like enough. Tell the chief of staff that he can have as many of my planes as he likes.” Admiral Ugaki who was sick in the hospital with dengue ever tried to send a message to Yamamoto to not go on the tour. That message though it did not make it to Yamamoto directly was interceived by Admiral Jojima. Admiral Jojima argued “what a damn fool thing to do, to send such a long and detailed message about the activities of the Commander of the combined fleet so near the front. This kind of thing must stop” Jojima had actually flown over to Rabaul to stop Yamamoto, but Yamamoto did not back down. Yamamoto was a stickler for punctuality, he alongside his party arrived to Rabaul’s Lakuni field a few minutes before 6am Japan time, thus around 8am rabaul time. The party wore their field green khai uniforms and airmens boots, aside from Yamamoto who wore his customary white dress uniform, with his usual white gloves carrying his ceremonial sword. Yamamoto climbed into one of the two G4M Betty medium bmbers and Ugaki climbed into the other. Yamamoto’s Betty had the number 323 painted on its vertical stablizer. The planes roared down the runway and climbed. The weather was clear, with excellent visibility above and below the high ceiling. The aircraft leveled out at 6500 with the bombers holding a close formation, enough for Ugaki to clearly see Yamamoto through the windshield of the other plane. The fighters hung out at 8200 feet above them and around a mile around them. The formation headed southeast making its first landfall on the southern tip of new ireland, then south along the coast of Bougainville, past the Japanese bases at Buka and Kieta, then on to Ballale. Ugaki began to nod off as the group began its descent towards Ballale.    Major Mitchells strike group launched at 7:10 guadalcanal time, seeing 2 lightnings fail as a result of a blown tire for one and a fuel transfer problem for the other. Both aircraft were part of the killers team, thus Lieutenants Besby Holmes and Raymond Hine, were replaced with Joseph Moore and James McLanahan. Not a great way to start such a precise mission by any means. As they made the first leg of their route, the P-38’s descended to 50 feet to avoid radar detection while the pilots had to endure extremely hot temperatures due to the sea level. The temperature was above 90 degrees as the sun blazed through their Perspex canopies causing the pilots to sweat like pigs. The P-38 was a high altitude fighter and its canopy could not open in flight to regulate the cockpit temperature. Thus instead it kind of acted like a convection oven, building up heat as the sun beat down on it. With nothing but hte sight of rolling waves for over 2 hours, the pilots could have very well dozed off. After 55 minutes of hte first leg, Mitchell turned right to 290 degrees then after another 27 minutes, 305 degrees. 38 minutes after this another 20 degree turn to make the 40 mile leg to the south edge of Empress Bay, all using clocks & compass.  As they crossed the bay they turned 90 degrees and were around 4 minutes from their calculated interception point. The lightnings began to close in and made sight of the southwest corner of Bougainville. In an act of extraordinary navigation they hit the precise location intended at 9:34am, a single minute ahead of schedule. Right on top of them, passing serenly overhead was the Yamamoto and unfortuntately for him, security was quite lax. You see the Japanese held air superiority at Buin, thus they did not anticipate any enemy action. Alongside this the escort zero’s had their radiots stripped out to reduce their weight. This meant they would not be able to communicate with the Betty’s. Ugaki’s Betty was carrying its regular armament of 3 13mm guns and 1 20mm gun, but because of the weight of the munition boxes, only a single belt was filled up for each. As for Yamamoto’s Betty, there does not seem to be evidence it was armed at all. Mitchell was shocked to see the two Betty bombers, the intelligence had told them one. This somewhat disrupted his plan not knowing where the escorts were hiding, futhermore 2 lightnings piloted by Lieutenants Besby Holmes and Raymond Hine had to pull out when their belly tanks were released and it caused a technical problem. Thus Mitchell had only half the fighters as planned and now faced double the Betty’s. He did not know which Betty was Yamamoto’s, but with icy resolve he did not improvise the plan and ordered Captain Lamphier to attack as planned stating “he’s your meat, tom”. The rest of the lightnings climbed to perform CAP actions as Mitchell expected the Japanese air base at Kahili to toss some zeros over to greet Yamamoto. None would come, another toss of the dice of fate as it were. As Ugaki recounts the event, at 9:43 he was awoken when his plane suddenly began a steep diving turn. The pilot was unsure what was happening, but all of a sudden evasive maneuvers of the Zero escorts alerted him something was wrong. The dark green canopy of the jungle hills were closing in on them as the gunnery opened up the gun ports to prepare firing. Between the rushing wind from the openings and the guns things were incredibly noisy. Ugaki told the pilot to try and remain with Yamamoto’s plane, but it was too late. As Ugaki’s plane banked south he caught a glimpse of Yamamoto’s plane “staggering southward, just brushing the jungle top with reduced speed, emitting black smoke and flames.” Ugaki lost visual contact for some time then only saw a column of smoke rising rom the jungle. Ugaki’s pilot flew over Cape Moira and out to sea, descending steadily to gain speed. Two lightnings were on their ass and some .50 caliber rounds slammed into their wings and fuselage. The pilot frantically trid pulling up, but his propellers dug into the sea causing the Betty to roll hard to the left. Ugaki was tossed from his seat and slammed agianst an interior bulkhead. As water flooded the aircraft he thought “this is the end of Ugaki”. But luckily for him, and 3 other passengers they managed to get free and swim to the beach as they were helped ashore by Japanese soldiers and transported to Buin. Despite his miraculous survival, Ugaki’s injuries were severe, including a severed radial artery and compound fracture of the right arm, which would leave him out of action until 1944 From the American point of few, they came upon the Japanese formation catching them by complete surprise. The escorting Zeros were flying above the bombers, scanning hte horizon ahead of them to the south and now suspected American fighters would be approaching them from behind at a lower altitude. There are quite a few accounts of how this went down, but by all of them Lamphier climbed to the left, going nose to nose with 3 escorting Zeros, while Lt Rex Barber banked to the right. In response all 6 of the Zeros made a straight dive from their higer altitude position to get between the bombers and the lightnings. Rather than firing directly at the American fighters, they kept their firing infront of the lightnings trying to prevent their line of sight meeting up with the bombers. With the eruption of the choas, both Betty’s accelerated into their dives, distancing themselves. One plane banked right going southwest towards the shoreline while the other banked left going east. Now what follows next has actually been a fight going on for decades with all participants going to their grave swearing their perspective was the legitimate account of the event. Lamphier’s story, which is by far the most well known, states he quickly engaged the 3 diving Zeros to the left, managing to shoot down one before twisting away to attack the Betty’s. He found the lead Betty skimming the jungle, heading for Kahili and dived in pursuit of it. With the other 2 zeros chasing to cut him off, Lamphier held course and fired a long steady burst across the Betty’s course of flight. He watched the Betty’s right engine and right wing catch on fire and in his words “the bomber’s wing tore off. The bomber plunged into the jungle. It exploded. That was the end of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto.” While racing out over the open sea towards Moila Point, Ugaki himself was horrified to see the funeral pyre of Yamamoto’s crashed bomber. But at the same time, Rex Barber tells a different story.  Rex claims Lamphier’s initial maneuver going to the left was smart, as it allowed Barber the opportunity to attack the bombers without the Zeroes being on his tail. Thus Rex banked sharply to the right to fall in behind one of the Betty’s. At around 1000 feet above the jungle canopy, Rex opened fire, aiming over the fuselage at the right engine. Rex could see chunks of the Betty’s engine and fires emerge as he continued to ranke the Bettey with his guns, until the Betty suddenly stopped in mid-air, nearly colliding with him before crashing into the jungle below. Rex also claimed the Betty did not fire back at all. The zero escorts however did catch up to him, but the sudden appearance of Lt’s Besby Holmes and Raymond Hine saved him as they shot down the 3 zeros.  Heading to the coasts, Holmes and Hine pursued the remaining Betty and fired upon it scoring some hits. Rex also dropped in behind what is assumed to be Ugaki’s Betty firing a burst over it before it hit the water. Holmes claimed to have shot down Ugaki’s Betty by himself. Rex states that “Holmes rounds must have hit the tanks and filled the bomber swings with gas fumes, because the ship exploded in his face”. As Rex flew through the black smoke and debris a large chunk of the Betty hit his right wing cutting out his turbo supercharger intercooler. Meanwhile Holmes and Hine were dog fighting two more Zeros. Holmes would claim to have shot one of the zeros down, making his total around 3 Zeros and one betty; Hine’s lightning was damaged in the fight forcing him to head east out to sea with smoke trailing his engine. Hine would be last seen around 9:40am, he was to be the only allied casualty of operation Vengeance. With both Betty’s down, the mission was done and Mitchell ordered a withdrawal. The lightning’s each headed home individually, operating at the limit of their range and suffering the hot weather. The controversy over who shot down Yamamoto’s aircraft would begin the moment the pilots got back to base. In the words of Lt Julius Jacobson “there were 15 of us who survived, and as far as who did the effective shooting, who cares?” Yamamoto’s plane had gone down about 4 miles inland, in a remote part of the jungle. Search parties took over a day to find the wreck. On April 20th they found the wrecked aircraft, there were no survivors. According to eyewitness testimony, Yamamoto was found sitting upright, still strapped to his seat, with one white gloved hand resting upon his katana. Yamamoto’s watch had stopped at 0745hrs. A bullet had entered his lower jaw and went out from his temple; another pierced his shoulder blade. Yamamoto’s body was wrapped in banyan leaves and carried down a trail to the mouth of the Wamai River, where it was taken to Buin by sea. His body would be cremated alongside the 11 other men aboard that Betty,  in a pit filled with brushwood and gasoline and his ashes were flown back to Truk and deposited on a Buddhist altar in the Musashi’s war operations room.  New’s of Yamamoto’s death was at first restricted to a small circle of ranking officers, and passageways around the operations room and the commander in chiefs cabin were placed off limits. But the truth eventually leaked out to the crew of Musashi. Admiral Ugaki was seen in bandages holding a white box containing Yamamoto’s ashes as he came aboard and the smell of incense wafted from his cabin. Admiral Mineichi Koga was named the new commander in chief. For over a month the news was kept under wraps. On May 22nd, Yamamoto’s death was heard on the NHK news. The announcer broke into tears as he read the announcement. A special train carried the slain admiral’s ashes from Yokosuka to Tokyo. An imperial party, including members of the royal household and family greeted its arrival at Ueno Station. As diarist Kiyoshi Kiyosawa noted “There is widespread sentiment of dark foreboding about the future course of the war”. Admiral Yamamoto was awarded posthumously the Grand Order of the Chrysanthemum, first class and the rank of Fleet admiral. His funeral was held on June 5th, the first anniversary of the battle of Midway, which also coincided with the funeral of the legendary Admiral Togo Heihachiro, 9 years previously. It was held in Hibiya park with hundreds of thousands coming to pay their respects. Pallbearers were selected from among the petty officers of the Musashi, carrying his casket draped in white cloth past the Diet and Imperial Palace. The Navy band played Chopin’s funeral march as the casket was driven to Tama Cemetery where it was placed in a grave alongside that of Admiral Togo. Some sought to make a Yamamoto shrine, but his close friend Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai said “Yamamoto hated that kind of thing. If you deified him, he’d be more embarrassed than anybody else”.  The new commander in chief of the combined fleet, Admiral Koga Mineichi would later say “There was only one Yamamoto and no one is able to replace him. His loss is an unsupportable blow to us.”  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Operation Vengeance was a success, leading to the death of the legendary, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto. Would his death help or worsen the allied war effort? For that question to be answered only time could tell.

Last time we spoke about Admiral Yamamoto’s Operation I-Go. The empire of the rising sun had to do something about the allied advance up the solomons and New Guinea. Yamamoto devised a grand counter air offensive to hinder the allies airfield building in the regions. However, this was not 1941, it was 1943 and the Japanese aviation crews and pilots were not the same men they once were. The war was taking its toll on the effectiveness of Japan’s airpower and it was showcased during Operation I-Go.  Despite the wild claims of the pilots who would have Japan’s leadership believe they shutdown every allied aircraft in existence, the reality was they had only inflicted enough damage to set back the allied timetables for 10 days. Unbeknownst to the Japanese also was that allied cryptanalysts were continuing to break their codes and found out fateful information about the mastermind behind Operation I-Go. But today you need to grab your onions cause were are talking about Chindits. This episode is the return of the Chindits  Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  For a few weeks we have been covering what basically can be described as the major strategic shift during the Pacific War. I know I repeat it so often, but the battle of guadalcanal was the real turning point of the Pacific War. It led the allies to grab the initiative for the rest of the war and as a result the Japanese were forced to take a defensive stance. The taking of guadalcanal and the Buna-Gona-Sanananda areas led to a lot of shuffling for both sides. And with all that shuffling came heavy losses and resources being forcefully allocated to certain areas at the cost of others. Now up in the frigid northern waters of the north pacific, the 6 hour battle of the komandorski islands had nearly ended in an American debacle. If admiral Hosogaya had pressed his advantage, he would have most likely destroyed the Salt Lake City alongside several other warships. But as we saw, the high explosive shell fired by a single man had prompted Hosogay to falsely believe American airforces were attacking him and he pulled out. Hosogaya’s conservative decision was condemned by his superiors and he was forced into retirement as a result. Admiral McMorris’s force suffered damage to 3 ships and lost 7 men, but he walked away and the Japanese convoy failed its mission. It was to be Japan’s last attempt to resupply the Attu and Kiska garrisons with surface ships, all future runs would be done via submarine. Thus the success of Admiral Kinkaids daring blockade had sealed the fate of the Japanese garrisons on the two islands. Yet before the Americans could begin invading these two islands they needed to perform basically the same strategy their colleagues were doing in the south pacific. They needed to secure advance bases and island hop their way west. One of the first major moves came when Admiral Kinkaid and General Buckner made the joint decision to move the Army, Navy and Air Force headquarters out to Adak. Adak was a thousand miles nearer to the enemy, but concentrating so much on the island created its own problems. A year prior, there had been only 5000 people in the Aleutians, now there were nearly 40,000. The bottleneck became so severe, Buckner’s soldiers were being supplies with just 10 rounds of ammunition per weapon and food rations were very limited. The men were living off canned vegetables and the occasional shiploads of foul-smelling mutton from New Zealand. Mutton in general was notably not very loved amongst American forces. Australians took a notice of this as Americans began to complain in Australia that they were tired of eating it all the time there. Actually a hilarious rumor emerged amongst the Americans in Australia that General MacArthur owned a sheep ranch and was being enriched at their expense. Yes I managed to toss another punch at Dougey. Medical problems began to emerge in the Aleutians as many American bodies began to reject the environment, that is polite talk for Americans who can't handle a bit of cold. Lingering head colds became so bad, the men began to refer to it as “Aleutian malaria”. I mean I do get it, snow can suck, the cold sucks, waking up at 6am to record this podcast only to look out my window at what is becoming a hours shoveling of my driveway sucks, Canadian problems 101.  As for the US Navy, the north pacific submarine force had spent the first few months of Kinkaids command simply gathering strength, building up enough to make a final push, but nothing too exciting. A new PT boat squadron had been assembled employing the Higgens model. Now I don’t know about all of you, but the idea of being on a tiny PT boat in the Aleutians sounds horrifying. If you might recall in January, 4 torpedo boats led by Lt CLinton McKeller had departed King cove to sail for Dutch Harbor. They sailed through a squall, coated with 4 inches of ice. The 4 boats made it to the nearest harbor, Dora Harbor on Unimak and were stuck there for nearly a week. There anchored they were bashed around by howling 80 knot winds, and Pt-27 smashed into some jagged rocks, Pt-28 went aground and sank, pt-22 crashed on a reef and sank, but McKellar was able to keep his crews intact. The two surviving boats had to be rescued some days later by the tender Virginia E.  The devastating experiences of the McKeller’s men led to this new squadron of PT boats being outfitted with hot-air heaters. To compare to the PT boat crews miseries, the experience of the pilots in the Aleutians was not any better. Butler lost 11 planes due to bad weather in January alone. The weather improved in February allowing for some missions, but they were hampered terribly by a technological issue. The B-24 liberators constantly had their bomb-bay rack mechanisms freeze on them. Thus the bombing missions half the time went bust. Now Admiral Kinkaid suggested an attack on Kiska in January of 1943. The plan found its way to the Casablanca conference in north africa where president FDR, Sir Winston CHurhcill and the allied combined chiefs of staff hammered out the fine details. Kinkaid’s plan to attack Kiska actually managed to become an item debated at the conference. The allied leaders approved it and sent it over to the US joint chiefs of staff to develop it into a real operation, which became code named Operation Landcrab. The task was handed over to General John DeWitt, who recommended using the 35th infantry division, but the war department decided instead to use the southwestern 7th motorized division. However this division was trained in desert warfare. The rationale for this was due to Rommel’s recent defeat and the lack of need for desert trained troops in Europe.Well obviously the desert tactics nor the tanks, truck and other armored vehicles were of any use to the Aleutians, the entire division required training in arctic amphibious operations which would take over 3 months. Luckily amphibious assault specialists like Major General Holland “Howlin Mad” Smith, Colonels Castner, Eareckson, Alexander and Carl Jones were accustomed to the Aleutian theater and helped retrain the 7th division at Los Angeles. By February Washington had assigned an insufficient number of ships for the invasion of Kiska. This prompted Kinkaid to suggest instead of attacking Kiska to bypass her and hit Attu. Attu was believed to only have a garrison of 500 men and Kinkaid believed seizing Attu, just west of Kiska would prompt the Japanese to abandon Kiska. Thus operation Landcrab was greenlit and ready to go, and all the major commanders of the theater would meet at a conference in San Diego to hash out the final details. The San diego conference quickly deteriorated into a series of arguments between two new commanders, rear-admiral William Ward Smith and Vice admiral Francis Warren Rockwell and the experienced Alaskan leaders Buckner and DeWitt. They squabbled over reconnaissance issues, in truth the Americans did not have a good picture of the western Aleutians. Bucker pointed out that the Navy, Army and Airforce had 4 different sets of map coordinates and asked the issue be rectified. This led the Alaska Scout leader Colonel Castner to urge Major General Albert Eger Brown who would be commanding the 7th infantry division to perform a reconnaissance personally. Brown however did not do this. Furthermore Buckner requested they employ a battalion of his ground forces for the operation to improve their low morale. Rockwell argued his shipping capacity was overstretched, leading DeWitt to assign the commercial ship Perida to take Buckner’s troops into the battle. Rockwell then complained the commercial ship would not be able to land his troops quickly enough to protect them it the enemy resisted the landings and Brown threw back at him the addition of these troops just disrupted the entire mission. So as you can see a lot of dick waving. In the end they reached a compromise, to hold Buckner’s 4th regiment in reserve at Adak, ready to ship out in less than a day to hit Attu if needed. On April 18th, reconnaissance revealed there were at least 1600 Japanese on Attu, prompting Rockwell to commit the entire 7th division, 10,000 men in all and the extra 4th regiment for operation landcrab. Now before the men his the island Rockwell sent a small team of combat specialists to come up behind the Japanese to prevent them from falling back into the mountains where they could hold out for weeks or even months. Captain Willoughby’s Scout battalion, 410 officers and men, trained vigorously in a short amount of time for the operation. They replaced all of their rifles and submarine guns with automatic rifles, machine guns and mortars and soft lead bullets for armor piercing bullets as those could penetrate ice without ricocheting. The mens packs were filled to the brim with grenades.  Meanwhile General Butler began a bombing campaign to soften up the island. A terrible storm prevented air raids during the first half of april seeing winds his 115 miles per hour and gusts over 127. Nonetheless over 1175 combat sorties would be made in april, with over 4000 pounds of bombs falling on Attu. Though it should be mentioned most of the bombers dropped their loads blind as Attu was covered in a thick fog. Finally on April 24th, the 7th division departed San Francisco at 1pm aboard 5 transports. The Aleutian campaign was soon coming to an end. But now we need to grab our onions and travel back to Burma to talk about good ol Wingate and the boys.  Back in Burma, Wingates forces were beginning the last phase of operation Longcloth, fleeing for their lives back to India. Now Fort Hertz and the new Ledo Road had been protectedAt his headquarters in Wuntho Wingate had to make a choice: retire back to India or press on and cross the Irrawaddy. Being Wingate he chose to press on with the Japanese hot on the Chindits trail. Now I do apologize I believe this will be the second time I am rehashing most of the Chindit story, I sort of am forced to do so as a result of how the week by week format laid out this story on the youtube channel. Think of it as a refresher to finish off the operation.  Major calvert’s Column 3 and Fergussons column 5 headed towards the Gokteik Gorge to blow up its viaduct; Colonel Alexander’s southern group was to rendezvous with the Kachin guerillas at Mongmit; and Wingate would personally lead columns 7 and 8 to hit Inywa one of the main based of the Burmese independence forces. Wingates northern force made its way to the Irrawaddy’s principal northern tributary, the Shweli by March 17th. Here the river was so wide, their ropes and dinghies would not suffice, the crossing had to be made by boat. The approach to the stream was over open paddy fields, where they could easily be spotted and gundowned. Another major issue of course was the Burmese liberation Army. Wingate began by sending an envoy across the river to treat with the BLA and they promptly decamped. While this was going on Wingate discovered the local boats and their skilled native paddlers could help move his forces. They helped tow the Chindats RAF circular dinghies using 1500 lb net weights. Upon seeing how the locals managed Wingate wrote notes that in the future he should employ at least 40 men to each column who were skilled in handling boats and that 80 percent of his men needed to know how to swim. Yes many of these Chindits did not know how to swim. The mules as usual proved to be difficult to get across, leading 40 to be abandoned while the rest were tethered to boats and paddled across.  Fergusson’s Column 5 crossed the Irrawaddy at Tigyaing with assistance of local villagers, missing the Japanese pursuers by a hair’s breadth. Fergusson turned south, but then received orders from Wingate to abandon his mission to help Calvert and instead rejoin the rest of the brigade. Calvert completely unaware of these orders, faced a game of hide and seek with the Japanese, leaving them boody traps as they marched. At Tigyaing, Calverts group’s rearguard were being hit by the Japanese as they crossed the river. Further south of him, the Southern group had crossed the river at Taguang on March 10th, continuing east. Wingate’s men were making their own way eastwards, but the supply drops were becoming less and less frequent and the amount of wounded men was increasing. Wingate was forced to leave many men behind as the Japanese continued to pressure them. On march the 15th, the Southern group met up with Calvert’s column 3 near Pegon where they exchanged information. Despite orders to head for Mongmit, Major dunlop and Colonel Alexander decided to advance to Namhkan, crossing the Shweliriver and making an escape for China. As the southern group continued they ran into Fergusson’s column 5 on March 20th at Inbale Chaung. There they received orders to continue with the original plans, so they redirected themselves to Mongmit again. There they were supposed to meet with the Kachin guerrillas, but they were so late the Kachin had departed. Meanwhile Calvert and Fergusson were having a rough time as an entire Japanese battalion had arrived at Myitson and they were fanning out patrols to hunt them down. On March 23rd, Calvert found one of these patrols near the Nam Mit River and laid a trap killing 100 of them. In his words  ‘We let fly with everything we had and a lot of Japs could never have known what hit them. It was one of the most one-sided actions I have ever fought in.’ He paid for the ambush with a dozen Gurkhas. Calvert’s column made its way towards Gokteik, their glittering prize when disappointment was dealt to them. They received orders from Wingate to withdraw back to India. Wingate also took the care to tell his commanders not to call it a “retreat”, but instead to tell their men they were marching north to cooperate with parachute troops in an attack on Bhamo and Indaw. This was to deceive the enemy if men were captured and to simply boost morale. Calvert complied with the order, but in a bit of defiance decided he wanted to hit a railway on the retreat. Reading Calvert’s mind Wingate sent an additional message to Calvert saying he needed to get out as fast as possible and not perform any additional strikes, he finished with this “we can get new equipment and wireless sets. But it will take 25 years to get another man. These men have done their job, their experience is at a premium”. Wingate at this point decided they needed a good supply drop and ordered one for March 24th in a paddy field near the village of Baw, which happened to be held by a Japanese company. This was the same location for the rendezvous with Fergussons column who were in bad need for supplies having been forced to butcher their own mules for meat and eat stews of monkeys, rats, locusts and cockroaches. Disaster struck. Wingate sent his forces to attack the Japanese company at Baw leading the RAF pilots seeing the confused battle to only drop one third of the supplies. Fergusson met up with Wingate on the 25th finding his superior to be a bit manic. Wingate was now claiming because of their actions, the Japanese commander would be hard pressed to annihilate them all to save face. Wingate faced a daunting issue, the Japanese would contest the passage of the Irrawaddy, how would they get through now? He decided to try a bluff, they would march back to Inywa and cross at the identical point they had taken to go east, thinking the Japanese would never expect it. To do this they would have to kill all their remaining mules and lighten their loads, perhaps we can take a moment of silence for these poor mules. Wingate told the men once they got across the river they were to break up into smaller groups, try to sabotage more railway installations and make their way back to Assam. The forces made a dreadful march back to Inywa, slaughtering their mules as they went, much to the grief of the muleteers. It became clear early the Japanese were following them. Colonel Tomotoki Koba had set up three defensive lines between the Chindits and the Indian border: 1 at the Irrawaddy, 1 along the Mu valley and 1 following the line of the Chindits. Koba’s orders were pretty simply, to drive the Chindits into a trap as if they were wild beasts to hunt.  Wingate attempted feints and decoys, such as sending Fergusson’s Column 5 towards the village of Hintha. This decoy worked great for everyone else of course, as Fergussons men suffered heavy casualties for their efforts. The feints and decoys worked as the bamboozled Japanese never fully caught up to the main body, failing to capture the Chindits in the Shweli loop as it was known. By 4pm on 28th, the main body reached Inywa where they lucked out greatly. It turned out the Japanese had neglected to commandeer the boats along the Shweli. Wingate was able to commander a number of local boats and his men began to cross the river. Column 7 went first followed by 2 and 8. But Column 8 as they made their way were fired upon by Japanese patrols. It was fortunate for the Chindits the Japanese patrols were small and lacked heavy machine guns. Even so, the mortar and rifle fire was enough for Wingate to call off the rest of the columns leaving column 7 on the other side of the river to make their own way home to India. Wingate took the rest of the forces to a secure bivouac 10 miles south east of Inywa where he ordered the men to disperse into 5 smaller groups. It was now every man for himself as they say. The first group to really suffer was Fergussons column 5. After the bitter fight at Hintha, he sent word to Wingate advised him where they should be rendezvousing for a supply drop. But when Fergusson got to the location, there was no drop and no Wingate. Fergusson’s radio radio was destroyed at Hintha so he had to rely on runners and now knew he basically was on his own. Fergusson decided to take his column and head for the Kachin hills. When his men tried to cross the Shweli it turned into a disaster. Many men were swept away by a flood and most of their animals alone with them. 46 men had to be abandoned on a sandbank in the middle of the river and in Fergusson’s words “‘the decision which fell on me there was as cruel as any which could fall on the shoulders of a junior commander’. His men staggered on half crazed with hunger and thirst. After 15 days they reached the Chindwin on April 24th and would limp over to Imphal 2 days later. Their column suffered horribly, 95 survivors out of an original 318. Major Ken Gilkes column 7 managed to get to China with 150 survivors and would fly back to India. Wingates dispersed groups would have a particularly horrible time on their way home. They had tales to tell of Japanese atrocities, the treachery of Burman villagers, the constant battle to stay awake, the agony of hunger and thirst and the feeling of being hunted down like beasts. Their menu more often the naught was python meat and nettles. There also began a rumor amongst the dispersed groups that Wingate had intentionally taken the easy way out for himself while using the rest of them as decoys.  As for Wingates group, his original thinking was that the trek would take 2 weeks but it took roughly 22 days. They spent 2 full days around the Irrawaddy trying to find a safe way across as the Japanese patrols attacked them. On April 13th, with the help of friendly locals who provided paddlers and bamboo rafts they got across. They planned to go across in three groups, and unfortunately for the last group who was acting rearguard they would be left behind. The starving survivors made their way to the Wuntho-Indaw railway then through the Mangin range. At this point all of the food ran out, making even the Python stews seem appetizing. They would make the mistake of trying to buy rice from a pro-Japanese village who began hitting gongs to summon the Japanese causing them to run. At another more neutral village they were able to buy some buffalo meat. As they continued through the Mangin range they nearly died of starvation if it was not for a stroke of luck when one of their Burmese interpreters contacted a local monastery who sold them chicken, tomatoes, rice bananas and 5 pigs. Refreshed they continued and by the 23ed of april could see the Chindwin river. Wingate recounted stating ‘Behold the Chindwin. It is a poor heart that never rejoices.’ The 30 mile trek to the Chindwin was the hardest part of the journey. When finally facing the great river Wingate was forced to divide his men into those deemed strong enough to swim across and those who needed a boat. It took 5 men 7 hours to hack some elephant grass to make rafts. Wingate and others swam the Chindwin at a narrow point 500 yards or so wide. Even the strong swimmers were in danger of drowning, many forced to float on their backs. Wingate himself was pretty close to being swept away but managed to keep afloat using a pack for buoyancy. Everyone who got to the other side of the river were utterly exhausted. To their misery they soon heard the incoming Japanese on the other side of the river. As they hit the first village they came across they devoured the meals they could find. But they had left countless non swimming comrades on the other side and Wingate was desperate to send rescue parties. They found a post manned by some Gurkha rifles and obtained their help grabbing local boats and taking a flotilla back over the Chindwin to save the men they could find. In the end Wingates small group of 43 would see 34 survivors reach Assam. Meanwhile far to the south, Dunlop and Alexander’s southern group were the furthest away from India. They decided to try and head back to Fort Hertz, but would be ambushed many times along the way. They crossed at the head of the Irrawaddy using stealth to avoid clashes with the Japanese. With the help of locals who gave them food and boats they made it across by April 20th, but after crossing were hit again by the Japanese suffering heavy casualties. Now down to 350 men, they continued towards the Mu River where they were ambushed yet again on the 28th. Colonel Alxander would be killed among others, as Dunlop recounted  "Clarke told me that the last mortar bomb had blown away most of the Colonel Alexander and officer De La Rue's legs. Edmonds and some orderlies had carried them away into the jungle, but that no one could now be found who knew of their whereabouts." Dunlop led the force of exhausted men to the Chindwin river fighting off multiple Japanese patrols. They would wander into early may and were saved by Karen guerilla forces a very lucky break. Lastly, Calverts column 3 made their way to the Shewli river by March 27th with Japanese patrols hot on their trail. Calvert decided the best course of action was to break up into 9 smaller groups. Out of the 360 men in Column 3, 205 eventually recrossed the Chindwin by mid April. Calvert personally would lead a group to detonate more explosives across the Burmese railway.  So ends operation longcloth. Two major things to note were Wingates character and behavior during the expedition. For the first, it is not surprising to see that extreme stress brought up the brittle personality of mr Wingate. It seems in his own mind, Wingate could never be at fault. Wingate clearly had not factored the importance of river crossings, which is unforgivable given Burma’s riverine system. The crossings over the Irrawaddy showcased Wingates glory hunting nature. Wingate also was draconian in his punishment of the men. He told his men if any of them plundered villages or lost their own equipment he would have them shot. This went beyond normal army code. If sentries fell asleep and were caught, Wingate gave them 3 choices; be shot, make their own way back home or be flogged, not surprisingly everyone chose to be flogged. Wingate’s behavior likewise kept switching from mania to depression given the circumstances.  The casualty figures of the operation were appalling. Out of 3000 men of the 77th brigade that Wingate took into Burma, 2182 returned; 450 were killed in action and the rest went missing. Out of the southern group 260 men out of the 1000 survived. What had been achieved to justify such losses? There are arguments made on both sides. General Slim said of the operation  “They had blown up bridges and cuttings on the Mandalay–Myitkyina railways that supplied the Japanese northern front, and attempted to reach across the Irrawaddy to cut the Mandalay–Lashio line. Exhaustion, difficulties of air supply, and the reaction of the Japanese, prevented this, and the columns breaking up into small parties made for the shelter of 4 Corps. About a thousand men, a third of the total force, failed to return. As a military operation the raid had been an expensive failure. It gave little tangible return for the losses it had suffered and the resources it had absorbed. The damage it did to Japanese communications was repaired in a few days, the casualties it inflicted were negligible, and it had no immediate effect on Japanese dispositions or plans.’” Even Wingates supporters admit the operation was a failure, some describing it “an engine without a train”. Fergusson would add it ‘What did we accomplish? Not much that was tangible. What there was became distorted in the glare of publicity soon after our return. We blew up bits of railway, which did not take long to repair; we gathered some useful intelligence; we distracted the Japanese from some minor operations, and possibly from some bigger ones; we killed a few hundreds of an enemy which numbers eighty millions; we proved that it was feasible to maintain a force by supply dropping alone.’ Really in the end, Wingates exploits were used for propaganda purposes lifting the terrible morale amongst the British. The sacrifice of over 800 men for a rather pointless operation had to be glorified for if not it would have crushed morale further. Sit Winston Churchill would say of Longcloth on July 24th of 1943 ‘There is no doubt that in the welter of inefficiency and lassitude which has characterised our own operations on the Indian front, this man, his force and his achievements stand out; and no question of seniority must obstruct the advance of real personalities in their proper station in war.’ Wingate performed a press conference on May 20th to spin the allied propaganda machine. Reuters called them “the british ghost army”, the daily mail hailed Wingate as “clive of Burma”. Wingate had performed the typical British habit of turning obvious defeats into glorious victories, it was very much his Dunkirk. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The mad onion man Wingate successfully, or unsuccessfully performed Operation Longcloth. His exploits became legendary, but perhaps one should look closer at the reality behind what occurred in the depths of Burma.

Last time we spoke about the disastrous first Arakan campaign and the Pacific Military conference of 1943. Yes Mr. Irwin had royally messed up the Arakan offensive, so much so it was gradually bringing his bitter rival General Slim into the mix. While Irwin failed, Slim gradually was placed in operation control and would soon unleash a box strategy against General Koga’s forces in Burma. On the planning front, the war between MacArthur and King raged on, but compromises were finally hashed out. The July 2 directive, became the Elkton plan which in turn would evolve into Operation Cartwheel. The allies were learning how to play nice together in the Pacific at last. MacArthur was gradually shifting the war towards his own personal goals. However while all of this was going on, the Japanese were also forming their own plans, which would soon be unleashed. This episode is the Operation I-GO Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  It is April of 1943, a year ago, the Empire of the Rising sun stood proud and victorious over the Pacific. The Japanese had taken Malaya, the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, Burma and pretty much anywhere they went, victory was at hand. Yet as Admiral Yamamoto moved his flag from super battleship Yamato to the Musashi, he looked quite withered down. The past 14 months since the great raid on Pearl Harbor had aged him considerably. His close-cropped hair had turned almost entirely gray and his eyes looked discolored. It was rare to see him leave his quarters and whenever he did it was quite briefly, usually him waving his hat in the air as a departing sign to a squadron of aircraft. Rarely did he join his fellow staff officers for a game of ring-toss on deck. In a letter he wrote at the end of January of 1943 he asserted he only set foot ashore 4 times since the previous august, only to check in on the sick or wounded men at the hospitals or to attend funerals. Critics of Yamamoto would claim he actually made considerable amounts of visits to the “naval restaurant” on an island in the lagoon. This “naval restaurant” was actually a well-known brothel near Yokosuka Naval base in Tokyo Bay. The commander in chief seemed resigned to his fate. When he was asked in October of 1942 what he would do after Japan won the war he replied “I imagine I’ll be packed off either to the guillotine or to set Helena”. On most occasions he would openly declare he did not believe he would live through the war. Yamamoto mourned the loss of so many IJN officers and sailors and was especially saddened by the loss of the commanders who refused to leave their doomed ships. Yamamoto had actually campaigned to reform the principle that a captain could and should honorably survive the destruction of his ship, but it was to little avail. The belief was so hard-wired into the Japanese naval officer corps.  Yamamoto knew Japan was staggering towards a catastrophic defeat, but he could not openly say it to those around him. He had tossed everything he could to thwart the war in the first place, warning everyone of the great industrial power of America that would gradually overwhelm Japan. His operation against Midway in june of 1942 was a major gambit aimed at forcing a decisive victory to bring the Americans closer to the negotiating table. The utter failure at Midway had ensured the war would be prolonged, it would become a war of attrition and one that Japan could not hope to win. On the morning of April 3rd, 1943 Admirals Yamamoto and Ugaki accompanied by more than a dozen officers of the combined fleet staff boarded two Kawanishi flying boats enroute for Rabaul. The battles of Guadalcanal and Buna-Gona-Sanananda were extremely heavy setbacks to Yamamoto’s plans of extending the defensive perimeter towards the east of Australia so it could be strangled of supplies. The disaster that occurred at the battle of the Bismarck Sea showcased how vulnerable their shipping lanes were. The state of their land-based aviation was abysmal, it failed to protect the convey sent to Lae resulting in the terrible loss. As Commander Toshikazu Ohmae stated “The land-based air groups at Rabaul were not effective, largely because there were only a few experienced pilots in them.  Vice-Admiral Ugaki was even harsher, adding “We cannot expect much of the land-based air force partly because of a passive atmosphere among them.”  Admiral Kusaka’s 11th air fleet had suffered tremendous losses from a series of serious ongoing issues, but two were of vital importance; 1) the poor health and low morale of those at Rabaul. Men were succumbed to widespread diseases, such as malaria and chronic diarrhea. And 2) the terrible situation when it came to replacing men such as their valuable veterans. As Yamamoto put it “They used to say that one ‘Zero’ fighter could take on five to ten American aircraft, but that was at the beginning of the war. Since losing so many good pilots at Midway we’ve had difficulty in replacing them. Even now, they still say that one ‘Zero’ can take on two enemy planes, but the enemy’s replacement rate is three times ours; the gap between our strengths is increasing every day, and to be honest things are looking black for us now.” The new recruits were unfamiliar with the aircraft employed by Kusaka’s command, requiring to be re-trained upon their arrival to Rabaul. Without their veteran pilots to train these men the task took longer and resulted in less capable pilots and crews. The replacement issue for aircrews was a fleet-wide issue forcing the IJN to shorten their training syllabus for commissioned and enlisted pilots by 2 months. To achieve this reduction, the amount of instructional time devoted to skill areas like tactics, gunnery and formation flying were reduced or in some cases even eliminated. The veterans who began the war in a third position of a 3-plane sector and were still alive now took upon the role of shotai or chutai leadership. Shotai leaders were responsible for flights of 3 aircraft and Chutai leaders were responsible for 9 aircraft or better said 3 shotai. However many of these men did not really have the necessary experience to assume such responsibilities. On March 25th a directive was established to quote “create a superior and impregnable strategic position”. In other words, Tokyo was demanding the Army and Navy come up with a plan to stop the allies southern offensive. Tokyo wanted the two services to actually work together so they could defend the precious gains they had made in the early part of the war, like their holdings in New Guinea which were currently being hammered upon by MacArthur's forces. To implement the new directive, General Imamura summoned a conference on Rabaul for April 12th. Commanders of the 17th and 19th armies, the 6th air division would be in attendance. During the conference it was decided General Hyakutakes 17th Army would take on the responsibility for defending the northern solomons in coordination with the Navy. They would also have to help assist the navy who was expecting allies attacks directed at the central solomons. General Adachi’s 18th army was given responsibility to defend Lai-Salamaua, but because of the shipping lane crisis this would have to be done mostly via land routes. They were going to establish a major overland and coastal supply route linking Madang and Western New Britain to the Lae area to aid this. Furthermore naval and air bases would be built up in eastern New Guinea to aid Lt General Itahana Giichi’s 6th air division to operation in the region. Despite all these grand plans, American air power was already making Tokyo express runs to places like Finschhafen impossible. The Japanese war effort in New Guinea was gradually being torn apart by constant air raids. Therefore, the only way to get men and supplies to places like Lae would be using the ever glamorous submarine or barge methodology. Now that is all for the Imperial Japanese army boys planning session, but what about Yamamoto and the Naval gang. By the time of the conference, MacArthur’s efforts in New Guinea had basically ruined Yamamoto’s expansionist strategies. A complete strategic rethink was now necessary. Yamamoto was quartered in a cottage high on a hill behind the town of Rabaul. He spent the following week inspecting airfields and other military installations, meeting with the local army and naval commanders all around New Britain. As was typical of him, he bid good luck to the departing air squadrons, with his usual wave of his hat. Yamamoto set to work creating a new offensive directive erected as part of the March 25th plan. The IJN planned for an air campaign against allied positions in New Guinea and the Solomons. The 11th air fleet, on its lonesome would not able to mount an effective strike, thus Yamamoto called upon the 3rd fleet to augment them.  Admiral Ozawa who led the 3rd fleet voiced opposition to this, not wanting his precious elite units to be squandered. But he eventually gave in and provided aircraft carriers and agreed to supervise plans for the new operation. At the same time it was decided that Yamamoto and Ozawa would shift their headquarters temporarily to Rabaul, this would prove to be a fateful mistake on his part. You see him doing so was announced using a radio message. His operations officer Commander Yasuji Watanabe would go on the record complaining that the information about Yamamoto’s visit to the Ballalae Airfield should had been done by courier and not by radio, but the communications officer replied “this code only went into effect on april 1st and cannot be broken”. It would be broken, but more about that later. Now the Zuikaku, Zuiho, Junyo and Hiyo would toss up 160 aircraft: 54 Vals, 45 Kates and 96 Zeros to augment the 155 aircraft of Admiral Kusaka pushing them to a strength of over 350 aircraft. The aircraft were dispersed to multiple airfields such as Buka and Kahili on Bougainville and Ballale in the Shortlands.   Now before Yamamoto and his team launched their new offensive, Admiral Kusaka decided to do a preliminary fighter sweep down the Slot on April 1st. He hoped to draw out large portions of the allied airpower on Guadalcanal to soften them up. Kusaka launched a first wave of 32 and second wave of 25 Zeros which intercepted 42 fighters of Admiral Mason’s ComAirSols command. The allied force consisted mostly of Wildcats, some P-38’s and a few new F4U Corsairs. They were intercepted over the Russell Islands causing a giant melee of dog flights lasting over 3 hours. The Americans had home field advantage over the Japanese, managing to shoot down 9 Zero’s at the cost of 5 Wildcats and a Corsair. It was not exactly a promising start for the Japanese. As usual both sides of the air battle submitted exaggerated reports. The Americans claimed to have taken down 18 Zeros and the Japanese claimed to have downed 47 American fighters. So yeah the Japanese claimed to have shot down more aircraft than they even encountered haha. Now it was on April the 3rd when Yamamoto and his staff arrived in Rabaul and he personally took command of the upcoming operation alongside Admirals Ozawa and Kusaka. Now Yamamoto had accurately anticipated the allied advance into the solomons and New Guinea would focus on the subjugation of Rabaul. Within five days of the battle of Guadalcanal being officially declared on February 9th of 1942, Lt General Kenney had authorized a plan to take down Rabaul. This plan commence on the night of February 14th with a bombing raid consisting of 12 B-29’s from the 63rd bomb squadron. They targeted the fuel dumps and munitions. A second wave of 10 B-29’s from the 65th bomb squadron came in dropping incendiaries upon the town of Rabaul. The Japanese had managed no fighter interceptions. Yamamoto had further predicted the allies would launch a double-pronged advance through New Guinea and the northern Solomon islands. To meet this advance he had set up a ring of airfields around Rabaul. His visit to Ballalae airfield was part of developing the rings and it would be his death sentence in the end. The result of these plans led to a triangular combat zone with Port Moresby on its west point, Guadalcanal at its east and Rabaul as its northern apex.  Yamamoto knew the US forces would advance under the cover of air superiority which in turn depending upon their ability to build forward airfields. In anticipation of his Yamamoto had as we mentioned gathered a massive build up of aircraft with the intent to hammer the allies ability to supply materials and build further airfields. The battle for Henderson field on Guadalcanal was the first of these contests and many would follow. Yamamoto hoped the shorter lines of supply from airfields closer to Rabaul would give them an advantage over the Americans, but despite all the claims of great air victories, Yamamoto’s personal tour was revealing the opposite. In fact, as Yamamoto used the post-guadalcanal lull in action to bolster his defenses for a anticipated battle ahead, Halsey had likewise prepared his forces for their advance into the central and northern solomons.  Halsey would have a number of new toys to play with such as the Chance Vought F4U Corsair and Grumman F6F Hellcat. 4 new airbases were built upon Guadalcanal and during march of 1943 allied bombers made sporadic attacks on the Japanese airfields at Ballalae, Kahili, Shortland Island and Munda. On top of that large scale reconnaissance efforts were made to get a good picture of the Japanese build up of their airfields. When reconnaissance found out the Japanese were developing a seaplane off southern bougainville, the Japanese launched a dawn fighter attack on March 28th. Led by Captain Lanphier of the 70th squadron, 6 P-38’s destroyed 8 Japanese seaplanes. Now after a week of sporadic bombing raids from both sides, allies watchers on the New Guinea coast indicated a major offensive was afoot.  Yamamoto’s grand air campaign was codenamed operation I-GO with attack day X set for april 5th. The first target was to be guadalcanal, but bad weather forced a postponement of 2 days. Japanese reconnaissance since March 25th had indicated the allies had roughly 300 aircraft on the island, alongside transports, cargo ships, warships and other goodies going between Lunga Point and Tulagi. In the early hours of April the 7th, Yamamoto unleashed a massive strike force consisting of over 224 planes, the largest striking force since the attack on Pearl Harbor. 67 Vals and 157 Zeros were enroute to smash Guadalcanal. But the allies enjoyed great intelligence and received several warnings of the impending offensive. The coastwatchers were hard at work transmitting their sightings. Rear-Admiral Marc Mitscher , the new commander of AirSols scrambled 76 fighters consisting of Wildcats, Lightnings, Airacobras and Kittyhawks from Hendersonfield, Milne Bay and other outlying airfields. Despite the prior warnings, the allied scramble was rather disorderly and to make matters worse the Japanese cleverly split up their attack force into 4 groups to confuse the allied radar systems. 4 squadrons of Vals were preceded by 2 sweeps of Zeros which were intercepted by 3 squadrons of Wildcats. Marine 1st Lt James E Sweet of the VMF-221 was credited with shooting down7 Vals and possibly an 8th using his Wildcat. His aircraft was badly mauled during the combat forcing him to make a water landing outside Tulagi harbor. He would be awarded the Medal of Honor for this great feat.  Despite valiant efforts made by the allies, the Vals laid havoc to the Tulagi anchorage. The destroyer USS Aaron Ward, New Zealander corvette Moa and US tanker Kanawha were sunk. THe crews over in Henderson field were fortunate as it was not hit too hard as the dog fights broke up the Japanese Vals and Zeros who were forced back towards Bougainville. For their efforts the Japanese lost 12 zerosand 12 vals. The Japanese pilots claimed to have downed 41 allies aircraft, which turned out to be 7 Wildcats and 12 major warships which were the 3 previously mentioned. With what seemed to be a large success for operation X, Yamamoto felt confident and decided to launch operation Y of I-GO. While operation X of I-GO was directed at Guadalcanal, operation Y would hit New Guinea. On april 11, 27 Vals and 73 Zeros departed Rabaul to hit Oro Bay which was adjacent to the rapidly expanding airdrome complex at Dobodura. The allies scrambled 50 aircraft consisting of Lightning and Warhawks of the 7th, 8th and 9th squadrons. The vals managed to sink a US cargo ship, heavily damaging a transport and an Australian minesweeper. The next day Yamamoto traveled to Vanukanau airdrome to personally send off another strike and announced he would do a tour of the forward bases of Buin, Ballale and Shortland island. The signal was picked up by allied listening posts. Cryptanalysts at Station Hypo led by Joseph Rocherfort decrypted the message and pronounced it a jackpot. The message referred to Yamamoto was easily deduced, and the geographic designators for Rabaul, Ballale and Buin were easily extracted. Better than that the message contained the specific information that Yamamoto would be traveling on a medium bomber escorted by 6 fighters, and would arrive at RYZ at 8am. This would put Yamamoto’s aircraft over the southern end of Bougainville on the morning of the 18th, a location just within the fighter range of Henderson Field. I will not be speaking anymore of this as it will be discussed in depth in a future episode, just a tease I know. At Vanukanau Yamamoto presented himself in his crisp white uniform, waving his hat to the crews of 43 Bettys followed up shortly by 65 Zeros. A second group of 66 Zeros assisted the raid to perform a sweep, leaving a combined total of 174 aircraft. They flew in two large formations with an initial course direction going towards Milne Bay. Allied radar picked them up prompting General Kenney to scramble every fighter had in the area. However the course the Japanese took was a feint and without warning they broke out going across the Owen Stanley range enroute for Port Moresby. 44 allied fighters were able to intercept them, but many of the bombers managed to get past them. The bombers hit the airstrips, damaged installations alongside 15 grounded aircraft. The Japanese would claim sinking a transport anchored in the harbor and the destruction of 28 enemy planes in the sky, though only two P-39’s were shot down at the cost of 2 Zeros and 7 Bettys.  On april the 14th, Yamamoto again personally waved off another attack, this time targeting Milne Bay. 23 vals and 75 Zeros were launched from carriers Hiyo and Junyo joined by 54 fighters and 44 Bettys from the 11th air fleet for a total of 196 aircraft. Here the Japanese scored some luck, because as a result of the air raid against Port Moresby the allies had actually rerouting most of their shipping to Milne Bay. The allies scrambled 44 fighters, 36 Kittyhawks from Milne Bay and 8 lightnings from Dobodura to intercept them. Despite the efforts of the allied airmen, Japanese bombers broke through making their way to Milne Bay in several waves. The high level bombers dropped at least 100 bombs over the anchorage, while the dive bombers attacked the allied shipping. The Dutch troop transport Van Heemskerk was forced to beach itself after suffering several hits lighting her ablaze; the British cargo ship Gorgon was also hit many times and lit on fire; the Dutch transport Van Outhoorn and Australian minesweepers Wagga and Kapunda were damaged by near misses. In the battle in the sky one Kittyhawk was shot down, 4 p-40’s were severely damaged and 1 lightning was forced to make a crash landing. The Japanese claimed to have sunk 3 large and 1 medium transport, heavily damaged 6 transports and shot down 44 aircraft. During the air battle one Lt Richard Bong was starting to make a name for himself having shot down a pair of Betty’s. He would earn a lot of attention from General Kenney who described him “as a little blonde-haired Norwegian boy. Best watch the boy Bong”.The Japanese claims was so incredible, upon hearing of it Emperor Hirohito sent a message stating “please convey my satisfaction to the commander in chief, combined fleet, and tell him to enlarge the war result more than ever”. To contrast this, General Kenney made some remarks about the intense air raids “the way yamamoto had failed to take advantage of his superiority in numbers and position since the first couple of month of the war was a disgrace to the airman’s profession”. The reason he had this scathing remark was because apart from the rare exception of mass attacks, the Japanese attacks were marked by their use of aircraft in Penny-packets. What Kenny did not know was how the IJN’s air forces were being hampered heavily by logistical issues. Their inability at this time was a result of lack of experienced aviation engineers, ground crews, adequate airfield facilities and airfield equipment. They simply were not the same aviation force that had hit Pearl Harbor, the spear had been heavily blunted. Yamamoto planned to perform another fighter sweep of the 16th, but reconnaissance flights failed to turn up adequate targets on New Guinea’s northeast coastline.  On April the 17th, Yamamoto’s chief of staff, Vice-Admiral Ugaki Matome held a conference to review the lessons learned from their air offensive. The staff were reluctant to admit a startling and horrifying truth. Hundreds of aviators had been burnt to a crisp because the aircraft engineers messed up installing the protected fuel tanks. This led to countless aircraft catching fire from minor hits, even tracer rounds. When Japanese aircraft saw they were on fire, they assumed they had been scored a fatale hit from the enemy, though in most cases their aircraft were minorly damaged. Many of the pilots in these situations chose to kamikaze their aircraft. Thus Operation I-Go was finished, but despite all the unrealistic exaggerated reports from the Japanese pilots, the entire operation only really amounted to setting back the American operations in the Solomons for about 10 days. While the Japanese believed they had inflicted tremendous damage, in reality the only real insignificance for the allies was to postpone some bombing raids and minelaying activity. The most significant consequence of operation I-Go would actually end up being Admiral Yamamoto’s decision to personally carry out a tour of the forward airbases, as he tried to raise morale for the men like he had done at Rabaual. This would have a very dire effect on the future of the Empire.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Operation I-Go was quite the lackluster offensive, despite what the Japanese pilots were claiming to their leadership. The leadership likewise believed the claims or were unwilling to see the truth of the matter. They had only accosted the allies about 10 days in the solomons.

Last time we spoke about the battle of Komandorski islands. Admirals Kinkaid and McMorris began a naval blockade of Attu and Kiska putting the IJN in a terrible bind. They could either give up the Aleutians, or they would have to reinforce them, either of which came at huge costs. Admiral Hosogaya had no choice but to try and breach the allied blockade to get the much needed reinforcements to the frozen islands. Hosogaya’s fleet was superior in numbers and firepower to that of McMorris when they fatefully met in the frigid northern seas. Yet by a stroke of luck, a single man fired a High Explosive shell during the heat of battle causing Hosogaya to make a terrible blunder. Under the impression allied airpower was about to attack them, Hosogaya backed off, losing the chance to claim a major victory. And today we are going to venture, behind the desk so to speak.  This episode is the Pacific Military Conference: MacArthur vs King Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Now before we jump into the real war of the Pacific, General Douglas MacArthur vs Admiral Ernest King, I first want to jump over the good old CBI theater. Interesting to mention I recently did a livestream, gaming with a friend of mine, answering some audience questions from you dear old audience members and others from my Youtube channel and Fall and Rise of China Podcast. One guy asked me “how important was the CBI theater?” and it really got me thinking on the spot. Honestly when Americans talk about the Pacific War, two things immediately come to mind, naval battles and island warfare. China gets overshadowed despite literally being the lionshare of fighting against the Japanese, I mean hell they kept like 30+ divisions in China out of 50 or so. But even more than that you hardly hear about Burma or India, they are always the quote en quote benchwarmers compared to lets say your Guadalcanal’s or Iwo Jima’s. As I said to the audience member on the livestream, its hard to quantify something, but honestly tossing %’s around you could argue the CBI was a hard 50-60% of the war effort, because it did the most important thing necessary to win a way, it drained Japan of men/resources. So lets jump into it a bit shall we? So the last time we were talking about the disastrous First Arakan Campaign. The British launched their offensive and saw heavy resistance at Rathedaung and Donbaik. General Irwin continuously made blunders. When Wavell made an inspection of the battlefields later on he commented how Irwin’s forces had “fought in penny packets”. Basically what he was getting out with this little jab, was unlike conventional battles, take for example the famous battle of Alamein. Instead this offensive consisted of hundreds of chance encounters, dozens of disparate set piece clashes, hand-to-hand conflicts, frontal attacks, ambushes, desperate defenses, bombing raids, all of which had been minutely chronicled, but the details of them were quite the mystery. General Slim when asked described it all ‘as an epic that ran across great stretches of wild country; one day its focal point was a hill named on no map; next a miserable unpronounceable village a hundred miles away. Columns, brigades, divisions, marched and counter-marched, met in bloody clashes and reeled apart, weaving a confused pattern hard to unreal”.  Now the beginning of the first arakan offensive seemed to go well. Despite the logistical nightmares, Lloyd enjoyed the advantages of both air superiority and numerical superiority. But the Japanese built their defenses knowing full well what was coming to hit them. The Japanese made no attempt to hold onto the lines between Maungdaw and Buthidaung, nor resist the British forces at Kyauktaw. Lloyd began sending optimistic reports, such as on Christmas Day when the enemy pulled out of Ratheduang. And so the British continued along the peninsula until they came a few miles north of a point of Donbaik, sitting on the coast of the Bay of Bengal. It was here, General Koga had dug in and waited for his enemy. It was to be here, after showcasing the Japanese superior jungle fighting tactics, their roadblocks and amphibious hooks, that they would unleash a new unsuspecting weapon, that of the bunker. General Slim described it as such “‘For the first time we had come up against the Japanese “bunkers” – from now on to be so familiar to us. This was a small strong-point made usually of heavy logs with four to five feet of earth, and so camouflaged in the jungle that it could not be picked out at even fifty yards without prolonged searching. These bunkers held garrisons varying from five to twenty men, plentifully supplied with medium and light machine guns.’ The bunkers were impervious to field guns and medium bombs. They also had crossing fire lanes, thus for one force to attack a bunker they would be fired upon by 2 more. The redoubt at Donbaik was situated alongside a “chaung”, which was a natural anti-tank position, having steep sides up to 9 feet high up on the bunkers. On January 7th of 1943, the forces got their first taste of these defenses and were tossed back with heavy casualties. For days a pattern emerged of men throwing themselves at the bunkers, only to be butchered. It was so bad, both Wavell and Irwin were forced to come visit Llyod on the 10th, just to tell him “you must take Donbaik at all cost”. And so Llyod asked for tanks, and he was given them. But to Slims horror the man only asked for one troop of them, prompting Slim to object stating “the more you use the fewer you lose”. His argument was sound and simple, if you were going to utilize tanks, you tried to do so en masse to overwhelm, otherwise the resources would be vulnerable and most likely lost. His objections were tossed aside, and half a squadron of tanks, merely 8 hit the bunkers. The british attacks were beaten off all he same. Now Koga knew he had to fight off the enemy until at least the end of march to receive some decent reinforcements. Thus he determined to hold out; he needed to perform a counterattack. Meanwhile his counterpart Irwin was determined that overwhelming infantry numbers on narrow fronts could achieve victory. And as one contemporary analysis called it “an idea rich in casualties”. Koga brought up the bulk of his 55th division to Akyab and on March 7th the 213th regiment attacked the Kaladan Valley, driving away the V force. Then the 112th regiment attacked the 123rd and 55th Indian brigades north of Rathedaung who were forced to pull back to Zedidaung. This left the 47 indian brigade trapped at the Hwitze bridgehead and the Japanese carried out wide outflanking maneuvers and infiltration attacks against the British lines. In response Irwin tried to toss another assault against Donbaik, which had just been further reinforced by Koga. On March 18th, the 6th brigade of Brigadier Ronald Cavendish launched a front attack on a very narrow front, despite multiple advice given by other commanders stating he should try to outflank the Japanese along the mountain crest. His force made little progress and suffered heavy casualties for their efforts. Meanwhile the 213th regiment secured the eastern side of the Mayu river and the 112th regiment was preparing to cross it. In early March Irwin was doing something aside from tossing his men into a meatgrinder, he began covering his ass. Sensing defeat was staring him in the face, in his desperation he tried to coopt his hated rival, General Slim into sharing some of his blame to come. He sent Slim to Maungdaw to see Lloyd and report on the situation there. When Slim asked him if this meant he was now in operational control, Irwin said absolutely not, he just wanted Slim’s assessment of the situation over there. Irwin did however add in, that Slim might gain operational control in the future, but only when Irwin said so and even in that case, Irwin would be retaining administrative control. Well Slim found the Lloyds men’s morale was at an all time low. He advised Lloyd to abandon the idiotic frontal assaults and instead to try and flank the enemy through the jungles. Lloyd argued that was too unfeasible and because of Irwins ordered overruled Slim. Thus Slim returned to Irwin with a useless report. Up until this point Wavell pretty much had no idea what was going on. He continued to urge action from Irwin, so Irwin ordered action from Lloyd and the result was just more disaster. By March 20th Wavell, Irwin and Lloyd all accepted they would have to withdraw the forces to the Maundaw-Buthidaung line. Wavell was livid at his subordinates writing “It seemed to me to show a complete lack of imagination, and was neither one thing nor the other. An attack in real depth with determined soldiers like the 6th Brigade would, I am sure, have accomplished something, though it has cost us casualties. But to use one battalion at a time, and that usually only deploying one company, seems to me to be poor tactics. With the Japanese in a pocket like that, I cannot believe that a plan could not have been made to eat them up; it looked to me like practically ideal for covering machine gun and mortar fire from a flank.” On the night of the 24th, the 112th regiment crossed the Mayu river, marched along narrows paths and jungle to get to the crest of the supposedly impassable Mayu range. The following days say lines of communications to Kyaukpandu severed, the enemy captured the mountain crest near Atet Nanra on the 39th and in response to this Lloyd sent the 47th and 6th brigades to retreat west before they were encircled. This of course was in contradiction to direct ordered he had received to wait until the monsoon season had broke before pulling out. Thus Irwin was forced to countermand Lloyd’s order. Wavell was livid over his insubordination blundering of things and sought to toss Lloyd under the bus. Thus Irwin was discreetly told to sack Lloyd, and before doing so he took direct command of the 14th indian division.  Lloyd was replaced by Major General C.E.N Lomax who was promptly ordered to carrying on doing the exact same things Lloyd had done. The 26th Indian division and Lomax were sent to bolster the peninsula, Lomax was going to assume command of all the Arakan forces when he got there, but until then Irwin had to run the show. Koga was not letting up of course and the 112th regiment managed to build a roadblock north of Indian village b April 3rd, successfully cutting the lines of communication of the 47th and 6th brigades. Simultaneously the 143rd regiment burst into the area advancing northwards up the Mayu River valley. The Japanese were soon infiltrating British positions at Indin village and overran the HQ of the 6th brigade capturing its commander, Cavendish in the process. However one of Cavendishes last orders before being grabbed was for the British artillery to open fire on Indian, which they did, taking the Japanese completely by surprise. It caused significant casualties on the Japanese, but also the British, killing Cavendish in the end. With the 47th brigade practically annihilated by Koga’s forces, Irwin began to launch himself into a frenzy of blame-shifting. He argued the brigade, not his own tactical ideas, was alone to blame and yet again he tried to drag Slim into the mess. This time he told Slim to hold himself in readiness to take over operational control and to move his HQ to Chittagong. But again Irwin reminded him he would not have administrative control of operations nor operational direction until Irwin said so. Slim met with Irwin in Calcutta on April 5th, having been recalled from leave in the small hours, something Irwin did often to him. That evening he dined with Lloyd at the Bengal Club and heard his side of the story, which the man remarkably told without any bitterness of his shabby treatment. After this Slim had a meeting with Lomax at Chittagong. The 6th brigade narrowly escaped annihilation by retreating along a beach road and the 47th brigade avoided the same by destroying their own heavy equipment, broke out into small parties and ran for their lives cross-country to the beach, thus ceasing to be a fighting force.   Following that initial catastrophe, Lomax and Slim devised a stratagem for catching Koga’s men in a box along the Mayu peninsula. The box would involve 6 battalion, 2 on the ridges of the Mayu hills, 2 along the mayu river and 2 on the hills due south of the Maungdaw-Buthidaung road. The idea was that the Japanese would be bound to utilize the tunnels on a disused railway track, dismantled for years. They would be led into a box on their way to the tunnels and then the lid of the box would be shut by a force of brigade strength. It was in many ways an attempt to replicate Hannibals famous victory at the battle of Cannae, every generals dream since ancient times. Lomax and Slim were going to used their tired and greatly demoralized men to carry out a scheme of geometrical perfection. But that is all for this week at the CBI theater.   Now as we all know, during the Pacific War General MacArthur and Admiral King both laid out their own plans for the drive towards Japan. This led to a compromise plan that held 3 phases: Phase 1 was to seize Guadalcanal; phase 2 was to drive up the central solomons and New Guinea; lastly phase 3 was to neutralize Rabaul. Now as much as MacArthur and King hated another, they both understood Rabaul was a crucial lynchpin for both their plans. Working together did not always go so well as you might imagine. Take for example Admiral Halsey who continuously found himself in the middle. At one point in early February  he was forced to go meet MacArthur to request reinforcements, because Operation KE made the allies think a major offensive was on its way. MacArthur argued that his heavy bombers were too few and that he could not promise much support as he believed an impending offensive was about to be launched in his own area. Now Halsey was one of the few men, a Navy man no less, that MacArthur did not hate, so if he was going to jerk him around, you can tell he was being difficult to work with. All of these difficulties emphasized the two services and two area commands needed to better coordinate. And thus a conference was called to hammer out the fine details of how they would all play nice together.   Now meeting all in person was not feasible so the commanders sent their representatives to Washington to present their plans. On March 12th, the Pacific Military conference was held with representatives from each Pacific area command: Lt-General George Kenney, Major General Richard Sutherland and Brigadier-General Stephen Chamberlin represented MacArthurs Southwest command; Lt-General Millard Harmon, Major-General Nathan Twining, Captain Miles Browning and Brigadier-Genreal De Witt Peck represented Halsey’s south pacific command; Lt-General Delos Emmons, Rear-admiral Raymond Spruance, Brigader-General Leonard Boyd and Captain Forrest Sherman represented Nimitz Central Pacific command.   Now small side note here, since MacArthur could not make this conference I still wanted to toss my good old 2 cents at the man. While all of this was going on, Richard Sutherland had been sent on another mission to Washington by MacArthur. Richard sutherland was sent to meet Arthur Vandenburg, a senior Republican senator. They met informally at the home of Clare Booth Luce, a strongly anti-Roosevelt republican. She was also the wife of Henry Luce, the man in control of the Time-Life media conglomerate. The purpose of the meeting was to discern how much republican support MacArthur could expect if he ran for President in 1944. Vandenburg was onboard for it and a month later MacArthur would send another aid over bearing a note to the senator stating “I am most grateful to you for your complete attitude of friendship. I can only hope that I can someday reciprocate”.   Vandenburg and his allies  drafted MacArthur for the republican nomination as MacArthur met with his public relations staff, better called his court. One of his court members, Colonel Lloyd Lehrbas was disgusted by open discussions of MacArthur winning the presidency and running the war from washington. Lehrbas was a former newspaper editor who now reviewed press releases in MacArthur's name. MacArthur kept the man on his staff specifically because of his media connections. Vandenburg found strong support for MacArthur amongst the arch-conservatives. The republican party was going to nominate two candidates: Wendell Wilkie and Thomas Dewey, but Vandenburg was trying to sneak MacArthur in as a third. However there was a specific group of republicans who adamantly opposed MacArthur’s nomination, veterans who had served under him during the Pacific War and before. Vandenburg tried to get a better picture by sending representatives to canvas the troops in the Pacific theater for their thoughts. The consistent response was overly negative about MacArthur.   In early 1944, a private conversation between MacArthur and Congressman Arthur Miller of Nebraska was leaked to the public. It revealed MacArthurs plot behind the scenes to run for presidency and this forced MacArthur to back pedal heavily. On April 30th of 1944 his staff released a statement from MacArthur stating  “I request that no action be taken that would link my name in any way with the nomination. I do not covet it nor would I accept it”. Yeah, MacArthur would try two more times to run. But anyways now that you know that little tid bit information on my favorite figure lets carry on.   The Pacific Military conference lasted until march 28th, conducted under the supervision of the joint staff planners, headed by Rear-Admiral Charles Cooke and Major-General Albert Wedemeyer. Now MacArthur’s team came to the conference with a plan in hand, codenamed Elkon. Elkon was a town in Maryland, a famous destination for quick marriages, and the operation was to be a two-pronged offensive. It called for the seizure of the New Britain, New Ireland and New Guinea area which would be based on phase 2 and 3 of the July 2 directive. That being the two approaches heading for Rabaul: one proceeding along the northern coast of New Guinea and the other through the Solomons. This ambitious plan called for first seizing airfields on the Huon Peninsula and New Georgia, then air bases on New Britain and Bougainville, then the seizure of Kavieng and finally Rabaul would be isolated enough to be invaded.   The first week of the conference became a arm-wrestling match between Sutherland and the other join chiefs, especially General Marshall who squabled over the details of Elkton. Admiral King and the navy were quite hostile to the plan, but rather shocking to some, William Bull Halsey was a large supporter of MacArthurs plan. Halsey’s team argued the plan did not overstretch their resources and in fact Halsey was finding working with MacArthur was enormously benefiting the Pacific War effort. Halsye and MacArthur were a lethal combo, but King was hard pressed because the truth was they simply did not have the necessary resources for MacArthur's plan. So as you can imagine compromises were made. Macarthurs initial calculations for the plan to work required 12 and ⅔ divisions and 30 air groups for the southwest pacific area, while 10 divisions and 15 air groups were needed in Hasleys south area.    The joint chiefs responded by asking what the pacific representatives thought they could accomplish in 1943 with the best reinforcements washington could deliver. Sutherland and Halsey’s team agreed task two: taking northeastern New Guinea, Madang-Salamua-Huon gulf triangle, Bougainville, New Georgia, Cape Gloucester and New Britain could be taken, but they would probably run out of resources to take Rabaul. The joint chiefs said to forget about Rabaul for the time being and focus on taking the Bismarck Archipelago. MacArthur began writing from Brisbane he thought this idea to be a huge mistake “We are already committed to the campaign in New Guinea….If at the same time we enter upon a convergent attack on the New Georgia group, we have committed our entire strength without assurance of accomplishment of either objective.” This led Hasley to agree to wait for his attack on New Georgia until MacArthur had achieved his objectives of taking the islands of Kiriwina, Woodlark and the Trobriand islands. When proposed back to the joint chiefs, to everyone's amazement King accepted the revised Elkon plan with little compliant. The final directive went out on March 28th, officially canceling the 3 stage drive to rabaul. Instead the objectives for 1943 would be first Woodlark and Kiriwina, then the Madang-Salamaua-Finschhafen triangle and New Britain, and finally the Solomons + southern Bougainville. For the first time in the Pacific war, there was an agreed-to strategy for winning in the southwest pacific. In the mind of MacArthur, who you can imagine was only thinking about the Philippines, he had achieved his plan to direct the war where he wanted it and he had a surprising naval ally in Bull Halsey. The Elkon plan would eventually be called operation Cartwheel   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Operation Cartwheel was greenlit and it showcased MacArthur could under extremely rare circumstances, make peace with his true enemy during the Pacific War, the United States Navy. Yes MacArthur would be able to direct the war, at least for a bit, to where he wanted it, the Philippines.

Last time we spoke about Wingate, the Chindits and Operation Longcloth. The onion eating madman Wingate certainly pushed his men to the limits as Operation Longcloth was in full swing. The Japanese had been alerted to the presence of the Chindits when they started blowing up railways and soon a game of cat and mouse was set loose. Some of the CHindit columns, especially those in the southern group were absolutely battered and had to flee for their lives back to India. Meanwhile Wingate and the main body were in a sticky situation and probably should have turned back from the offset, but Wingate pushed on regardless. His rather reckless attitude led the men to be hunted down more fiercely until orders from India forced Wingates hand to return home. In order to return home Wingate would have to sacrifice some and push others to the absolute limit. But today we are venturing back to the icy cold waters of the northern Pacific. This episode is the battle of Komandorski islands Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Raid, counterraid and a constant battle against the brutal power of mother natures frigid northern climate occupied both the Japanese and Americans in the Aleutians for much of 1942. Things did not really quick off much until the arrival of Rear Admiral THomas C. Kinkaid on january 3rd of 1943. Kinkaid quickly persuaded his chiefs to send both men and materials to Alaska to help expel the Japanese menace from their footholds on Kiska and Attu. Thus a naval force led by Rear Admiral Charles McMorris was sent. McMorris led Task force 8 which consisted of the heavy cruiser Indianapolis, light cruiser Richmond and the destroyers Gillespie, Coghlan, Bancroft and Caldwell. One of their early successes as we saw last time was the occupation of Amchitka. The race to take the island between the Japanese and Americans was a bit of a nail biter, but in the end it would fall securely into allied hands and a new airstrip was quickly built.  Kinkaid and McMorris began a blockade of the enemies approaches to Kiska and Attu trying to squeeze them out of the region. Submarine reconnaissance gave a report on February 18th claiming to have spotted several enemy warships harbored at Attu’s Holtz Bay. McMorris decided to carry out an attack against Attu as a result. The submarine report however also made its way to Adak and the report prompted General Butler to order a bomber strike against Holtz Bay before McMorris could arrive to the scene. Unexpectedly the Americans were met with clear weather for once, which allowed McMorris to make it over to Attu in great time, so both the naval and aerial forces reached their target around the same time. This also however almost was met with disaster as a single B-17 flying around 10,000 feet mistook the american task force to be Japanese. The pilot attempted two bomb runs, but luck would have it, the bombs failed to release because of mechanical malfunctions. Meanwhile some anti-aircraft fire from the Americans forced the B-17 to withdraw. McMorris set to work ordering his task force to shell Chicagof village and Holtz Bay. They fired their salvo’s using a checkerboard pattern, firing for 2 hours while some of his ships paraded back and forth. The bombardment managed to kill 23 Japanese, wounded one and demolished a building, but was not overly successful at neutralizing the airfields. After the bombardment, McMorris took the Indianapolis and destroyers Gillespie and Coghlan westward to bolster the blockade. This also allowed him to tease Japanese home waters a bit and potentially intercept some outbound convoys. The Japanese had actually launched a convoy back on February 13th. The convoy was transporting an infantry platoon, airfield construction materials and munitions, all escorted by the light cruiser KISo and destroyers Hatsushimo and Wakaba. Until this point the allies had never ventured to these waters and when they did, the Japanese were caught off guard and dispersed quickly leaving the 3100 ton Akagane Maru vulnerable. She was caught, fired upon and sunk while the other IJN vessels made way back to Paramushiro, not wanting to get caught up in the enemy's activity. The fact the allies were now prowling out in these waters indicated to the Japanese they were blockading Kiska and Attu. This left General Higuchi in quite a predicament; he had two options laid bare: to simply withdraw from the Aleutians or to continue reinforcing Attu and Kiska. The later of course would require more resources from the IJN, perhaps even sending naval assets to hit allied strongholds like Adak or the newly acquired Amchitka base. General Higuchi made a request for the later choice and this was vetoed down by Admiral Boshiro Hosogaya. As I have mentioned in some episodes, the IJN held an aggressive doctrine that held most actions to be directed at enemy warships. What I mean by this, take for example with the IJN submarine fleet, was that they viewed merchant raiding as dishonorable and instead favored using such assets in fleet engagements. It honestly goes far too unnoticed that during the Pacific War the other key actors, such as Nazi Germany, Britain and America employed considerable assets to hit their enemy's merchant fleets. The Nazi’s devestated Britain with their U-boats, trying to strangle the island nation similarly to what the German empire did in WW1. Likewise the US employed its submarines in the Pacific almost exclusively against Japanese merchant shipping lanes and it was one of the major reasons for their victory. The American effort to eventually strange the Japanese home islands of their merchant fleet brought her literally to her knees, while the IJN submarine fleet only began significant efforts to do the same far too late into the war. On top of this, partly as a result of not having a doctrine to attack enemy merchant fleets, the IJN had basically no doctrine on how to defend their merchant fleets, and this proved disastrous from the early days of the war. Admiral Hosogaya had vetoed General Higuchi’s call to perform some merchant attacks based on the grounds it was dishonorable, but when Higuchi requested then to simply abandon the Aleutians, he vetoed this as well on the grounds it would leave the Kuriles and northern Japan bare to attacks. It is rather interesting, if you pull out a map and look at the Aleutian island chain that extends over towards Japan, how likely this could have been. Though the weather conditions would have made it an absolute nightmare, a drive from the north could have had major potential. In the end Higuchi and his forces would be forced to make do, trying to build up their fortifications and airfields to combat the American campaigns to bombs them out. Higuchi had not a ton at his disposal. He had 8000 troops on Kiska and around 1000 at Attu, none of which were first rate soldiers, but it was to be expected given the nature of where they were and their roles. They had around 60 trucks, 20 motorcycles, some cars and small tractors. Anti aircraft guns were plentiful, but they had no artillery, not any significant mechanized strength.  They mined and barbed wired their sparsely defended beaches, hoping the war over the skies would keep the Americans at bay. But after the loss of Guadalcanal, the Japanese could ill afford to spare much in terms of aircraft to the North Pacific. By early march American bombing campaigns had crippled or sunk over 40 vessels and inflicted a total of 3477 casualties. Higuchi’s men were running low on provisions, beginning to face the same fate as their comrades once did on Guadalcanal, albeit a very different type of climate. A resupply convoy slipped past the American blockade on March 9th, but it was to be the last. McMorris was stepping up the blockade game, finally forcing Admiral Hosogaya into a corner. Again Hosogaya was facing the dilemma, abandon the aleutians or commit significant assets to break the blockade. Hosogaya planned a major resupply mission using 2 large transports filled to the brim and 4 destroyers likewise carrying loads. He planned to blast his way through the American blockade, personally taking command of the 5th fleet “Northern Force” which consisted of heavy cruisers Nachi and Maya, light cruisers Tama and Abukuma and destroyers Wakabam, Hatsushimo, Ikazuchi, Inazuma and Usugumo. Hosogaya would be taking Nachi as his flagship for the operation set to depart on March 22nd. In keeping with the IJN’s tradition of overly complicating operations, 3 groups of ships would converge on a rendezvous point 60 miles south of the Soviet owned Komondorski islands. Meanwhile Admiral Kinkaid had made some reforms to Task Force 8, forming it into the new Task Force 16 consisting of heavy cruisers Salt Lake City, light cruiser Richmond and destroyers Bailey, Coghlan, Dale and Monaghan. The Indianapolis had been switched out for the older Salt Lake City, which recently had been repaired after being damaged at the battle of Cape esperance. The same day Hosogayas 5th fleet departed, so did McMorris’s from Dutch Harbor, heading to the west to enforce their blockade efforts. What is a bit interesting for this event, while dozens of carriers were being constructed, literally a 100 would be afloat by the end of the war, the war in the aleutians would see no more of these. In the remote fog-bound and storm lashed waters of the north, neither the Japanese nor Americans would field any carriers, after Yamamoto had withdrawn his during the Midway catastrophe. The battle for control over the Aleutian sea’s would be quite the traditional one. Small task forces meeting and engaging another in furious exchanges of cannon fire at line of sight ranges. Hosogaya sailed his 5th fleet northern force to meet the transports, supply ships and escorts to shepherd them the rest of the way to Attu. His convoy sailed in two separate sections, the 2nd escort force consisting of Usugumo and transport Sanko maru and Convoy D led by Rear Admiral Mori Tomoichi comprising of Abukuma, Ikazuchi, Inazuma and the transports Sakita Maru and Asaka Maru. The second escort force left Kataoka naval base on the 22nd, while Convoy D departed on the 23rd. Hosogaya sailed south over the gray northern seas as the convoys went north. The Japanese did not realize it, but Joseph Rocherfort and his fellow cryptanalysts at Station Hypo were continuing to break Japanese naval codes, providing invaluable information on IJN movements. The Americans knew of the convoy sailing for Attu and Kinkaid was planning to intercept it. Now the IJN warships outmatched the Americans in terms of firepower, both in gun and significantly more so in torpedoes. The type 93 long lance oxygen torpedo boasted a 25 mile range against the Abysmal american Mark 15’s which held a 7.4 mile range. The Long lances also held a 1080 lb warhead compared the Mark 15’s 827 lb warhead. Regardless, the Americans had the distinct advantage of intelligence and the sailors were in high spirits despite knowing how outgunned they were. Joseph Candelaria, a water tender aboard the Monaghan said this prior to the battle “ I remember going up on the deck and across it going down to the fire room. We was going to attack some transports; going to be all over in a few minutes; duck soup”.  As the two fleets were edging closer to another in the northern sea, a terrible storm broke out. The battering winds and huge swells made the destroyers heave and thrash terrible and soon the light and heavy cruisers began to experience some minor damage. Hosogaya’s force remained ignorant of the American threat stalking them through the inhospital weather. The weather issue caused problems for the Japanese at their rendezvous point. They were forced to cut speed by half on march 24th due to the violent weather and Hosogaya was only able to link up with Convoy D by 4pm on march 25th. The two other ships of 2nd escort force remained missing, thus Hosogaya’s vessels began patrolling in a 60 mile line while awaiting their comrades. In the meantime the Americans had their own problems, the sea had grown so violent the crews feared sinking. Geoerge O’Connell aboard Salt Lake City recalled this  “the Salt Lake City would literally dive into the base of the next wave. Tons of water would come crashing down onto the forecastle, sweeping over Turrets I and II and... the open bridge. Shortly after our turn into the sea, and after only a few moments of that dangerous agony... Commander Bitler came to the bridge. Visibly disturbed, he said the ship patently could not take the punishment” By the early morning of march the 26th the storm finally died down making it safer for both sides. Damage to the American ships saw some smashed hull plates, bent stanchions, flooded storerooms, but nothing major.  The morning saw the furious ocean calmed to a near smoothness with almost no swell. Thick grey gloomy clouds hung over the expanse. McMorris had received a number of reports from PBY’s stating they had seen the enemy ships appearing and disappearing in the west. McMorris was certain this had to be the large convoy and was anxious to intercept it, under the belief they would only have a few destroyers as escort. The leading destroyer Coghlan made a rader contact showing several unidentified ships around 10 miles north. McMorris took his force, then strung out in one mile intervals to close in around his flagship the Richmond and begin sailing towards the northeast to intercept the enemy. The mood amongst the Americans was exuberant, they believed the radar blips indicated a helpless line of transports with perhaps a destroyer or two in attendance, nothing to match their 6 vessel group. As one officer aboard Salt Lake City, Lt Howard Grahn put it “fox in the henhouse, the chickens had all turned to wolves and the door was locked”. As the forces came closer together, Japanese lookouts saw the Coghlan and Richmond and initially thought it was the second escort force, but quickly surmised their identity. Hosogaya ordered a message to be sent via signal lamp and this confirmed for the Americans to their horror that they were not facing a helpless convoy but rather 2 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers and 4 destroyers. McMorris had orders to avoid superior forces and could have dashed for safety, but with the Japanese force so close chances of that were quite slim. It was likely the Japanese would overtake them all and sink them regardless, thus he decided to engage the enemy. Hosogaya upon realizing what he was facing motioned the transports further back and got his warships between the foxes and his chickens. McMorris sent word to Kinkaid asking for air support. The two fleets set into a collision course with the Japanese destroyers swing to bear down on the port bow of Richmond. McMorris planned to draw the enemy cruisers away with a feint and then dash in behind them to attack the cargo ships. The Japanese cruisers were the first to fire with Nachi in the lead. At 8:40 cruiser Maya opened first at 20,000 yards upon Richmond which swung into a westward turn. Nachi suddenly received some electrical problems cutting power to her turrets for several minutes. As the range closed in more between the forces, the American ships began to open fire while the Japanese shifted their attention from Richmond to the larger and more threatening looking Salt Lake City. The Tama continued to fire upon Richmond scoring no hits, causing the surface around the American vessel to erupt in fountains of spray. Hosogaya ordered his destroyers to make torpedo runs, but none of them obeyed the order. Various captains would later make excuses such as not receiving the signal or being unable to reach the correct speed for proper maneuvers, but this was certainly a sharp contrast from IJN destroyers whose commanders and crews were famous for aggression. Meanwhile the American ships began “chasing salvos” to avoid taking hits, altering their course towards the last splash in order to foil enemy gunners. The IJN cruisers began launching their torpedoes, but all missed with one churning past dangerously close to Richmonds bow. The American guns put Nachi’s main battery out of action forcing Hosogaya to change his course to get even closer to bring his other batteries into play. In response McMorris made a 40 degree turn to port to confuse the enemy’s gunner. Captain Bertram Rodgers, soaked to the skin with ice cold water made gast guesswork as to where the next enemy salvos were aimed and expertly headed towards the point the last salvo had hit, assuming the enemy spotters would correct their aim each time. In this manner Rodgers chased salvoes with great skill exclaimed “fooled em again!”. At 10am, with almost no actual its having been achieved, Salt Lake City landing 3 hits on Nachi damaging her rudder and jamming her starboard. Her crew managed to free the rudder but it began functioning erratically. Noting the ships loss of maneuverability, and within 20,000 yards the crews all shifted their fire onto salt lake city. Hits were made from Richmond and Coghlan upon Nachi causing much smoke. McMorris then decided to disengage turning his force westwards. Upon seeing the Americans trying to flee, Hosogaya ordered Tama to cut across their arc and deployed Nachi, Maya, Hatsushimo and Wakaba to cut off the American escape route. Task force 16 was forced to flee for their lives going west and northwest. During this chase, both sides began frantically calling for aerial support, but both were informed no were coming. The Maya and Salt Lake City were the only ships dueling during this interval and Maya managed to hit Salt Lake City’s amidships catapult taking out a floatplane and then hit her quarterdeck. Salt Lake City’s own gunfire managed to damage her hydraulic steering system making her maneuvers more difficult. Over 200 shells fell around her until a dud hit and caused flooding to an engine room forcing her to slow down. In response to this McMorris ordered Coghlan and Bailey to drop back to the rear of the line and generate a smoke screen Hosogaya had the initiative now, the enemy was fleeing and they were far from Alaska, in fact they had managed to get themselves much closer to the Kuriles. The American crews believed their only chance of survival lay getting interned by the Russians, but Hosogaya squandered that chance by speeding up to block them. The Japanese were closing in and believing they were close to point blank range McMorris decided to make a wide turn south covered again by his destroyers smoke screen. The Japanese launched 16 torpedoes all at the same time but missed with all of them. At 10:59am the Nachi finally ranged in on the Salt Lake City, despite the smoke screen cover and landed a shell killing 2 men, one of which was Captain Rodgers second in command Lt Commander Windsor Gale. Then a 8 inch shell from Nachi hit her below the waterline at 11:03am destroying 2 fuel tanks, damaging propeller shafts and started flooding her engine room. Soon Salt Lake City was dead in the water as the Japanese concentrated their fire upon her. Her engineers struggled to restart her boilers and offset the flooding as McMorris ordered his destroyers to perform basically a suicidal torpedo run at the enemy in the hopes of saving Salt Late City time to repair herself. The 4 US destroyers began surging at the enemy as the Salt Lake City continued firing her guns back at Nachi. The Salt Lake City landed some hits on Nachi killing several men. Admiral Hosogaya himself was saved by a hairsbreadth as a shell had gone through the bridge killing 3 officers standing right next to him. By the time Salt Lake City had exhausted 80% of their armor piercing rounds, one Lt Benjamin Johnston made an amazing hit, largely by accident as he recalled “ I guess I probably would have asked permission to throw rocks had the Japs been close enough! […] In order to conserve armorpiercing ammo, I shifted to high capacitys [sic] with the hope that one shell at a time might just possibly cause the Japs to think a plane or two from Amchitka […] was dropping a few bombs. The high capacitys, not having shell dye, just might appear similar to bombs exploding on the water. They did, and the Japs fired off bursts into the overcast” After seeing the blue shell dye of the American armor piercing shots for hours, the Japanese believed Johnstons random HE shell was from an aircraft as the Nachi and Maya anti-aircraft guns suddenly began to fire into the clouds.  Meanwhile the American destroyers continued their charge forward with the Bailey in the lead. At 10,000 yards the Japanese concentrated fire upon Bailey and a shell through her killing 5 men. Captain Ralph Riggs of the Bailey ordered her to fire torpedoes at the extreme range of 9500 yards and just as the first fish was launched into the water suddenly the Japanese ships began steaming away. Hosogaya had ordered his fleet to retreat! Hosogaya had broke off the battle for a variety of reasons. His warships were dangerously low on ammunition and sailing back and forth in search of the second escort force had used up most of their fuel. The smoke screens had masked the state of Salt Lake City, Hosogaya believed she was still combat ready during the battle. Also the admiral had received reports about the Americans calling in for air support and alongside the odd HE shell incident he believed there might be American aircraft in the vicinity. There is also another factor no Japanese admiral would ever admit, fearing shame brought upon him. He saw 3 officers blown into chunks of flesh a few feet from himself and perhaps the commanders nerves were shot. Hosogaya’s sudden departure was a miracle for the men aboard Salt Lake City. Admiral Kinkaid after investigating her damage declared “the Japanese could have sunk Salt Lake City with a baseball”. Likewise Ensign F.R Floyd wrote this on the ships log shortly after the battle ended “This day the hand of Divine Providence lay over the ship. Never before in her colorful history has death been so close for so long a time. The entire crew offered its thanks to Almighty God for His mercy and protection”. As indecisive as the battle was, it caused major changes. Hosogaya lost his command when the IJN staff analysis recognized correctly that more aggression would have resulted in Salt Lake City and perhaps more ships being sunk. In all 7 Americans and 14 Japanese were killed with 20 Americans and 26 Japanese wounded, no ships sunk. Most importantly the battle caused the Japanese to abandon efforts to resupply and reinforce Attu and Kiska. Now the IJN would rely on submarines to carry out the task, which could only manage so much. The battle of the Komandorski islands resulted in a tactical draw, but a strategic victory for America. It was also the last real slugout gunnery duel ever to take place between opposing surface fleets without the use of combat airplanes. Basically it was the last of the good old fashioned naval battles, those of you who play world of warships could probably make a “get rid of CV’s joke”. McMorris received praise from Nimitz and Kinkaid for the unlikely victory. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The ice cold water in the north pacific saw a good old fashioned naval brawl the likes of which would not be seen again. It was a strategic victory for America and one that would advance her recapture of the Aleutians.

Last time we spoke a bit about the ongoings of the Second Sino-Japanese War. Mao Zedong’s Fourth Army faced off against the IJA in the western Hubei area causing significant casualties to both sides. The engagement was a mixed one with both sides claiming victory, and it seems it was a tactical draw. Over in the Solomons, Halsey had fixated his eyes on Munda and this prompted him to perform a naval bombardment of it and Vila-Stanmore. Some very unlucky Japanese aboard two destroyers ran right into the Americans enroute to bombard the airstrips and this led to their terrible defeat at the battle of Blackett Strait. The small and short battle showcased the Japanese were being bled and things were only going to continue to get worse for the empire of the rising sun. But today we are venturing back to Burma to talk about the Chindits so grab your onions.  This episode is Operation Longcloth Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    A few weeks ago we began the story about Wingate and the Chindits. The first task given to the Chindits was Operation Longcloth which Wingate did not like as a title because it did not hold the grandiloquence he sought. Now a major rationale for Operation Longcloth was to help relieve some pressure from places like Fort Hertz, the last remaining British outpost left in Burma. Fort Hertz was around 60 miles south of the Chinese border manned by Karen levies and was on the brink of collapse. The fort was maintained as an outpost originally by the Myitkyina Battalion, but after the Japanese pushed the allies out of Burma it began to see many retreating allied troops who would garrison it. The military authorities within India however had no direct contact with the fort during most of the summer of 1942. Luckily for the allies, the Japanese did not continue their advance towards the northern Burmese border, most likely because they did not believe a allied outpost could be maintained in such a remote place. To get a picture of what the hell was going on at the Fort, the 153rd Gurkha Indian Parachute Battalion led by Lt Colonel James Owen Merion Roberts were parachuted into upper burma to investigate the state of the Myitkyina area on July 3rd of 1942. Alongside this on August 12th of 1942, Major Hopkins of the 50th Indian Parachute battalion overflew Fort Hertz and discovered unexpectedly that it was still in British hands. Lt Colonel Roberts had reached the fort some days prior and figured out the landing strip near the fort was still usable. The Fort Hertz airstrip served as an emergency landing strip for aircraft flying over the Hump to get supplies into China. The same airstrip was naturally also a supply line for Fort Hertz. The day after the discovery of the usable airstrip was made, a party led by Captain G.E.C Newland of the 153rd indian parachute battalion dropped into Fort Hertz with engineering supplies and they quickly went to work repairing the airstrip. By the 20th the airstrip was fully functional and Lt Colonel Gamble was sent to be the new commander of the area followed by a company of the 7/9th Jat regiment. A special force was created called the Northern Kachin Levies. They were made up of member of the Kachin people under the command of British officers. Originally Colonel Gamble was their leader and they helped various British Indian army units in the area to engage the Japanese and rally locals to their cause. Now way back at the beginning of the war, Chiang Kai-shek sought the construction of a road from Ledo to Assam that would cut through the mountains, forests and rivers of northern Burma to link it with the Burma road at Lungling on the Chinese side. This was to be a colossal amount of work, Chiang kai-shek estimated it would be built in 5 months, while Stilwell’s team of experts believed it would take 2.5 years. The British were wary about the Ledo road because it destroyed their private shipping monopoly by allowing the Chinese direct access to India. However washington forced them to accept it, despite Britain trying to obstruct its construction by claiming they would perform a amphibious assault to recapture rangoon to reopen its road to China. Wavell argued that even if the Ledo road was complete it would be too costly to maintain, but washington was adamant about it, so they took full responsibility for its construction and cost. The Ledo road would be agonizingly slow to construct. It would take all of 1943 for the road to be cut from Ledo to assam to Shingbwiyang in Burma, just 103 miles in all. This was not surprising given it consisting of 100,000 cubic feet of earth that had to be removed along a track that ran as high as 4500 feet over the Patka range through thick jungle. The workforce consisted of 15,000 us troops, of which 60% were african-american and 35,000 locals. Churchill famously described the Ledo Road as “a road that would be open only when there was no longer any need for it”.   Chennault likewise eager to do anything to increase his funding for the airforces in CHina began argued that the road used up precious resource that would never provide the 65,000 tons of supplies over the Hump that his pilots could deliver. A lot of the allied analysts crunched the numbers and agreed with Chennault, and even General Slim added his agreement to the mater, stating they should better focus on simply retaking burma by military means and thus the road to china would be open. General Slim actually had a lot to say in the matter and wrote this   “I agreed with Stilwell that the road could be built. I believed that, properly equipped and efficiently led, Chinese troops could defeat Japanese if, as should be the case with his Ledo force, they had a considerable numerical superiority. On the engineering side I had no doubts. We had built roads over country as difficult, and with much less technical equipment than the Americans would have . . . Thus far Stilwell and I were in complete agreement, but I did not hold two articles of his faith. I doubted the overwhelming war-winning value of this road, and, in any case, I believed it was starting from the wrong place. The American amphibious strategy in the Pacific, of hopping from island to island would, I was sure, bring much quicker results than an overland advance across Asia with a Chinese army yet to be formed. In any case, if the road was to be really effective, its feeder railway should start from Rangoon, not Calcutta.”   Regardless the Ledo Road was to be built, all 1072 miles of it . Back in December of 1942, the 45th american engineer regiment and the 823rd aviation battalion, two african-american units arrived to begin the first segment of the colossal project connecting Ledo to Hukawng Valley. To build these 103 miles had the men led by Major General Raymond Wheeler braving the difficult Pangsau Pass of 3727 feet before dropping 700 feet to Shingbwiyang. By January 20th of 1943, construction was being done on a 24 hour basis at a rate of 3 quarters of a mile a day. By February 18th Wheeler was given command of the defense of the Ledo sector and despite Wavell’s engineer in chief giving a skeptical estimate that the next 45 miles of the road would only be done by March 1st, on February 28th they crossed the Burmese border.   Meanwhile the 18th division led by General Mutaguchi Renya was given the responsibility of defending northern Burma. General Mutaguchi was a victor of the Singapore campaign. In fact the 18th division was something of an elite division having fought in China, Malaya, Singapore, the Philippines and now Burma. The logistics as you can imagine for his forces all the way in Northern Burma were not good. The men were greatly fatigued by the heavy fighting and lack of everything, so Mutaguchi was content simply garrisoning the region. He deployed a single regiment, the 114th in Hukawng Valley, the 55th in the Indaw area and the 56th in Myitkyina. Mutaguchi’s men were plagued by Kachin levies performing guerilla warfare. Soon he was forced to deploy his men to embark on vigorous patrolling north of the area of Myitkyina, leaving his 19th division vulnerable to attrition and without much in terms of replacements for casualties. In the words of Private Fujino Hideo: “Our enemy was not actually British, Chinese, nor Indians but the Kachins. They were quicker than monkeys and talented in shooting … After the eight month occupation, the punitive force at Sumprabum suffered heavy damage and the casualties from the Kachins’ guerrilla tactics … In the course of the campaign, the killed and wounded amounted to a great number.”    By february the situation prompted Mutaguchi to redirect his attention towards the Kachin state where he planned to send the 114th regiment to attack Fort Hertz and Hkalak Ga, one of the important bases for which the Kachin levies operated. This also happened to be a place the Kachin levies screened for the building of the Ledo road. Thus in order to save everything, Wavell had gone along with allowing Wingate to launch operation Longcloth in an effort to prevent the offensive against Fort Hertz, the Ledo Road and the Hump air route.   Now the last time we were talking about the Chindits they had scored a success attacking Pinlebu and demolishing major parts of the Bongyaung railway. Wingate 10 miles north of Wuntho had established an HQ in the Bambwe Taung hills and was faced with a large decision, to carry on across the Irrawaddy or to retire back to India. Being Wingate he carried on. However while the Japanese at first were a bit bewildered by the attacks, they soon figured out what kind of force they were facing and set out to search and destroy them. The success of the railway demolition had thus created new perils. The Japanese were gathering in number to the rear of the Chindits. The No 1 column in the southern force that had survived the multiple disasters had blown up the railway bridge at Kyaikthin and crossed the Irrawady at Taguang on their own initiative. By March 10th, they had no time to lose as the Japanese were in hot pursuit. The people of Tigyaing welcomed the British and made boats available for their crossing. Fergusson and the No 5 Column got across by nightfall just before a JApanese column appeared on the westen bank to smash them. Learning the enemy had occupied Tigyaing, Calvert with the No 3 column crossed 5 miles downriver. Then on march 13th they were ambushed. Calvert tried to hold the Japanese off with rearguard actions, while his main body crossed some islands midstream and luckily for the men the Japanese did not press their attack or else the entire column likely would have been annihilated. The Japanese were uncertain of the numbers of this new enemy and were being cautious, again they had been fooled into believing the force facing them might be large. Regardless of getting the majority to safety, 7 of Calverts men were killed with 6 wounded who had to be left on an island. Calvert left a note with the 6 wounded men directed towards the Japanese commander asking him to treat the 6 wounded men in accordance with the code of bushido.   Meanwhile Wingate and the main body of the northern force, around 1200 men left Bambwe Taung and came to a major tributary of the Irrawaddy called Shweli on March 17th. Here the river was so wide it made ropes and dinghies useless and the crossing had to be made by boats. The danger was that the approach to the stream was over open paddy fields, where they could easily be spotted. On top of this intelligence had revealed the far shore was held by units of the Burmese Liberation Army. When Wingate sent across an envoy to treat with them, the fearless warrior of the BLA promptly decamped. Wingates men crossed at once, but yet again their mules gave them trouble. 40 mules had to be left behind, while the rest were tethered to boats waddling across. They crossed during the night of March 17th and all got over by sunset. With Calvert and Fergusson well ahead of him, Wingate signaled the forces to march for the Gokteik viaduct so they could demolish it,thus severing the Mandalay-Lashio road.    Calvert turned south towards Mytison, while Fergusson was ordered to rejoin Wingates force. However Calvert was unaware of this order thinking Fergusson was backing him up as he approached Mytison. Without the extra man power, when he got to Mytison he knew he could not hope to take it head on, so he prepared an ambush. He called the RAF in to bomb the town while his men laid a trap along the Nam Mit river. A japanese patrol walked right into the ambush and lost 100 men. Calvert reported ‘We let fly with everything we had and a lot of Japs could never have known what hit them. It was one of the most one-sided actions I have ever fought in.’ For this great feat, the paid with the lives of around 6 Gurkhas. Calvert’s group continued on receiving an airdrop on the 19th, a 10 ton dump of supplies that would be the largest drop of the entire expedition. With their supplies in hand they trekked up the hills to prepare for their assault against Gokteik, but they suddenly received an order to return to India. Calverts force were too far south of the main body and would have to achieve the objective on their own initiative, thus he could not hope to ignore them. Calverts men turned back, but made sure to demolition a railway in their retreat. Wingate sent Calvert word that he should get out as fast as possible in order to bring the most survivors he could for quote ‘we can get new equipment and wireless sets. But it will take twenty five years to get another man. These men have done their job, their experience is at a premium.’ Calvert and the No 3 column reached the Chindwin on april 14th crossing it without opposition and were the first out of Burma. Calvert and his column were the real success story of Operation Longcloth.   As for Wingate, according to those in his company he came into a “down period” for his bipolar cycle. Many accounts refer to him at this time as “luth suspendu” highly strung, irritable and irrational. During the crossing of the irrawaddy, an officer had reported to Wingate he had a snag and apparently Wingate reacted by throwing himself to the ground in a cry of exasperation despair. Wingates biographer had this to say about the minor event “it was one among a hundred evidences of his impersonality at continual variance with his egotism’ he left no record of exactly where he crossed the Irrawaddy. He seems to have concentrated on the negative and discounted the amazing run of luck the Chindits had enjoyed so far – crossing the Chindwin, cutting the railway in 70 different places, crossing the Irrawaddy, all without significant losses – suspecting that, in the words of one of his sergeants, ‘there must be a catch somewhere’. It seems Wingate did not know his men were at their limits and he made the cardinal mistake of funneling his columns together, perfect to bring them into a death trap. Instead of spreading them over a wide area, he compressed them within 15 miles of each other in a king of peninsula surrounded by the Shweli and Irrawaddy rivers, making it much easier for their japanese pursuers to find them. The Chindits were also on a terrain mainly made up of paddy fields rather than jungle, thus they were particularly visible to the enemy. A Japanese spotter plane detected the No 5 column at one point and basically all the Japanese needed to do was take the roads from Mytison to Male where they could have encircled them. But suddenly Wingate realized his predicament and ordered his men to break out of the Shweli loop. This was to be easier said than done. The men were slow, due to hunger, their boots were worn out, they had not had a supply drop in many days. No 5 column had gone 48hours without food and it was becoming apparent Wingates force was too large to be supplied by air.    Back over in Imphal the 4th corps whose role was to provide logistical back up for the CHindits were greatly puzzled by Wingates plans once he had crossed the Irrawaddy. The signaled to know what exactly his intentions were and Wingate replied that his destination was the Kachin hills, from where he would launch an attack against the Lashio-Bhamo road. The 4th corps gently reminded Wingate that such a distance meant they would be unable to supply him by air and suggested he try to instead attack Shwebo west of the Irrawaddy. It was clear they wanted him to go there, but Wingate responded the men could not get back across the Irrawaddy as the Japanese had stolen all their boats and were patrolling the access routes. To this the 4th corps ordered him to end his operation and make their withdrawal back to India. It was actually the order that prompted Wingate to sent his message to Calvert when he did, while he also sent word to Fergusson to rendezvous with him at Baw, where Wingate hoped to get all his men a supply drop before making the journey home. Ferguson's column were in really bad shape, they had no water and began sucking the fluid from any green bamboo stems they could find. They butchered their mules for meat and made stews of monkeys, rats, locusts and cockroaches. They were ridden with lice and leeches. The leeches were particularly bad, as when a man pulled one off, the parasite's head would get stuck in the skin creating an infected oozing sore. Fergusson sent word via radio to Wingate stating a bitter bible verse ‘I can count all my bones: they stare and gloat over me. (Psalms 22:17).’   It was a mistake to send the bible thumper Wingate such a message as he quickly responded back a quote from St John’s gospel ‘Consider that it is expedient one man should die for the greater good of all people.’. It seems Wingate was overconfident about the supply drops, having success prior by allowing some of his forces to attack Japanese garrisons while other oversaw aerial drops had driven the CHindits to take it all for granted. At Baw disaster struck. Wingate launched an attack hoping the RAF would support him, but the pilots could not make out friend from foe and ended up flying off after only dropping a third of the supplies. Fergusson finally rendezvous with Wingate at Shaukpin Chuang river on march 25th. Wingate told the men he thought the Japanese commander was pressed to do everything he could to annihilate them all just to save face at this point. Wingate held a conference with the officers where Fergusson recounted it as being ‘the last reunion of a very happy band of brothers before setting out on the perilous homeward journey, which many of them did not survive’. Knowing the Japanese would block their passage across the irrawaddy, Wingate decided to try a bluff. He would march back to Inywa and cross at the identical point of the eastward crossing. They would have to kill all their remaining animals to make the traverse lightly armed, and once across they would to split up into small groups to try and sabotage more railway installations on their way back to India. Wingate arranged for the drops to be made south of the Shweli loop in the hopes of persuading the Japanese that was where the brigade was to buy his men time. He sent No 1 column eastwards to the Kachin hills, basically to their doom to save the rest of his brigade.   All the columns would endure a terrible march back to Inywa. The mules were slaughtered as they went, and the Japanese were hot on their heels. Colonel Tomotoki Koba had set up 3 defensive lines between the Chindits and the border to India: the first position was at the Irrawaddy, the second along the Mu valley and the third following the line of the Chindwin. Meanwhile the Japanese hot on their trail’s purpose was to drive them into the trap. Wingate tried to toss the enemy off the scene by using feints and decoys, including ordering Fergussons No 5 column to attack the village of Hintha, halfway between Baw and Inywa. The feints it seems worked as the Japanese never caught up to them, missing the opportune chance to trap the Chindits in the Shweli loop. The main body of the Chindits reached Inywa at 4pm on the 28th and their luck had not run out. While the Japanese had stolen their boats over the Irrawaddy, they had neglected to do so on the Shweli. The Chindits gathered the boats they could and crossed the river. No 7 column was first followed by 2 and then 8. 8 was fired upon by the enemy halfway across, fortunately the Japanese force was quite small and lacked heavy machine guns. Even so their mortars, rifles and light automatics was enough to drive many of the CHindits into the jungle as the No 7 column was left on its own to flee. Wingate tried to secure a bivouac 10 mile south east of Inywa and divided his columns into 5 dispersal groups arranged for supply drops. From that point on, they were on their own initiatives.    Fergusson’s No 5 column suffered heavily during their fight at Hintha and having lost his radios equipment they were own their own. Fergusson decided to take his men to the Kachin hills the closest sanctuary it seemed. But when they tried to cross the Shweli it turned into a nightmare. Many of his men were swept away during a flood as were many mules. 46 men were abandoned on a sandbank in the middle of the river as the Japanese began to attack. Fergussons recalled ‘the decision which fell on me there was as cruel as any which could fall on the shoulders of a junior commander’. Fergusson’s group staggered on, starving and dehydrated and would limp to Imphal by april 26. Column 5 had suffered tremendously, only 95 survived the ordeal out of 318 men. Column 7 managed to get 150 of his men to China and flew back to India. All the dispersed groups had terrible tales to tell about atrocities committed by the Japanese, or treachery on the part of Burman villagers. Men spoke of having to struggle to stay away, hiding in caves while the enemy hunted them down like dogs. Rice and buffalo meat were rare luxuries for them, more often than naught they ate python and nettles. But here we have to end to story, for the next time we come back to the Chindits we will conclude Operation longcloth and the daring retreat back to India by the Chindits. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The onion eating madman Wingate took his men dangerously into the fray and many of the paid dearly for it. Their success brought the anger of the Japanese bearing upon them, how many would survive the trek back to India? 

Last time we spoke about the battle of the Bismarck Sea. Though it was called a battle, what occurred at the Bismarck Sea was more of a catastrophic slaughter and a showcase of how the Japanese were no longer capable of performing offensives. The allies performed skip bombing and mast head bombing techniques against a convoy heading for Lae to deadly effect. 4 destroyers, 8 transports, 20 fighters were destroyed and nearly 3000 Japanese were killed. The allied pilots were ordered to give no mercy to the enemy and many reluctantly attacked the survivors of the shipwreck carnage. Their commanders justified the actions stating the men would have been landed and put right onto the front lines in New Guinea causing even more suffering. Yet as magnificent a victory as it was for the allies, it certainly was not the only one at this time for another major naval battle was occurring in the solomons This episode is the Battle of Blackett Strait  Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    Yet before we can jump back into the turbulent seas of the south Pacific we will talk a bit more about the theater of the Pacific War that goes far, often too forgotten, that of China.  Its been quite sometime since we were last in China. Now stating the Second sino-Japanese war is complicated is an overstatement. To simplify it somewhat know this, there were 22 major engagements between the NRA and IJA during the war. One of these engagements is known as the Battle of West Hubei, which was one of four major battles that took place in Hubei. Now in July of 1938 the IJA Dai-Jyu-ichi gun “11th army” was formed under the Japanese central China area army. The purpose of such a formation was to conquer and occupy central provinces in China, specifically those between the Yangtze River and the Yellow River. The 11th army had played a crucial role during the battle of Wuhan and had seen quite a list of differing commanders. In December of 1942 Lt General Isamu Yokoyama took control of the 11th army and he set his sights on various targets. But before he could unleash his forces, Yokoyama was dealing with major sabotage operations against his main base. And these sabotage operations were not being performed by the NRA, no they were being performed by the CCP’s New Fourth Army. Now the CCP had limited actions against the Japanese during the Second Sino-Japanese war. Although the press, such as the New York times had parroted some CCP propaganda insisting Mao and his forces were tying down 80 percent of Japanese forces in China, this is not at all true. The CCP did not have the means to do this, nor did they even want to. Mao Zedong himself was not an all-powerful leader at the offset of the Pacific War. The USSR favored his colleague, Wang Ming who was known as one of the 28 Bolsheviks, ie: moscow educated leaders. Mao referred to these people as “ the dogmatist faction”. Mao also had to deal with empiricist faction members such as the former party leader Zhou Enlai and other CCP military commanders such as Peng Dehuai and Chen Yi. In February of 1942 the CCP began the “rectification Movement” known as (Zhengfeng) and on February 1st Mao Zedong have a speech in Yanan calling for a study of the CCP’s history and suggesting “the party not only needs democracy but needs centralization even more”. The roots of Zhengfeng indicate a Confucian philosophy emphasized the importance of ethical education “The cultivation of the person depends on rectifying the mind,” Confucius had instructed his followers”. Mao organized the Rectification Meetings expecting CCP members to indulge in self-criticism and confession. As you can imagine there were nefarious reasons for this. Mao alongside his close allie Kang SHen, the CCP’s ruthless head of intelligence took charge of the Central General Study committee and began to get false confessions using psychological torture. Kang’s methodology would define Mao’s growing grip over the CCP and the future of it. Residents of Yanan would recount “the valleys and cave outside the town held victims of psychological bullying who produced screams and howls like wolves every night. Suicides occured often, one victim who survived swallowing glass was immediately forced to write self-criticism”. By 1943 the Rectification campaign had become a system of mass arrest, torture and execution. In essence it was a purge that carried on well into 1944 using false confessions from prisoners who were trying to save their own lives. It is estimated 10,000 CCP members, many of which were former inhabitants of KMT held areas were executed. Wang Ming, Mao’s primary target at the time was spared, but he alongside the 28 Bolsheviks were forever sidelined, but hell better then being dead I guess? Meanwhile Zhou Enlai and the empiricists swung firmly behind Mao fearing for their lives. The Rectification movement was to be one of many themes played out by Mao Zedong. There was a cycle throughout his reign where intellectuals were invited to be open, then the party turned against them, they were destroyed by self-criticism, paraded as criminals, tortured until they revealed traitors real or not and executed. As Mao put it in August of 1943 “It is not good to correct too early or too late, Too early … the campaign cannot unfold properly; and too late … the damage [to torture victims] will be too profound.” One of the 28 Bolsheviks, Wang Shiwei who worked as a journalist for Liberation Daily wrote an article titled “Wild Lilies” in 1942, which criticized Mao Zedong for womanizing and enjoying too many luxuries. He spoke about how Mao took an ambulance sent as a gift by the Chinese New York Laundry workers to the CCP to carry wounded troops and instead used it as a private transport for himself as his 23 year old mistress, actress Jiang Qing. Mao would later marry her after leaving his third wife He Zizhen who he had 5 children with. Well Wang Shiwei was expelled from the CCP on Mao’s orders in October 1942 having been found guilty of treason and would be executed in 1947 on Mao’s orders. Anyways, enough sidelining about Mao, closer to the story at hand Mao had unleashed a propaganda campaign promoting the false image of the CCP’s war effort against the Japanese. The KMT actually captured documents with orders from Mao which explained his thoughts on the war “The Sino-Japanese War affords our party an excellent opportunity for expansion. Our fixed policy should be 70 percent expansion, 20 percent dealing with the Kuomintang and 10 percent resisting Japan.” Between 1937-1940 the CCP grew its 8th army from 45,000 to 400,000. Meanwhile the 4th army increased from 15,000 to 100,000. The CCP’s lionshare of war effort was aimed at the KMT but they did perform considerable actions against Japan. The Fourth Army was led by Commander Chen Yi and he had an irregular force known as the 15th brigade of the 5th division led by Commander Li Xiannian. Their arms and ammunition were self manufactured and though they had enough of them, the quality suffered heavily. Their main base was in Northern Jiangsu, but they also operated in central Jiangsu, northern and southern ANhui, northern Jiangxi and Zhejiang provinces. They were all over the place specifically to thwart any efforts of the NRA from encircling and destroying them. They also clashed with the NRA much more than they did with the Japanese. Despite that, the 5th division of Li Xiannians forces had fought tenaciously during the 1942 battle of the Dwarf Mountain. The CCP forces defeated the forces of Wang Jinwei and captured Mienyang in the process. This success however drew the 11th army in who carried out attacks from the north to drive the CCP out, but the CCP troops dug in and would not budge. Yokoyama sought to surprise the CCP menace by attacking their positions rear from Yueyang and Jingzhou. The idea was to grab the CCP’s attention while his 58th division launched an attack against Mienyang. In early february the 40th and 13th divisions began to raise their activity at Yeuyang and Jingzhou to deceive the CCP into believing a major offensive was about to be made against Changsha, which had been the crux of the IJA for a long time. On February 15th the 40th crossed the Yangtze river and began to attack Zhuhezhen, Jianli County and Hubei. Meanwhile the 13th division advanced east sneaking over the Yangtze river from Shashi and marched through a gap between the CCP positions in Jiangnan. The Chinese defenders were taken by complete surprise and it would be the 87th army garrison who would be first hit. The defenders were taking heavy losses and had to pull back to Mienyang. Soon the 40th and 13th divisions were closing in on Fengkow and Fuchang as the CCP resisted their advances killing 354 and wounded 890 Japanese. The final phase of the operation saw the 58th division begin a march south upon Mienyang, enjoying aerial support in the form of the 44th air regiment. The CCP’s fortified positions were obliterating and the defenders were forced to disperse and escape before encirclements could be made. Many would manage to avoid capture by disguising themselves as civilians, but this only prompted Yokoyama to enact intense search and pursuit actions lasting into late march. The CCP leader Wang Haishan along with countless CCP troops were captured by these means. What was the battle of west hubei resulted in a mixed victory for either side. Many in the allied camp reported the Chinese had achieved a major strategic victory. However they paid a heavier price than the Japanese, it is estimated the CHinese had nearly 24,000 dead and 18,000 wounded while the Japanese had 25,000 casualties. Alongside this Historian Barbara Tuchmen states “the Japanese withdrew without pursuit from what appeared to have been a training and foraging offensive to collect rice and river shipping”. Thus it perhaps should be better called a tactical draw between the two forces.   Japan had just lost 4 destroyers, 8 transports and the lives of 3000 or so men. These figures did not even count the numerous sailors and irreplaceable pilots lost. The battle of the Bismarck Sea was strategically a defeat for Japan, second only to that of Coral Sea and it confirmed their inability to control the air in the region and ensured the continued isolation of their forces in New Guinea. In many ways New Guinea was facing the same fate that had befallen Guadalcanal. The Japanese logistics simply could not stretch that far and the allies were strangling their enemy the same way siege warfare had been done since ancient times. Japanese commanders would never again send transports or capital ships into the waters off Papua. From this point on the garrisons on New Guinea would only receive meager supplies brought via submarine or barges, completely inadequate to the task. Thousands of Japanese troops manning the defenses at Lae and Salamaua would basically be left on their own to face a growing allied advance. General Douglas MacArthur went on the recond to say “the battle of the Bismarck Sea was a decisive aerial engagement of the war and marked the end of the Japanese offensive in the Southwest Pacific”. For those Japanese survivors who did manage to land on friendly territory after the slaughter, they were finished as combatants. Lieutenant Masamichi Kitamoto observed survivors coming ashore at Tuluvu on the west of New Britain and had this to say “Their eyes were glassy and deeply sunk into their faces. All were jittery … as if they were seeing a horrible dream … a pitiful scene of a vanquished and defeated army.” Despite the amazing victory, MacArthur's forces could not capitalize on the success and perform a major offensive against Lae. The major reason for this was MacArthur lacked amphibious forces to support the overland march through New Guinea. Since mid 1943 MacArthur’s forces had been advancing up the northern coast of New Guinea while a amphibious force was in the making. Rear Admiral Daniel Barbey took command of what would become the 7th amphibious force on january 10th of 1943. Barbey had immediately hit it off with MacArthur in a similar fashion to how General Kenney had hit it off with MacArthur. However Barbey had pretty much nothing to work with. There were no amphibious training facilities, therefore one of his first actions was to establish some at Toobul Bay near the mouth of the Brisbane river and point Stephens. Meanwhile MacArthur requested small craft and transports, as aside from his command everyone else was receiving such equipment en masse, obviously because Europe and the central pacific had been priorities. As Australian and American troops began to arrive to MacArthurs command he began to demand they train to debark from larger ships down cargo nets onto smaller craft. But Barbey did not have any attack transports (APA), which were key for these types of operations. The first Landing ship tanks (LST)s and Landing craft Tanks (LCT)s would not arrive until mid January. Until he received these he began training up the Landing craft infantry (LCI) by tossing nets over cliffs to replicate the debarkation from large ships. By march 15th of 1943 Admiral King signed off that the Southwest Pacific force was to be the 7th fleet, under the command of Admiral Arthur Carpender. This did not go over well with MacArthur who believed quote “much like his predecessor, Vice Admiral Leary, Carpenter seemed to be working more for the Navy rather than MacArthur”. All was not well in the court of camelot. PT Boats of the MacArthur fleet would once in awhile engage an enemy submarine, but they usually got away with ease. Bad weather, large coral reefs made it sort of a nightmare for the smaller ships and PT boats were very fragile, striking just a log could knock them out. But they were enough to scare the Japanese from using too many barges and thus were sort of a fleet in being. The PT boats would have something of a surface monopoly in the Solomon sea for 6 months, constantly looking for action and finding none. Admiral Carpender encouraged their use in his command as they had shown their effectiveness during the battle of the Bismarck Sea.  Now back over in Rabaul, Vice Admiral Jinichi Kusaka remained in command of naval forces at Rabaul and had the responsibility for the defense of the central solomons. He knew he could not expect much help from the combined fleet and definitely nothing from the Army so he set about strengthening the air defenses at Rabaul and rapidly tried to develop airfields at Munda and Vila-Stanmore. Alongside this he performed a survey of Santa Isabel island incase it could also provide an additional strip. With over 200 fighters and bombers under his thumb he hoped to hold the Central Solomons with air power alone, but he would be horribly overwhelmed. Against his command, Admiral Fitch had some 316 aircraft of various types on Guadalcanal and the Cactus air force could easily be reinforced from a pool of 200 more aircraft from Espiritu Santo and New Caledonia. And here we have another decisive advantage coming to the allies, that in technology. New aircraft were coming to the Pacific such as the Grumman F6F Hellcat and the Vought F4U Corsair which were significantly more advanced than the Zero fighter in terms of speed, armament, ceiling and rate of climb, the key parameters for a good fighter. The Hellcat was the next generation for carrier fighters and the Corsair was a gull-winged fighter bomber issued to marine fighters on Guadalcanal. Just for you tech geeks, the Hellcat was a very large aircraft for its type, weighing 1200 pounds unloaded, powered by a 2000 horsepower Pratt & Whitney engine that could climb 3500ft per minute. It held a flying range of 1000 miles, had a cockpit slickly faired into the fuselage and heavily armored. It carried 6 electrically charged .50 caliber guns and twice the ammunition to its predecessor the Wildcat. While the Wildcat lagged behind the Zero, the Hellcat outdid her in speed and dive. As Bill Davis said upon first encountering a Hellcat “the plan was a monster. From the moment I started the engine I was thrilled and amazed, there was a thunderous backfire as flames shot out of the exhaust pipe. A sailor with a fire extinguisher moved toward the plane, but the engine quickly caught and the flames disappeared as the engine started to purr with a mighty roar. I could feel the power through the throttle as well as my ears and every quaking fiber of my body”. In contrast, the Japanese continued to employ the same types of aircraft knowing full well their weaknesses and knowing full well the Americans were developing new models to counter them. The only advantage the Japanese still enjoyed was their airstrips laid out all over the South Pacific, with Munda base being a particularly important one to allow bombers from Rabaul or Bougainville to stop and refuel for striking missions.  Munda’s airfield was attacked countless times by naval and aerial bombardment which filled her up with holes, but just as fast as they were maid her Japanese construction crews filled the craters with crushed coral and in a matter of minutes or hours the strip was made operational again. As Admiral Ainsworth said “The fact is inescapable that the Japs have gone right ahead and built two airfields in spite of constant bombing by aircraft and two bombardments by surface vessels. We may destroy large quantities of gasoline and stores, and we may render these fields unusable at critical times, but the only real answer is to take the fields away from them.” Regardless of the lack of success neutralizing the airstrip for good, Admiral Halsey had his eye on Munda from the offset of finding out the Japanese had begun constructing an airfield upon it. Halsey saw it as a very valuable new site offering terrain suitable for a large bomber field. In order to invade it simply needed to be pounded to dust and if Aerial bombarding was not enough to do the job he was willing to navally bombard it to hell if he must. The Japanese had become emboldened by the increasing failures of the allies to hit their airfields at Munda and Vila-Stanmore and allowed cargo and troopships to make runs between them and Rabaul more frequently. Thus far only piecemeal attacks had been made against either outpost, but Hasley was planning to send a larger force with considerably larger firepower. On february 27th, Halsey appointed Rear Admiral Aaron Merrill’s Task Force 68 to smash Munda and Vila-Stanmore. Task force 68 consisted of 3 light cruisers: Montpelier, Cleveland and Denver and 7 destroyers: Waller, Cony, Conway, Fletcher, Radford, Nicholas and O’Bannon. Merrill divided his force into two groups, the first group of 4 destroyers led by Captain Robert Briscoe would hit Munda, while the rest led by Merrill himself would hit Vila-Stanmore. On March 4th Merrill departed Espíritu Santo heading for the new allied base at the Russell islands. Merrill intended to use the same tactics employed during the last two bombardment attempts back in January. Navigation was to be by SG Radar, gunfire to be continuous after the first ranging salvos were fired and he would use all ships in a column formation to fire simultaneously to limit the time period of time they had to stay in the enemy waters. By the afternoon of March 5th, Merrills force left the Russells en route to their departure point just 7 miles north of Daisen island. During the night the 4 destroyers detached to go hit Munda while Merrills group continued en course towards the Kula Gulf, believing they would manage to do so undetected. However that night the IJN destroyers Murasame and Minegumo were bringing supplies from their base at Vila to Kolombangara. These 2 ships were part of the 2nd fleets Destroyer squadron 4 under the command of Captain Masao Tachibana. They had taken their route through the Vella Gulf and Blackett Strait and were going to return to the Shortland Islands via the shorter route through the Kula Gulf. The Japanese destroyers were discovered by American aerial reconnaissance prompting Admiral Merrill to engage. The Americans estimated the Japanese destroyers were going to reach Blackett strait at about 11:30, while Merrill’s schedule called for him to make a course change to enter Kula Gulf by 12:17. The distance from the mouth of Kula Gulf to the eastern entrance of Blackett strait was around 20 miles thus it seemed to Merrill to be senseless to change his plans and increase their speed, he did not think they could catch them in time. Thus he opted to simply carry out his original bombardment plan before the Munda group did their which would raise the alarm for the nearby Japanese vessels in the strait. But After Captain Tachibana delivered his supplies he had chosen to take the shorter route back through the Kula Gulf which would fatefully shove him into Merrills position. Just after midnight, Merrills 3 light cruisers were swinging into Kula Gulf while his destroyers detached to perform an advance sweep of the Gulf. Meanwhile the two Japanese destroyers were coming in from the opposite direction along the east coast of Kolombangara when at 12:53, the radar aboard Montpelier detached them northeast of Sasamboki Island. The ships all began to converge on the contact as they tracked the enemy, training their guns on the enemy. Now Radar controlled gunnery was still new to the US Navy and thus the first barrage tended to target the nearest and same target. This was actually a tactical deficiency that had given the IJN an advantage on multiple occasions. At a minute after 1am, the Montpelier broke the silence of the night and opened fire with her main batteries, followed by the Cleveland and Denver. The cruisers 6 inch guns were firing at a round of 11,000 yards battering her. Their fire was concentrated upon the Murasame and their radar controlled gunnery successfully straddled the destroyer. In just 5 minutes a salvo hit caused a large explosion on the Murasame with large fires erupting across her deck.  While this was going on the Waller launched a volley of 5 torpedoes and scored a hit on the Murasame causing a tremendous explosion breaking her in two as she quickly sank. Apparently the explosion from the torpedo hit was heard by Briscoes force around 25 miles away over at Munda. Merrill then directed fire upon the Minegumo as it tried to keep a northerly course while returning fire. After charging north for 4 miles under intense fire the Minegumo came to a stop suffering from heavy damage. The American destroyers tried to get into position to fire torpedoes, but by the time they did the Minegumo was sinking. Merrills cruisers likewise had begun firing starshells over the Blackett Strait and the illumination indicating there were no more enemy vessels. Merrill force began their bombardment of Vila-Stanmore at 1:25 targeting supply dumps, runways, bivouacs and the various aircraft they could see on the ground. Using aid from their aerial reconnaissance they were able to score many hits on emplacements such as shelter tents, barracks, ammunition dumps, grounded planes and such. It was very successful causing a lot of damage and they knocked out the shore batteries that tried to respond. By 1:40 Merrill ordered a withdrawal through the North Georgia Sound. 174 IJN personnel had been killed, of which 128 were aboard the Murasame. There was two submarines the USS Grayback and Grampus that had been assigned to support Merrills force and the Grampus would never return from her voyage. It is possible during the battle one of the IJN destroyers sunk her, but her wreckage has never been found. At the same time the battle was occurring, Captain Robert Briscoe’s group proceeded unmolested to to their bombardment point. At 1:04 they group began to hear and saw the firing flashes from the battle and alongside this unidentified aircraft were coming over Rendova island prompting their caution. Nonetheless by 1:39 they began their bombardment striking the center of the landing strip. By 1:50 the bombardment ceased and they made their withdrawal. Although the airstrips were repaired quite easily, the loss of 2 destroyers in a fast fashion was a bad omen for the Japanese. During March of 1943 allied bombers would make sporadic attacks on the Japanese airfields over Ballalae, Kahili, Shortland Island and Munda. Alongside this allied photo reconnaissance got a good picture of Japanese movements between all their bases and this soon revealed a new Seaplane base being built off southern Bougainville prompted a dawn fighter attack on the 28th. Led by Captain Lanphier of the 70th fighter squadron, 6 P-38’s destroyed 8 Japanese seaplanes. Every month brought the Japanese more losses, whether it be shipping, men or materials they simply could not afford, while the American production capabilities were only growing bigger. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Japanese had a mixed success in central China and a rather small, but terribly loss in the Solomons. They simply could not afford any more losses, for each one was drawing them ever closer to losing the war. 

Last time we spoke about the landing at Amchitka and the invasion of the Russell Islands. The Aleutian island campaign saw a lot of action when the allies decided to investigate whether Amchitka island would be suitable for a new airfield and what the Japanese intentions were with it. A race began between the two, but it would be the Americans who would seize the island and begin the process of building up an airfield upon it. Then over in the south Pacific, the Japanese had finished up Operation KE and with it had used and abandoned the Russell Islands. The allies quickly launched an invasion of the islands prompting the Japanese to send some air raids, but all for naught. Now with the Russells in hand, the Americans had a launching point to attack New Georgia. Yet today we are going to jump into one of the major naval battles of 1943. This episode is the battle of the Bismarck Sea. Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Last time we were in New Guinea the forces of Brigadier Moten had arrived in the nick of time to save Wau from the main Japanese thrust.The Australians were pouring reinforcements and supplies via transport aircraft daily. On January 31st 35 aircraft had made 71 trips, the next day 40 aircraft made 53 trips. This allowed the Kanga force to increase to 3000 men and receive heavy equipment necessary to smash the Japanese. Facing larger numbers and possible encirclement, Major General Toru Okabe had to order his men to withdraw. With that order came the lost hope of capturing Wau it seemed. By February the 1st, Moten had 201 officers and 2965 soldiers of all ranks at his disposal. He began sending patrols across the Black Cat trail and the Jap trail. He quickly surmised the Japanese threat was strongest in the Crystal Creek area where they had established a headquarters The Australians neutralized the crystal Creek area and began pushing the Japanese towards Mubo. By late February the Australians controlled the area from Waipali to Buibaining and a large part of the Mubo valley. Nerve wrecking patrols set off multiple ambushes and skirmishes for countless days. The Australian high command could only authorize such limited activity as they did not yet possess sufficient numbers to undertake further major offensive operations. Moten was awarded a bar to his distinguished service order for “his high order of leadership and control at Wau”. While the Australians were tossing all they could via aerial transport, the Japanese attempted to thwart this. Aerial strikes were sent to hit the airstrip at Wau, but the typically terrible New Guinea weather hampered the Japanese. Aircraft dispatch from Rabaul were unable to locate Wau through the torrential weather and would return back without any success. Then on February 6th, 8 P-39’s of the 40th fighter Squadron were escorting 5 Dakota transports incoming to Wau when they sighted 24 Japanese aircraft. Captain Thomas Winburn led the P-39s to engage the enemy claiming to have downed 11 Zeros and a Sally. Simultaneously 8 P-40’s of the 7th fighter squadron were escorts other Dakota’s inbound for Wau when they sighed 12 Japanese bombers attempted to bomb the airstrip. The Dakota’s were turned back at the last second as the P-40’s engaged the bombers claiming to have downed 7 aircraft. On the ground at the airstrip in Wau were 4 Dakota’s while 5 circled its skies hoping to land after the combat was over. Second Lt Robert Schwensen was circling around in his Dakota and was shot down by a Japanese bomber, he alongside 4 other crew died. Another grounded Dakota was damaged and a CAC Wirraway was destroyed by a bomber. The increased aerial pressure prompted Major General Ennis Whitehead over in Port Moresby to order 3 squadrons to join the battle for Wau’s skies. P-38’s of the 39th and 9th fighter squadrons and P-40’s of the 41st fighter Squadron intercepted a Japanese fighters and bombers claiming to have shot down over 23 aircraft. The Japanese were decisively losing the war of the skies, showcasing the limitations of their offensive capabilities in the area. Now while the Japanese surprise attack against Wau had failed and they had been pushed back heavily, all was not lost for the Japanese. They still held some high ground around Waipali and Guadagasal. Yet in order to turn things around, Major General Toru Okabe would require significant reinforcements to defeat Moten’s 17th Brigade. Things were extremely chaotic at this time for the Japanese high command. The battle for guadalcanal collapsed, leading to Operation KE which involved a major shuffling of troops all over the place. They first ordered Lt General Jusei Aoki’s 20th division to depart Korea for Guadalcanal and for Lt General Heisuke Abe’s 41st division to depart China for Rabaul. Lt General Hitoshi Imamura commander of the Japanese 8th area army at Rabaul ordered Lt General Hatazo Adachi’s 18th army to secure Wewak, Tuluvu and Madang in New Guinea. Adachi was the one who ordered Major General Toru Okabe, commander of the 51st division and the 102nd infantry regiment to capture Wau in order to further secure Lae and Salamaua. However with the conclusion of Operation KE, the focus was reshifted from the Solomons to New Guinea. General Imamura and Vice admiral Gunichi Mikawa, the commander of the south east area fleet developed a plan to move the 18th army HQ and the rest of the main body of the 51st division from Rabaul to Lae. They would also follow this up by moving the remaining forces of the 20th division to Madang. The first movement was set for the 3rd of march and the second for march 10th. It was to be a very risky plan, as the allies held aerial supremacy. The 18th army held some war games indicated the operation would lose around 4 out of 10 transports and upto 40 aircraft. They believed the operation stood a 50/50 chance of success and there were limited alternatives. If they tried to land all the forces simply at Madang, the men would have to march over 230 km’s over swamplands, mountains and jungle terrain. It seems the Japanese were beginning to acknowledge their lack of success at logistics as this course of action was deemed impossible.  Over on the Australian side, General MacKay sent word to Blamey that he feared the Japanese would make a second attempt to capture Wau. He reasoned that even with the projected arrival of reinforcements in the form of the 4th and 15th brigades, they would still be outnumbered by the Japanese. MacKay estimated the Japanese held around 7500 men in the Lae-Salamaua area while they held onto their position in the Mubo region. Because of this, he had restricted activity to patrolling to not allow for any gaps allowing an opening against Wau so that more men could be brought over for its defense. Despite the enormous success in transporting men to the area, supply continued to be a major issue. There was a major increase in the number of aircraft at the Dobodura airfields thanks to the capture of Buna allowing for men and materials to be tossed to Wau, but in early February General Whiteheads confided to MacKay that 2 of his squadrons of 18 aircraft were pressed to their limits and the bad weather was greatly reducing their ability to deliver the men and supplies. Whitehead predicted, correctly that the bad weather would continue for the next 6 weeks, which left typically 2 hour windows for the deliveries per day. Attempting to improve the situation General Blamey had begun the construction of a Jeep trail all the way back in January from Bulldog to Way. But during the process the surveyors quickly discovered the terrain was extremely formidable and the job would take many months. Native carriers performed the lionshare of work as the 68 mile trail would end up taking 4 months to complete. Now during the campaign for Buna-Gona, the allies owed much of their success largely due to their control of the air, and this as we can see at Wau continued to be a vital factor. The Japanese of course held their large air and naval base at Rabaul and since the early days of the war remained an ongoing threat to air and sea supremacy in the region. Blanche Bay in Rabaul provided the Japanese with one of the best natural harbors in the south pacific. It is encircled by hills, is around 6 miles long and 2 and one half miles wide. It alongside 3 other harbors provided an anchorage for a large body of ships, as many as 60 by some accounts. The Japanese had built up the harbors and their defenses to more than 300 antiaircraft guns. By the fall of 1943 the Japanese had almost 100,000 men stationed at Rabaul, the vast majority being army troopers. The Southern fleet force had around 21,000 men under the command of Vice admiral Jinichi Kusaka. Air strength at Rabaul depending on reinforcements provided by the combined fleet, but in early 1943 they held a significant enough number to pose a major threat to the allied operations, if utilized properly. General MacArthur was deeply concerned about Rabaul, despite having the number in theory to negate its threat. MacArthur consistently pushed for an invasion of eastern New Britain in early 1943 and disagreed on using airpower to negate Rebaul. Then during the bloody campaign against Buna-Gona he declared the decision to bypass Rabaul would “go down in history as one of times greatest military mistakes”. THEN later on he would agree that bypassing Rabaul was a good strategy and that it had largely been done because of his advisement. Basically what I am saying is MacArthur is full of shit and more worried about his autobiographies that actual decisions. Regardless of that, MacArthurs early suggestions indicated Rabaul was vitally important and needed to be neutralized. This is sort of a no brainer as you can imagine, it was one of Japan’s largest naval air force bases covering all major operations in the eastern and central solomons. Fortunately for the allies there was no unified command at Rabaul. As we all know the IJA and IJN did not get along very well and Rabaul’s operations is a great example of it. The IJA had fewer aircraft based regularly at Rabaul although its responsibility was to cover New Guinea. Throughout 1943 the IJN’s air forces were primarily concerning themselves with the Solomons, which would eventually see them losing nearly 400 aircraft and irreplaceable pilots for all their efforts. Because of the catastrophe of the Guadalcanal campaign, Rabaul was largely neutralized by US bombers from the solomons. By mid February Imamura and Kusaka recognized the need to reinforce Lae. They had sent a 3 ship convoy on the 19th which went unmolested to Wewak and this emboldened them to brave the allied aerial supremacy. Thus on February 28th a convoy of 16 ships commanded by Rear Admiral Masatomi Kamura departed Rabaul. 6 transports, a oil tanker and their destroyer escorts would be combat loaded so that supplies and the men could be off loaded quickly to minimize turnaround time. Almost 7000 men, mostly from the 115th regiment of the 51st division and some SNLF were crowded onto the transports guarded by an escort force of 8 destroyers. Lt General Hatazo Adachi and his staff were on board accompanied by Lt General Hidemitsu Nakano and his staff. The planned route was to go along the northern coast of New Britain through the Bismarck Sea, to Cape Gloucester and then through the Vitiaz strait to the Huon Gulf. The Japanese commanders believed their movement would be masked by the terrible weather.  Allied command began detecting signs of a major convoy operation in early february. On february 14th aerial photographs taken over Rabaul indicating over 79 vessels at port, including 45 merchant ships and 6 transports. It was clear to allied command a convoy was going to be dispatched, but its destination was unknown. Two days later naval codebreakers at FRUMEL in Melbourne and Washington DC decyphered some coded messages revealing the Japanese were going to send the convoy to Wewak, Madany and Lae. Other intercepted coded messages from the Japanese 11th air fleet to the convoy indicated they would reach Lae by March the 5th or by latest 12th. Another aerial reconnaissance over Rabaul on the 22nd indicated 59 merchant vessels were at harbor. Kenney read the Ultra intelligence to General MacArthur on the 25th and the prospect of 7000 Japanese being landed at Lae certainly disturbed him. Kenney then sent word to Whitehead of the proposed convoy date and warned him the Japanese would most likely perform a pre-convoy aerial strike. Kenney urged he cut back on the transport hours so the aircraft could be made ready the moment the convoy appeared. Kenney would fly over to Port Moresby on the 26th to speak to Whitehead personally and the two generals concluded the Japanese convoy was going to go through the Vitiaz strait.  Now in the south west pacific conventional strategic bombing was not really on the menu as industrial targets in Japan were obviously too far away. Thus since the early days of the way, the primary mission of the allied bomber force in the region was to intercept Japanese supply lines, particularly their sea lanes. Some 416 sorties were flown in January of 1943, resulting in only 2 ships sunk and 3 ships damaged, clearly the allied tactics needed revamping. Captain Bill Garing of the RAAF, part of Kenney’s staff, held considerable experience in air to sea operations and he began to recommend that Japanese convoys should be met with simultaneous attacks from different altitudes and directions. This led allied air force brains to come up with some innovative tactics. In February of 1942 the RAAF began experimenting with “skip bombing”. Skip bombing was an anti-ship technique used primarily by the British and Germans in the atlantic. It involved flying ones aircraft just a dozen feet above the sea level towards a target whereupon bombers would release their bombs, which ideally would ricochet across the surface of the water to hit the sides of the ships or explode overhead, IE “skipping”. If you play world of warships, you know exactly what I am talking about, nasty stuff. Another similar technique involved bombs taking a low altitude between 200-500 feet and dropping around mast height, approximately 10-15 feet and 600 yards from their target, IE “Mast height bombing”. This when performed well would see the bombs smash into the sides of a ship. These two techniques paired with slow fuse bombs would see considerable use in an event we are about to jump into. Now Kimura envisioned, by taking the route along the northern coast, that this would put enough distance between the convoy and allied reconnaissance aircraft until they reached Vitiaz strait. Kimura took the destroyer Shirayuki as his flagship to command the operation. Destroyer Tokitsukaze would carry General Adachi and destroyer Yukikaze would carry General Nakano. The idea was that upon arrival at Lae the ships would anchor 600 or so meters apart along the shoreline due west of the airfield around the mouth of the Busu river. They would use a smoke screen to cover the anchorage to make their unloading activity to hinder aerial attacks as well. A escort of 40 IJN and 6 IJA aircraft would provide aerial protection for the convoy from 5am to 6pm each day it operated.  General Blamey wrote “every effort will be made by our own air force to deal with the enemy as he approaches”. Thus Generals Blamey and MacArthur tossed the job to General Kenney, the commander of allied air forces. Kenney had at his disposal the RAAF under air vice marshall William Bostock and the 5th air force led by Brigadier general Ennis Whitehead. In total 154 fighters, 34 light bombers, 41 medium bombers and 39 heavy bombers available for combat operations in New Guinea. The 5th air force was subdivided into two commands: the V fighter command  led by Brigadier General Paul Wurtsmith consisting of 95 fighters, some P-39’s, P-38’s and P-40s. Then there was V bomber command led by Brigadier General Howard Ramey which had 28 worn out B-26’s, 27 B-25’s, 55 B-17’s and 60 B-24’s. Alongside this Kenney and Whitehead had at their disposal the 3rd attack groups of light bombers, nicknamed the Grim Reapers which included a squadron of A-20 Bostons equipped with 4 .50 caliber guns and long range fuel tanks. You see the A-20 Bostons usually were equipped with .30 caliber machine guns and could not fly across the Owen stanley range from Port Moresby, but Kenney was very keen on the “attack aviation” concept which focused on using low-level strafing and bombing methods. Alongside the grim reapers was 2 squadrons of B-25’s that had been modified by Major Paul Pappy Gunn, the same man who had altered the Grim reapers. The B-25’s had their lower turrets and tail guns removed and instead had 4 .50 caliber machine guns installed in the nose and another 4 in the forward firing chin blisters. With the top turret firing its guns forward, the aircraft boasted an extraordinary strafing firepower and on top of that still carried 6 100 pound bombs and 60 23 pound fragmentation bombs. The fragmentation bombs were outfitted with small parachutes so they could be used for low-level bombing of airfield without damaging the aircraft trying to drop them. Honestly try to imagine this goliath beast firing those .50 cals, would have been like torrential rain of lead.  All of these modifications would allow aircraft like the B-25 to be much more capable of pulling off the masthead bombing technique without the need for a bombardier, which ironically was in opposition to their original role of carrying out bombardier assisted missions from altitude. The Australians could also count on the support of the No. 9 Group led by Captain William Garing consisting of 59 fighters, 26 light medium bombers and 2 heavy bombers; the no 73 wing of Hudson bombers, P-40 Kittyhawks and Beaufort bombers operating at Port Moresby and the no 71 Wing of Wirraways, A-20’s and Beaufighters operating out of Milne Bay. So needless to say a lot of allied airpower was on hand. Now as I had mentioned prior, allied attempts to hit Japanese shipping, particularly that coming out of Rabaul had not shown much results in the past. So in order to increase the success of hitting this convoy, Garing persuaded Whitehead to rehearse a plan for the attacks, integrating all available aircraft. This specifically included performing the bomb skipping a masthead bombing techniques. Garing’s idea was to get all the aircraft to gather over Cape Ward Hunt at 9:30am so they could get themselves over the enemy convoy by 10am all at once to completely overwhelm the enemy escorting aircraft and anti-aircraft defenses. Two rehearsals were carried out, with the 2nd one turning out to be “damn good”.   On March the first at 2am the Convoy departed Rabaul. The convoy slowly made its way across the Bismarck Sea undetected as for the past two days major tropical storms had been occurring since February the 27th. However on March the 1st there was a clearing and a crew of patrolling B-24 Liberators managed to spot the convoy. They reported the sighting, prompting a dispatch of 8 B-17 to be sent to the location, but they failed to relocate the convoy. The Destroyer Tokitsukaze then intercepted an allied message stating their convoy had been spotted. This prompted Kimura to put the forces on full alert. General Adachi who was onboard the Tokitsukaze was uncensored by the report stating it was all part of the plan. His reasoning was that the allies were always going to find them, but with the terrible weather it would be unlikely they could manage to perform a decent attack.   At dawn on march the 2nd, a force of 6 RAAF A-20 Bostons coming out of Ward’s Strip at Port Moresby performed an air strike against Lae to hinder its use to the fighter escorts for the convoy. At 10am another B-24 liberator found the convoy, prompting another order for 8 B-17’s to be sent to attack. They would soon be followed up an hour later by a group of 20 B-17’s. The B-17’s planned to rendezvous with some P-38’s of the 9th fighter squadron, but they arrived too early to the convoy’s location and thus had to face the Japanese escort fighters on their own until the P-38’s eventually arrived to the scene. The first group of 8 B-17’s made their runs at the convoys through anti-aircraft fire and Zero fighters. They dropped 1000 lb bombs from 5000 feet claiming 5 critical bomb hits and sinking 3 merchant ships. The Kyokusei Maru was hit and sunk carrying 1200 IJA troops. The second group of B-17’s then showed up and luckily for them, 12 P-38’s had managed to haul it quickly enough to escort them in the nick of time to make their bombing runs. The B-17’s claimed to have sunk 4 enemy ships, but in reality only damaged two transports, the Teiyo Maru and Nojima. 8 Japanese fighters were shot down with 13 others damaged at the cost of 9 B-17’s damaged in return. While the Kyokusei Maru was sinking, the destroyers Asagumo and Yukikaze managed to rescue 950 troops out of the water alongside 2 mountain guns. Because destroyers are fast, the two ships opted detach from the convoy and haul it over to Lae to drop off the survivors before trying to regroup to reperform their escort duties. The survivors and General Nakano would be brought to Lae by the end of the day and the two destroyers turned around to rejoin the convoy by daybreak. Throughout the rest of the day the convoy would be subjected to multiple heavy bomber attacks. 11 B-18s made an evening strike inflicting minor damage to another transport. The days efforts saw the convoy zigzagging to save its life from high level bombing and this led it to be stretched out for 20km. Rather bizarrely, the Japanese fighter escorts showed little aggression towards the American heavy bombers and departed rather early from the days action. During the night PBY Catalina’s from the No 11 RAAF squadron began shadowing the convoy. One PBY flown by Flight Lt Terry Duigan received a message from HQ to shadow the convoy in order to guide a strike of torpedo bombers, which did not make sense, so he discarded it. However the message as he would later find out, was not necessarily for him, but rather to trick the enemy. The allied intelligence officers back at HQ were certain the Japanese were listening in on their radio traffic so they began sending false messages. Early the next day, Admiral Kimura made what would be a disastrous decision, ordering his ships to mark the time and circle in the dark. This process cost the convoy 2 hours of night cover and the reasons behind the decision are quite unknown. It is theorized Kimura was trying to make sure his convoy would appear to the destination at the same time their fighter escort would show up for the daily activity. In any case, Kimura’s convoy would not see their escort nor stormy weather at sunrise to their dismay. Sunrise on march the 3rd saw a beautiful sunny day, a terrible omen. The convoy was now within striking distance of Milne Bay and 8 Bristol Beaufort Torpedo bombers of the No 100 RAAF squadron took off at 4am. Only 2 Beauforts would make it to the convoy and fail to cause any damage. The Japanese commanders however were now alerted by the presence of torpedo bombers, so they began maneuvers, turning the beam of their ships to the enemy aircraft, exposing the full length of their ships to strafing.    At 5:10am, 4 Australian A-20’s performed an airstrike against Lae, catching several grounded planes that were needed to escort the convoy. At 8:30am, a striking force of 90 aircraft consisting of a squadron of B-17’s, 4 squadrons of B-25’s including some grim reapers, a squadron of Beaufighters, a squadron of A-20’s and 2 squadrons of P-38 lightnings. The striking group departed Port Moresby and headed for Cape Ward Hunt while 22 A-20 Bostons of No 22 RAAF squadron attacked Lae to reduce the convoys air cover. The striking group took up their practiced formation with the B-17’s leading the echelon at 7000 feet, the B-25’s behind them at 4000 feet, the Beaufighters at 500 feet, some other B-25’s designated to perform low level bombing at around 700 feet and the P-38 lightings hanging above at 12,000 feet.   At 10am, 13 B-17s reached the convoy first and began bombing them from 7000 feet causing the convoy to zigzag, dispersing their formation and reducing the concentration of their anti-aircraft fire considerably. The B-17’s attracted the Zero fighter escort, but were quickly pounced upon by the P-38 lightnings. One B-17 was shot apart by a Zero and its crew took to parachuting. The parachuting men were fired upon by Zero fighters and when they hit the water some Zero’s continued to strafe them. Although the B-17’s inflicted no damage, 7 Zero’s would be shot down by the P-38s reducing the convoy's protection.   Meanwhile the Beaufighters were coming in just above the waves making it look like they were Beaufort torpedo bombers. Admiral Kimura ordered his ships to maneuver so their beams were towards the enemy expecting torpedo runs and this exposed his ships to the Beaufighters strafing runs. The Australian pilots began to open up with their 6 .303 machine guns and 4 20mm Hispano cannons. The combination unleashed a carnage seeing rivers of fire erupt across the lengths of the ships. Some vessels were stopped dead in the water as a result of their officers being cut down to pieces across their bridges. Much of the convoys anti-aircraft positions were destroyed by the strafing. After the first strafing run, B-17’s and B-25s began to make their bombing runs rather unexpectedly, leaving the BEaufighters scrambling to flying as the bombs were literally falling down around them. Out of 37 bombs dropped by the 90th attack Squadron Grim reapers, 17 were claimed as direct hits. 12 A-20 bostons from the 89th bomb squadron claim while performing low level bombing that 11 out of 20 bombs made hits. The B-25’s of the 405th bomb squadron dropped 35 500 lb bombs from low level and claimed 4 direct hits, these bombs had 5 second delay fuses. The bombing runs caused massive chaos amongst the convoy, so much so that pilots claimed to have seen 2 japanese vessel collide into another. The modified grim reappears strafed the convoy during all of the runs. A squadron leader named Brian Blackjack Waler recalled this “I was observing it from the side and all these ships - honestly, I’ve never seen anything like it. Dozens of planes all going in at zero feet. In fact, I could see a Beaufighter and a B-25 both going in at the same target and I thought, get out one of you!” The assortment of differing aircraft were coming in at all sorts of angles and all sorts of altitudes, many low.    Garrett Middlebrook, a co-pilot in one of the B-25s, described the ferocity of the strafing attacks: “They went in and hit this troop ship. What I saw looked like little sticks, maybe a foot long or something like that, or splinters flying up off the deck of ship; they’d fly all around ... and twist crazily in the air and fall out in the water. Then I realized what I was watching were human beings. I was watching hundreds of those Japanese just blown off the deck by those machine guns. They just splintered around the air like sticks in a whirlwind and they’d fall in the water.” The Shirayuki was the first ship to be hit, by a combination of strafing and bombing attacks. Just about all of the men on her bridge were strafed, including Kimura who was wounded. She received a bomb hit that stated a magazine explosion breaking her stern off and causing her to sink. Her crew transferred to the Shikinami as the Shirayuki was scuttled. The Tokitsukaze was hit fatally and her crew had to abandon her. The Arashio was strafed violently causing her to collide with the transport Nojima disabling both ships. Both ships would be abandoned as the allies strafed and bombed them sinking Nojima eventually. The remaining destroyers struggled to save survivors in the water.   By 10:15, all 7 of the transports had been hit and we're sinking 100km’s southeast of Finschhafen. After midway a second series of attacks were made by B-17’s and A-20’s who strafed and bombed the Asashio while she was trying to rescue survivors. The 4 remaining destroyers withdrew up the Vitiaz strait and were joined by the destroyer Hatsuyuki coming from Long Island. The Hatsuyuki and Uranami brought 2700 survivors back to Rabaul while the 3 other destroyers continued picking up survivors and would eventually bring them to Kavieng by march 5th. During the night of march 3rd, a force of 10 PT boats led by Lt Commander Barry Atkins made an attempt to finish off the convoy alongside some B-17’s and Beaufighters. 2 of the PT boats hit submerged debris and were turned back, but the other 8 continued and arrived off Lae in the early hours of March 4th. Atkins spotted a fire that turned out to be the transport Oigawa Maru. Pt-143 and PT-150 fired torpedoes at it, further crippling and eventually sinking the transport. The Asashio was hit by a B-17 with a 500 bomb bomb as she was grabbing survivors and sunk. Amongst the 4 surviving destroyers it would only be the Yikikaze that went undamaged. The PT boats and allied aircraft attacked the Japanese rescue vessels and survivors clinging to rafts or floating in the sea. The decision to attack the survivors was highly unpopular amongst the pilots and sailors but was deemed necessary on the grounds the rescued Japanese were most likely going to be landed for military duty if not attacked.  One Japanese survivor wrote in his diary of the ordeal “The Boeing B-17 is most terrifying. We are repeating the failure of Guadalcanal. Most regrettable!” Many allied pilots were sicked by these actions.   One pilot recalled "as per instructions, we flew around to see if some ships were still afloat. Some were sinking and burning--we san a lifeboat with about 20 people. I thought these poor guys. But we had a job to do because if they got to shore, they were going to kill our guys. So I came around and strafed them. One of the cruel things of war which had to be done"   Another pilot recounted this “At the briefing, Australian officer had told us we must not permit a single enemy to reach the shores of New Guinea. They explained the suffering, agony, and loss by our troops in having to hunt down and kill a suicidal Jap”. It is estimated around 352 Japanese troops were killed during these attacks adding to the 2890 casualties suffered during the battle. Another 224 survivors in the water would be rescued by the I-17 and I-26 shuffled over to various nearby islands such as Goodenough island. Of the 116 Japanese that would be landed on Goodenough island, 72 would be killed with 42 captured and 2 missing.   Officials at the Advanced air echelon at Port Moresby went through the claims of their pilots and sailors and believed a great number of ships had been destroyed. Their conclusion was that 12 transports, 3 cruisers and 7 destroyers had been sunk, which MacArthur readily believed, although a report would later come out to claim the number was actually 4 destroyers and 8 transports. Later the Japanese would admit that 3000 soldiers had been killed during the battle, but this did not count the hundreds of sailors lost on the ships, nor the pilots in the aircraft. MacArthur would make a commendation on march the 4th for all the air force units in New Guinea stating “it cannot fail to go down in history as one of the most complete and annihilating combats of all time. My pride and satisfaction in you is boundless” Kenney added to it stating “tell the whole gang that I am so proud of them I am about to blow a fuse”. MacArthur would also at the offset claim they had caused 15,000 enemy casualties describing the battle as a decisive aerial engagement for the southwest pacific theater. And it certainly was a decisive victory, it was a devastating loss for Japan that showcased Japan was no longer capable of being on the offensive. I will finish off the tale of the battle of the Bismarck sea with a account from Reiji Masuda, a crewman aboard the destroyer Arashio, as it leaves a vivid and harrowing account of the attack.   They would come in on you at low altitude, and they’d skip bombs across the water like you’d throw a stone. That’s how they bombed us. All seven of the remaining transports were enveloped in flames. Their masts tumbled down, their bridges flew to pieces, the ammunition they were carrying was hit, and whole ships blew up. . . . They hit us amidships. B-17s, fighters, skip-bombers, and torpedo bombers. On our side, we were madly firing, but we had no chance to beat them off. Our bridge was hit by two five-hundred-pound bombs. Nobody could have survived. The captain, the chief navigator, the gunnery and torpedo chiefs, and the chief medical officer were all killed in action. The chief navigator’s blackened body was hanging there, all alone. Then a second air attack came in. We were hit by thirty shells from port to starboard. The ship shook violently. Bullet fragments and shrapnel made it look like a beehive. All the steam pipes burst. The ship became boiling hot. We tried to abandon ship, but planes flying almost as low as the masts sprayed us with machine-guns. Hands were shot off, stomachs blown open. Most of the crew were murdered or wounded there. Hundreds were swimming in the ocean. Nobody was there to rescue them. They were wiped out, carried away by a strong current running at roughly four or five knots. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The battle of the Bismarck sea proved the Japanese were indeed incapable of being on the offensive, the allies were now in the driving seat. It also showcased war produces wild innovations that can prove quite deadly. 

Last time we spoke about the first adventure of the Chindits. Eccentric and quite literally madman Wingate was championed by Wavell to create a guerrilla unit to perform operations in Burma. Wingate soon readjusted the group to be a long range penetration group known as the Chindits. Their purpose was to disrupt the Japanese behind their front lines. The eccentric Wingate proved to be capable of turning men into onion wearing jungle warriors and they marched into the jungle to sabotage railway lines to hinder the Japanese. Their first mission was met with tremendous disaster after disaster, but surprisingly by the end they had achieved their goal of blowing up some railway. We finished off by talking about a lesser known allied partner during the Pacific War, Free France. The Japanese had ignored them for a long time, but eventually enough was enough and they seized Guangzhouwan from Free France thus ending their position in China. But today we are venturing back to the Aleutians. This episode is Landing at Amchitka and Invasion of the Russels Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Now the last time we were in the Aleutians, the Americans had taken Adak back on August 30th of 1942. There they began building a new airfield from which they could continue to reclaim the Aleutian island chain. However the Japanese did not give up on their northern possessions and reoccupied Attu Island by late October. The Japanese acted so boldly because they believed the Amerians were not able to construct an airtstip yet on the neighboring island of Amchitka. Also during October, Kiska was reinforced by massive amounts of anti-aircraft weapons and an impressive underground network of bunkers. Now initially the plan for the Aleutians for the Japanese was simply a large feint that would see them gradually withdrawing to the northern Kuriles while bleeding the americans of lives and resources. However all the American activity in the north was surprising Japanese high command and they now were beginning to believe the Americans sought to hop along the Aleutian island chain all the way to the home islands to potentially invade Japan from the north, a rather insane war strategy to be sure. As a result, the Japanese high command decided not to abandon the Aleutians for the winter and on November 1st, the formulated a joint plan to strengthen the defenses of Kiska and Attu by February of 1943. They also sought to create a seaplane base at the unoccupied island of Shemya. Now on the other side, the US army planned to occupy Tanaga along with Atka after the Adak base was established, but for the time being this was not a pressing issue. What was a pressing issue was a concern that the Japanese might seize Amchitka, 60 miles east of Kiska. Admiral Nimitz directed Theobald to preempt any such occupation and for Colonel Talley to go with a party of Alaskan scouts to go to the island to see if it was possible to build an airfield there. The Alaskan scouts landed on the island having to hid, while Japanese reconnaissance aircraft flew overhead. They found test holes all over the island that had been made by Japanese patrols. Contrary to the Japanese reports, the Alaskan scouts determined Amchitka was long, narrow and flat, except of course for a volcano at one end, but this indicated it could operate an airfield. Given the viability of the island and the presence of the Japanese holes testing its viability likewise, the race was on. Thus Admiral Nimitz approved the invasion of Amchitka codenamed Operation Longview. General Marshall approved the plan to advance upon Amchitka and agreed to assign troops for an invasion. While planning for the Amchitka occupation was underway, major changes in command structure also were going on. On January 4th of 1943, Theobald was transferred out of his command assumed by Rear Admiral Thomas Kincaid. Likewise Theobalds second in command, rear admiral W.W Smith was also replaced by rear admiral Charles McMorris. Kincaid was a combat veteran who liked action and was more to Buckner’s liking as he immediately went on the offensive, arranging for a task force to deliver the Army’s Amchitka occupation forces of 2000 men led by Brigadier General Lloyd Jones. Beginning in early November upon discovering the Japanese reoccupation of Attu, General Butler sent missions against the island. Colonel William Eric Eareckson led the airforce to hit Attu, successfully destroying several beach installations, sank a cargo ship and took out 9 Zero fighters at Holtz Bay. During the first 6 months of 1943, Attu and Kiska would be attacked by the 11th air force who would hit the islands with over 3,000,000 pounds of bombs. In July Kiska alone would be hit by 900,000 pounds of bombs. Liberators, mitchells, dauntless, lightnings and warhawks took part in the aerial attacks making the islands untenable. This is quite a lesser known aspect of the Pacific War. The American airfield on Adak was little more than 200 miles away from the Japanese on Kiska and nearly twice that distance from Attu. Any day weather permitted it, American aircraft departed from Adak to strike at the Japanese, it was grueling work fighting the Japanese and mother nature.  Over on the Japanese side on November 23rd the first Shemya convoy departed from Paramushiro, carrying 1100 troops of the 303rd independent battalion escorted by the light cruisers Abukuma, Kiso, Tama and the destroyers Hacuoshimo, Wakaba and Usugumo led by Admiral Hosogaya. But before the convoy was able to get to the island, the Americans sent a wave of B-24’s on November 27th which managed to sink the transport Cherrybourne Maru just off Attu waters. Hosogaya began receiving reports indicating a North Pacific task force was in the vicinity as well. This prompted Hosogaya to postpone the Shemya landings and return back to Paramushiro. Ironically there was no American task force in the north pacific as Admiral Theobald had literally taken the majority of warships with him for the invasion of North Africa.  Eareckson’s constant aerial attacks forced Hosogaya to consolidate his vessels at all times and prompted him to take the entire convoy to Kiska landing the troops there on December 2nd. On December 18th, Earecksons aerial forces smashed Amchitka, destroying every building on the island. Mere hours after the report of the damage, General Buckner decided to send the Alaska scouts in. The Alaska Scouts, were also known as Castner’s Cutthroats, led by Colonel Lawrence Castner. The scouting expedition showed further signs the Japanese had been on the island recently doing the same type of work as them. Thus operation longview’s timetable had to be increased. The scouts reported a fighter strip could be built up in 2 to possibly 3 weeks and a main airfield in 3-4 months time. By the end of the year the 11th air force had managed to take down 50 enemy planes in combat and lost around a dozen in the combat. However, over 80 other aircraft had been lost to a multitude of other causes, such as good old mother nature. Operating in the far reaches of the north was extremely dangerous, and the weather seemed to be taking a heavier toll than the Japanese. In spite of mother nature, Eareckson’s bombers continued their work using rather innovative means. Eareckson pioneering a low-level bombing technique to raid the enemy and thwart the effects of the unpredictable Aleutian weather. To overcome the shortness of the daylight cycle, he was forced to bomb at night and to do so he would use a single plane that preceded the main force by a minute to drop incendiary bombs to illuminate the area. It was a very Japanese type of strategy, perhaps he was learning from his enemy. As I had mentioned the 11th air force would literally drop more than a million pounds of bombs over Attu, Kiska and other islands under Earecksons command. Earecksons personally was in the air ever flyable day of the campaign excluding one brief October mission to the States. On January 4th, Admiral Kinkaid, an American admiral who had seen action in more big naval battles than anyone else, finally arrived at Kodiak to replace Theobald. The day after, Kinkaid ordered the full troop landings on Amchitka to be executed. Butler was very pleased to have a “fighting admiral”. Heavy cruiser Indianapolis, light cruisers Detroit, Raleigh and 7 destroyers led by Admiral McMorris were to do the job. Yet mother nature did not comply, the weather became severe forcing the americans to postpone the operation for a few days. Meanwhile Butler sent a reconnaissance over Amchitka and more air strikes against Attu and Kiska. These runs led to the sinking of the freighter Montreal Maru off the Komandorski islands, hey I am from Montreal and the Kotohiro Maru off Attu.  Because of the nonstop pressure from the 11th air fleet, the Japanese were only able to pull off 8 resupply runs for Kiska and 4 for Attu between December 17th to January 30th. Basically it was similar to the situation on Guadalcanal, trying to stop the Japanese from receiving provisions. By the night of January 11th the weather continued to look bad, but as the storms slacked just a bit, Admiral McMorris decided to depart with the 2100 Engineer and army troops led by Brigadier General Lloyd Jones. It was a risk to be sure, you could not trust any windows of decent weather to be open for very long. McMorris also ordered the destroyer Worden to take a detachment of Alaska Scouts led by Lt COlonel William Verback to hit Constantine harbor. The destroyer blasted through the surf at the harbor mouth shortly before dawn, successfully landing Verbeck’s scouts. But as the Worden made her departure from the harbor mouth a brutal current smashed her onto a pinnacle rock, leaving her powerless. The destroyer Dewey was sent racing off to assist her, but the Worden would capsize and kill 14 of her crew before the rescue could be made. Like I said, mother nature was taking a heavier toll than the Japanese. Verbecks scouts did a full reconnaissance of the island finding no Japanese forces, so the rest of the convoy came in. They came ashore the same way they had come ashore at Adak, wading through icy surf. They were soaked with ice water and oil. It was miserable, but Amchitka was quickly secured. The American engineers went to work immediately to construct the new airfield. They would have 12 days before a Japanese aircraft emerged to the scene, it was a floatplane which reported their presence back to Kiska. The men made good use of the 12 days and it was the same story as what occurred on Adak before. Men toiling without rest in winter rain and wind, in the bitter cold surf of Constantine harbor, wading through black Aleutian mud, climbing over rocks and heavy tundra. They unloaded, carried ashore, stored and protected their arms, ammunition, food, fuel and other equipment, even the smallest of kindling. Her in the Aleutians, the soldiers bodily needs were more than that in a place like the south pacific, I can assure you I live in a place where we get the nasty combination of ice rain and snow, its not fun to be out in that. The Japanese commanders were shocked by the unexpected occupation of Amchitka which lay only 50 miles from their main base at Kiska. The Japanese began their own series of air strikes against Amchitka hoping to hinder the construction of the airfield. They knew if the American completed an airfield the already relentiles air attacks would increase. The Japanese air raids caused considerable damage over the course of the following days, but the american engineers performed miracles and managed to complete the Amchitka runway by the end of January, allowing a P-40 squadron to be landed on January 28th. After this the Japanese bombing missions became more sporadic until February 18th when they ceased. Just like the Americans, mother nature was just as cruel to the Japanese and they simply could not spare anymore aircraft bombing Amchitka, they had to have a reserve to defend themselves. Now additional air forces were joining the daily raids against Kiska using Amchitka as a launch pad. The Japanese were being whittled down slowly but surely in the north. Yet we need to leave the north and head back south to the Solomons. After the epic conclusion of the Guadalcanal campaign, culminating with the success of Operation KE, the Japanese Empire now had to switch to the defensive. During Operation KE, on February the 1st, the Americans received a cascade of sighting reports from coastwatchers and scouting aircraft. Some 20 Japanese destroyers had headed down the slot and a small Japanese infantry force was landed in the Russell Islands. Likewise allied flights over the Japanese held anchorage off Buin noted a sharp increase in the number of ships. Now the third run of Operation KE took place on the night of February 7th and lifted 1796 men off Guadalcanal and the Russell Islands. This prompted Admirals Nimitz and Halsey to commence their campaign to move up the solomons and thwart any Japanese incursions moving down them. In January they wanted to hit the Japanese base at Munda, but lacked the necessary forces for such an operation. One place in the solomons they could perform an operation against was the Russell Islands to the southeast. Admiral Halsey decided it would be advantageous to seize the Russell Islands and develop them while preventing their use to the Japanese. Thus operation Cleanslate was born. The idea behind it was simple, take the island away from Japanese use, further limited the Japanese operational capacity in the solomons and the Russell Islands could be used as a launching pad to hit other places like New Georgia. As Air Force historian Kramer Rohfleisch put it “for allied operations worked in such a way, that each fresh base became a successive cancer in the structure of the enemy’s defense lines, sending out its tentacles and relentlessly destroying the equipment and personnel opposing it”. Operation Cleanslate was to be the first step in the conquest of the central and northern solomon islands, all to culminate with the final drive against the stronghold of Rabaul. By the end of January Halsey received permission from Nimitz to proceed with the invasion. The americans would dispatch an infantry battalion and anti-aircraft units from Guadalcanal into 2 destroyers to occupy the Russell Islands. Likewise the Japanese quickly beat them to the punch by landing around 400 troops as indicated by their aerial reconnaissance. As we know however, this was not a reinforcement of the island, but a part of Operation KE. The 17th army sought to use the Russell islands as a backup extraction point if the destroyers failed to get the men off Guadalcanal. Halsey was forced to postpone Operation Cleanslate, believing the Japanese were going to put up a large fight for the Russell Islands. In early february the Americans still were unaware the Japanese had evacuated Guadalcanal, but Hasley finally kicked off Operation Cleanslate regardless on the 7th. The 103rd and 169th regiments of Major General John Hester along with the 3rd marine raider battalion, anti aircraft units from the 10th and 11th marine defense battalions and ACORN 3: a naval engineering force of the 35th naval construction battalion.  Admiral Turner was given command of the operations with his task force 64 consisting of 8 destroyers, 5 minesweepers, 12 tank landing craft and a number of barges and torpedo boats. He was going to receive assistance from Admiral Fitch’s land based aircraft to cover the transports and 2 other task forces. Task force 18 led by Admiral Giffen consisting of heavy cruisers Wichita, Louisville and 3 destroyers and Task force 68 led by Rear Admiral Aaron Merrill consisting of light cruisers Montpelier, Cleveland, Denver, Columbia and 4 destroyers. The other task forces would be in close proximity just in case things got dicey. Of course unbeknownst to the Americans the Japanese had evacuated the Russell Islands by the 10th closing off Operation KE. Australians and New Zealand coastwatcher alongside US army, marine and naval air reconnaissance saw a ton of abandoned equipment on the Russell Islands, which Halsey ignored as he was deadset to carry out Operation Cleanslate as planned, fearing the enemy might try to reinforce the islands still. On February the 20th the first echelon of the Russells Occupation force departed Guadalcanal under strict radio silence. It was an uneventful trip and the transports were divided into 3 groups to hit their landing sites. The 10rd regiment landed on Banika easily taking control over the island. The 3rd marine raider battalion did the same at Pavuvu. The landings went unopposed, but the Marines quickly found out that the 10 man rubber rafts used for their landings had motor issues. Alongside this the 169th field artillery battalion somehow managed to get lost and took over 19 hours to land instead of 2, but by the end of the day the islands were firmly in American hands. The men began digging themselves into defensive positions. As soon as reports came in that the islands were secure, Halsey began pouring Seabees into the islands and supplied their 2 new fighter strips with lavish amounts of ammunition and aviation fuel in anticipation of expanding the air operations in the central solomons. But the Russell Islands were at the absolute limit of Hasleys designated border, technically they were over that border. No more westward progress could occur without good old General MacArthurs blessing. So the men simply set to work, and by the end of hte month over 9000 soldiers were in the Russells and the construction of a new airbase was occurring in Banika and a torpedo boat base at Wernham Cove. Upon learning of the American seizure of the Russells, the Japanese launched a surprise air strike. 12 Vals and 25 zeros struck the unfinished airfield and torpedo boat base on March 6th without any warning. They caused little damage, but would just be the beginning of a 3 month long campaign of night air attacks. By late may the airfield at Banika alongside the torpedo boat base, a training center and staging area for the future operation against new georgia. Operation Cleanslate may have been lackluster when it came to combat, but acted as a great practice run for what was to be the future of island hoping warfare in the solomons. The landing craft tank veterans of operation cleanslate would help teach others, increasing Americans amphibious capabilities. The American also learned a very valuable lesson when it came to loading and landing operations. They had certainly come a long way from the earlier experience of operation Watchtower. Now back to the issue of Hasley’s operation stepping on the toes of MacArthur's area. Upon taking the Russell Islands, Halsey had his eyes on Munda Point, where there was a new Japanese fighter strip in New Georgia, around 120 miles to the west. The terrain looked suitable for a large bomber field, something highly desired. But MacArthur stood in the way, so they were going to have to talk. A face to face summit was made in early april, forcing Halsey to cross the Coral sea to present himself to the general at the AMP building in Brisbane. There was no reason to believe this was going to be a warm meeting. Halsey to this point had certainly not appreciated MacArthur's credit snatching communiques. In fact one aide to Halsey had referred to General MacArthur as quote “a self-advertising son of a bitch”. MacArthur had also declined an invitation from Admiral Nimitz to attend a command conference in Noumea in September of 1942, a slight insult if you were. He instead sent Sutherland and Kenney in his place to which one of Nimitz staff officers remarked “MacArthur found himself unable to be present”. When Halsey met MacArthur face to face, believe or not they instantly took a liking to another. Within just 5 minutes Halsey wrote “I felt as if we were lifelong friends. I have seldom seen a man who makes a quicker, stronger, more favorable impression. He was then 63 years old, but he could have passed as 50. His hair was jet black; his eyes were clear; his carriage was erect. If he had been wearing civilian clothes, I still would have known at once that he was a soldier”. MacArthur was equally impressed writing about Halsey  “He was of the same aggressive type as John Paul Jones, David Farragut, and George Dewey. His one thought was to close with the enemy and fight him to the death. . . . I liked him from the moment we met, and my respect and admiration increased with time.” In the year that followed the admiral and general would effectively coordinate their operations in the south pacific. As Kenney and Kinkaid had learned, and as Halsey was in turn, MacArthur was accustomed to deference but did not bristle at well reasoned opposition. MacArthur could yield to sound arguments. Of course heated arguments occurred between the two men. Halsey’s long term chief of staff, Robert Carney witnessed one in 1943 where he said “The admiral, with his “chin sticking out a foot,” told MacArthur that he was placing his “personal honor . . . before the security of the United States and the outcome of the war!” MacArthur responded “Bull, that’s a terrible indictment. That’s a terrible thing to say. But, I think in my preoccupation, I’ve forgotten some things. . . . You can go on back now. The commitment will be met.” Imagine that, MacArthur almost admitting a mistake, that goes to show the character of Halsey. What they were arguing about was Hasley proposing to attack New Georgia and it turned out to be inline with MacArthurs thinking. MacArthur approved the operation on the spot and it would intersect with his own plans for an offensive up the north coast of New Guinea.  Because of the seizure of the Russell Island’s, D-Day for the invasion of New Georgia would be originally set for May 15th, but would get postponed to June 30th. However that is far into the future for us!   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Amchitka and the Russell Islands were taken unopposed and with relative ease. The Americans were being cautious in their actions, but little by little they were breaking down Japan's new defensive posture, a few islands down and many more to come.

Last time we spoke about the successful execution of operation KE and the battle of Wau. Operation KE was a success and the Japanese had managed to evacuate 10652 men. Simultaneously while Operation KE was going on, the Japanese had refocused on New Guinea and sought to secure their important bases at Lae and Salamaua. In order to secure them the Japanese commenced a new offensive, this time aimed at Wau which held a significant airfield that could be used to threaten Lae and Salamaua. The Japanese managed to land significant forces to hit Wau, but the Australians tenaciously held them back long enough to get reinforcements to Wau to push the Japanese back. The Japanese offensive turned into a catastrophic failure, yet despite being pushed back the Japanese would regroup and plan another offensive to take Wau. But for today we are diving back into the CBI theater. This episode is the First Chindits Expedition: Operation Longcloth  Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    The story of Operation Longcloth and the actions that will take place in Burma require us to talk about some notable figures, one who is to put it frankly, a very bizarre but fascinating man. Orde Wingate was born into a military family in February of 1903, his father was a religious fundamentalist who became a member of the Plymouth Brethren. Wingate and his 6 siblings experienced a very repressed childhood and were kept away from other children for fear of spiritual contamination and would endure a regime of religious mania spending entire days reading and memorizing the Old Testament. For Orde, the religious indoctrination was accompanied by a spirit-shrinking spartan regime, something like a secular boot camp. When his family moved to Godalming, in 1916, Orde was sent to a Charterhouse school. He was very much an outsider there and did not mix with the other children nor participated in any sports. Then in 1921 he was accepted into the Royal Military academy at Woolwich, training as an officer in the Royal Artillery. At this point he suffered a salient trauma, Wingate began breaking all the rules and underwent a ritual known as “running”. The other military students summoned Wingate from his room, stripped him naked and had him run between lines of senior students who whacked him with knotted towels before he was tossed into a tank of icy water, it was the good old running the gauntlet. Wingate would stare the other boys right in the eyes and define them to do their worst to him. Many were intimidated by this and ceased hitting him as a result. Then Wingate would toss himself into the icy water tank. Wingate had thus shown himself to be a student of note at an early age.  By 1923 Wingate received his commission as a gunnery officer and a post at Salisbury Plain where he soon gained a reputation for being a skilled horseman and particularly good at the fox hunt.  But many who knew of him described him to have a dark side, yet again he always broke the rules and conventions. This became more of an issue by 1926 when he took a post at the military school of Equitation where he became very alienated by his peers and superiors by his arrogant insubordination. But Wingate enjoyed a powerful patronage for at this point in his life his fathers first cousin, “Cousin Rex”, Sir Reginald Wingate, the former Governor-General of Sudan and High commissioner in Egypt took him under his wing. Wingate took leave and began studying Arabic at the London School of Oriental and African Studies and then served in Sudan and Ethiopia. He also carried on a 5 year affair with a woman named Enid Peggy Jelley, to whom he got secretly engaged. But after 6 years after boarding the liner Cathay at Port Said, returning for his marriage to Peggy, he fell in love with a 16 year old girl named Lorna Paterson who was traveling home from Australia. As soon as he got home to Peggy he notified her he was in love with another.    Wingate married Lorna in 1935, a woman 13 years younger. In 1936 Wingate became an intelligence officer with the British Mandate in Palestine and almost immediately became an ardent Zionist, though he was not himself Jewish. Palestine at this time had an enormous Jewish population since the end of the first world war and a large influx of those fleeing Nazi Germany in the 1930s. The Arab population saw them as a future threat and guerilla groups sprang up. Archibald Wavell the newly arrived commander in chief in Palestine had Wingate form the Special Night Squads (SNS) to combat Arab terrorism. Wingate was an early proponent of using paramilitary actions at night to induce a unique and singular terror in his enemies. He got the SNS to use slavering dogs, a very calculated piece of cruelty since the animals were regarded as unclean by Muslims. The SNS were basically legitimizing Zionist counterterrorism, using Jewish thugs to strike back at Arab thugs.  Wingate performed war crimes and horrible atrocities while leading the SNS and was recalled. This should have been the end to his career, but Wavell and Sir Edmund Ironside kept making up excuses to cover for criticisms against him. These two men managed to get Wingate back into the game by 1941 where he was brought over to Ethiopia to help fight against the Italians. Backed by Wavell, he attempted another go at the SNS, this time named the Gideon Force, a band of irregulars made up of British, Sudanese, Ethiopians and some ex SNS. Wingates force proved spectacularly successful and this time with no controversy. But still because of his tactlessness and insubordination, Wingate ended up getting whisked out of Ethiopia at the end of hostilities.  Wingate found himself in Cairo in a major depression, he tried to kill himself with a Ethiopian knife but was saved by a man who drove him to the hospital. There is considerable evidence to suggest Wingate was bipolar and had experienced an acute episode of downswing for his manic-depression. Wingates enemies and critiques were delighted at the news of his downfall and hoped he would be court-martialed and tossed into an asylum, but Wingates backers prompted him up yet again. His suicide attempt was attributed to delirium induced by malaria, but as Churchill’s personal physician Lord Moran would write in his diary about Wingate ‘Wingate seemed to be hardly sane . . . in medical jargon a borderline case.’  Wingate was certainly a bizarre person, he was also an exhibitionist and extremely eccentric as many sources put it. He was careless in dress, always unkempt, had zero respect for military convention and hierarchy and expected his superiors to satisfy his every whim. When General Auchinlack succeeded Wavell as commander in chief in the middle east he met Wingate who came to his office in shorts, with a dirty solar topi and a greasy blue jacket. Wingate loved to go around camps naked, often appearing out of a shower nude to bark orders at other men. He liked to wear an alarm clock around his wrist that would go off on odd occasions for no particular reason that anyone could figure out. He was rarely seen with his trademark Wolseley helmet and fly whisk. He carried on a string around his neck a raw onion which he occasional snacked upon, cant make that one up people. He had a lot of food fads which he imposed upon his subordinates, such as vegetarianism. He rarely changed his clothes and thought doing laundry was unnecessary.  Wingate went through a limbo period until 1942 where Wavell asked for his services to help in South-East Asia. Originally Wingate was told he would be training Chiang kai-sheks forces guerrilla warfare and he was quite unenthusiastic for 2 reasons. 1) such an endeavor he deemed to be like teaching one’s grandmother to suck eggs. 2) he wondered what the point was of sending a Middle East expert to the CBI theater? Yet as of February the 27th Wingate found himself departing to be the liberator of Delhi with the rank of major. It would take 3 weeks for him to get over to Wavell and by that time Rangoon had fallen. Wavell told him that his job had thus changed, now he would be in charge of all guerilla operations against the Japanese within Burma.Wingate was sent to Maymyo east of Mandalay to take over the Bush Warfare School being run by another colorful character named Michael Mad Mike Calvert. Calvert was coming back to Maymyo, returning from a failed operation and found Wingate sitting at his desk. Calvert glared at him and asked who he was and calmly Wingate simply stated his name. And would you know it, they got on perfectly fine and even became friends. The two men both decided their first task should be to go down to see Slim at Prome. Slim had met Wingate back in East Africa in 1940, both men serving under Wavell against the Italians. Upon discussing the matters of organized guerilla groups, Slim agreed to some of Wingates ideas but doubted his Ethiopian experience would be relevant for the task. As Slim was becoming very aware, jungle warfare in Burma was a special type of beast. Wingate was very impressed by Slim and said of the man ‘There is only one soldier worthy of the name East of Suez. He is a bad-tempered little terrier by the name of Slim.’ When Chiang Kai-shek was departing back to China after a visit in March, Wingate managed to take a seat on the plan alongside him, hoping to learn about warfare in Burma from the generalissimo. However their aircraft was chased by Japanese fighters, ruining times for conversation. Wingate was informed at Chongqing that he would not be receiving Chinese fighters for his programs as they were now going to Stillwell as a result of the catastrophe in Burma. When he returned to Burma he was informed by Calvert they had sent 100 Bush warfare people into the Irrawaddy and only 11 survived, things were chaotic to say the least. Wingate then took Calvert for a week long car tour of the Burmese frontier making careful notes of animals, insects, reptiles, and terrain details. In Delhi on april 24th, Wingate announced he no longer had any interest on training a guerrilla group, but instead wanted to create a more proactive long-range penetration (LRP0 group. He had 3 major motifs for this, 1) the Japanese troops behind the lines had to be inferior to those as the front, thus the British should get behind. 2) They needed to use communications based on radio and supplied by air. 3) They had to cut the Japanese supply lines and destroy their arms dumps, thus typing up disproportionate numbers of the enemy. He continuously made his case to his superiors and many thought him nuts to think he could train men for jungle warfare in just 8 weeks time. But Wingate kept pushing for it, insisting also that all the men must be volunteers and that he needed at minimum 3000 men.  The finer points of his idea brought up the need to supply special units with airdrops, not a particularly new idea, but certainly a gung-ho one. His superiors wanted to outright reject his ideas, but Wavell yet again was championing his cause. Wingate won out the day and it was agreed to allocate men to his project. The 77th Indian brigade was formed and it was certainly a motley collection. The main British component was the 13th battalion of the King’s liverpool regiment raised in Glasgow, Manchester and Liverpool in 1941. These were older, married men with no dreams of martial glory, typically employed in the coastal defense of Britain then suddenly shipped to India after the Japanese went supernova in the east. They displayed a lack of enthusiasm for Wingates ideas, many of them were also too old for jungle combat. Wingate rejected 250 of them off the bat and Wavell gave permission to fill the gaps with other units. The rest would come from two oriental units,the first being the 2nd battalion Burma rifles. These were mainly warriors from anti-Japanese hill tribes, the Kachins, Chins, Karens and such, those personally affected by Japans aggression and eager for payback. They were eager and better yet, they taught Wingate a lot about jungle warfare. The other were Gurkhas whom always held high regard amongst the British, though Wingate thought them arrogant, ill-disciplined and overrated. I find that truly bizarre, because all literature i have ever read about Gurkha’s troops has been nothing, but praise and something out of a Rambo film. One historian of the Gurkhas said of Wingate ‘Wingate was the only officer in 130 years of service ever to criticise the performance of Gurkha soldiers, characterising them as mentally unsuited for their role as Chindits. Of course the same might be said of Wingate.’ Likewise the Gurkhas found Wingate arrogant, overly domineering and someone who paid little heed to them who had vastly more experience fighting in Burma. They also really did not like him because of his rude and autocratic treatment of them.  Wingate divided his force into 8 columns each commanded by a major and each given 15 horses and 100 mules. The columns would be sustained by airdrops, thus an RAF signaling section was attached to each. They trained in the central provinces of India and in the Saugur jungle due south of Gwalior. Within the jungle training the idea was to hit the men with every possible scenario they might face, to push them to the absolute limit. They endured hell. Encounters with giant snakes, mosquitoes, leeches, days filled with half rations deliberately to simulate living off airdrops. Men collapsed from heat, marching with full packs through vegetation. When the monsoons hit, they were marching through mud, rivers and torrential rain. Many days began at 6am with half an hours bayonet drill, followed by unarmed combat. After breakfast they learnt woodcraft, map reading, compass reading, how to forage and distinguish poisonous plants. They learnt how to blow up bridges, lay ambushes, how to storm airfields, how to properly clear paths in jungles, it was grueling.  From the beginning of the training programme there were sickness levels allegedly as high as 70%. Wingate was ruthless, in the case of those saying they were suffering from dysentery, he ordered his officers into the bathrooms to inspect the mens stools to prove if they were lying. Amongst many of his enemies, the Medical Corps would be a large one. Wingate continued to alienate himself and made more and more enemies. At one point Wingate misunderstood the Burmese word for Lion “chinthe” as Chindit and declared it to be the name of his LRP group henceforth, thus they became known as the Chindits. His Burmese aide, Sao Man Hpa told him the word made no sense in Burmese, to which Wingate told the man Chinthe made no sense in English.  Wingate defeated the 70 percent rate of illness, bringing down to a 3 percent, via brutal methodology, most genuinely ill men simply carried on too afraid to be punished. Wingates eccentric qualities spread amongst the men, like his necessity to wear shorts in the rain, to eat raw onions, and to keep a bunch of buffalo to milk because he believed their milk had salubrious qualities. Wingate should have been sacked at countless times, but the rubicon had been crossed and he was expected to lead his men by 1943. By December of 1942, the Chindits and Wingate were ready for action. They had been trained to carry 70 pounds on a march, were equipped with tropical uniform: army bots, mosquito nets, mess tins, sterilizing kits, each man had a rifle or Bren gun plus 50 rounds of .303 ammunition and 6 days worth of rations. The rations were 12 wholemeal biscuits, 2 ounces of nuts and raisins, 2 ounces of cheese, 4 ounces of dates, 2 ounces of chocolate, 20 cigarettes (which greatly annoyed Wingate as he deemed smoking a major hinderance), tea, sugar, powdered milk, salt and vitamin C tablets. The mules of his forces carried 3 inch mortars, ammunition, wireless radio sets and batteries. His force of 8000 were divided into 8 columns of around 400 men each: consisting of 3 rifle platoons, a support platoon with 2-3 inch mortars, 2 Vickers medium machine guns, a mule transport platoon and an RAF air liaison detachment. In addition he had 10 platoons for reconnaissance, scouting and sabotage operations. Now originally Wingates force was supposed to be part of a 3 pronged offensive, utilizing conventional British forces attacking Akyab and the ARakan while the Ledo and Yunnan forces led by Stilwell would secure northern Burma and reopen the land route to China. As we all know during this series, Burma was a colossal mess. Originally 4 Corps would assault Sitang and Kalewa while 15 Corps attacked Akyab and Arakan, but shortages in labour, transport and lack of skilled hands led to the cancellation of the major project. Even worse, Chiang Kai-Shek, greatly pissed off by the decisions made during the Casablanca conference, refused to sanction a Chinese expedition from Yunnan. With all hopes for the great 1943 offensive dashed, Wavell had to consider whether the Chindits were even relevant anymore. Wavell arrived to Wingates HQ on February 7th after countlessly telling the man things were simply postponed. In a 2 hour meeting Wingate fought bitterly to send his men into the fray, but Wavell stated he could not be party to the pointless waste of lives. Wingate made multiple arguments for sending his boys in, 1) cancellation would boost defeatism in the Indian army: 2) it was essential for the British to overcome their current ignorance of Japanese jungle fighting: 3) Fort Hertz, the remaining British outpost in Burma was in desperate need of relief: 4) without a Chindit crossing, the Japanese would dominate the jungle on either side of the Chindwin river: 5) the 77th brigade was not pitch perfect and any delay would be catastrophic to morale: 6) An attack by the 77th brigade would impair and set back Japanese preparations for an offensive. Wavell apparently impressed by Wingates enthusiasm agreed to let the Chindits have their day. The Chindits were not directed south-east to help with the Arakan operation, instead their assignments were to be to cut two railways, one between Myitkyina and Mandalay in northern Burma and the other, the Mandalay-Lashio line. The codename of the operation was Longcloth, which annoyed Wingate because it held no grandiloquence he sought.  In early february the 7 Chindit columns marched south east from Imphal to Moreh on the Assam/Burma border. Once across the border they split into 2 groups, the southern group consisting of columns 1 and 2, around 1000 men and 250 mules which was a feint to throw off the Japanese and the Northern group consisting of columns 3,4,5,7 and 8, around 2000 men and 850 mules who would destroy the railways. Small patrols were sent across the Chindwin marching some 30 miles into enemy territory and coming back without any incident, however doing that with 3000 men was another matter entirely. On February 13th, an advance party of the Northern group crossed at Tonhe around 50 miles north to act as a a doubled bluff to cover for the southern groups feint. Meanwhile a disinformation party with the southern group marched south and ordered a huge quantity of supplies from a village known to be aiding the Japanese, providing a great ruse. The second wave of 2000 men from the Northern group crossed the Chindwin unopposed on the 14th.  Crossing the Chindwin was not easy, while elephants and bullocks swam across with ease, the pack mules proved very skittish, most likely fearing crocodiles. Getting them to the far bank was a nightmare. The southern group also had its problems with their mule. They had the first task of ambushing a 250 strong Japanese garrison at Maingnyaung on the 18th, but ran into a skirmish with a Japanese patrol before they made it there. The enemy was thus alerted and bombarded them with mortars, this spooked the mules and the caused a stampede. Many mules were lost in the jungle, the element of surprise with it and the fiasco cost the southern group a delay of 3 days. The southern group slowly pulled away from the hill country east of the Chindwin, making for the Mandalay-Myitkyina railway. By the night of the 3rd of March they were ambushed in the Mu valley. It was a utter disaster. Radios, ciphers and most of their equipment were lost. Column 2 was almost annihilated, column 1 limped on to the banks of the Irrawady awaiting final orders from Wingate, who instead kept blaming their commander, Major Burnett. As for column 2 he said “the disaster to No. 2 Column, was easily avoidable and would never have taken place had the commander concerned understood the doctrines of penetration”.  Meanwhile Wingate and the Northern group rendezvoused 5 miles inland from the Chindwin and received their parachute drops. Wingate then pondered his options, he could make for Tonmakeng where intelligence reported no enemy presence and wait for the next supply drop and attack the 200 strong Japanese garrison at Sinlamaung or they could bypass it and head into the Mu valley. He kept the men marching and some of his scouts reported a Japanese garrison was at a gold mining village called Metkalet 15 miles east of the Chindwin near Tonmakeng. He ordered columns 3 and 5 under Calvert and Fergusson to attack at once. Then another disaster struck. Fergusson’s column got stuck in a swamp and scouts returned again with a new report that no Japanese garrison was in Matkalet after all. So Wingate and Calvert directed the columns to Tonmakeng. Wingates thinking was it was better to strike at an enemy strength he knew, rather than the Mu valley which was an unknown. They reached Tonmakeng without further incident by february 22nd and learnt a Japanese garrison was at Sinlamaung, 10 miles away so WIngate dispatched 3 columns to attack it while the rest of the men waiting for a supply drop expected 3 days away. Disaster struck. The 3 columns were unable to locate Sinlamaung after 3 days and when they finally found it on the 25th, the Japanese garrison had just pulled out. Wingate met with his officers and they decided to march to Zibyutaungdan with Calverts column 3 in the lead. On March 1st they made it to Zibyutaungdan and then proceeded to descend into the Mu Valley. Wingate then ordered the Northern group to disperse into its columns and rendezvous later at the Irrawaddy or beyond. He also dispatched an advance party across the Irrawaddy to the Kachin highlands northeast of Mandalay to try and raise a guerrilla force among the pro-british people there.  By the night of March 3rd disaster struck. At the very same time the southern group was being ambushed, column 4 walked into an ambush, 2 miles west of Pinbon. Major R.B Bromhead, a descendant of the Bromhead famous for fighting the Zulu at Rorke’s drift in 1879, did his best to get his panicked mules with their Gurkha handlers to disperse and regroup at a rendezvous point hoping to get help from columns 7 and 8, but while trying to do so, the men were attacked again and by the time they reached the rallying point columns 7 and 8 had moved on. With no food or radios and just a handful of mules left, the column had no choice but to retreat back to India. Within a days time, columns 2 and 4 were broken and on their way back to India. Wingate was livid, his credibility was at stake, but fortunately for him and his men the Japanese assumed when they whipped out Column 2 they had destroyed the entire invasion effort. By March 6th, Calvert and Fergussons columns were within striking distance of the Wuntho-Indaw railway. Calvert and Fergusson hatched a bold and daring plan to assault what was a 800 strong garrison at Pinlebu. They spoke with Major Walter Scott leading Column 8 and told him to attack Punlebu while they supervised a massive supply drop north-east of the town. The idea was that the attackers and supply collectors would support another. Doing so they would set up roadblocks to the north and east of Pinlebu and call upon the RAF to bombard the town, making the Japanese believe they were facing a huge force. The attack turned into an amazing success. The Japanese were quickly confused as Calvert and Fergusson had the railway line demolished. It was a bloody fight, but the line was blown up in several places. The Japanese counterattacked in force trying to stop the demolition. Calverts men also mined 2 railway bridges, one of them a 3-span 120 footer. In the bloody mayhem, Calvert and Fergussons men killed about a third of the Pinlebu defenders and cut railway lines in 70 separate places. During the evening Fergussons column no 5 blew up the 40 foot rail bridge at Bongyaung gorge, leading also to hundreds of rock and rubble going over railway lines around the gorge. Now 10 mites north of Wuntho, Wingate established his HQ in the Babwe Taung hills. He had a tough decision to make, should he retreat back to India or press further and cross the Irrawaddy? Wingate even considered turning his HQ into a new fort like Fort Hertz, to try and push the Japanese to give up the Irrawaddy towns. Wingate as you probably have guessed went with option number 2, despite how unbelievably dangerous it was. The Japanese were hard on their tail as the Chindits made their way trying to cross the Irrawady river. This is where I have to leave our story of the Chindits, but they will come back throughout the war.  We need to make a small detour to speak about the Casablanca conference that took place from January 14 to the 24th. Chiang Kai-Shek had been begging the Americans and British for more aid. FDR told Chiang Kai-shek he would champion his demands to Churchill at the Casablanca Conference, but Churchill brushed this all aside. The conference ended with two large decisions, the first being the controversial doctrine of unconditional surrender. The allies were now confident after the success of operation Torch, the victories at Alamein and at Stalingrad that the Germans were on the run. But over in southeast asia, the Japanese looked impregnable. Thus the 2nd decision made was basically to keep the Europe First course steaming ahead, the Pacific was simply second banana. But for America, the situation in the Pacific had distinctly changed, they had won the initiative and now sought to consolidate their conquests in the east. Admiral King applied considerable pressure to the matter, in private he began urging that if the Pacific did not get 30% of allied resource quote “it would necessitate the US regretfully withdrawing from the commitments in the European theater”. Admiral King wanted to continue the momentum in the Pacific by seizing the Solomones, the eastern New Guinea-Rabaul area, capture back Kiska and the Attu islands in the Aleutians begin operations in the Gilberts, Marshalls, Carolines, take Truk and extend the occupation of New Guinea to the Dutch borders. The British opposed this as they continued to argue the best course was to defeat Germany first then devote all resources against Japan. Now as for the CBI theater, plans were continuing for Operation Anakim and the Burma offensive, but the British were not looking to extend their commitments in the theater very much. They argued that the depleted condition of the eastern fleet prevented them from carrying on a naval supremacy campaign in the Bay of Bengal, and this led Chiang Kai-shek to refuse to support an offensive through northern burma, because of the lack of British naval forces at hand. Thus operation Anakim looked like it was only going to get off in late 1943. For all the failures of the conference, FDR did try to remedy the situation as best as he could with their Chinese allies. FDR made it known he wanted to treat China as a great power that the allies would help build up for the current war and postwar. He also acknowledged the dramatic need to keep supply routes to China open. Stilwell advised 5000 tons of supplies be sent over the Hump per month as a goal to hit by February of 1943, this would require 140 aircraft during good weather and 300 aircraft during monsoon seasons. But Washington at this time could only spare 75 aircraft, another disappointment to Chiang Kai-shek. Another important side aspect to the Casablanca conference was brought forward by Generals Charles de Gaulle and Henri Giraud who were vying to become recognized partners to the allies with their Free French Forces. Until this point, the Japanese had a pretty awkward relationship with their technical ally, Vichy France. This awkward situation led them to simply ignore the Free French forces and by proxy they decided to not touch the French concession of Guangzhouwan which had declared itself part of Free France. French Indochina of course was fully invaded prior to 1941 and remained under nominal Vichy French control, but Guangzhouwan was beginning to stick out like a sore thumb. Chiang Kai-shek recognized Free France’s authority over Guangzhouwan and many Chinese forces of the 4th Area Army led by General Zhang Fukui fled into the concession to escape the Japanese. This drew Tokyo’s attention and they finally decided to put an end to the Free French presence in China. The 23rd army of General Sakai lent 2 battalions of the 23rd independent mixed brigade from Hong Kong to go over to the Luichow Peninsula. They landed at the village of Peichatsun on February 17th and began skirmishing with some Chinese defenders. They soon overwhelmed the defenders and seized the towns of Hsinlaitsun and Haikang, forcing the Chinese to withdraw towards Suichi. From there the Japanese continued north, seizing Suichi and Chihkan. After these seizures, the Japanese had fully encircled the French concession of Guangzhouwan. The Japanese and representatives of Guangzhouwan soon fell into negotiations and the Free French were forced to declare the concession an open city, allowing the Japanese to occupy it without a fight.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The eccentric or better said madman Wingate got his wish to send the Chindits into the fray, despite just about no one other than Wavell wanting him to do so. With Onions wrapped around their necks they made their first strike against a Japanese railway and it was a surprising mixed success. 

Last time we spoke about the successful execution of operation KE. The Japanese feints had proven to be effective as by the time the Americans figured out what was going on, the Japanese had managed to evacuate 10652 men. It was an incredible achievement given the vast disparity in fire power between the Japanese and the Americans. Over 6 months of blood, sweat and tears had been poured over 2500 miles of jungle that made up starvation island. With just mop up operations left for guadalcanal, now Douglas MacArthur and Admiral King sought aggressive pushes into the south pacific. Admiral Yamamoto attempt to create a more favorable situation in the south pacific to bring the Americans to the negotiating table had failed and with the loss of Guadalcanal the empire of the rising sun had officially lost the initiative in the war. Yet while the Solomons campaign was drawing closer to an end, the battle for New Guinea raged on. This episode is: the Battle of Wau Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  The situation in the Pacific had basically reversed with the Japanese defeat at guadalcanal. The Japanese now were forced onto the defensive while the allies stole the initiative and would go on the offensive. Despite the grand success of operation KE, Guadalcanal was a decisive defeat and it had dramatically drained the empire of its resources. Along with that defeat came the loss of the Buna-Gona area, the last toehold of the failed operation to seize Port Moresby. Both of these large campaign losses shocked the Japanese commanders, but while operation KE was ongoing, the Japanese also had focused their attention on New Guinea and would embark on a new offensive. Facing mounting losses at Guadalcanal and Buna-Gona-Sanananda, General Hitoshi Imamura acting on orders from the Imperial HQ on january 4th, ordered the evacuation of the remnants of his army from both places. By early february this left 3500 troops evacuated from Buna-Sanananda and 13,000 from Guadalcanal. Most of these men were sick and exhausted from fighting for months and thus could not be reconstituted quickly. Japan had basically lost more than 35,000 men fighting two futile campaigns.  General Imamura had decided to strongly reinforce New Guinea, but with the loss of Buna-Gona, the Japanese would require new landing sites. It was envisioned that the 2nd special naval base units of Rear Admiral Kamada Michiaki and the Konishi battalion of the 21st regiment would land at Wewak while 2 battalions of the 21st regiment led by lt colonel Harada Noriyoshi would land at Madang. These areas would be secured so new airfields could be built. Alongside this the 31st road construction unit would be sent to occupy Tuluvu in Cape Gloucester with a force of SNLF marines to secure a landing site at Finschhafen The convoys carrying the Madang and Wewak occupation forces departed from Rabaul on December 16, while a surface support force including one aircraft carrier headed south from Truk to cover the operation. The Wewak force reached its destination without mishap on December 18, but the Madang force underwent both air and submarine attack off the New Guinea coast, the cruiser and flagship Tenryu sinking as a result of torpedo hits. Despite these attacks, the convoy continued to Madang and unloaded its troops early on December 19. By the start of the new year the airfield construction was on way and General Imamura planned to bring 2 army divisions to reinforce New Guinea consisting of the 20th and 41st divisions and some extra air units once the airfields were ready. Meanwhile General Hatazo Adachi over in New Guinea had no intention of conceding Papua to the allies. On January the 5th, he sent the Okabe Detachment to Lae, a regimental group of the 51st division led by Major General Okabi Toru. However General MacArthur’s intelligence group correctly predicted the convoy was sailing to reinforce Lae. It was thanks to Ultra which was feeding Japanese shipping codes to the USAAR and RAAF since January 3rd 1943 giving them a distinct advantage. Aerial reconnaissance indicated the convoy consisted of 2 cruisers, 4 destroyers and 4 transports along the south central coast of New Britain alongside a considerable fighter screen. Despite some terrible weather, MacArthurs bombers with P-38 lightning fighters claimed they had taken down an estimated 50 aircraft while only losing 10 themselves. The real figures were closer to 9 enemy aircraft being shot down. During the night, a sortie of Australian PBY catalina’s managed to sink 1 transport, killing 465 Japanese and wounding another 85. This was followed up by a strike gorup of 12 B-25s which hit another transport severely damaging it. Despite the air attacks the Japanese had managed to land an estimated 4000 troops, a sufficient number to begin a planned offensive aimed at Wau. The 51st divisional troops that had landed at Lae were battle hardened veterans of the China War. After the bulk of the division was ferried to Salamaua, the garrison there amounted to around 6500 men. Major General Okabe sent a few hundred men down the coast to help evacuate the survivors of the Buna-Gona battle. This action convinced the Australians that the Japanese high command was performing a major offensive, this time aimed at Wau. The commander of this campaign was Colonel Maruoka leading 2500 men. His force moved quickly marching upon Mubo from which he planned to use a little used trail towards Wau. In planning the route for the attack on Wau, the Japanese command had utilized a copy of a pre-war Australian 1:250,000 scaled, uncontoured map of the region. Okabe ended up selecting an old and direct track parallel to the Black Cat Track, which was later termed the Jap Track. However, as the map showed no contours, it gave no real indication of the extreme difficulty of the terrain through which this route would pass. Once they left the Black Cat Track, the Japanese would also have to hack a path through the jungles, as there was no defined path towards Wau.As was the case with the disastrous Kokoda track campaign, the Japanese had no good maps and miscalculated the time it would take to make the trek over such difficult terrain. More crucial was the lack of supply dumps, the men who would make this trek would literally have to carry their own supplies, a recurring nightmare for the Japanese in the Pacific.  General Blamey saw the threat posed by the Japanese reinforcing the garrison at Lae and wrote to General Herring on January the 8th. “Whether the intention of this force is to push forward from the Lae and Salamaua area towards Wau remains to be seen. This event has always been present in my mind and I have kept the 17th Brigade A.I.F. intact either to meet this threat or as the spearhead of an advance in this area.” Blamey then dispatched his plans for the disposition of allied forces in New Guinea. The US 41st division would retain the Buna area, while the battered 32nd division would be withdrawn to the mainland for refitting and training. The 32nd would be replaced by 2 australian brigades, with one of them being the 17th brigade coming up from Milne Bay. The 17th brigade was led by Brigadier Murray Moten and their job was to defend Wau and its approaches. In order to pull this off, the 2/6th and 2/7th had to be brought as fast as possible. On the 13th leading elements of the 2/6th were landed at Wau, but terrible weather forced many others to turn back, some of which were aircraft carrying Moten and the main sections of his HQ who had to turn back to Port Moresby. Despite the weather setback, the bulk of the 2/6th, 28 officers and 535 men were fully unloaded by the 19th. As the weather cleared up the rest of the 2/6th and leading elements of the 2/5th arrived and Moten sent Lt Colonel Starr to command the 2/5th, taking those men down a trail towards the Mubo area. Meanwhile the 2/6th were given the task of defending the Bulolo valley. General Herring promised Blamey he would expedite the transport for the rest of the 2/5th as fast as possible and the main body would arrive by the 27th. Moten received word the Japanese were moving into the Guadalgasal Gap Area, but he believed this was defensive in nature. He wrote to Blamey stating “the raid on Mubo has undoubtedly disturbed the Japanese commander and I feel he fears that it might be a preliminary to an attack on Salamua similar in strength to those which have defeated him at Buna and Sanananda”. And so it was Moten seemed to believe Wau was in no danger for the time being, because the Japanese were simply reacting to the allied movements, but he was quite wrong. On the 24th, Captain Winning was leading a patrol and confirmed the Japanese were marching towards the village of Wandumi using a trail hardly ever used by anyone, covered thickly in vegetation. It was parallel to what was called the Black cat trail and the Japanese had cleverly chosen it to hide their movements. When Moten received the news he immediately sent the 2/6th from the Black Cat Mine Area to launch an offensive to stop the Japanese advance.  Meanwhile Okabe’s men were managing to evade the allies by using the so called Jap track, but the difficult terrain was taking a heavy toll and the food was beginning to dwindle. The Japanese began their march carrying 14 days worth of rations and as they departed Salamaua they had been told the amount they carried should last them 20 days. This led Okabe to try and raise morale for the men by shouting “we are short of food, let us quickly capture Way and get food from the enemy!” Okabe’s men were having a horrible time trekking through the vegetation and Okabe began considering pulling back to Mubo to replenish supplies, but then his scouts discovered Wau was within their reach. Okabe was encouraged so he continued the march and sent a coded radio message back to Salamaua stating he was going to capture Wau and that he urgently needed more supplies. The reply he received was “immediately occupy Wau and secure supplies from the enemy”. It was at Wandumi on the morning of the 28th when the Japanese fell upon some Australian positions manned by Company A led by Captain Wilfred Sherlock. Maruoka had planned to attack Wau that very night using his 1st battalion on the left flank, the 2nd battalion on the right and the 3rd held in reserve. Sherlocks men were met with heavy fire and were forced to move to nearby cover southwest. They would be reinforced by a platoon of the 2/5th alongside some Commandos and the fighting lasted until the late afternoon. Sherlock personally led a bayonet charge to repel some Japanese infiltrators and reclaim lost territory which ultimately allowed his men to hold on for the night. Sherlocks men were running out of ammunition so Moten sent the recently landed C company of the 2/5th to reinforce them. As the men arrived, Sherlock withdrew over to the Bulolo river where they performed a fighting withdrawal hoping to delay the Japanese long enough for more reinforcements to make it over to Wau. Sherlock and his men came to a large cedar log that had felled across the river between two huge boulders at the point where Crystal Creek flowed into the river. Sherlock called “come on boys” as he began to straddle the log to make his way across. As he was doing so a Japanese machine gun company opened fire as Sherlock cried out “are you an Aussie?” As he was being fired upon his men could hear him further say “i’ll soon find out whether you are a bloody Aussie or not”. Those would be his last words as he was soon shot dead by machine gun fire. Sherlocks men would continue to resist performing a fighting withdrawal and delaying the Japanese a full day. The delaying engagement made by Sherlock and his men would turn out to be the decisive moment for the battle of Wau. Back on the 23rd as the fighting over in Buna-Gona had ended, this had freed up much needed aircraft that could support Way. 52 brand new Dakota’s of the US 317th Troop carrier group had just arrived in Australia, having been expedited rapidly as a result of General Douglas MacArthur pleading for their use for the Buna fight. They were quickly flown over to Port Moresby to help the 374th Troop carrier group fly out the 17th infantry brigade over to Way. Now the Australians could rely on around 40 aircraft operating daily to Way. On January 29th, 57 landings were made, bringing the majority of the 2/7th infantry battalion and the remainder of the 2/5th. The Japanese air forces missed their opportunity to smash the transports and only ground forces near the Wau area managed to inflict minimal damage using small arms fire. 40 aircraft made over 66 trips on January the 30th, unloading 25 pounders of the 2/1st field regiment and almost 700 rounds of ammunition. Captain R.J Wise would lead the artillery regiment that same day they had landed to shell a concentration of over 300 Japanese troops between the villages of Wandumi and Kaisenik alongside aerial attacks by Beaufighters of the No. 30 RAAF Squadron. The next day 35 aircraft would make 71 trips, followed by 53 trips on february 1st bringing the 2/3rd independent company. Now the Kanga force consisted of 3000 troops, decisively turning the scale of war for Wau.   After taking Wandumi the Japanese divided their forces with their right flank following the Bululo river attacking Sherlocks force heading northeast to Way. The other advanced along the main road and their HQ was established along Crystal Creek. The Japanese plans unraveled quickly as the Australians attacked the advancing column just before they hit Mubo causing them 116 casualties. Lt Colonel Seki’s 2nd battalion heading up the main road was held up by Australian forces for ove r48 hours suffering 75 casualties. The Japanese not well hidden by foliage the entire while were straffed by allied aircraft daily. On the 28th 6 Japanese were moving along the Crystal Creek Road when they stumbled just 400 yards short of the airfield there before they were discovered and annihilated. A major problem Maruoka’s men were facing was running into steep ravines just before being ambushed by Australians. Regardless Maruoka planned for a general attack to take place on the 29th, but this was thwarted by the arrival of over 800 fresh troops of the 2/5th and 2/7th being brought over via aircraft transport. They were quickly rushed over into defensive positions and began to bombard the Japanese using 25 pounders. Okabe’s men had lost the element of surprise gained by the clever use of the Jap Track. Moten soon ordered the 2/7th to counter attack the Japanese towards a point known as Leahy’s Farm. One section of the battalion occupied some high ground due west of the farm while the bulk advanced towards a key spur under artillery and mortar support. The high ground section led by Major Walker unleashed machine gun and artillery fire into over 400 Japanese moving along the road from Leahy’s farm unaware of their position. The casualties were heavy and within minutes Australian Beaufighters emerged to the scene adding to the carnage. Despite the losses the Japanese held firm and stopped Walker’s section from halting their advance west. The fighting over the course of the next few days was greatly confused and centered upon the defense of Way against many thrusts made by the Japanese from the southwest. Reinforcements continued to pour in and by February the 1st, Motan had 201 officers, and nearly 3000 soldiers at his disposal. The greatest threat to Way was found in the Crystal Creek Area where the 2/5th battalion was blocking the Japanese as smaller units attacked near Leahy’s farm and the Black Cat Mine. On february 3rd Moten notified the New Guinea Force HQ that the “crucial period” of the Wau defenses had passed and now he was releasing a larger portion of his forces to perform offensive operations. Now taking a side step back down south to the Buna-Gona area, by February 7th the entire Buna Detachment had assembled at the Mambare where countless landing vessels, totaling 20 barges or so, were pouring down from Lae. These vessels were going to bring the men up to Lae as two companies of the Okabe detachment would perform clearing operations along the Mambare river to try and establish a hold off point thus thwarting allied pursuers. By the 11th the Japanese survivors would finally start their last journey towards Lae and Salamaua, but it was an agonizingly slow process because they would only move by night. By late april the South Seas detachment was finally evacuated in full to Rabaul, where the 18th Army finally dissolved them. The once most famous detachment of the IJA was thus reabsorbed into the 55th division which was fighting in Burma.  Back over in the Wau front, on February 2nd Major Warfe was ordered to attack Woody Island, but the Japanese were well dug in behind a steep-banked creek. The Australians took heavy casualties and were forced to pull back. After 2 days, Warfe launched another attack on the 4th, this time with more information about the Japanese defensive positions and with more artillery support. The Australians lashed out with artillery, mortar and machine gun fire this time aimed at known Japanese positions. Then the Australians performed a bayonet charge forcing the Japanese to withdraw back to the Bulolo River by the 6th. At the same time the Japanese began to regroup around the Crystal Creek area to prepare for a possible withdrawal. Moten now grabbed the initiative ordering the 2/5th and 2/7th to launch a major offensive against the enemy, moving up a supply route. A new trail was cut eastward to the Jap Trail used above a junction to cut off the Japanese retreat. A small unit of Australians took Leahy’s farm on the 5th and burned all the buildings in the vicinity that might prove useful to the Japanese. The Japanese were well dug in and offered a determined resistance. As the Japanese were being pushed back towards the Crystal Creek area they suddenly unleashed their first and only major air attack against Wau. On Febuary 6th, 29 Ki-43 Hayabusa fighters and 9 Ki-48 Lily bombers departed Lae to lay waste to Way’s airfield. That morning a routine flight of C-47’s with 8 P-39 Airacobra fighter escorts were transporting men to the area when they stumbled upon some of the Japanese fighters. The allied pilots claimed they shot down no less than 11 aircraft in the scuffle. Having been alerted of the airstrike, 8 P-40 Kittyhawks scrambled to help and their pilots claimed taking down another 7 aircraft. During the entire day of aerial engagements, allied pilots claimed down 23 Japanese aircraft. The Japanese had inflicted only minimal damage upon the airfield and managed to take down a single Wirraway and a grounded Dakota transport. The war over the sky was a decisive victory for the allies at Way, the following day the 2/5th continued to pressure the Japanese at Crystal Creek. For two days the Australians hammered the Japanese positions which were held by men who were now on the brink of starvation, their rations having run out on them. Allied artillery, mortar and Machine guns gradually pushed the Japanese out of the area. On the 9th a major breakthrough was made as Company B of the 2/5th pushed through towards Skindiwai leaving many Japanese fleeing to the hills near Wandumi. At this point Okabe had determined the next best option was to pull the men back to Mubo before his entire force was annihilated. Yet as the Japanese prepared for a final retreat they were dealt a nasty surprise along the Jap track. The 2/6th battalion had effectively cut off the track and were harassing the desperate Japanese struggling to head east. Lt Colonel Frederick Wood leading the 2/6th battalion die, being shot in the head, thus allowing a brief pause in which the Japanese were able to break free and continue their retreat. To aid the struggling Japanese as they withdrew, over in Mubo a fresh detachment of men were sent to engage the Australian pursuers led by Major Warfe. They managed to push back Warfes commandos around the Waipali area. It would only be by the 21st that Okabe’s men managed to reach the relative safety of Mubo, but with that the battle for Wau had come to an end. The Japanese had lost over 1000 men in their failed attack upon Wau, while the Australians suffered around 350 casualties. Ultimately it was the actions of Captain Sherlock and his men that won the decisive point of the battle. They had delayed the Japanese advance long enough for the reinforcement of Wau to be met. For Sherlocks gallantry he was mentioned in Dispatches as so Captain Wilfrid Holden "Bill" Sherlock Mentioned in Dispatches   "At Wandumi, on the morning of 28 January, Sherlock's under-strength company, bolstered by twenty men of the 2nd/5th Independent Company, was attacked by the main body of a Japanese force which was approaching Wau from the east along a disused track not known to the Australian defenders.   Despite being reinforced during the afternoon, Sherlock's party remained heavily outnumbered, but held its ground until early next morning. When one of his platoons had been overrun at 3 p.m., he had led a counter-attack with fixed bayonets. Forced to withdraw shortly after 3 a.m. on 29 January, he took his troops across a single-log bridge over the swollen Bulolo River. Pursuing Japanese machine-gunners fired on them. Sherlock turned to face the enemy and was heard shouting defiantly above bursts of gunfire until he was killed.   The grim determination, resolution and courage of Sherlock and his men enabled the Australian command to build up sufficient forces at Wau to defeat the Japanese assault over the next two days. Sherlock's leadership accounted in large part for this achievement." I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The battle for Wau was a catastrophic failure for the Japanese and a rather remarkable achievement by the Australian forces on New Guinea. Captain Sherlock would be remembered as the man who thwarted what could have been a Japanese seizure of an important air field. 

Last time we spoke about General Patchs campaign to finally rid Guadalcanal of the Japanese menace. The Sea Horse, Galloping Horse and Gifu were neutralized and now the hybrid force of US Soldiers and Marines were marching west. The newly created CAM division seized Kokumbona in astonishing speed, greatly hindering the future Operation KE. At the same time, all of the Japanese activity related to preparing Operation KE was prompting responses from the Americans. One of those responses was sending Rear Admiral Richard Giffen  to Cape Chunter to rendezvous with Captain Robert Briscoe. Giffen was stubborn about making his rendezvous and this led him to make some very poor tactical decisions leading to the sinking of the USS Chicago during the battle of Rennell Island. Despite the sinking of the cruisers, the Japanese now had to push back Operation KE until February the 1st, would this setback ruin everything? This episode is Operation KE: the Evacuation of Guadalcanal Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    Last week we spoke about the rather small battle of Rennell Island. Perhaps small in scale, but the consequences of the battle were far reaching. Operation KE had to be postponed until February 1st. Alongside this there was some shuffling about for who was to command the Reinforcement unit, and eventually it landed in the hands of Admiral Shintaro Hashimoto, with Rear Admiral Koyanagi in a reserve capacity. The 11th air fleet and the 6th air division were tasked with maintaining the CAP over the reinforcement unit during the day, while the R Area air force would cover them during the night. Now the skirmish at Rennell Islands gave the IJA and IJN a dose of anxiety, because the islands had a critical role in Operation KE. Basically if the destroyers failed to evacuate the 17th army on Guadalcanal, the backup was to be landing crafts via Russell Island. Many staff officers also sought to create a temporary garrison and base in the Russells to be a feint. Thus on January 28th, 6 destroyers bearing 328 men went to the Russells and were attacked by 33 aircraft from the cactus airforce, leading to 17 casualties, but no warship damage. The day for Operation KE to commence had finally come and it was to begin with a short battle over the air. 9 B-17’s with their fighter escort bombed Shortland at 8:45. They were unable to damage or delay Operation KE very much and lost 3 B-17’s for their efforts. Likewise the Cactus air force lost 2 dauntless attacking Munda while the 6th air division tossed 23 Oscars and 6 Lilies at Guadalcanal. On February 2nd, General Patch concluded that with the seizure of Kokumbona, this must mean the Japanese were all but finished on guadalcanal, unless more reinforcements came. He presumed they would prolong the struggle by making a fighting withdrawal to the southern coast, so to thwart this possibility he decided to land a battalion in a blocking position. Lt Colonel George commanding the 132nd infantry assembled a task force at Lunga using his 2nd battalion with various other units, one of which was a howitzer company of the 10th marines. The men loading up in some Landing Craft Tanks aboard the destroyer transport Stringham. Captain Briscoe’s Cactus striking force escorted the group as they traveled to Nugu point, but when they were unloading they received news of nearby enemy activity, thus an emergency unloading was made 1.5 miles north at Verahue. An IJA reconnaissance pilot saw this and misidentified the destroyers as cruisers and reported this giving the Japanese the idea the Americans were about to challenge their first Reinforcement Unit run. Thus to clear a path for Operation KE’s first run, a group of 13 vals and 40 zeros was launched from Buin to take out the threat. At 2:43, guadalcanal issued a condition red alert, and this led to a grievous mistake. The destroyers DeHaen and Nicholas had shepherded the remaining landing craft tanks 2 miles southeast of Savo, but the fighter director scrambled all the wildcats to go protect the other destroyers of the Cactus striking force. Thus DeHaven and Nicholas were dangerously exposed without aircover when some of the Vals found them. 6 vals attacked DeHaven, with the first bomb hitting her at 2:53 amidships on her port side. An eye witness said it “caused tremendous burst of flame to envelop the central part of the ship.” A second bomb hit just aft of her bridge and a third exploded her forward magazine. The Dehaven jackknifed and disappeared under the waves claiming 167 men and officers with her. Over on the Nicholas, Lt commander Andrew Hill barely managed to evade the bombs taking his ship 32 knots. One bomb exploded near his ships hull killing 2 men and injurying 7, but the Nicholas returned the favor by taking down 3 aircraft while some Wildcats came to the scene eventually claiming a dozen kills. The actual Japanese losses would be 5 vals and 3 zeros. As this was going down, Admiral Hashimoto left Shortland with his Cruisers and 21 destroyers sprinting down the slot. A coast watch saw Hashimoto’s reinforcement unit just due north of Vella LaVella around 1pm, prompting the Cactus air force to toss up 92 aircraft in 2 waves. The first wave consisted of 17 avengers, 17 dauntless, 4 P-39’s, 4 P-38s, 4 p-40s and 5 Wildcats. The second wave consisted of 11 avengers, 10 dauntless, and 20 wildcats. The first group claimed the sunk a destroyer and 7 zeros while the second claimed they landed 2 bomb hits on destroyers and took down 10 zeros. During the actual attack, Hashimoto’s flagship the Makinami received a near miss, while Koyanagi took charge of the flotilla. Hashimoto was forced to move his flag to Shirayuki and gradually reigned back command. The shuffling set back the force 30 minutes and at 8pm the screening ships began peeling off to conduct a sweep ahead. While this was happening 11 PT boats from Tulagi came in groups of 2 and 3 from Savo, Cape Esperance and Doma Cove to hit the reinforcement unit.  Meanwhile on Guadalcanal, Generals Miyazaki and Sano had reached their boarding point at Cape Esperance around 8pm. Thousands of their men were making the grueling trek up muddy trails through the night. Miyazaki was frustrated by the man wandering from the designated area and making too much noise, then both he and Sano heard a single rifle shot. A staff officer was sent to investigate and he came back reporting a soldier of the 229th infantry had reached the area supported on the shoulders by 2 comrades. He was unable to move any further, and his comrades were exhausted, thus he received his comrades assistance to commit suicide. The reinforcement unit was set to arrive for 9pm, but minutes were passing by 9pm without a ship in sight. Then the Japanese began hearing gunfire and saw fires emerge seward. The reinforcement unit were pulling 30knots when PT boat 48 and 111 found them around 10:10pm launching 4 torpedoes. Lt Lester Gamble, the most successful PT skipper of the Guadalcanal Campaign managed to scurry his PT 48 away, fleeing to Savo, while Lt John Clagett aboard PT 111 took a direct hit from the Kawakaze at 10:54 killing 2 men. Off of cape esperance, Japanese float planes strafed PT 59, 115 and 37. PT 115 launched 4 torpedoes at the destroyers. PT 37 also fired 4 torpedoes, but was fired upon killing all but a single man aboard. PT 124 and 123 moved in to attack south of Savo. A Pete of the R Area air force managed to plant a bomb on PT 123 killing 4 and sinking the boat, an amazing hit. PT 124 fired 3 torpedoes claiming hit, bringing the American loses at 3 PT boats and 15 dead sailors.  The R Area air force Petes began to drop flares over the Cactus striking force which now was just 3 destroyers trying to harass 18 IJN destroyers. The Pete flares thwarted any chance of surprise. 6 transport destroyors reached Cape Esperance at 10:40 and at 12am, Kamimbo began to launch their boats. Admiral Koyanagi described the sight of the evacuees as such; “[They] wore only the remains of clothes [that were] so soiled their physical deterioration was extreme. Probably they were happy but [they] showed no expression. All had dengue or malaria [and their] diarrhea sent them to the heads. Their digestive organs were so completely destroyed, [we] couldn’t give them good food, only porridge.  A report informed Admiral Yamamoto that the evacuees . . . were so undernourished that their beards, nails and hair had all stopped growing, their joints looked pitifully large. Their buttocks were so emaciated that their anuses were completely exposed, and on the destroyers that picked them up they suffered from constant and uncontrolled diarrhea.” By 1:53am the last man board at Kamimbo and 5 minutes later over at Esperance. Because of all the delays, 1270 men were stuck on the beach at Cape Esperance and 300 over at Kamimbo. The Destroyer Makikumo was chasing away one of the PT boats when she was ordered to help at Cape Esperance. When she was heading over a large explosion suddenly occurred in her hull at 1:45am. It could have been a mine, or perhaps one of the PT torpedoes had finally hit its mark. Regardless, the Makikumo was dead in the water and forced to be scuttled by a sister destroyer, the Yugumo. The 11th air fleet launched 8 Betty’s over Guadalcanal during the night to keep the Cactus air force grounded, but 6 Dauntless managed to get up around midnight. Despite the enemy being illuminated well, the dauntless did not manage to score any hits. At 8am the Cactus air force made another go trying to hit the enemy destroyers, but failed to score any hits. By noon the reinforcement unit successfully landed 4935 men at Bougainville, including General Sano.  The first run was a large success and helped boost morale for the 17th army HQ, as they were quite frankly fearing the worst. As a deception, they had the soldiers over at Cape Esperance ignite campfires and move them gradually south towards Tassafaronga over the course of 2 nights. Meanwhile the 2nd division began to march in the opposite direction towards their own disembarkment points. On February 3rd, the 8th area army ordered the next run to have soldiers and sailors wait offshore in boats rather than on the beach. Despite the success of the first run, the 17th Army was still skeptical about the IJN making 3 runs. This led them to dispatch orders to Colonel Matsuda incharge of the rear guard, warning him it may be likely that he would have to make his own way out with a landing craft.  The Japanese high command was also gravely concerned with a growing situation at Marovovo. Lt Colonel Georges battalion had successfully departed from Verahue and around 9:10am one of their patrols ran into a pair of Japanese staff officers and 140 soldiers near Titi. There was a brief skirmish and the Japanese captured 2 of Georges men who were interrogated, revealing that around 600 of their comrades were marching around Marovovo. On the morning of February the 3rd, Matsuda’s rear guard of 350 troops of the Yano battalion were holding a position about half a mile west of Bonegi, alongside 60 survivors of the 124th infantry. His main force consisting of the remnants of the Ichiki detachment, which is simply incredible that any of them still exist at all at this point, alongside the 124th regiment were holding the right bank of the Segilau river. Fortunately for Matsuda the Americans were limiting their actions mostly patrolling for the day and he used the time to plan out the evacuation of his rear guard. His general plan was to lead his forces to Kamimbo and disembark to the Russells by boat.  The next day General Patch ordered his 161st infantry to relieve the 147th infantry, taking their job of advancing to Cape Esperance. The 147th would head west to an area between Bonegi and the Umasani rivers to clear out the area. 128 men under first Lt Miyano were ordered to hold the eastern bank of the Segilau river and Major Yano was ordered to leave a rear guard of 70 men to the west of Bonegi before he took the rest of his command to advance on Marovovo. Major Yano strongly objected to performing actions at Marovovo and that his units would be better served remaining with the rear guard. Basically Matsuda was ordering Yano to leave men to die at Bonego and Yano began to argue all his men should make a stand if so. So Matsuda caved in a bit and allowed Yano to leave only those unable to walk at Bonegi while he took everyone else to Segilau at 3pm. For those poor men left at Bonegi, each was given 2 tablets of mercury bichloride. From February 2-4th around 15 Bettys hunted the sea around guadalcanal and they reported very strong American naval presence, including carriers. Each day saw more bettys failing to return home, one of which carried Lt Commander Genichi Mihara the leader of the 705th air group. Despite the presence of many american naval units, on February 3rd the second run of Operation KE was approved to go. Admiral Yamamoto ordered the Asagumo and Samidare to replace the lost Makikumo and Makinami and on february the 4th, Hashimoto readied his cruisers and 20 destroyers to dare another run. His reinforcement unit left Shortland at 11:30 and at 3:50 his CAP of 29 Zeros clashed with 33 dauntless and avenger alongside 41 assorted fighters in two waves trying to take out his destroyer. The Americans lost 11 aircraft while the Japanese lost 2. A near miss crippled the Maikaze, forcing the Nagatsuki to tow her back to shortland and yet again Hashimoto was forced to change flag as the Shirayuki’s engines failed and thus he jumped onto the Kawakaze. Over on Guadalcanal 7 Bettys emerged at night dropped flares and bombs over Henderson field while IJN reconnaissance planes hunting PT boats. The embarkations proceeded smoothly, in 2 hours 3921 men were loaded off. General Hyakutake and his staff boarded the Isokaze, Maruyama and his staff got aboard the Hamakaze and both transport groups left with their screens completely unmolested up the slot, reaching Bougainville by 12:50 on february 5th. Miyazaki recounted seeing countless soldiers aboard the Isokaze sun bathing, as they had been long denied such a pleasure. There was nowhere to walk about the destroyers decks. He also found a soldier holding a corpse of a friend aboard, insisting the man was still alive. On Bougainville, Lt General Moritake Tanabe, the deputy chief of stuff of the IJA’s section of the Imperial General HQ met the evacuees. Miyazaki exchanged a wordless salute with the man, then as Tanabe approached him, he blurted out with tears, his desire for an appointment that would give him a death in battle. Tanabe was quite overcome by this and stated “Everything about this is the responsibility of Imperial Headquarters.” As Operation KE was whisked away men, the Yano unit withdrew from Bonegi to the Segilau river. Colonel Matsuda now took charge of the forces left on Guadalcanal as he took his men from Segilau over to Kamimbo. He ordered the Oneda Unit, consisting of the remnants of the 3rd battalion, 230th infantry to head west of Cape Esperance to block any american advances from Marovovo. Now Matsuda pondered how he was going to evacuate his rear guard. Lt Colonel Sakuji Matsuyama gave his very pessimistic view, the American air forces would whittle down the amount of boats available to them to most likely just a handful. They also received word from a tapped signal to the IJN on Rabaul that they were looking to use at minimum 3 or 4 destroyers with an adequate number of boats to be detailed for the final run. Thus Matsuda figured any attempt to evacuate the rear guard to the russells by boat would be suicidal. Matsuda wrote in his diary that night he doubted any destroyers would come, from his perspective, the sacrifice of 2000 men would be less than that of a single destroyer. Over on the American side, Colonel George’s men reached Titi on the 4th and would remain there for 2 days. Because of the smaller size of his command and not fully knowing the Japanese composition forced George to act cautiously. All of the Japanese activity had really confused the American’s and they presumed there was a major offensive afoot, there was of course just not what the Americans were thinking. Over on the west coast the 161st infantry advanced to the Umasani river by February 6th. Despite the apparent American inactivity, Matsuda feared that if they decided to make a thrust from the southern coast this would cut him off from Kamimbo and thus an embarkation spot. To keep this option open, he sent 100 men to move down the west coast to hold a position about 3.5 miles due east of Cape Esperance. He ordered them to march during daylight and to light cooking fires as a deception. Later that afternoon he received the demoralizing report that the IJN might only be able to pick up men already waiting in boats, those on the land would have to find their own way to new Georgia. The 17th army estimated that Matsuda had a 50% chance of getting the men out. On the 6th, senior IJA and IJN commanders met over the issue. The chief of staff of the 8th fleet said he doubted the third run of operation KE would be possible because there were reports of American carriers near guadalcanal. Admiral Mikawa assured the IJA, the IJN would do its best to meet the enemy. Colonel Konuma went to see Admiral Hashimoto to fish out his views, and Hashimoto asserted regardless of the orders or desires of the chief of staff of the 8th fleet, he would personally see to it that they evacuated all the men. Konuma requested to accompany the 3rd run personally. Hashimoto said to this it would be a stain on the IJN’s record if it was said they only made a run because an Army officers presence aboard their ships was the causation.  On the 7th, General Patch reported his belief that the Tokyo Express had made to successful runs, landing another regiment with supplies. Though in the same report he also acknowledged they may have extracted the HQ of some depleted units as well. Over on the west coast, 161st tossed patrols near the Tambalego river, 9 miles away from Cape Esperance. That day Colonel George had to hand command of his task force over to Lt Colonel Ferry after injuring his leg. Upon taking command, it was Ferry’s judgment that the Japanese were withdrawing to Cape Esperance or perhaps evacuating guadalcanal. Their native guides began reporting to them that the Japanese had just abandoned Marovovo, so the task force marched upon it. At 12:40, the units assigned to guard Marovovo did abandon it stating they had been subjected to severe artillery bombardment, earning anger from Matsuda who demanded they go back to prolong the american advance. They rushed back just in time to fire their machineguns at the Americans who were advancing 2000 yards north of Marovovo by 3:30pm. Meeting resistance, Ferry told the men to dig in for the night.  February 7th was a day of decision making for Matsuda. Ever hour brought him more stress, the severe shelling that was reported to him at Marovovo could be heard alongside American machine gun fire at Kamimbo. Then at sundown, 26 land craft still remained operational, it was a miracle american air forces had not destroyed them all! Compared to the experiences of the entire guadalcanal campaign, it really did seem a miracle. Matsuda set to work organizing his boarding plan to provide for 4 units of 500 men each. In a very tense 45 minutes starting at 9:30pm, the remaining movable Japanese survivors of guadalcanal got onto the boats as American artillery could be heard smashing Segilau. On the boats many Japanese prayed, the rendezvous time of 11pm passed, greatly demoralizing them. Then they saw the blue recognition lights of approaching destroyers.  The second run of operation KE went off very well compared to the first. But Admiral Yamamoto suspected the third would see major american naval forces that were lurked around just outside their search plan range waiting to pounce. The submarine forces combed the area without success as the Advance force was ordered to come within 550 miles of Guadalcanal to be ready to support the Reinforcement unit. Hashimoto would have 18 destroyers this time, grabbing men from two points, Kamimbo and the Russells. Despite reported sighting of American carriers and other naval units just due south of San Cristobal, Hashimoto departed Shortland and made one last sprint to save the men of starvation island. 15 Dauntless, 20 wildcats and a single F5A bore down upon the reinforcement unit after a search plane tipped them off. 17 out of 49 zeros sent by the 11th air fleet intercepted them. At 5:55 the Isokaze was hit by 2 bombs to her deck and around her forward gun mount killing 10 men and starting fires. She limped away with the help of the Kawakaze as the Urakaze took a near miss doing slight damage. One zero and the F5A failed to return home.  Over on Guadalcanal, the men in their boats climbed aboard the destroyers. By 12:04am, on the 8th, Matsuda received word that the boarding was complete. To honor Hashimoto’s pledge, the sailors had even rowed boats along the shore waters calling out again to make sure no one was left behind on the beaches. By 1:32am, the boats returned and the destroyers began to depart. It was to be the last time the Rising Sun fluttered from a surface ship near the blood soaked shores of Guadalcanal. On the way Matsuda signaled the 17th army  “With the help of 20,000 souls the recovery of 1,972 men from Guadalcanal is reported complete.” When Matsuda reached Bougainville at 10am, he reported to General Hyakutake the end of his special mission, adding thanks for the 17th army’s efforts to guarantee the last run made it. Hyakutake praised Matsuda’s command as the rear guard. As Matsuda and Hyakutake pointed out and so will I here, the first unit to fight on Guadalcanal was the Ichiki detachment and they were amongst the last to leave on the third run of Operation KE, simply incredible. Operation KE was an enormous feat, over 10652 men were evacuated with 4935 on the first run, 3921 on the second and 1796 on the third. For naval units they had lost the Makikumo and major damage was dealt to the Makinami, Maikaze and Isokaze. They sank the Chicago, DeHaven and 3 PT boats, while also heavily damaging the LaVallette. For the air war, between January 25th to February the 9th the Japanese lost around 56 aircraft while taking down 53 American. Needless to say, Operation KE was a major success from a figures point of view. The Japanese attributed the success of Operation KE to the careful planning by the combined fleet and to those men who sacrificed their lives prolonging the American pursuers on the ground. After receiving word that the Reinforcement unit returned on the morning of the 8th, Admiral Yamamoto commanded all units involved.  The American forces at Marovovo after observing the sea littered with small boats and debris from the nights activities set off in hot pursuit, reaching Kamimbo at 5pm. During these hours over on the western coast the 161st pushed towards Cape Esperance where they ran into sporadic skirmishes with the Japanese, but the enemy they skirmished with were in extremely poor condition, mostly wounded men unable to walk. Based on the condition of the enemy, Colonel Dalton of the 161st sent a report that he believed the enemy was not defending nor delaying, but actually fleeing. General Patch concurred with this and advised Hasley that be believed the last Tokyo Express runs were not reinforcements but rather evacuations. On the morning of the 9th, the 1st battalion, 161st infantry met up with the 2nd battalion of the 132nd at the village of Tenaro. Colonel Dalton shooks hands with Major Butler of the 132nd at 4:50, then General Patch announced to the men “Total and complete defeat of Japanese forces on Guadalcanal effected 1625 today. . . . [the] Tokyo Express no longer has a terminus on Guadalcanal.” Now there were of course Japanese left behind on Guadalcanal, but organized resistance was all but over by the 9th. Encountered with some isolated pockets and stragglers occurred for the next few days. Some stragglers would go on to live within the interior with the last known survivor surrendering in October of 1947. Given the vast disparity in fire power between the two sides on guadalcanal and likewise the severity of how debilitated the 17th army was compared to General Patchs soldiers and marines, the failure of the Americans to annihilate Hyakutakes men was strange. Hyakutake believed that if the Americans had focused on marching towards Cape Esperance, they would have completely destroyed his army. The failure to do so was because of 2 major reasons. The first was the relatively small size of the forces engaged in the pincer attack against Cape Esperance. After January 25th, the American forces typically involved no more than a regiment on the western coast. After February 1st this was supplemented by an additional battalion on the southern coast. The second reason was the pace of the advance of those forces which was hindered by a combination of logistical factors, rough terrain and the Americans thinking an offensive was about to kick off any moment. The logical way the Americans could have foiled operation KE would have been something Vandegrift repeatedly had done, amphibious hooks. General Patch considered this often in mid January, but again, all the indications from the Japanese activity was a major offensive was about to occur, and you simply don't toss units into the abyss. Admiral Nimitz confessed in his report  “Until the last moment it appeared that the Japanese were attempting a major reinforcement effort. Only skill in keeping their plans disguised and bold celerity in carrying them out enabled the Japanese to withdraw the remnants of the Guadalcanal garrison. Not until all organized forces had been evacuated on 8 February did we realize the purpose of their air and naval dispositions. “ It has been 6 months of blood sweat and tears over 2500 square miles of jungle that was called Guadalcanal. She was in American hands, the great prize being her airfield capabilities. Both the Japanese and Americans knew her worth and both sides evaluated the costs and returns of trying to hold her. Now I have said it quite a few times, when it comes to turning points or quote en quote “the turning point” of the pacific war, a lot of people generally fall victim to the allure of the battle of midway. Sure thing the battle of midway was a turning point, but in comparisons to Guadalcanal it is arguably not as important. Midway halted the Japanese from further major operations in the Central Pacific. It thwarted Yamamoto’s attempt to create more favorable conditions militarily and diplomatically to bring American to the negotiating table. Midway also caused severe losses to the IJN, but did the Japanese go on the defensive? No they did not, in fact they immediately tossed a large scale operation against Port Moresby. Given the Japanese took Port Moresby, the course of the war would have dramatically changed, it was a pivotal place to hold. The Japanese were not simply on the defensive footing awaiting counter attacks from the enemy after midway, they still held the initiative. If you look at what the Japanese military high command was thinking directly after Midway, you find they all believed, falsely mind you, that the allied counterattack would commence no earlier than 1943, probably even later. This was not a stupid conclusion by the way, if we look at the situation in Europe, it did not seem possibly a nation like America could allocate that many resources to the pacific at the time. General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral King aggressively pushed for offensives in the south pacific, albeit for differing reasons. MacArthur wanted to leap to Rabaul, which was obviously insane and the Navy rightfully pushed back against this. Kings proposal was much more realistic and won the day in the end. Its incredible given hindsight, that the American offensive in the south pacific began when it did. They had little in land based or carrier based aircraft, not to mention limited amphibious shipping. Yet Kings insistence produced great reward, they achieved tactic surprise and a strategic surprise of great magnitude. The Marines on guadalcanal reaped the benefits of the surprise for a long time. Given what the Japanese were capable of doing, their response to the landings on Guadalcanal was a terrible miscalculation. It took the Japanese far too long to figure out Guadalcanal was potentially the decisive battle they sought. Operation WatchTower held countless flaws that could have been exploited by the Japanese to produce a major victory. The American navy in the pacific could not hope to challenge the Japanese even after Midway, so much of their strength lay in the battle over the Atlantic, but Guadcanal offered them a unique chance to boost their ground and aerial forces in the Pacific, dramatically compensating for the lack of carriers. With the victory over Guadalcanal, the Americans would develop it and Tulagi in major bases to support the allied offensive up the Solomons. Extensive airfields, naval ports and other logistical facilities would be built up. The Japanese had lost the initiative for the Pacific War, now they were on the defensive in the Pacific. The fall of Guadalcanal went hand in hand with the campaign in New Guinea, Japan kept juggling both campaigns and each suffered because of the other. The IJA and IJN were not beaten of course, but now the allies were in the driving seat for once. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The allies had finally seized guadalcanal and now the Japanese were on a defensive footing, they had lost the initiative for the pacific war. Things were going to dramatically change for the empire of the rising sun who now would look to a new strategy, that of bleeding the allies dry.  

Last time we spoke about the offensive against the Gifu. The estimation of the Gifu defenses proved to be greatly underestimated and it was only after the Sea Horse was taken and the Gifu was severely isolated that its defenders began to crumble. At the last minute 100 Japanese came out screaming, tossing grenades and bullets, but ultimately the Gifu was taken and now the American forces on Guadalcanal could focus on pursuing the Japanese fleeing west. We also finished up the Buna-Gona campaign with the fall of Sanananda. The Japanese fought bitterly tooth and nail to retain their last toehold from their failed Port Moresby campaign. The evacuation was a disaster leading countless wounded and ill Japanese to commit suicide while their comrades fled for their lives trying to break through the allied lines. Those lucky enough to get past the gauntlet of fire went to Salamaua and Lae, where they would have to continue the fight over New Guinea. This episode is the battle of Rennell Island Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Last time we saw the conclusion to one of the bloodiest battles fought in New Guinea, let alone the Pacific War. The battle of Buna-Gona took the lives of countless Americans, Australians, Japanese and native Papuans whose misery almost never gets spoken about. We also saw a ton of action over on Starvation Island. The Sea Horse was captured, thus greatly isolating the fortified Gifu. When the Gifu’s defenders realized they were cut off from the rest of the army, they made one last hurray into oblivion. 100 or so screaming Japanese stormed out of the Gifu with rifles, pistols, swords and grenades in hand to hurt the Americans as much as they could. After their suicidal charge, the Gifu had finally fallen and now the Americans could focus their attention west.  By January 17th the first phase of the 14th corps western offensive had ended. The 25th division reduced 3 pockets of Japanese that emerged 2 days prior and the 2nd marine division smashed the Japanese around Hill’s 83/84. On the 12th, the 27th infantry had captured the Horse’s Head, cutting off Major Nishiyama’s units then numbering 200 survivors out of an original 600. He was forced to make a last stand. He smoked his last cigarette with tears in his eyes as he had to look his men in the eyes and tell them all to prepare to die, he wrote in his diary that their calm acceptance to this moved him greatly. For the next 2 days he and the men looked for an area they could best serve to give up their lives, to make it meaningful. While Nishiyama kept a strong face for the men, following the orders to make a final stand, privately in his diary he debated with himself if he should try to withdraw the men on his own authority and as he wrote it “even at the expense of my honor”. He knew very well he could make a cover story to save face, some sort of false pretext to save the men from annihilation. But to do so did not only mean dishonoring himself, it meant to dishonor the whole unit. Over the course of those 2 days he sent a runner to the division HQ and General Ito sanctioned a withdrawal and thus Nishiyama and his 200 men escaped annihilation with their honor intact. It was very fortunate for them as General Patchs next phase of the offensive was set to begin on January 16th. The 14th corps next objective was a line from Hill 87 going northeast to the beach. This would contain Hills 87, 88 and 89. The 6th marines of the 2nd marine division and the 182 infantry would secure the right side and the 25th division would advance in the southern portion seizing hills 87, 88 and 89. 4 infantry regiments of the 147th infantry would be held back to guard the airfields. The 27th infantry of the 25th division would advance astride a narrow ridge called the snake to assault Hill 87 from the east, which the Americans assumed would be heavily fortified. The 161st infantry would perform a deep envelopment from the Galloping Horse to the southwest capturing Hills X,Y and Z then perform a flanking maneuver to seize Hills 88 and 89. The 25th infantry would protect the southern flank of the 161st and would continue to exterminate pockets of Japanese in the area.  Exterminate by the way is a very cruel and fitting term for the way they were going about the business, for many of these so-called pockets were nothing more than abandoned, starving Japanese. By the 21st, Hills X and Y were taken by the 161st with relatively minor resistance. Then the 161st planned to deploy the 1st battalion to guard the southern flank while the 2nd and 3rd battalions got off Hill 7 to march towards Hill 87 when circumstances changed.  On January the 21st, the 27th infantry was advancing on the narrow front with the 1st battalion as their spearhead, and behind them were the 3rd and 2nd battalions. The next morning at 6:30am, the 25th divisions artillery began tossing over 3654 shells upon Hills 87,88 and 89. At that point the 1st battalion advanced down the “snake’s back” where they took out 3 Japanese machine gun nests trying to block their advance to the snakes tail. By 9:10am the 1st battalion was on its way to assault Hill 87. It looked from afar that Hill 87 held light opposition. After the 1st battalion seized the hill at 9:40, the 161st infantry was ordered to cross Hill Y to Z while the rest of the regiment turned north to follow along the snake behind the 27th infantry. Now while this was occurring, Brigadier General Robert Spragins was sent by General Patch to give General Collins leading the 25th authority to have them advance upon Kokumbona as rapidly as possible. The 25th’s boundaries were extended to Hills 91, 98 and 99 which were like stepping stones towards Kokumbona. Without pause the 1st battalion took Hill 88 and then 89 by 11am. Then at 2pm it received the orders to seize Hill 90. By the time night was coming on, Hills 90 and 91 would be seized and this all tossed the Japanese defensive plans into chaos. During the night of January 22nd, the 17th Army HQ marched to Cape Esperance and the 38th division began to extract all the units it still was in contact with. But the huge thrusts made by the 27th infantry were pinching off the 2nd divisions flank and the Yano battalion. The 2nd division had orders to hold its position until sundown of january 23rd, but with the enemy advancing so much, Maruyama had ordered his men to pull back at 5am. Most of the 2nd division succeeded to pull back, but the Nitto Battalion of about 50 men all died holding their position. When the 17th army found out they were very angered by Maruyama. However unbeknownst to them, Maruyama pretty much saved countless Japanese lives as on January 23rd, the 27th infantry performed a 2 pronged. The 3rd battalion hit Hills 98 and 99 while the 1st battalion marched for Kokumbona. By 3:30 Kokumbona was captured, this was all done in astonishingly quick time, they could have overrun and annihilated Maruyama’s men had he not pulled out. Overall between January 10th to the 27th, the 27th infantry had suffered 66 deaths including 7 officers. Now taking Kokumbona caused major changes for both the Americans and Japanese. For the Japanese the obvious change was many units were withdrawing while others who did not receive the orders to pull out would be smashed by the americans now thrust along the coast. The 6th marines were assaulting Japanese forces who had failed to withdraw and by January 24th the remnants of the 27th regiment were annihilated just a bit due east of Kokumbona. Now the 25th had made it to the area, joining CAM divisions consisting of the 147th, 182nd and 6th marines to advance further west. From the American perspective it looked like the Japanese might be aiming to perform a counteroffensive, so General Patch retained at least one division at the Lunga airfield incase. This of course was not the case as the 17th army was now hyper mobilizing its withdrawal and to do so it organized new coast defense units, made up of the ill and wounded. Men of the 38th and 2nd divisions were sent to Cape Esperance and Kamimbo, while the Yano battalion was deployed along the Marmura river by the 25th. Colonel Konuma in charge of rear guard duty took his men to the Bonegi river where he hoped to make a stand on its eastern bank to regain time lost because of 27th’s incredible advances. On January 24th and 25th his men scattered into independent groups hindering the enemy's advance short of the Poha river.  The CAM division ran into the Yano Battalion at around 1pm on January 26th which the marines said gave them heavy resistance. Major Yano’s forces were gradually pushed back half a mile west of the Maruma by the 28th and the next day they had to withdraw across the Bonegi leaving the battered 2nd infantry group to face the American advance. On the 30th the 147th infantry got hit by the American vanguard. 1000 men crossed the Bonegi, but were quickly chased back to the east bank. The next day the 147th performed an envelopment maneuver using 2 companies which crossed the Bonegi. This resulted in what the Japanese called “considerable losses”, leading them to extract their forces away from Bonegi. By February the 1st the 147th fled for their lives as the Destroyer Wilson began bombarding the Bonegi area.  Now we have to take a pause about the ground offensive going on to talk a bit about the air and sea. American intelligence found the Vila-Stanmore area on Kolombangara to be associated with radio traffic directing aviation units on Ballale. They sent reconnaissance to go look and found a nascent air base and began to suspect it was a staging area for barges and other small vessels trying to smuggle supplies to Munda. This prompted Admiral Halsey to plan an attack upon Vila-Stanmore to destroy the Munda air strength. Halsey gave Admiral Aisnworth the assignment of bombarding, he would come from the Kula Gulf while Munda would be hit by aerial bombardment. Ainsworth had task force 67 consisting of 4 light cruisers and 7 destroyers.  Japanese search planes located Ainsworth on the afternoon of January 23rd, prompting them to launch Betty’s from the 701st and 705st air groups. Ainsworth managed to slip by them during the night, and at 2am his cruisers and destroyers fire over 2000 6 inch shells and 1500 4 inch shells in 30 minutes. According to the Japanese over in Kolombangara, they sustained heavy material damage that delayed construction efforts, killed 5 men and wounded 20. Meanwhile the 30 Betty’s hunting down Ainsworth finally caught a glimpse of his force because of the muzzle flashes. Before the Betty’s could toss torpedoes, Ainsworth pulled the ships into rain squalls and used radar directed 5 inch antiaircraft fire to hit the enemy. Around 8am 24 dauntless, 17 avengers and 18 Wildcats from Saratoga delivered 23 tons of bombs upon Munda. Neither Munda nor Vila-Stanmore played a crucial role in Operation KE fortunately for the Japanese.  On January 25th, 54 Zeros and 18 Betty’s left Rabaul to perform a live-bait role. Another 24 Zeros left Buin to join this but weather prevented 18 of them. The air force reached Guadalcanal at 1:40pm as the Cactus airforce tossed 18 Wildcats and 6 P-38’s to meet them. 4 zeros were shot down with another 6 heavily damaged. A second raid was made by the IJA’s 6th air division. 9 Kawasaki KI-48 Lily bombers, 74 Nakajima Ki-43 Oscar fighters and 2 Mitsubishi Ki-46 Dinah’s departed Buka and Shortland at around 9am on January 27th. The Cactus airforce tossed up a dozen wildcats, 6 P-38s and 10 P-40s over Lunga to battle them all the way towards the Russels. 6 Oscars were downed as the Lily’s bombed the Matanikau for little effect. A third raid set for January 29th had to be postponed because something big was cooking up around Rennell Island. The campaign to claim air superiority had fallen short of its goals, prompting the southeast area fleet to request Operation KE be postponed, but the 8th area army adamantly insisted the evacuation must proceed as fast as possible. Now the IJN had sent some submarine supply missions to the 17th army in late december and on January 8th, American intelligence began to look closely at their radio traffic. They managed to decipher some signals predicting  submarine transport runs set for January 26, 27 and 29. On the 29th the Kiwi and Moa, 2 out of 4 new zealand corvettes operating from Tulagi were hunting off the coast of Kamimbo when Lt Commander Bridson of Kiwi sighted the I-1 at 9:05. He dropped 2 depth charges forcing the submarine to surface and an eruption of 4 inch gunfire began. The skipper of the Kiwi ordered full speed and to ran the submarine drawing protest from Kiwi’s chief engineer, but Lt Commander Bridson said “shut up! There’s a weekend’s leave in Auckland dead ahead of us”. Thus Kiwi smashed into the submarines port side, causing a breach in her and send troops aboard her to start jumping overboard. As Kiwi backed away she began firing upon the landing barges strapped to the submarine. Then Brison yelled “hit her again! It’ll be a weeks leave! Once more for a fortnight!”. The Kiwi smashed into her again causing diesel oil to spout everywhere. After this rather hilarious battle that went on for 90 minutes, Bridson withdraw allowing the Moa to hold the fight. Aboard the I-1, captain Lt Commander Eichi Sakamoto had been operating the periscope when the depth charges hit the submarine. He scrambled her to the surface and her gun crew managed to fire 2 salvos at the Kiwi before fusillade fire from Kiwi cut the gunners and Sakamoto down. This prompted the submarines navigator to rush down the ladder screaming “swords!swords!”. The navigator, apparently a famous swordsman remerged topside, sword in hand and tried to jump aboard the Kiwi during her ramming venture. He grabbed onto one of her rails as riflemen on top I-1 tried firing at her. After being rammed for the third time, 47 soldiers jumped overboard swimming to shore as the Moa captured the navigator, that must have been a funny sight. The I-1 lay twisted in the water as the Japanese desperately tried to scuttle her. Later in february, Australian divers would manage to loot the submarine finding 200,000 pages of secret documents providing cryptographic materials and valuable JN-25 code information. In mid to late January, Admiral Nimitz and Halsey both regarded the dramatic accumulation of IJN shipping, vigorous air activity and all the radio chatter to be pointing towards some sort of new offensive in the southern solomons. They were looking at this anxiously because the projected withdrawal of the 2nd marine division was coming up. They had procrastinated the last removal of the marines for quite some time. So, in order to shield the movement of troop transports and counter possible IJN surface ship threats, Halsey deployed the kitchen sink in the south pacific. On January 29th, a carrier group built around Enterprise rendevouzed with Saratoga’s task force. Task force 67 consisting of 4 cruisers and 4 destroyers joined up with Admiral Lee’s task force 64 consisting of 3 battleships and 4 destroyers. They escorted Task force 62.8 consisting of 4 transports and 4 destroyers maintaining a course 100 miles to Lunga Point through the Lengo Channel. Close by the cover this was also task force 18 consisting of 6 cruisers and 6 destroyers sailing due south of Guadalcanal. Yes there are going to be a lot of task forces, growing exponentially henceforth. Rear Admiral Richard Giffen commanded task force 18, a new face to the pacific, he had spent the war thus far in the atlantic and mediterranean sea and was a favorite of Admiral King’s. He was tasked by Halsey to rendezvous with Captain Robert Briscoe who was commanding the Cactus striking force consisting of 4 destroyers off Cape Chunter. Once they met up, Giffen was to lead them on a daylight sweep up the Slot as the transports unloaded at Lunga on the 30th. Now Giffen needed to meet up with Briscoe for 9pm and in order to make the deadline he detached his escort carriers Suewanna and Chenango with 2 destroyers so the rest of his force could pull up to 24knots. During the afternoon, unidentified aircraft began lighting up his task force 18’s radar. His escort carriers began tossing up groups of wildcats and radar equipped avengers to get a clearer picture, but poor weather was hindering their efforts and Giffen refused to break radio silence as were his orders. In the mid afternoon 32 Betty’s of the 701st and 705st air groups took off from Rabaul with the intent to perform night aerial torpedo attacks. Around twilight, task force 18 was set up in a column formation spaced out around 2500 yard apart arranged perfectly to face off against another surface fleet, but in quite a terrible position for anti-aircraft maneuvers. By 7:00 his flagship Cruiser Wichita’s radar began showing what looked like a Japanese hornet nest of bombers. The Japanese airwave came from the west circling around the task force to gain the darker backdrop of the eastern sky for their approach. At 7:19 16 Betty’s from the 705th commenced their attack. Anti-aircraft fire began to spurt, but Giffen remained hell-bent on making his rendezvous so the kept the speed going and ceased having his formation perform zigzagging maneuvers. This obviously aided the Japanese pilots who began dropping white flares along each side of the task force column to help guide the bombers torpedo runs. At 7:38 Lt Commander Joji Higai took his force of 15 Betty’s from the 701sy and began their runs. At 9:40 a torpedo hit Chicago on her starboard side, followed 2 minutes later by another, halting Chicago. Another torpedo hit Witchita, but it was a dud. Still Giffen did not feel the need to change course nor lower speed. To decrease their visibility from the enemy he ordered the gunners to cease any firing unless they had an absolute target. Chicago’s crews had stopped her flooding, leaving her listing 11 degrees. Chicago’s engineers were trying to crank her engines to keep her up to speed, but it simply was not in the cards, so Giffen deployed the Louisville to tow the injured Chicago to safety.  On January 30th, Chicago was limping behind Louisville at 3knots while Giffens task force 18 continued. Halsey dispatched the destroyer transports Sands and tug Navajo to relieve Louisville so she could rejoin the task force. From the early morning to 2pm, task force 18’s radar screens displaying multiple Japanese reconnaissance aircraft coming from Rabaul. Admiral Kusaka was greatly relieved to find out Task force 18 was dealt an injury thus preventing it from threatening the first run of Operation KE. Kusaka predicted the Chicago would slip beyond the radius of her fighter cover from guadalcanal so he sent another air strike to attack the vulnerable ship. However unbeknownst to him, the escort carriers Suwannee, Chenango and Enterprise were shuttling wildcats to protect Chicago.  Another group of 11 Bettys from the 751st air group lifted off at 12:05. A coast watcher warned Chicago and Enterprise of the threat around 3:05 allowing the carrier to launch fighters to intercept shortly after 4pm. Admiral Nimitz advised Giffen alongside the Japanese aircraft there were also 10 enemy submarines deployed south and southeast of guadalcanal. But Halsey ordered Giffen to change course for Efate with the battle worthy cruisers at 3pm, thus task force 18 divided, leaving the Chicago stripped of her shield of anti-aircraft batteries as the fighters were heading off with the rest of the force. Chicago would have only 4 wildcats running cap over her and at 3:40 the Betty’s began to emerge. When enterprise understood the plight of the Chicago she sent force 6 more Wildcats to intercept, prompting the Betty’s to rush for Chicago. Only 2 Wildcats managed to attack the Betty’s before they released their loads. In all but a minute the Japanese desperately tried to toss their fish into the sea as the American pilots downed 3 Betty’s likewise into the sea. Chicago tried its best to put up anti-aircraft fire, with her gunners claiming to down 4 Bettys as they attacked. 5 torpedo wakes emerged all converging upon Chicago. At 4:24 one torpedo hit her forward, followed seconds later by 3 others which ripped open Chicago's midship. The catastrophic damage prompted Captain Davis to immediately order abandon ship. As Davis recounted “Chicago rolled slowly over her starboard side and settled by the stern, with colors flying”. 56 men, including 6 officers died aboard Chicago leaving 1069 survivors. The Japanese pilots also came across the destroyer LaVallette which had valiantly turned back at the last minute to help chicago. 3 Betty’s surged at her with one dropping a torpedo at just 300 yards away. The torpedo hit LaVallette’s port side abreast her forward engine room. 21 of her crew were killed, but her engineers managed to get her back to fighting condition quickly and she pulled away. 12 Betty’s had been lost that day, including Lt Commander Higai, one of their best Betty pilots for the IJN. The sinking of Chicago greatly frustrated Admiral Nimitz. In his official report of the event to King he wrote “especially regrettable because it might have been prevented.” Yeah Nimitz was frankly pretty pissed off. There was a long list of errors that led to the Chicago’s fate. For one, Giffen was obsessed with keeping his rendezvous time and this led him to not consider the formation of his force, the amount of aerial support and to be blunt it was a tactical disaster. To make matters worse, some of his warships were carrying the super secret at the time VT proximity fuze. Nimitz vented his anger at his staff threatening to shoot anyone who announced the loss of the Chicago.  During the afternoon of January 31st, american intelligence decyphered a dispatch stating Kondo’s advance force had departed Truk 2 days early and this triggered Nimitz to alert his subordinates in the south pacific to expect a major Japanese operation was about to begin. The little battle of Rennell island had taken out the Chicago, but it also postponed the beginning of Operation KE now being slated for February 1st. The reinforcement Unit which was responsible for the evacuation was gathering its cruisers and over 21 destroyers at Shortland. Army officers were assured that the nominated commander of the Reinforcement unit for operation KE, Rear Admiral Satsuma Kimura led the finest flotilla in the IJN, destroyer squadron 10. But on January 19th, Kimura was injured when the submarine Nautilus damaged his flagship Akizuki near Shortland, prompting his replacement for Rear Admiral Koyanagi. At the same time, Admiral Kusaka secured the appointment of Rear Admiral Shintaro Hashimoto as commander of the Reinforcement Unit, prompting Koyanami to be held in reserve capacity. The 11th air fleet and 6th air division were responsible for maintaining the daylight CAP over the reinforcement units runs, but at night it would be the R Area air force. the 60 float planes of the R Area air force would sweep ahead of the reinforcement unit trying to shield them from the troublesome american PT boats.  Operation KE relied heavily on some plans revolving around the Russell islands, if the destroyers failed to extract the 17th army it would fall upon landing craft from the Russell islands. Many army officers also hoped to install a temporary garrison and base in the Russells to work as a feint. Thus on January 28th, 6 destroyers bearing 328 men went to the Russells. And so soon, the grand operation would be unleashed. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The hybrid force of US soldiers and Marines seized Kokumbona, greatly hindering Operation KE’s timetable. Alongside this the battle of Rennell Island also added to hinder Operation KE’s, to add further misery to its future success. Could the IJA/IJN work together to pull it all off, time will tell!   

Last time we spoke about the crazy scramble between the Japanese and Americans as a result of preparation for Operation KE. The American intelligence network was working overtime trying to figure out what the Japanese were cooking up, while the Japanese did their best to feint and hide their intentions. Then we spoke about the enormous offensive performed by the US Army and 2nd Marine division on Guadalcanal. The Americans continued to advance west of the Matanikau and south against the Gifu. The Galloping Horse and Sea Horse would prove to be quite difficult to advance upon, costing countless lives. Like ants crawling up a hill the Americans seized hill after hill, gradually neutralizing the Japanese presence in the mount Austen area. But today we are going to come to the conclusion of the last remaining toehold of the failed Port Moresby campaign, Sanananda.

Today, another chapter opens up in Guadalcanal: it is to be the final chapter of the campaign, the last American offensive, the final Japanese defeat. As we saw previously, the Japanese had approved plans for the evacuation of this Island of Death, but it would take time to prepare for such an operation. In the meantime, the Japanese forces on Guadalcanal were starving, their strength waning with each passing day and their position getting more and more untenable by the minute. A formidable army, now reduced to tatters. And to add to all their grievances, General Patch was about to launch another offensive against the battered and depleted Japanese units, aiming to remove their presence from this island. Thus, join us as we delve once more into the last offensive of the Guadalcanal Campaign with the battles of the Galloping Horse and the Sea Horse.

Last time we spoke about the secretive discussions amongst the top ranking Japanese military leaders that lead to the creation of operation KE. Both the IJA and IJN were grasping at straws trying to figure out a way to save face and get their boys off Guadalcanal. The Guadalcanal campaign had to be abandoned and now the IJA and IJN would share the responsibility of holding a new defensive line in the northern and middle Solomons while redirecting efforts at the New Guinea campaign. We also continued our story about the Buna-Gona front. Buna had finally fallen after bitter blood sweat and tears were shed in its defense. The Buna-Gona front was collapsing as the Japanese were scrambling to hold their remaining toehold that was supposed to be the Port Moresby campaign. Now they would have to defend the Sanananda front, their last hope.

Last time we spoke about the First Arakan Campaign. General Slim and Lt General Irwin Noel were beginning to have a budding bromance, but Noel simply wanted to see other people and it led to disaster. All jokes aside, Noels attempts to keep Slim away from military campaign seems to have really hurt the war effort in the CBI theater. Slims men and the Chinese forces who came to India received terrible treatment from their comrades and on top of this a political crisis was brewing in India. Noel’s operation sent men to Foul Point where they got a taste of Japanese bunker defenses. Rather ironically Wavell compared the failure at Foul Point to the fierce battle fought by the Australians and Americans over in Buna-Gona stating“It seems quite clear that we are facing a form of ‘Buna’ and ‘Gona.’ And today we will be returning to Green Hell and Starvation island.

Last time we spoke about the grueling battle for Buna-Gona. The villages of Buna and Gona had been captured, but the Americans and Australians had a lot more ground to take before their job was done. By Christmas day American companies were marching upon the Buna government station while the Australians were marching in the direction of Giruwa. Then over on starvation island the situation was so dire for the Japanese, they had to perform a feint to draw the American Army’s attention away from their coastal lines. They chose to mount a feint from Mount Austen to draw the Americans there and the feint worked. Now the Americans would be marching upon the Seahorse and Galloping horse to face the brutal defenses of the Gifu to claim Mount Austen's peak. But today we are going to venture back to the Burma front where a new offensive is commencing.

Last time we spoke about the grueling fall of the villages of Buna and Gona during the Buna-Gona offensive. The Americans, Australians and Japanese had been at it for weeks in a battle of attrition for the Buna-Gona area, a battle General Douglas MacArthur was impatient to draw out. Because of the drive to speed up the seizing of the territory, every day became a groundhog day of morning bombardments followed by failed ground offensives. While it was disheartening to fall upon the concealed Japanese bunkers each day, little by little the allies were whittling down the Japanese defenders, whose backs were to the sea without any hope of escape. With the villages of Buna and Gona captured, the end was drawing near for the Japanese, many of whom were trying desperately to escape via the ocean or by running into the jungles. Today we are going to continue this brutal story and a new offensive on the starvation island.

Last time we spoke about the battle of Tassafaronga. It was a defeat, but also a major humiliation for the American navy. A American Cruiser-Destroyer group lost to an inferior destroyer-transport group that they had managed to surprise. The issue of the mark XV torpedoes were still plaguing the Americans and would continue to do so well into 1943. Admiral Tanaka managed to perform his new drum technique, but little by little the IJN was losing their valuable destroyers, submarines and transports. We also saw some more action along the Buna-Gona front which had become a horrible war of attrition, one that the Japanese knew they would ultimately lose. General Harding was continuously throwing men against the fortified and concealed Japanese positions causing a massive meatgrinder. But soon Harding would be replaced and some progress would be made.

Last time we spoke about the long and bloody patrol of Carlson’s raiders. Shoji and his men were in for a nasty surprise when they disappeared into the jungle for a long march back to the 17th Army, for they were not alone. Carlson’s raiders hunted them down for over a month killing 488 Japanese at the cost of 16 marine lives. Shoji’s main body had been reduced to just 800 men when he finally rejoined the 17th army HQ. Over in the Buna-Gona front, the Australian-American forces fell into a bitter stalemate despite 2 weeks of trying to find weaknesses at either area. The concealed Japanese bunkers were taking a heavy toll on the allies, but ultimately the Japanese were just prolonging the inevitable as they had nowhere to run. Then we finished off with the battle of Brisbane, where some yanks got a bit handsy with some gals, prompting brawls with the aussies. Today we are venturing back to starvation island and Green Hell.

Last time we spoke about the battle for Buna and Gona. The American and Australians forces pushed the Japanese towards the Buna-Gona area and with their backs against the wall and nowhere to retreat, the defenders began fighting to the bitter end. Wave after wave of american ground assaults were met by concealed bunkers holding machine guns and treetop snipers. The New Guinea offensive was going to be a few long weeks of carnage for both sides, in a brutal war of attrition. We also talked about the Americans on Guadalcanal making another push west of the Matanikau. Their objective was to secure territory up to the Poha river and to harass the already brutalized Japanese forces after their failure during the last attack on Henderson field. Today we will continue both stories, first with one long patrol thats purpose was to hunt down Japanese trying to escape being encircled at Koli Point and get safely back to the western part of Guadalcanal.

Today, the sun begins to set on the Empire of the Rising Sun. The decisive battle to destroy the American Navy had failed; their overland offensive through the Kokoda Track had failed; their attempts to recapture Guadalcanal and its important airfield had failed. Meanwhile, the Americans had successfully launched their counteroffensive on the Southern Solomons and the Australians had managed to corner the invaders at the Buna-Gona area. Thus, the initiative has finally slipped off the hands of the Japanese; and now, it is their turn to go on the defensive. Yet it will be long until complete darkness falls over the Japanese Empire, as their stubborn and tenacious forces are prepared to give one hell of a fight. Join us as we delve into the start of the long and bloody Battle of Buna-Gona in this new episode of the Pacific War.

After many weeks of seeing the brutal fighting that was unfolding in the Southwest Pacific, we are finally reaching the apex of the Guadalcanal Campaign. With three failed attempts to recapture the infamous Island of Death and with their latest victory on the Santa Cruz Islands giving them the illusion that they had achieved naval supremacy over their enemies, the Japanese again prepared for a planned last offensive to finally win what they believed to be the most decisive battle of the Pacific War. Today, however, those illusions are going to be shattered as we delve into the critical Naval Battle of Guadalcanal.  

Fifty weeks have passed since that infamous day in which the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, setting in motion the Pacific War that we have been covering in this series. For many months, we’ve seen the relentless Japanese forces achieve tremendous feats of conquest but also commit horrendous war crimes against innocent people; we’ve seen the tenacious Allied defenders suffer defeat after defeat only to get up back again to fight the ruthless invaders; and we’ve seen the sacrifices of brave men and women on both sides of the war that gave up their lives for what they believed to be a good cause. Now, we’re in a stage in which the Japanese Empire has surrendered the initiative to the Allies in the Pacific. With the recent victories on the Guadalcanal and Kokoda Track Campaigns, today we’ll see the Australian and American soldiers continue to counterattack as the tide turns against the invaders.

Last week, we covered the failed third Japanese attempt at retaking the important island of Guadalcanal. The unmitigated disaster that was the Battle for Henderson Field would prove to be the last attempt of the invaders to contest the Americans in what they believed to be the most decisive campaign of the war. Yet at the same time, two American carriers would take on four Japanese carriers in a battle that would decide the fate of the Japanese garrison on this Island of Death. In a theater decided by air power, join us as we delve into the fourth carrier battle of the Pacific War: the crucial Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands.

After the recent defeat at the Bloody Ridge, the Japanese Empire knew for the first time in the Pacific War that they were finally losing the initiative. The US Marines had proven to be resilient foes, and their invasion of Guadalcanal was looking like it could become the most decisive battle of the war. If the Americans could be defeated, then their offensive ambitions could be checked and the Japanese could continue with their designs in the South Pacific. In that regard, General Hyakutake himself traveled to Guadalcanal to command another costly attempt at securing the island. It is all or nothing for the Japanese commander on this episode of the Pacific War, so join us as we travel to the Island of Death to cover the Battle for Henderson Field.

After so many delaying actions and rearguard engagements, after seeing so many of their comrades die at the hands of the enemy, after enduring months of almost no provisions; the time has finally come in the Kokoda Track. The recent failures in Guadalcanal, coupled with the Japanese inability to adequately create a supply line, has finally forced General Horii and his relentless South Seas Detachment to begin their retreat northwards. Now, it’s up to the courageous Australians on New Guinea to at last start their counteroffensive, so join us as we delve into this important chapter of the Pacific War with the Second Battle of Eora Creek and Templeton’s Crossing.

In our last episode, we covered the direct aftermath of the key Battle of Edson’s Ridge, the second Japanese offensive in Guadalcanal that caused so many losses for the invaders that it’s today remembered as the Battle of the Bloody Ridge. Because of this major defeat and because they started to feel like they were losing the initiative against their enemies, the Japanese then began to prioritize the Guadalcanal theater, sending almost 17500 men in their characteristic Tokyo Express to finally win what they perceived to be the most decisive battle of the Pacific War. Today, we are going to cover the American attempt to intercept the Japanese express runs during the Battle of Cape Esperance, as well as the recent developments in the air warfare over the Aleutian Islands.

With the withdrawal on the Kokoda Track and the recent defeat at the Battle of Edson’s Ridge, the Japanese high command was now beginning to understand that they were losing the initiative against the resilient American and Australian forces in the Pacific. In that regard, more resources began to be allocated for the Guadalcanal Campaign, in a build-up that would lead to one of the bloodiest engagements of the Pacific War. But in the meantime, today we’ll cover the direct aftermath of the struggle at the Bloody Ridge, as both sides sought to reinforce their position on the island and the US Marines prepared to launch a series of raids against their opponents at the Matanikau area.

As we saw in our last episode, we are amidst one of the key points of the Pacific War. With the disastrous defeat on the bloody slopes of Edson’s Ridge, the Japanese high command started to comprehend that they were losing the initiative against the tenacious and resilient American forces in the Pacific. Now, General Horii continues his difficult and harsh advance along the Kokoda Track, not knowing that the recent failures in the Guadalcanal Campaign were soon to affect his overland offensive against Port Moresby. Nonetheless, the stubborn but effective commander will soon face the might of the Australian soldiers in yet another delaying action, and also the even more threatening prospect of straining his supply line, so join us today to cover the Battle of Ioribaiwa and the crucial aftermath of the offensive.

Ten months after the start of the Pacific War, we are reaching one of the high points of the conflict. In the Kokoda Track, General Horii’s South Seas Detachment relentlessly continues its advance towards Port Moresby, and unbeknownst to him, he’s marching to his final doom; and in Guadalcanal, the Japanese forces of General Kawaguchi are preparing for their second major offensive of the campaign, an operation that would be even more bloody than the catastrophic Battle of the Tenaru. With both events happening at the same time, the Japanese came to be as close as possible for them to materialize their objectives of seizing New Guinea and recapturing Guadalcanal, but alas, fate would see them fail on both enterprises. Join us today as we cover the Battle of Edson’s Ridge, one of the major milestones of the Pacific War.

Back on August 24, the Japanese had commenced their amphibious invasion of Milne Bay, aiming to occupy the airstrip at Rabi to employ it for the overland drive against Port Moresby. Believing it to be held by few enemy soldiers, Admiral Mikawa only sent forward a small force of SNLF marines, which would be vastly outnumbered by the Milne Force of General Clowes; but despite their numerical inferiority and the constant threat of enemy air attacks, the Japanese expertly employed their two Ha-Go tanks to support their brave assaults against the Australian positions, reaching the Rabi airstrip by August 28. Now, however, the strength of the defenders was beginning to show; and they would soon prepare for an all-out counterattack, one that would drastically change the course of the battle. Join us as we cover the conclusion of the Battle of Milne Bay, as well as some new developments in Guadalcanal and the Kokoda Track, as the Japanese continue to press for their objectives.

In our last episode, we covered the carrier Battle of the Eastern Solomons, as the Japanese attempted to land reinforcements on Guadalcanal, and we’ve also covered the start of the Battle of Milne Bay, in which a numerically-inferior Japanese force managed to push back the defenders towards the airfield at Rabi. Yet during this period, new developments were also unfolding in the Kokoda Track. With the bulk of the South Seas Detachment finally on New Guinean soil, the Japanese now prepared to start their main drive against Port Moresby; an offensive that would be opposed by brave Australian soldiers in what is considered as Australia’s Thermopylae. Join us as we cover the Battle of Isurava and the Japanese Advance on Eora Creek.

During the last year, the Japanese Army proved to its adversaries that it was an unstoppable behemoth, defeating the British, American, Dutch, Indian and Australian forces at every place they managed to advance on. But in the last week, their so-called invincibility was finally debunked with the defeat of the Ichiki Detachment at Alligator Creek; yet the conclusion of the Battle of the Tenaru also harboured the start of a new phase for the Guadalcanal Campaign, a period in which the Marines and the US Navy were going to be challenged by some of the best forces of the Japanese Empire. Join us as we cover the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, as well as new developments in the New Guinea Campaign with the start of the Invasion of Milne Bay

Guadalcanal was one of the most brutal campaigns of the Pacific War, as the US Marines not only had to fight the relentless assaults of the enemy in that jungle hell, they also had to fight malnutrition, lack of supplies and tropical diseases that would eventually disable nearly two-thirds of General Vandegrift’s force. Yet after the Battle of Savo Island, these problems were only starting to emerge for the Marines, as they were soon to face a true baptism of fire at Alligator Creek. At the same time, the 2nd Raider Battalion was preparing to launch a deadly raid against the heart of the Gilberts, an attack that would have deadly consequences for the Americans in the future. Join us as we cover the Raid on Makin Island and we also take a look at the Battle of the Tenaru and some other developments in the Guadalcanal Campaign.

The disastrous Battle of Midway is remembered nowadays as one of the major turning points of the Pacific War, leaving the IJN significantly weakened. The Japanese would still continue to secure more territory, but it was now the allies who held the strategic initiative, and the Americans would then go on to execute Operation Watchtower, the first Allied offensive of the Pacific War; and as we’ve seen last week, the invasion of the Solomons was up to a good start. Yet despite its tremendous losses at Midway, the IJN was still standing and it still had sufficient strength to contest control of the south seas from the US, so Admiral Mikawa now prepared for a bold naval ambush that would prove to be one of the worst defeats in the history of the US Navy. Join us as we cover the Battle of Savo Island, and as we also take a look at some new developments on the Kokoda Track

After eight months since the outbreak of the Pacific War, after many defeats at the hands of the invaders, and after many bold actions that resulted in the few successes that the Allies enjoyed during the war, the time is finally ripe for the start of the first Allied offensive against the Japanese Empire: the Invasion of the Solomon Islands. Yet this was not only the first Allied offensive of the Pacific War, this was also the first American amphibious invasion in many decades, an invasion that would cement the importance of the US Marines for years to come. Welcome to our episode on the start of the crucial Solomon Islands Campaign, covering the initial landings on Guadalcanal, Tulagi and the islands of Gavutu and Tanambogo.

In the last couple of weeks, we have covered both the American and Japanese general plans for the future, delving into the minds of important figures like General MacArthur, Admiral King, General Hyakutake or Admiral Yamamoto. Although the American plans haven’t quite gotten in motion yet, the Japanese had started their Kokoda Track campaign in the last episode; and today, we are going to cover the continuation of the Japanese advance on Kokoda, as well as the resistance offered by the Maroubra Force and the plans that were brewing in Burma for future operations in the region.

Three weeks ago, we delved for the first time into the American plans for their future offensives, as the Army and Navy factions clashed for control of the operations that were going to unfold in the Pacific. But thanks to the efforts of General Marshall, by early July, the matter of command had been resolved and a compromise between General MacArthur and Admiral King had been reached. Now, we turn to cover the plans of the Japanese commanders for the region of New Guinea, as well as MacArthur’s response and the aid that the British were planning to give to the Americans in the Pacific.

The Aleutian islands were not the only territories in North America to be attacked by Japan. About a week after the attack on Pearl Harbor, 9 submarines of the Japanese 6th Fleet arrived off the North American Pacific coast. They were tasked with performing reconnaissance and disrupting shipping lanes. Some of these submarines would go a step further and carry out attacks on the mainland of North America. This episode will be the War on the American Pacific Coast.

Last month, we covered the start of the violent and unforgiving campaign that took place in the provinces of Zhejiang and Jiangxi as the Japanese invaders hunted down the American pilots that had taken part in the Doolittle Raid. In their ensuing struggle to curb down the Chinese air power in the region, the natives of Zhejiang and Jiangxi suffered the abuse and savagery of the Japanese troops, who caused such devastation on the land that around 90% of the market towns and its homes were destroyed. In many cities, the streets were left void and one could only see ruins and burning houses on the horizon. Yet this was just the beginning, with the invaders now preparing to withdraw from the area with the employment of biological warfare, thus leaving only death and misery in their wake.

After the small break of the last couple of weeks, we return to the main theater of the Pacific War, where the astounding consequences of the Battle of Midway continued to resonate in the minds of the key figures of the war. Yamamoto had been outmaneuvered, outsmarted and he had suffered terrible losses in the battle, from which the IJN may never recover. But worst of all, he had finally surrendered the initiative to the American commanders, who immediately began to plan the first Allied offensives of the Pacific War. Join us as we delve into Admiral King’s and General MacArthur’s plans for the future, as well as the first incursions into the region of New Guinea.

Douglas MacArthur was one of the US military’s most celebrated and controversial commanders. His  military service career is one of the most extensive and impressive in history, but it did not go unblemished. This episode will look specifically into one of the blemishes, that being Douglas MacArthur’s blunder of the defense of the Philippines at the offset of the Pacific War. If you would like to learn more about the the Philippines campaign, please check out our episode on the “Defense of the Pacific”.

During the attack on Pearl Harbor the Japanese dispatched 5 Type A midget submarines[1], each carrying two men and two torpedoes[2]. The night before the attack at 6:45am the destroyer USS Ward came across 1 of 5 midget submarines trying to enter the harbor and opened fire on it sinking it, this was the first official shot of the Pacific War. One midget submarine shot a torpedo at Seaplane tender Curtiss missing and another, Ha-19 was captured on December 8th. These failures led the IJN to upgrade their midget submarines in the hopes of attempting another strike on a harbor. This episode will be about the attack on Sydney Harbor   [1] I-16,I-18,I-20,I-22 and I-24, Ko-hyoteki-class [2] They also had swords and pistols to commit suicide with if caught

Last week, we covered one of the most important battles of the Pacific War, the milestone that stopped the expansion of the Japanese Empire and allowed the Americans to go on the offensive for the first time in the war. But concurrent to the Battle of Midway and the death of the 1st Kido Butai, Admiral Yamamoto had devised a plan to strike Dutch Harbor and invade the first territory in North America: the Aleutian Islands. With huge resources allocated to this operation, the American defenders in Alaska were about to meet one of the most significant invasion forces this soil would ever see, so join us as we delve deeper into the struggle for Alaska and the Aleutian Islands.

Almost six months have passed since the devastating surprise attack on Pearl Harbor that gave birth to the Pacific War. In this half-year, the Japanese Empire proved to be the one that was better prepared for war and the one that held military superiority over its foes, as they rapidly steamrolled across the Pacific, capturing key points like Malaya, Burma, the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies and the island of New Britain; putting high pressure on important countries like Australia and India; and even making a big power like the US feel threatened over a possible invasion. The Empire of the Rising Sun was at its zenith, but things would quickly go downhill from this point forward. The surprising and fierce Doolittle Raid, as well as the carrier battle at the Coral Sea, had shown the weaknesses of the Japanese, and this forced Admiral Yamamoto to seek a decisive battle with his main enemy.  Yet unbeknownst to him, he was sailing into a trap… a trap that would forever change the course of history. Welcome to our video on the Battle of Midway, the event that finally put a stop to the expansion of the Japanese Empire.

Almost six months have passed since the start of the war, and the Japanese behemoth had proved to be almost unstoppable across the Pacific. Last week, we saw them complete their invasion of Burma, another victory in a long string of triumphs; yet we also saw there a huge participation by one of the most forgotten allies of World War Two: Nationalist China. Today, we are going to see war resume in the Chinese mainland as the Japanese prepare for a new offensive in retaliation for their participation in the Doolittle Raid.

In the last couple of weeks, there were quite a handful of very important events that managed to drastically shake the course of the Pacific War, including the Fall of the Philippines and the Battle of the Coral Sea. Today, we are going to see the direct aftermath of these events, as the Japanese recover from their losses in the New Guinea region and the Americans prepare to avenge their Filipino compatriots. And primarily, we are also going to cover the final retreat of the British and Chinese forces in an effort to safely get out of Burma. Join us as we plunge into a new episode of the Pacific War.

Last week, we covered the first carrier battle in history, one of the most important events of the Pacific War which directly tied with the American victory at Midway. Thus, the Battle of the Coral Sea and the downfall of Operation MO were such important events that they warranted their own episode, but in that week, other developments were also unfolding as well. The most important one was the Battle of Corregidor, leading up to the events of this week in which the whole of the Philippines was finally taken. So join us as we look at General Homma’s last offensive and the final surrender of the Filipino defenders.  

After our last episode, all the main players were ready for the first carrier engagement of history, a battle that would plant the seeds for one of the most decisive engagements of the Pacific War. The set is staged for the battle that would change the course of the war, so join us as we turn back to the island of New Guinea to cover the Battle of the Coral Sea and the attempted Japanese invasion of Port Moresby.

In the last few weeks, we’ve been covering a wide range of events that were happening in the Pacific War, from Ceylon in the Indian Ocean to the Solomon Islands in the South Pacific. But one of the regions that we have neglected during this time is none other than Burma, which saw heavy fighting during these last few weeks as the victorious Japanese advanced towards the Burma Road, the Chinese forces tried to stop them in their tracks and the decimated British soldiers took new positions in defense of India. So today, we are going to cover the developments in the Burma Road campaign, as well as the decisive actions of General Joseph Stilwell. 

Last week, the Japanese had scored an amazing victory with the ultimate fall of the Bataan Peninsula. For three months, those Battling Bastards had resisted against the full might of a Japanese army, successfully holding their ground and inflicting heavy casualties on the invaders. But now, with the peninsula firmly under his control, General Homma finally started to look south towards the Manila Bay and the Southern Islands. On the Indian Ocean, there was also a great concern because of the Japanese raid that took place in the last two weeks, which left the British afraid of a possible follow-up invasion of Ceylon. But this week, it was the turn of the Americans to launch a devastating raid against the heart of the Japanese Empire, an operation that would foreshadow the key cooperation of the US Army and Navy in the future. So join us as we take a look at the Doolittle Raid, the first Japanese incursions against the Visayas, and more.

Four months have passed since the start of the Pacific War, and of all the initial objectives of the Japanese Empire, only one remained unachieved. The invaders had up until now conquered the Dutch East Indies, advanced down the Malayan Peninsula to capture Singapore, expanded through a series of islands in the Pacific Ocean, and achieved important air and naval attacks that caused havoc on the Allied fleets. Furthermore, with the fall of Rangoon, the Burma operation was on good track, so Tokyo was planning to shift to phase two of operations, looking east towards Midway and the US, south towards Australia and New Guinea and west towards Ceylon and India. But despite the early capture of Manila, still there was a huge thorn on the Japanese side that hadn’t been vanquished by the invaders. Thus, today we’ll continue to cover the Battle of Bataan as the Japanese get reinforced and prepare for a final assault against the Filipino defenders.

In the last couple of weeks, we’ve been covering some special topics about the Pacific War since there wasn’t much happening during this time. But today, we come back for the main series with an episode looking forward towards the Indian Ocean. After the fall of the Dutch East Indies, Malaya, Singapore, Manila and Rangoon, the Japanese Empire had achieved all of its initial objectives for the start of the war. Now, they seek to probe the strength of the Allies outside of the Pacific with a deadly raid aimed towards the island of Ceylon and the coast of India. Brace yourselves as we plunge into the Indian Ocean Raid and other Japanese offensives in the waters south of the Indian subcontinent.

This interview featured Brad St Croix a Canadian Military historian who did his PhD dissertation on the Battle of Hong Kong. The podcast explains why the battle occurred, what happened during the battle, dispels many misconceptions and myths about the event and its long lasting effect on Canadian veterans. Brad St Croix also runs the Youtube channel OTD Canadian Military History

This interview is about General William Henry Rupertus, a commander during the Pacific War and author of the Rifleman's creed. Craig is speaking with Amy Rupertus Peacock, granddaughter of General Rupertus and her co-author Don Brown (author of over 15 books, including the Last Fighter Pilot) for their new book "Old Breed General". General Rupertus is one of the longest-serving members of the United States Marine Corps (USMC) at 37 years of service. General Rupertus served during WW1, the Haiti occupation, commanded the China Marines during the Battle of Shanghai, and commanded USMC forces during the Guadalcanal Campaign, the Battle of Cape Gloucester, the Mariana, and Palau Islands Campaign, and the battle of Peleliu.

Last week, we witnessed one of the most pivotal moments of the Pacific War: the Fall of Java. The surrender of the Dutch island not only brought the total collapse of the ABDA Command and the Malay Barrier, which had failed in every one of its missions; but also consolidated the position of the Japanese Empire in the Pacific, having achieved supremacy over the two main resource hubs of the East: Singapore and the Dutch East Indies. With the completion of the Malayan campaign and the Dutch surrender, new objectives appeared for the Japanese on the horizon… And today, we are going to focus on one of them: the British colony of Burma, with its key port of Rangoon, and the last of the Chinese lifelines, the Burma Road.

Twelve weeks ago, the Pacific War started with the critical attack on Pearl Harbor and the start of the Japanese invasions across East Asia. Now, the first phase of their expansion is near its end and the desired prize is within reach of the Japanese Empire. Last week, we covered the start of the First Battle of the Java Sea and the failure of the ABDA Command to stop the invasion of Java from taking place. Today, we’re going to see its disastrous conclusion and the final surrender of the Dutch East Indies, as the Japanese finally land on the island of Java.

Two weeks have passed since the fall of Singapore, and the situation looks hopeless for the Allied nations: the Malaya Barrier has been pierced; the island of Java is almost completely open for an attack; Burma is being invaded; and the Filipino defenders have been cornered at the Bataan Peninsula. It seems that the Allied command has failed in its mission to stop the advance of the invaders across the Pacific, and now we are reaching the climax of the first few months of the Pacific War. The short-lived ABDACOM, after proving their incompetence at containing the Japanese forces, now seeks desperately to stop the complete loss of the Dutch East Indies. But alas, their desperation would only cost them more than they could possibly afford. Join us as we cover the invasion of Timor, the disaster at the Sittang Bridge and the beginning of the crucial Battle of the Java Sea

Two weeks ago, we covered the fall of the last key cities and airfields in Borneo, the Celebes and the Moluccas. From the airfield of Kendari II alone, the Japanese had already achieved their goal of having the necessary range to successfully conduct air operations over Java; yet to be completely certain that their most important offensive was going to come into fruition, the Japanese commanders had decided that they first wanted to take southern Sumatra and the important airfield of Palembang. Last week, we also saw the Japanese pierce the Malay Barrier for the first time with the capture of Singapore; and today, they turn to Burma to start their advance on one of the most important British ports in Southeast Asia: Rangoon. Join us as the Empire of the Rising Sun commences the invasions of Burma and Sumatra.

Since the start of the Pacific War, we’ve been following one of the major theaters of the Japanese offensive: the Malayan Campaign. Two weeks ago, the campaign came to its near-end with the final retreat of the Allied soldiers towards the British fortress of Singapore. The Malayan Peninsula had been invaded back on December 8, and the defense of the colony had shown a total lack of readiness on the side of the British government. Suffering defeat after defeat and making a critical string of blunders, the Allied forces had rapidly been conceding territory; and only after two months since the invaders first landed at Kota Bharu, they had been thrown back to the island settlement, which had been transformed into a fortress. But the British would see that their belief that Singapore was an impregnable fortress was as much a lie as their idea that they could intimidate the Japanese by employing a small naval force in the Pacific. Now, the campaign is finally coming to its end, as the Japanese prepare to execute one of their most important operations of the war.

Barely a month ago, the fast progress in the Japanese campaigns across the Pacific had prompted them to start what was one of their most important operations of the war: the invasion of the Dutch East Indies. As we’ve seen, the main objective of this operation was the island of Java, yet the invaders first needed to take several airports and major towns around it, known to the Japanese as Java’s Dehors. Now, the Japanese are on the verge of completing their conquest of these dehors on Borneo, the Celebes and the Moluccas. Concurrently, the island of Java was also one of the main links of the Malay Barrier, and its safety was a huge concern for the ABDACOM. Seeing that it was to be in huge peril if the cities of Makassar and Banjarmasin fell to the Japanese, the Allies prepared to fight in any manner they could to keep the Malay Barrier intact and accomplish their mission to protect the Dutch colony. The stage was set for a very important battle of the Pacific War.

We have been following the Malayan Campaign since the start of the war, seeing the British Empire continually prove that it was hardly prepared to defend its eastern possessions. After many lost battles and desperate rearguard actions, last week the complete pull out from Johor was finally ordered, signifying the fall of Malaya as the British defenders retreated into Singapore to protect their so-called eastern fortress, called the Gibraltar of the East. The situation thus looked bleak for the empire in which the sun never sets, with the Rising Sun looking like it could menacingly replace their hegemony in the East. But before that, the British defenders were determined to offer as much resistance as they could in Burma and Singapore, so the stage was set for one of the most important battles of the Pacific War.

Last week, the Japanese had commenced their most important operation: the capture of the Dutch East Indies and the important resources that it harboured; yet this week, they would also start a new operation for the invasion of the island of New Britain, further trying to interrupt the lines of communication between Australia and the US. And as the invaders continue their advance across Borneo and the Celebes, a major breakthrough is achieved at Malaya and the Philippines. Join us, as we delve into this critical point of the Pacific War

After an entire month of fighting, and with both Malaya and the Philippines thrown against the ropes, the time had finally come for the final step of the Japanese advance. Now, the Dutch East Indies, the final link in their planned defensive chain across the Pacific, stood open for a Japanese attack. And as the Japanese prepared to execute one of their most bold and brilliant plans of invasion, the Malayan and Philippine fronts saw the start of strong Allied resistance.

For the Japanese, the war was marching exceedingly well in these first few weeks. Poor preparations on behalf of the Allies had left their Pacific possessions in a very precarious state, with the Japanese rapidly capitalizing on this advantage to spread their rule across East Asia. The British in particular, focused on their front against Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, demonstrated that they were hardly prepared to fight in these conditions and that not even their impressive fortress at Singapore could save them from the might of the Japanese firepower. The Malayan Campaign up to this point had been characterized by an ineffective command and a strain of poor strategic decisions that ended up giving the upper hand to the Japanese invaders; and today, we are going to see one of the biggest blunders in British history, as the Japanese decide to attack Malayan positions on the Slim River.

In the previous week, we covered the fall of two of the first places the Japanese had attacked, Hong Kong and Wake Island, and we also watched General MacArthur’s forces start their catastrophic withdrawal into Bataan, where they would resist until reinforcements could arrive to save them. In Malaya, the British defenders were also in a difficult position, nearly thrown off the center of the peninsula. Today, we are going to continue our coverage over the events unfolding in the Malay Peninsula and in the Philippines, but first, we are going to take a quick detour to China, where major combat resumed for the first time since the attack on Pearl Harbor.

For the last two weeks, the war had raged on in the Pacific after the unexpected Japanese attack against British and American possessions in the East. The Japanese soldiers had already achieved victory after victory, pushing their enemy back on Malaya, Hong Kong, the Philippines, and the Pacific islands. But this week would be one of Japan’s finest hours in the course of the war, as they finally overcame their enemy in Hong Kong, launched their main offensive on the Philippines, and struck an incredible victory against the only place in the Pacific that had managed to thwart their expansionist aims so far.

On December 7, 1941, the war had reached the Pacific to the surprise of the Allied nations, drastically changing the course of history forever. After its first week, smoke darkened the horizons of Pearl Harbor, hundreds of British soldiers laid dead on the battlefields of Malaya and Hong Kong, the Philippines and Wake Island had tasted their first blood, and Guam and the Gilbert Islands had already fallen into Japanese hands. The situation looked grim for the Allies, and this week would do nothing but confirm that the Rising Sun was really on the rise. So today, we are going to cover the continuation of the Japanese expansion across the Pacific and the start of the Battle of Borneo.

As the Rising Sun expanded across East Asia, the United States Pacific Fleet laid broken in the shallow waters of Pearl Harbor. The British colonies had also been invaded, suffering defeat after defeat both in Hong Kong and in the Malayan Peninsula. But this would not be the end of the Japanese aggression, as the strategic American possessions in the Pacific were now up for grabs. Today, we are going to cover the initial landings in the Philippines, as well as the attacks against Guam and Wake Island.

After the attack on Pearl Harbor, December 7 would always be remembered as the day of infamy in which the Japanese started the Pacific War. But at the same time, the Empire of Japan also began simultaneous offensives against British, Dutch, and American possessions in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Today we are going to cover some of these attacks in mainland Southeast Asia, primarily focusing on the invasion of Malaya and the British response against the Japanese aggression.

As we’ve seen in the previous episodes, the Japanese Empire had decided on war with the West since the embargo enacted by the US in July, 1941. The plans to simultaneously execute invasions on the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines and Malaya, as well as a preemptive attack on Pearl Harbor to destroy the American Pacific Fleet, had all been drafted back in September, with preparations carried out successfully by late November.

With war raging both in Europe and in China, prying eyes around the world eagerly followed the events that were unfolding in front of them. In the US in particular, many still advocated for anti-war sentiment, but President Franklin Delano Roosevelt had decided that he was not going to tolerate anymore the aggressions of the Japanese or the Germans. In 1941, he would finally draw a line to stop Japan that would surely risk war. And although FDR didn’t want to fight against the Japanese, or at least not yet, this was a risk worth taking for the preservation of democracy around the world; a risk that would inevitably ignite war in the Pacific. Welcome to our final prelude of the Pacific War, as the growing tensions between the US and Japan eventually ended in another act of aggression

For four long years, Europe had been devastated during the First World War, leaving almost 30 million casualties along with many more dying of famines and disease. As such, the world had suffered enough, so another major conflict like that one was strictly avoided by the main Western powers. But in the 30s, all of this would change with the rise of fascism and nazism in Italy and Germany. While the war between Japan and China intensifies and reaches a stalemate in 1939, a new conflict is brewing in Europe; a conflict that is destined to change the course of history. Join us as we take a look at the start of the Second World War and the effects it had on the Japanese Empire and the United States.

China is a huge country, full of important resources and extensive farmlands, a huge population, and an important strategic and commercial position. This made it a desirable objective for expansion to European colonial powers, but also, to the rising Japanese Empire. Within China itself, revolutions, civil wars and warlordism plagued the nation as different factions fought to become the ultimate ruler of the country. So today, we return to East Asia to cover the divided state of the Chinese people and the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War.

So far in this series we’ve been mainly covering the history of the Japanese Empire prior to the start of the Pacific War; but what about the other major player of the war? What was the position of the United States after the end of World War One? What were their interests and strategies in the Pacific? And how did they feel about their future rival and its rise as a great power? Today, we are going to answer all these questions and more as we cover the history of the United States and its role in the Pacific theater

By the start of the 20th Century, Japan had turned from a pre-industrialized isolationist state into a modernized regional power, defeating both the Chinese and Russian Empires, annexing Korea and Taiwan, and expanding their sphere of influence across East Asia. But after the death of Emperor Meiji, new problems would arise, opportunities would be taken and Japan would continue to expand and develop itself as a rising great power. Today, we’re going to continue analyzing the evolution of the Japanese Empire during the Taishō and Early Shōwa eras, covering its role in the Great War, subsequent expansionist developments, and the start of its trajectory towards fascism and the Pacific War.

In the first half of the 19th century, Japan was an agrarian country of tens of millions of rice farmers, a small minority of merchants, who benefited from their hard work, and the elite class of samurai, who, as peace continued, exchanged their swords for calligraphy brushes, working in a variety of administrative positions. Both the farmers and the samurai were indebted to the merchants and this, coupled with increasing peasant unrest and foreign interventions, threatened to destroy the status quo of the Tokugawa Shogunate. And yet, almost four decades later, the Japanese Empire established itself as a regional power in the Far East, going so far as to defeat the Russian behemoth. How did Japan achieve this? How did it undergo such a transformation from a poor isolationist state into a modern military powerhouse? Today, we are going to answer all these questions and talk about the Meiji restoration and the Russo-Japanese War.

Once a land of ancient empires and legendary rulers, Asia saw itself turn into a colony of the expanding European powers in the Early Modern period. Drawn to the Asian silk and spice trade, their colonization efforts were initially directed to harness the continent’s economic power. Eventually, the European states started to use more and more force, and by the start of the 20th Century, the Eastern world would be almost entirely in the hands of Colonial Empires. Welcome to our quick rundown on the European expansion in Asia and the Pacific. This is a prelude video to our series on the Pacific War - we’ll release weekly episodes with events that started 80 years prior, don’t forget to subscribe to never miss them!